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Post-islamism: emergence and development in Indonesia

Post-islamismo: surgimiento y desarrollo en Indonesia

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ABSTRACT:

The emergence of Post-Islamism in Indonesia in the 1970s was a manifestation of the rejection of the powers that existed. This study uses a qualitative method with a historical contextualist approach and the theory of power relations from Michel Foucault. The results of this study can provide an overview to readers in particular and developers of knowledge generally related to the term trend of Post-Islamism which has always been a hot conversation in the global world. Islam is very different from Islamism, Islam is not a religion of politics, Islamism uses Islam for political strife and Post-Islamism rejects it.

KEYWORDS: Post-Islamism, emergence, development, Indonesia.

RESUMEN:

El surgimiento del post-islamismo en Indonesia en la década de 1970 fue una manifestación del rechazo a los poderes que existían. Este estudio utiliza un método cualitativo con un enfoque contextualista histórico y la teoría de las relaciones de poder de Michel Foucault. Los resultados de este estudio pueden proporcionar una descripción general a los lectores en particular y a los desarrolladores de conocimientos relacionados con el término tendencia del post-islamismo, que siempre ha sido una conversación candente en el mundo global. El Islam es muy diferente del islamismo, el Islam no es una religión de la política, el islamismo usa el Islam para las luchas políticas y el post-islamismo lo rechaza.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Post-islamismo, emergencia, desarrollo, Indonesia.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Post-Islamism does not mean the end of the history of Islamism in Indonesia (Bayat: 2007, pp. 1-23). The group of Islamism still exists and further strengthens its existence in Indonesia until now, even being used by political figures for the sake of power in order to overthrow its political opponents. Post-Islamism exists because of changing patterns of thinking from the right model of Islam (rightist) to the leftist model of Islam (leftist). A right Islamic group is a group of Muslims who have conservative thinking tendencies and are closer to the term traditional Islam or orthodox Islam. The existence of this group is because of the strong influence of the spread in the style of the group called Al-Ikhwan al-Muslim from Egypt, which arrived in Indonesia before Indonesia became independent. Whereas, what is meant by the left Islamic group is a group that has a tendency towards moderate, progressive, liberal, and inclusive Islamic thought (Mahmudah: 2016, pp.54-55).

Muslim groups which belong to the Post-Islamism group can be interpreted as ex-Islamists who have metamorphosed, among others: from textual thinking to contextual thinking, from exclusive ways of

thinking to inclusive, from extreme to flexible, and from hard to peaceful. Post-Islamism emerged around the 1970s in Indonesia, which was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), and continued by the followers of these two figures, namely Nurcholisan and Gus Durian.

The successors of the ideas of the two figures are largely embodied in the auspices of religious organizations in Indonesia, such as the Nahdatul Ulama and the Paramadina group. The successor groups of Post-Islamism ideas remain consistent in voicing what Islamism groups have not voiced about the understanding and practice of Islam in Indonesia. Adherents of these two groups are almost evenly distributed in Indonesia: starting from ordinary people, middle-class people, political figures, even to the level of existing government officials. Some support the ideas of Islamist groups, and some support the ideas of the Post-Islamism group.

It is strange, but it has truly happened in Indonesia, where there are political figures who win elections; there are two choices, namely being opposed or rejected. The party that wins the election is rejected and maximally opposed by the Islamism group but supported optimally by the Post-Islamism group or even supported optimally by the Islamism group, but rejected by the Post-Islamism group. This really happened to President Jokowi (2014-2019) and (2019-2024) and the Governor and Deputy Governor of Jakarta Anies-Sandi (2017-2022).

Post-Islamism has accommodated peaceful voices for the continuation of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), which still maintains Pancasila and the Basic Law (UUD) 1945 as the basis and foundation of the legitimate Republic of Indonesia since its establishment until now. This program is strengthened by the establishment of the Presidential Work Unit of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (UKP-PIP), which is a non-structural institution established in 2017 through Presidential Regulation (PERPRES) number 54 in 2017. Yudi Latif acts as the chairman, along with nine directors appointed by President Joko Widodo on June 7, 2017 at Merdeka Palace.

This Post-Islamism research is a continuation of what has been done by previous researchers. (Gause:2008, pp. 165-167) in his book entitled *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* discussed the emergence of the Post-Islamism movement in Iran after the Iranian revolution (2007). Bassam Tibi was unsure about the existence of Post-Islamism until he finished his book entitled: *Islamism and Islam* (2012). Noorhaidi Hasan (Hasan: 2012, pp. 369-390) has described the form of application of Post-Islamism in the form of zikir Akbar (dhikr Akbar) in order to reject the forms of violence that have been practiced by Islamic groups in Indonesia (2012). In this study, the author argues that in the context of Islamic history in Indonesia, Post-Islamism has existed since the 1970s, which was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009).

Indeed, the existence of Post-Islamism in Indonesia serves as a cooling atmosphere of the life of the nation and state that has mixed with chaotic politics, full of issues, slander, hatred, hoaxes, and riots to be more reconciling and reassuring. This context is quite interesting to be investigated further and can be a basis for asking questions in order to provide an understanding of the emergence, existence, and development of Post-Islamism in Indonesia: Why did Post-Islamism emerge, even continues to grow in Indonesia?

METHODOLOGY

The method used in this study is a qualitative method with a historical contextualist approach and power relations theory. The reason is that to be able to answer the problems described in the introduction above, and it requires a very in-depth analysis to obtain answers to what has been formulated in this research introduction. Religious issues that are increasingly developing in Indonesia are strongly influenced by the existence of power relations: "Where there is a power, there must be resistance" (Hidayaturrahman & Dhona: 2020, pp. 35-65). Its form is a mass movement by raising all kinds of issues in order to reject the existing power.

This type of research is library research. It means that data obtained from news coverage in mass media, books, and journals are processed and analyzed based on qualitative methods with historical contextual approaches, developed with the creative imagination of the author, and read based on Foucault's power-relations theory.

RESULTS

Masyumi Party

The existence of the Masyumi Party or Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) has become the forerunner to the birth of Post-Islamism in Indonesia. The reason is that Masyumi is a party and religious organization that is very thick in maintaining the ideology of Islam, which has been abandoned by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as its best friends; dissolved by President Sukarno; and rejected by Nurcholish Madjid as a figure in Post-Islamism in Indonesia. This context has caused a profound sense of disappointment to the Masyumi leaders and followers in Indonesia. Behind its dissolution, Masyumi figures and followers remain passionate about realizing what they want to aspire to, namely the form of an Indonesian state based on Islam and Islamic law. Indirectly, the Masyumi has brought up Islamism groups in Indonesia for the first time and continues to exist with increasing numbers of followers until now.

The Masyumi Party is the first and largest Islamic political party in Indonesia, founded on November 7, 1945, based on the Congress held at the Mu'allimin Building in Yogyakarta. The conference was attended by Islamic figures, namely ulama, teachers from Islamic boarding schools and Madrasah, and leaders of Islamic community organizations. The results of the Congress are: first, the Masyumi is an Islamic Political Party. Second, Masyumi is the only political party among Muslims. Third, strengthen the preparation of Muslims to jihad fi sabilillah in resisting all forms of colonialism. Fourth, strengthen Indonesia's national defense by arranging sabilillah ranks in the regions. Fifth, choose Dr. Soekiman as chairman, and respectively Abi Kusno and Wali al-Fatah (Ishaqro et al.: 2017, pp. 52-66).

The aim of the formation of this party is to channel the political aspirations of Muslims, which is at the same time the only political party that represents the Islamic groups in Indonesia (Fogg: 2020, pp. 1-18). Here, it can be clarified that the goal of Post-Islamism desired by Cak Nur with the concept of "Islam yes, and the Islamic Party no" is also in order to bring down Islam from the political stage. Cak Nur does not agree in terms of: "Islam is used for political purposes." Islam is related to spirituality, while politics is only worldly and for the sake of power (Szymański: 2017, pp. 25-30).

The author strongly supports what Cak Nur has suggested, that Islam is a religion that is sacred and is not supposed to be used by a group of Muslims in the interests of a political relationship with a momentary power.

It seems that the political leaders are very worried if they do not involve Islam as a symbol of politics to gain power. This is the root of the problem that has plagued Indonesian politics since pre-Independence until now.

President Soekarno had dissolved the Masyumi Party, with reasons, among others: The ideology of Islam that wanted to be realized as the basis of the state championed by Masyumi figures was very contrary to the ideology of Pancasila, which had been agreed together and legitimately became the basis of a pluralistic Indonesian state; Masyumi was accused of "conducting a rebellion" against the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) (Subekti: 2017, pp. 295-335). President Soekarno stressed: "... Based on revolutionary morals and the morality of the revolution, the authorities must eradicate any foreign or foreign, indigenous or non-indigenous powers which endanger the safety or the ongoing revolution."

Post-Islamism in Indonesia

Post-Islamism is a new paradigm which is a "political manifesto" that has surpassed the previous movements and political understandings of Islam, namely Islamism, both in the Middle East, such as Iran,

Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Turkey, and including in Indonesia. The new paradigm in question is that there has been a metamorphosis here from being militant, exclusive, dogmatic towards a more inclusive, pluralist, and tolerant one. This change began to occur, according to Asef Bayat, after the 1988 Iraq-Iran War. As proof, it was from their participation in the modern/national political system, which they had previously considered to be a non-Islamic political system. Their participation in national politics can be in the form of increasing voting rights in elections, affiliation with certain political parties, and even forming new political parties.

The tone of Post-Islamism began to grow in Indonesia since the 1970s, which was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009). The two Indonesian figures are referred to, according to the results of the research of previous authors in the book: *Historisitas Syariat Islam: Kritik Relasi- Kuasa* Khalil Abdul Karim published by LKiS, Yogyakarta, June 2016, the metamorphosis from Islamist to rationalist (progressive). The idea of Cak Nur was initially more traditionalist in nature. It can be exemplified here that Cak Nur initially argued that secularization must be resisted because it would destroy the ideological basis and the inevitability of religion as a condition for directing national life. Modernization in the Indonesian context, according to him, should not result in an end to ideology because life cannot work well without a set of ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. He was also reminded of the dangers of hidden agendas developed by some westernized Indonesian elites who were very unhappy with everything that was Islamic (Mukaromah: 2020, pp. 137-160).

The thinking of the model described by Cak Nur mentioned above, according to Bassam Tibi, is already in the category of Islamism (Lubis: 2020, pp. 205-229). The reason is that Cak Nur has understood Islam not only as a faith but also more towards the order of a country with the term "modernization in the context of Indonesia should not lead to the end of ideology. There was a mixture of Islam and politics in Cak Nur's thinking at that time until finally, Cak Nur's idea emerged about "Islam yes, Islamic politics no." This is the metamorphic form of Cak Nur that is very clear. From this incident, the writer dares to state that Cak Nur is a genuine Post-Islamism, which cannot be doubted, like what is doubted by Tibi. According to Tibi, is there real Post-Islamism? If they still want Islam as a state order.

The shift of Cak Nur's thinking towards more progressive (liberal) Islamic thinking was caused by several factors behind it, namely: first, the result of self-dynamics and intellectual environment, because Cak Nur is a person who likes to learn and read. The book was his first boyfriend, even though he felt right, but because of his willingness to always learn, it forced him to question what he had believed. Second, blessings for his visit directly to the United States and the Middle East. In October 1968, Cak Nur was invited to visit the United States under a sponsor Council for Leaders and Specialists (CLS). The reason behind this invitation, according to an official at the American Embassy in Jakarta, he "just showed what he hated all this time." During his two months in America, Cak Nur visited universities and learned about academic life from students, attended seminars and discussions of several academic and political figures, and witnessed firsthand the achievements of Western civilization. He also had the opportunity to meet his compatriot, an influential socialist intellectual, Soedjatmoko, who was the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States, who welcomed his visit. After that, he continued his trip to France, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Then in March 1969, at the invitation of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, he took a pilgrimage together with ten other functionaries of the Islamic Student Association (HMI). When reflecting on his visit, both to the Western world and to the Islamic world, he became aware of the distance between Islamic ideals and the reality of life in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the West, which has been criticized so much, shows many positive dimensions and achievements. Since that time, there have been changes in the direction of Cak Nur's mind (1968). Third, Cak Nur felt uncomfortable with the attitude of Islamism, which, according to him, tended to be arrogant and forced the will of others. For example, those who do not follow his teachings will be punished by apostasy and infidelity. In the author's opinion, this is the source of religious (Islamic)

violence. So, religious violence (Islam) does not lie in Islam because it has nothing to do, but more to the individual adherents, because of their arrogant nature, imposing their will and feeling that they are the only ones who are right and the others are all wrong. There needs to be an understanding between Islam and Islamism. Islam is faith, while Islamism is the politicization of religion (Islam) for the sake of power. It means that religion is used as a symbol to achieve political power.

According to Gus Dur himself, in his youth, in the 1950s, he followed the path of the mind of the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslim, a group of Islamists (the first emerging Islamic Islam in Egypt) whose influence also reached Jombang, East Java at that time. Even Gus Dur was active in the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslim movement in his hometown. This is a form of Islamism that once settled on the young Gus Dur before he became a student at Egypt's al-Azhar University and Baghdad University in Iraq.

Abdurrahman was interested in exploring Arab nationalism and socialism in Egypt and Iraq in the 1960s, precisely when he was a student at al-Azhar University in Cairo (1964-1966) and Baghdad University in Iraq (1966-1970) (Tibi: 2020, pp. 127-156). The experience of studying in these two countries greatly influenced the development of his thinking. However, after returning to Indonesia in the 1970s, Gus Dur saw new developments and dynamics of Islam that were different from those in the Middle East. He saw the reality that Islam as a way of life (shari'a) could learn and take each other's various non-religious ideologies, even the views of other religions (Anam: 2019, pp. 81-97).

The author argues that even a very well-known moderate, Gus Dur, in his youth, as well as young Cak Nur, was once interested in Islamic-style thinking. Gus Dur's reason at that time was that Islam was an alternative to the "Western" thinking pattern. Islam could be a solution in order to reject Western values (decolonization) in Indonesia.

Gus Dur experienced a period of change towards progressive/ liberal Islam as Cak Nur upon his return from Egypt and Iraq around the 1970s. The reason is that after going through education, reading, and personal experience, which consciously rejects conceptions or movements that carry themes that are oriented to the ideology of Islam. Gus Dur's actions, according to the author, are also a true form of Post-Islamism and cannot be doubted. As proof of this, Gus Dur continued to fight for Islam as a religion adhered to and practiced by Indonesian people but did not defend the fighters who wanted Indonesia to become an Islamic state based on Islamic law until the end of his life. In the ideologization of Islam, it is easy to encourage Muslims to political efforts that lead to a textual and radical interpretation of religious texts. The most obvious implication of Islamic ideologization is an alternative ideological effort towards Pancasila, as well as the desire of a number of groups to fight for the return of the Jakarta Charter and the steps of a number of regional governments and the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) that issue regional regulations based on "Islamic law." According to Gus Dur, efforts to "Islamize" the national principle and "shari'a" the regional regulations are not only historical but also contrary to the 1945 Constitution.

So, the emergence of Post-Islamism in Indonesia, pioneered by Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, was a new idea from both in order to reject the Islamism movement that wanted to uphold an Islamic state based on Islamic law in Indonesia. This is the manifestation of a new science which is from the attraction of existing powers. Every time there is power, there is a rejection (Kebung: 2017, pp. 34-51). Apart from that, Cak Nur rejected the ideas of Islamism, which, in his opinion, tended to be arrogant and forced the will of others, such as giving punishment to apostates and infidels as well as to others who do not agree with them. On the other hand, Abdurrahman Wahid refused the wishes of a number of groups to fight for the return of the "Jakarta Charter," which, in his opinion, was historical and contradicted with the 1945 Constitution.

DISCUSSION

Post-Islamism is evidence of Foucault's theory: "Where there is power, there is resistance" (Duraesa & Ahyar: 2021, pp. 45-71). The reason is that Post-Islamism emerged as a form of rejection of the existence of a

power, namely the Islamism group, which had existed and reigned in Indonesia since before Indonesia's independence until now. Post-Islamism emerged around the 1970s, which was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) in order to reject the existence that endangered the continuity of the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila.

The emergence of Post-Islamism began with the emergence of Cak Nur's idea of "Islam, yes, and the Islamic Party no" and the idea of secularization from Cak Nur and was subsequently followed by Gus Dur's idea of "Indigenous Islam," which rejected the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. These are the two figures who have initiated Post-Islamism in Indonesia, which has been followed by its followers to the present.

Post-Islamism in Indonesia still needs secularization in order to support democracy. As Cak Nur emphasized, the absolute thing in Islam is only Allah, while constitutional affairs are profane. The idea of Cak Nur's secularization is not secularism, in which religious significance has still functioned and not thrown away at all (Cornet: 2021, pp. 1-19). It is just that the difference between Islam and Islamism must be distinguished, said Tibi. Islam is related to the problem of faith, while Islamism is related to the problem of politicizing religion. Islamism has used religious symbols for the sake of mere political power. This was rejected by the figures of Cak Nur and Gus Dur since the 1970s in Indonesia and continued by the followers of these two figures until now.

Religion (Islam) must be preserved by its sacred spirituality, not used as a daily political game, from day to day, from month to month, and from year to year. So, for the sake of religion (Islam), the sacred must be separated from the political game that is not sacred and not absolute in order to maintain the sacredness of religion (Islam) itself. This is the understanding of secularization cited by Cak Nur since the 1970s in Indonesia. The aim is to make Islam the basis of faith by not doing Islam as politics, "Islam Yes, and Islamic Party No."

Religious sensibility needs to be respected if modernity and democracy are expected to succeed in Muslim communities, such as in Indonesia. According to Sorosh, an ideal democracy does not conflict with religion. There is no democracy that is Islamic and non-Islamic (Miichi: 2020, pp. 589-604). This is what is maintained by the Post-Islamism group in Indonesia in order to maintain stability, harmony, unity, and peace to remain and live in the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia.

This can be seen in the community that embodies the aspirations of Post-Islamism in Indonesia, which has survived until now. These communities play a significant role in the history of Muslims and the Indonesian people. The Post-Islamism group is embodied in various groups of organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic Unity, Jami'at al-Khair, Al-Irsyad, and Mathlaul Anwar. Apart from that, Indonesian Post-Islamism also gave birth to, among others: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community networks oriented to community reform, such as the Pesantren Association and Community Development (P3M), Emancipatory Islamic Network (JIE), LAKPESDAM NU (Institute for Study and Development of Human Resources), Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKIS), Paramadina, Liberal Islam Network (JIL), Progressive Islamic Network, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), Movement Transformative Islam (GIT), Progressive Santri Generation (GSP), Prophetic Islamic Da'wah Movement (GARDIF), Islamic Philanthropy Network (JIFI), Madani Humanitarian Praxis Movement (Gaprikima), International Center for Islamic Pluralism (ICIP) and Center for Moderate Muslims (CMM), elSAD (Institute for the Study of Religion and Democracy) Surabaya, LKPSM Yogyakarta, NU Youth, Syarikat (Society of Santri for Social Studies and People's Advocacy), LAPAR (Institute for Advocacy & Education for Children) Makassar, Puan Amal Hayati, Rahima, Fahmina, and Lentera Hati (Sirait: 2016, pp. 115-126).

In carrying out a moderate mission in religious thought, LAKPESDAM NU published the *Tashwirul Afkar* journal since 1997 with diverse and actual themes: Reinterpreting Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah; Challenging Official Discourse: Upheaval of Muslims in Below; Fikih Siyasa: Building Discourse

Developing Movements; Islamic parties: Transformation of the Islamic Movement and Democratic Space, Women's Movement in Islam; Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: from Conservatism Towards Criticism, Tracing Islamic Liberalism in NU, Islamic Post-traditionalism, Towards Pluralist Islamic Education, Shari'a Deformalization, Suing Islamic Fundamentalism, Indigenous Islam, Refusing Arabism Seeking Indonesian Islam; and Scrambling for Islamic Identity: The Struggle of Islamism and Progressive Islam, Interpreting Kalam Tuhan.

The development of Islam and politics in Indonesia increasingly looks overlapping and unclear. The new actors can just pop up and do not have basic and strong religious authority, but are very welcomed by the Indonesian Muslim community to become a model for the people of Indonesia today. These new actors provide an alternative to thinking about Islamic actions in a social and political context. They created a synthesis through a kind of cultural hybrid practice by utilizing new interactive global media in such away. They package Islam and offer it for mass consumption (Akmaliah: 2020, pp. 1-33). Indirectly, the new actors have also been used by political leaders in order to mobilize time for the sake of power.

The preachers and leaders of the dhikr (Meutia & Jalaluddin: 2020, pp. 3059-3072) received full support from political figures to spread Islamic da'wah while still carrying the name of the person who made the orbit after the lecture material was debated. Every mosque in the city and in the village has been booked and arranged: anyone who may be invited to give lecture material at the mosque may not be scheduled except those already ordered by the person who is the pioneer. This sample occurred in my living environment, namely in Bandar Lampung, Lampung-Indonesia.

The Post-Islamism group, which is widely represented by the Nahdliyin group, has the opposite attitude, which is still supporting the government's program to continue to try to prevent radical acts in Indonesia. The model of the offer includes, among others: the concept of dialogue between the Government and the groups that become its opposition, returning Pancasila subjects to be taught in elementary schools to universities, and still maintain Pancasila as the basis of a pluralistic Indonesian state. This is a program offer that can reduce the amount of Islamism that tends to increase in recent times in Indonesia.

Undoubtedly, Post-Islamism serves as a moment of support for the President elected in the Jokowi era (2014-2019) from blasphemy opposition groups that have the support of President Jokowi's political opponents. Apart from that, Post-Islamism remains committed to maintaining Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the legitimate basis of the state in the Republic of Indonesia. This is the legacy of Indonesian Post-Islamism figures, namely Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009).

CONCLUSION

Post-Islamism emerged as a form of rejection of the ideas of Islamism, which wanted the establishment of an Islamic state based on Islamic law in Indonesia. Post-Islamism emerged in Indonesia in the 1970s which was pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005) with the concept of "Islam Yes, and Islamic Party No," and the theory of secularization, which was not secularism, by Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) with the concept of Indigenization of Islam in Indonesia.

The two leaders of Post-Islamism, who were also known as CakNur and Gus Dur, had passed down their ideas to their followers, namely Nurcholisian and Gus Durian, who still exist today in Indonesia. The legacy of their ideas is about how to maintain unity, integrity, national unity as the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia and still maintain the establishment of the Pancasila state based on the 1945 Constitution in a truly plural condition.

Post-Islamism was represented by the Muhammadiyah group, Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic Unity, Jami'at al- Khair, Al-Irsyad, and Mathlaul Anwar. Apart from that, Indonesian Post-Islamism also gave birth to, among others: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community networks oriented to community renewal, such as Perhimpunan Pesantren dan Pengembangan Masyarakat (P3M), Jaringan Islam

Emansipatoris (JIE), LAKPESDAM NU (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia), Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS), Paramadina, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), Jaringan Islam Progresif, Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM), Gerakan Islam Transformatif (GIT), Generasi Santri Progresif (GSP), Gerakan Dakwah Islam Profetik (GARDIF), Jaringan Filantropi Islam (JIFI), Gerakan Praksis Kemanusiaan Madani (Gaprikima), International Center for Islamic Pluralisme (ICIP) and Center for Moderate Muslims (CMM), eISAD (Lembaga Studi Agama dan Demokrasi) Surabaya, LKPSM Yogyakarta, Kaum Muda NU, Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk Kajian Sosial dan Advokasi Rakyat), LAPAR (Lembaga Advokasi & Pendidikan Anak Rakyat) Makassar, Puan Amal Hayati, Rahima, Fahmina, and Lentera Hati. Post-Islamism tends to continue to provide support to political figures who are deliberately rejected and blasphemed by Islamism groups. As a sample is what happened around the Governor of Jakarta since 2016 until the election of Anies-Sandi as Governor of Jakarta in April 2017. Post-Islamism continued to support and defend Ahok as a candidate for governor from non- Muslims.

Post-Islamism existed and should have existed in Indonesia as a stronghold of the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia from the invasion of Islamism groups which continued to seek additional numbers of followers through the creeping da'wah system in Indonesia. The Islamism group also exists in the Republic of Indonesia because it has the support of domestic and foreign countries, especially from the Middle East. The sample is that ISIS (Islamic State of Syria and Iraq) is also in great demand by some Islamists in Indonesia, but not by Post-Islamism.

The contribution of this research can provide an overview and understanding to the readers in particular and the developers of science in general related to the term trend of Post-Islamism, which has always been a hot conversation in the global world. Islam is very different from Islamism; Islam is not a religion of politics, Islamism uses Islam for political strife, and Post-Islamism rejects it.

BIODATA

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