Abstract
The author maintains that in order for the thesis of the universality of fundamental rights - and its corollary of equality - to be compatible with multiculturalism and respect for cultural differences, that thesis must be understood not in a substantial, sociological or cultural sense, but rather in a logical and purely formal sense: as universal quantification of the rightsholders. What is more, understood in this way, the universality and equality of fundamental rights represent the main guarantee of cultural differences claimed by multiculturalism. And that because fundamental rights, attributed to each and everyone equally, protect the individual against all the others and particularly the weakest against the law of the strongest that would rule in their absence. In the author's opinion, the reason that justifies the legal stipulation of fundamental rights does not lie in the ontological and cognitivist idea of the moral nature of man, nor in the moral unity of mankind, but in the opposite idea of the lack of such unity, as well as not in the moral, but in the amoral or immoral nature of man, above all of men who wield power.

Keywords
Universality of fundamental rights, equality of rights, cultural differences.