Building on the work of Ames (2005) , I test the effect of (1) vote distribution , (2) dominance and (3) living standards on the behaviour of councillors when submitting amendments to the ABP.

Formally all fifty-one councillors in Rio de Janeiro represent the same single at-large citywide constituency. However, the existence of different territorial distributions of votes suggests otherwise. In the 2000 election, for instance, councillor Luis Carlos Aguiar got almost half of his sixteen thousand votes from the two suburban neighbourhoods of Cordovil and Parada de Lucas alone, which comprises an area of six square kilometres (km²) or 0.5% of the municipal territory. On the other hand, in that same year, councillor Carlos Bolsonaro exhibited a completely different pattern of vote distribution. His 16,053 votes are much more dispersed, with a maximum of 1,002 or 6.2% garnered in Copacabana.

Each of these two patterns of vote distribution should create a different set of incentives leading, therefore, to different behaviours. On the one hand, there is a well defined geographic circumscription in the north of the city; on the other, there is a thematic/ideological non geographic space. As expected, councillor Bolsonaro is indeed known for defending far-right political views and for standing as the representative of the military while councillor Aguiar likes to picture himself as the local benefactor of his small bailiwick. The first fits the model proposed by comparativists while the second proves that the transplantation of the distributive archetype from first-pass-the-post systems to Brazil does, if not always, also make sense.

Accordingly councillors whose votes are reasonably scattered should reallocate greater amount of budget funds to non-territorial targets. Given their pattern of vote distribution, instead of a few specific neighbourhoods, they would see non geographic social segments as their constituencies. Conversely, councillors who concentrate large shares of their votes in a few neighbourhoods are more likely to target these same neighbourhoods with local benefits. Given their pattern of vote distribution they would see their top neighbourhoods as their constituencies, instead of non geographic social segments.

From what has been specified, I derive the following hypotheses:

H1 The more dispersed the votes of a councillor, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to non-territorial targets.

H2 The more votes a legislator concentrates in a few neighbourhoods, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to these same neighbourhoods.

Aguiar, in fact, reigns comfortably in his suburban stronghold, as no other councillor is firmly established in that area. Thus, in this case, the analogy with the representatives of single-member constituencies of FPTP systems is far from inadequate. However, most of his peers are not as dominant as he is. The clash between councillors Aspásia Camargo and Andrea Gouvêa Vieira demonstrates this.

These two councillors received similar amounts of votes in the 2008 election, respectively 31,880 and 28,213. They, too,concentrated much of their votes – 42.1% and 43.1% – in the five neighbourhoods in which they performed better. The similarity between them includes their main sources of votes,as the map below shows the overlapping of their vote distribution.

The comparison between Aguiar, on the one hand, and Camargo and Vieira, on the other, takes us to the second defining element of the informal constituencies: the competition from fellow members of the legislature in the areas in which legislators perform better, in other words, the degree of a councillor´s dominance over a territory. Distinct degrees of dominance should lead legislators to behave differently. For dominant councillors like Aguiar the status of local benefactor is reasonably safe from challengers. Conversely, the local leadership of councillors such as Camargo and Vieira is much more precarious.

Essentially, increasing degrees of dominance would bring councillors closer to the distributive mode of behaviour as their ability for claiming credit for the delivery of particularised benefits increases. In contrast, for councillors at the low end of the dominance scale, claiming credit for the delivery of local benefits would be anything but feasible. Because they lack the power to affirm any territorial leadership, they would more frequently engage in non geographic initiatives.

From what has been specified, I derive the following hypotheses:

H3 The less dominant a councillor, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to non-territorial targets.

H4 The more dominant a councillor, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to her top neighbourhoods.

The third main defining element of the informal constituencies is the living standards of the neighbourhoods which contribute the greatest to the legislator’s votes. For example, considering the 2000 election, councillors Aguiar and Leila do Flamengo both concentrated large shares of votes in a few neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods were also fairly safe from outsiders. Their living standards were starkly different though, as seen in the following map. Aguiar’s top neighbourhoods scored 0.79 on the Human Development Index (HDI) whereas Leila do Flamengo’s scored 0.95.

It is plausible to expect that differences in the living standards of the top neighbourhoods influence the behaviour of legislators. Constituents in poorer neighbourhoods are, at one time, less well served by and more dependent on the provision of public services. Understandably, demands for the proper provision of basic public services are more frequent and dramatic in low HDI neighbourhoods.

Therefore, councillors whose top neighbourhoods have low living standards are subject to greater pressure regarding the solution of eminently local immediate needs, which would draw them near the logic of distributive policies ( Diniz, 1982 ; Kuschnir, 2000a ; 2000b ). In contrast, the inhabitants of high income neighbourhoods usually do not need to knock on the doors of the RJCC to have the potholes on the local public ways taken care of. Thus, free from worrying with the proper delivery of basic public services, these constituents can more frequently centre their demands on broad-scope policies and issues.

From what has been specified, I derive the following hypotheses:

H5 The higher the living standards of the top neighbourhoods of a councillor, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to non-territorial targets.

H6 The lower the living standards of the top neighbourhoods of a councillor, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to these same neighbourhoods.

I am also testing for interactive effects between vote distribution , dominance and living standards . I have a series of two-way interactive terms and one three-way interactive term.

I expect vote distribution , dominance and living standards to influence on one another’s effects. For instance, as set out in H2, the larger the shares of votes a councillor concentrates in her top neighbourhoods, the greater the amount of funds reallocated to these same neighbourhoods. As I contend, this relationship is further reinforced or attenuated by living standards and dominance . High dominance and low living standards would reinforce the effect of high vote distribution scores on local funds while low dominance and high living standards would attenuate it. The same applies to the remaining possible different interaction terms both in terms of their effect on local and non-territorial funds . Thus, for instance, the heavier emphasis on non-territorial funds of fairly non dominant councillors is strengthened by high living standards and/or small sum of votes concentrated in the top neighbourhoods.

I include eight variables in the binary component of my model. These are all dummy variables. Five of them indicate the different regions of the city: (1) South Zone Centro & North Zone ; (2) Suburbs ; (3) Ilha do Governador ; (4) Barra & Jacarepaguá ; and (5) West Zone . Each of these five regions provides their inhabitants with a sense of a shared identity. These different identities are found in councillors’ speeches delivered on the RJCC floor and in the strategies and languages employed in political and electoral campaigns ( Kuschnir, 2000a ; 2000b ). Several councillors are notoriously – and self-proclaimed – strongly associated with certain regions. The city administration, too, uses them to divide the municipal territory into different planning areas.

Two other variables refer to freshness: freshers and freshers with relatives . In this case the reference group are non fresher councillors. Finally, there is a dummy variable for the membership of the Committee of Finances, Budget and Fiscal Oversight (CFBFO). Notwithstanding its lesser importance in the analysis, the binary component addresses the interesting question of what determines the chance of a legislator to submit at least one budget amendment.

In sum, as far as region is concerned, I expect to see a distinct behaviour among councillors whose votes are found mainly in South Zone, Centro & North Zone . This is the region from which Kuschnir’s (2000a) ideological councillors come. Accordingly, ideological councillors champion “universalist” approaches underpinned by modern notions of citizenship, regarding their terms in office as “instruments” for the “organised” and “politically aware” sectors of society. In comparison with their fellow legislators, these councillors should be more likely to reallocate at least some non-territorial funds and more likely not to reallocate any local funds .

In regard to freshness, freshers should be more likely not to reallocate any funds while no significant difference should be seen between freshers with relatives and non freshers . Lastly, councillors with no experience in the CFBFO should be more likely not to submit any budget amendments.

Vote distribution is a continuous variable. It measures, for each councillor, the extent to which her votes are more or less evenly scattered throughout the city. Constructing it involves two steps. In the first step, for every councillor in each neighbourhood, I calculate Cij , the percentage that neighbourhood j contributes to councillor i ’s total vote citywide.

As I contend, given their electoral importance, councillors might convert some neighbourhoods into their informal constituency. It is reasonable to suppose that neighbourhoods with great shares of a councillor’s total vote should comprise her informal constituency. Generally Cij shows little dispersion. On average 122 of the 140 neighbourhoods contribute, each, with 1% or less of the councillors’ total vote Neighbourhoods concentrating such small fractions of councillors’ total vote can hardly be thought as relevant per se and hence may well be considered not part of an informal constituency. In contrast, on average councillors find 19.1% of their total vote in their top neighbourhood and slightly more than half of this amount, 9.8%, in their second top neighbourhood. Together the top five ranked neighbourhoods add to nearly 45% of the councillors’ total vote. ⁸

For the purpose of my analysis, the fifth top neighbourhood, which has a Cij score of nearly 4% of the total vote, seems as a reasonable reference for drawing the line to calculate how concentrated the votes of a councillor are. Moreover, all councillors would increasingly tend, beyond this point, to equally value the neighbourhoods, as there is little and decreasing dispersion around the mean Cij score.

So for each councillor, vote distribution is measured by calculating the share of her total vote that comes from her top 5 neighbourhoods.

Dominance is a continuous variable. The way I operationalise it is slightly adapted from Ames (2005) . Dominance measures the extent to which a councillor dominates her top 5 neighbourhoods. The five neighbourhoods used to calculate councillors’ vote distribution are also the reference for assessing councillors’ dominance .

I proceed in two steps. First, for every councillor in each of her top 5 neighbourhoods, I measure Dij , councillor i ’s dominance score in neighbourhood j . In order to do so, I identify all councillors who have neighbourhood j ranked among their top 5 neighbourhoods. I then calculate Dij as councillor i ’s share of the total vote cast in neighbourhood j for all councillors who have neighbourhood j ranked among their top five neighbourhoods.

In the second step, I calculate the dominance score for each councillor across her top 5 neighbourhoods. I sum the five Dij scores, weighted by the share each neighbourhood contributes to councillor i ’s vote in her top 5 neighbourhoods. Hence, the higher a councillor’s dominance score, the more she dominates her five best neighbourhoods, instead of sharing them with fellow legislators.

Living standards is a continuous variable. I use the Human Development Index (HDI) as my measurement of living standards . The HDI, which varies from 0 to 1, is widely known as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) index for assessing human development around the world. The higher the score, the greater the human development.

I assess, for every councillor, the HDI of her top 5 neighbourhoods. As I proceed with dominance, here I sum the five HDI scores, weighted by the share each neighbourhood contributes to councillor i ’s total vote in her top 5 neighbourhoods.

In regard to the other independent variables, Table 1 explains their coding, measuring and expected effects on the dependent variables. ⁹

Table 1
Independent Variables – Count Model ¹⁰

Since zero-inflated negative binomial (Zinb) models are two-part models, I first approach the results of the count component. Next, I discuss the figures coming out of the binary component.

I have nine different models for each of my two dependent variables. The first, Model I, is the basic model, in which there are no interaction terms. The other models all include one or more interaction terms.

I present the results in Tables 2 and 3 . As far as non-territorial funds is concerned, I show the results just for Models I, IV and IX, as the others have yield significant, although small, impact only for the variable vote ( Long, 1997 ). ¹¹

Table 2
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Models – Count Component – Non-territorial Funds

Table 3
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Models – Count Component – Local Funds

Table 3
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Models – Count Component – Local Funds. Cont.

As hypothesised, the conformation of different informal constituencies is paramount to explaining how councillors choose to amend the Annual Budget Proposal. All in all the analysis confirms the impact of the electoral connection. More important, it confirms the multiple configurations of the electoral connection in OLPR systems. Dominance , living standards and vote distribution significantly affect the amending choices of legislators in Rio de Janeiro. The variation in these three indicators – taken on their own or as interaction terms – tells us where the different members of the RJCC place their emphasis when funding public policies.

Vote distribution , on its own, plays a critical role on both local and non-territorial funds . The fewer the votes a councillor concentrates in her top 5 neighbourhoods, the more she prioritises the funding of broad-scope public policies whereas the more votes a councillor concentrates in her top 5 neighbourhoods, the greater her emphasis on reallocating funds to particular geographic areas. Specifically, considering Model I, for every additional 1.0 point in the vote distribution score, the amount of funds a councillor reallocates to her top 5 neighbourhoods increases by 0.8%, holding all other variables constant. The effect on non-territorial funds is exactly the same but runs in the opposite direction: for every 1.0 point decrease in the vote distribution score, the amount of funds a councillor reallocates to non geographic targets increases by 0.8%. ¹²

On the one hand, legislators whose votes are reasonably scattered across the city put their terms in office at the service of the non geographic representation of social segments. As such, they use their budget amendments to fund broad-scope public policies, attaching no special interest to their top 5 neighbourhoods. For comparativist scholars these councillors are the archetype of legislators in OLPR systems, in which the essential territorial overlapping of multi-member constituencies would strongly dampen the emergence of geographic-based representation ( Loewenberg and Kim, 1978 ; Jewell and Loewenberg, 1979 ; Lancaster, 1986 ; Carey and Shugart, 1995 ).

On the other hand, councillors who concentrate large shares of votes in a specific area of the city turn their terms in office into a tool of geographic-based representation. The five neighbourhoods where they perform better are what make up their de facto constituencies. Given the chance to influence the funding of government programmes, they choose to tailor the ABP in accordance with the needs of their geographic informal constituency. Moreover, the effect of vote distribution becomes stronger as this informal constituency becomes fairly free from fellow legislators’ incursions. This relationship is clearly seen in the interaction between vote distribution and dominance .

Using the results seen in Model VII, Figure 5 shows the partial effect of dominance*vote distribution on local funds , holding all other variables at their mean. The partial effect on local funds is plotted on the y-axis as a function of dominance . In addition, each curve measures the partial effect at a selected vote distribution score. The distance between them reveals the change in the partial effect of local funds vis-à-vis changes in vote distribution . ¹³

Figure 5
The Interaction of Dominance and Vote Distribution
Author´s elaboration using the coefficients of Model VII of Table 3

On the top right corner of the graph are the councillors with the highest scores in vote distribution and dominance . These councillors resemble, to a reasonable extent, the legislators of first-pass-the-post systems and their single-member constituencies. For most of the scholars working on Brazil, these are the councillors brought into the models.On average they reallocate R$ 2,130 thousand local funds, which is 354% larger than the amount of R$ 470 thousand reallocated by the councillors found on the lower end of the vote distribution and dominance scales.

Additionally, the interaction term dominance* living standards significantly affects how councillors behave in regard to local funds .Using the results seen in Model VII again, Figure 6 shows the partial effect of dominance*living standards on local funds , holding all other variables at their mean. The partial effect on local funds is plotted on the y-axis as a function of dominance . In addition, each curve measures the partial effect at a selected HDI score. The distance between them reveals the change in the partial effect of local funds vis-à-vis changes in living standards .

Figure 6
The Interaction of Dominance and Living Standards
Author´s elaboration using the coefficients of Model VII of Table 3.

As seen in Figure 6 , non dominant councillors with wealthy top 5 neighbourhoods are found on one side, reallocating the least amount of local funds , whereas dominant councillors in less prosperous areas are found on the other, reallocating the most local funds .

The amount of local funds increases 12% for every 0.05 decrease in the HDI score. Also, the amount of local funds increases 13% for every 0.1 increase in the dominance score. A simultaneous change involving a decrease of 0.05 on the HDI and an increase of 0.1 on the dominance score leads to a 29% increase in the amount of local funds . Comparing the extremes, on average, a councillor with a 0.75 HDI score and a 0.95 dominance score reallocates an amount of local funds 401% larger than a councillor with a 0.95 HDI score and a 0.05 dominance score.

In fact, the effect of dominance*living standards is consonance with the deeply rooted imagine of the bailiwick or curral eleitoral and the practices intimately associated with it: local leaders holding sway over small poor portions of a territory solely sustained by pork barrel politics.

Although hardly threatened by challengers, dominant legislators nurture a strong depedency on the executive. This is because the budget in Brazil, at all three government levels, is not mandatory. Therefore, even though the ABP must pass in the legislature, the decision on whether or not the budget – including the budget amendments – is implemented belongs to the executive. Thus the executive chooses which programmes is implemented, when to implement them and how much money is used in their implementation. In one sentence, the executive, alone, decides on a case-by-case basis which of the budget amendments is implemented. This discretionary power is a potent tool vis-à-vis the legislature as it allows the executive to induce legislators to cooperate ( Pereira and Mueller, 2003 ; 2004; Ames, 2005 ). ¹⁴

As the argument goes, there is a chain involving constituents’ demands for public services → legislator → executive → constituents’ demands heard → pro-government voting on the floor. This dependency is further reinforced in the cases of dominance over areas where living standards are low. It is also found among non dominant legislators who, still, concentrate large share of their votes in a few neighbourhoods.

Former Mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1996; 2001-2004; 2005-2008) explains how this series of exchanges among citizens, legislators and the executive provides the mayor a rather powerful mechanism for forging alliances in the legislature:

The councillors whose electoral fate is tied to a few neighbourhoods came onboard in the following day of the inauguration. (...) This does not mean that they will always vote in my favour. You need to give them public works in their area, in their neighbourhoods. This means renewing their loyalty, not gaining loyalty forever ( Marques, 2009 , p. 59, own translation).

Along those same lines, councillor Rosa Fernandes offers her view of the phenomenon to journalist Sidney Rezende in October 2012. Fernandes concentrates much of her votes in the suburban region of the Great Irajá, where she is largely dominant.

Former Mayor Cesar Maia wanted to marshal the opposition in the council, against Mayor Eduardo Paes. Accordingly, Maia approached me, as we were both affiliated with the same party. But I am too dependent on the executive. I cannot afford to be in the opposition. (...) I am always an ally of the executive. There is no other option. I base my career on the delivery of benefits to a certain area. This is how I work and this is how my constituents expect me to work ( Rezende, 2012 , own translation). ¹⁵

The relationship between living standards and local funds is anything but unreasonable as councillors who perform better in areas with low living standards probably face more pressing demands for the proper delivery of public services. Unsurprisingly too the relationship between living standards and non-territorial funds runs in the opposite direction: the higher the HDI of the top 5 neighbourhoods, the greater the amount of non-territorial funds a councillor reallocates.

This effect is strengthened when living standards interacts with vote distribution and dominance .The next graphs represent the three-way interaction effect of living standards * dominance*vote distribution . The graphs show living standards at three different HDI scores: 0.75, 0.85 and 0.95. The partial effect on non-territorial funds is plotted on the y-axis as a function of dominance . Each curve measures the partial effect at a selected vote distribution score. The distance between them shows the change in the partial effect of non-territorial funds vis-à-vis changes in vote distribution , holding all other variables at their mean. ¹⁶

The reallocation of non-territorial funds clearly increases as dominance and vote distribution scores decrease. It is evident, too, how the interaction effect between dominance and vote distribution is further reinforced across the board as living standards goes up from a 0.75 to a 0.95 HDI score.Therefore, together, changes in living standards , dominance and vote distribution have a significant impact on non-territorial funds .

In short, non dominant legislators whose votes are widely dispersed over the territory of mainly wealthy areas centre their effort in funding non geographic public policies. Far from more urgent demands for state action, these councillors see themselves as representatives of social segments or ideological platforms while at the same time unable to play the card of the local leader responsible for delivering fragments of government programmes to specific neighbourhoods.

The Binary – Logit – Model

The models for local funds render no significant results at all, showing that the chances that a councillor will never reallocate any local funds does not significantly change as a consequence of (1) serving/having served on the CFBFO ; (2) being a fresher ; (3) concentrating most of the votes in a particular region other than South Zone, Centro& North Zone . ¹⁷ The figures for non-territorial funds tell a different story. Because there are no differences among the levels of significance as well as among the coefficients, except, if any, for the third decimal place, I display only the outcome of Model I.

Apart from my argument regarding freshness , my hypotheses are corroborated. Starting with the regional hypotheses, except for Suburbs , the sign and the significance level of the coefficients are all the expected ones. In sum councillors from South Zone, Centro & Tijuca are more likely to fund broad public policies than their fellow legislators from the other four regions of the city. ¹⁸

Table 5 also confirms the importance of the CFBFO membership: sitting or having sat on the CFBFO increases by 55% the chance of submitting at least one budget amendment reallocating non-territorial funds .Thus, be it because of collusion, influence or better understanding of the budgetary process, legislators with experience in the CFBFO are far more likely to use the amending power of prioritising the targeting of government programmes.

Table 5
Regions – The Chance of a Councillor to Reallocate At Least Some Amount of Non-territorial Funds