In the Anthropocene²⁰ (Walter et al., 2016), governance is based on shared expectations, as well as on intentionally designed institutions and mechanisms. However, governance is at the same time a permissive concept –like globalization– in the sense that it gives one license to speak or write about many different things, from any pattern of order or deviation, from anarchy –which also has multiple meanings– to normative preferences about how people should organize and understand the world (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Biersteker, 2009).

We foresee that normative approaches are critical to support strong critical thinking while giving us the basis for reliable conclusions. This approach gives us limits and boundaries (mostly because environmental issues demand discussion to reach consensus), but also because as in the case of Brazil, advanced environmental norms and laws strongly regulate environmental issues.

Our approach entails an objective perspective for current and future analysis, by seeking to establish clear rules on (i) how environmental goals can be established and maintained; (ii) how they can be adapted to achieve previously established goals exposed to a dynamic reality; and finally, (iii) how the political outcomes produced can be shaped in a way that positively re-fuels the advancement of policies and actions. Thus, under this perspective, we seek to reinforce the provision of solutions to the complex problems of environmental deterioration and human well-being in the field of natural resource management. We also adopted the belief that a system of rules and norms that extend from the global to the local level has been used to provide a basis for forest governance in the country. It has defined, constrained, and shaped actors’ expectations in different domains (Ostrom, 2005; Biersteker, 2009: 180). How it could work from the local to the global is still an open and promising field of research.

Nonetheless, our approach is consistent with observations of Arid Vatn and Paul Vedeld (2011). They stated that two main elements are fundamental to governance: (i) the type of actors involved, characterized by their capacities and competencies; and, (ii) the (formal and informal) institutions that facilitate the interaction and the coordination between them, and the different levels of actors (playing a fundamental role in this process). In this sense, environmental governance demands continuing policy-making at national and subnational levels, but also, accountability.

Granted that «global governance of the environment» is not limited to «governance that is global» (Overbeek et al., 2010; Latham, 2009). It is instead concerned with political power –as a basic concept– at all levels of the political system. To the best understanding of environmental governance, the analysis of how state and non-state actors actively shape policy actions and outcomes is inevitable (Biermann et al., 2010; Schroeder, 2010: 320). Global norm-setting requires local decision-making and implementation (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2014: 688; 696), once actors’ actions are not merely the result of functional gaps being filled in the governance structure, but they are –at least, partially– the result of political motives, oriented and constructed under normative directives.

The three branches of government in Brazil have historically issued a series of decrees and norms aimed at combating deforestation in the Amazon basin²¹. These actions were commonly based on the restriction of credit to activities associated with illegal deforestation. However, the effect of these policies was often expressionless or short, since the market itself had most influenced deforestation rates (Barreto and Araújo, 2012).

However, since the beginning of the 21^st century, Brazil has been witnessing a paradigm shift concerning deforestation. According to Maia et al. (2011), and Viana et al. (2012), the increase in farmers’ awareness concerning the market forces and their consequences regarding economic gains and losses, as well as command and control policies²², have proved successful in reducing deforestation, by the promotion of change of mentality, and certainty of punishment. Despite the limited effects on the reduction of the environmental degradation in the Amazon Biome, and limited reduction of deforestation in the other Brazilian Biomes, a possible path of sustainability appears to be emerging in the country (MMA, 2018). This new view is based on the quest to evolve beyond merely isolated punitive measures designed to unsuccessfully promote sustainable land use and forest conservation.

During the period 2004²³-2009²⁴, Brazil has experienced the development of a vast set of environmental policies and multi-level actions, including the active participation of the civil society trying to cope with the challenges of reducing deforestation more consistently. This set of policies tried to hold entire value chains accountable for illegal deforestation, especially targeting logging, soybean farming, and cattle ranching; issuing hefty fines and shutting down illegal operations while also setting up a blacklist of perpetrators of deforestation and environmentally unsustainable practices with top-down approaches (MCTIC, 2016; MPF, 2012; MAPA, 2013).

As a result, the Amazon basin witnessed the emergence of several local-level environmental governance schemes –some based on deforestation-free commitments as the PMV–, as a response do federal actions. As a result, the country efforts to promote compliance with international environment and climate negotiations, and the construction of modern social laws, as well as the repositioning of Brazil as a key-actor in global climate negotiations contributed to recently reduced deforestation rates in the Amazon basin.

At the same time that international²⁵ and national discussions²⁶ on climate change, forest conservation, and GHG reduction emissions strongly influenced the strengthening of environmental policies combating deforestation and land degradation in Brazil (MMA, 2016b; SIRENE/MCTIC, 2017; OC, 2018). They have mobilized different actors –mainly the Federal Government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and large national entrepreneurs against environmental degradation, resulting in the creation of economic and political incentives to reduce deforestation and promote GHG emissions reductions in key sectors (MCTIC, 2016; SIRENE/MCTIC, 2017). Brazil has adopted voluntary commitments and established a robust climate strategy to achieve the national goals to reduce GHG emissions, as initially established in the PNMC, in 2009, evolving towards the establishment of even more ambitious goals, expressed in the Brazilian NDC, in 2015. Besides, the government altered the Forest Code, establishing monitoring and verification mechanisms such as CAR.

Initially, the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) established under the Federal Law No. 12,187/2009, and by Federal Decree No. 7,390/2010 –replaced by Federal Decree No. 9,578/2018²⁷–, described a voluntary commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 36.1-38.9% compared to projected emissions by 2020 (according to the baseline of 3,236 GtCO₂e), towards absolute emissions reductions between 1,168 GtCO₂e, and 1,259 GtCO₂e. Later, on September 27, 2015, the Brazilian Government submitted to the UNFCCC, its intended NDC to the new agreement under the Convention at the 21^st Conference of the Parties (COP21), in Paris. By adopting an economy-wide, absolute mitigation target, Brazil voluntarily agreed to follow an even more stringent modality of contribution, compared to its voluntary actions pre-2020.

The Brazilian contribution became consistent with emission levels of 1.3 GtCO₂e (GWP-100; IPCC/AR5, 2014) in 2025, and 1.2 GtCO₂e, in 2030 (GWP-100; IPCC/AR5, 2014), respectively corresponding to a reduction of 37% and 43%, based on estimated emission levels of 2.1 GtCO₂e, in 2005 (GWP-100; IPCC/AR5, 2014). The new voluntary commitment, represents an additional gross GHG emissions reduction of approximately 19% in 2025, compared to Brazil’s previous national voluntary commitment, which aimed to achieve gross GHG reduction emissions of approximately 2 GtCO2e²⁸ in 2020 (ITAMARATY, 2015; GoB, 2015).

Regarding forest conservation, the Federal government established law No. 12,651, of May 25, 2012 –known as the new «Forest Code»–. It provides general norms on the Protection of Native Vegetation, including Areas of Permanent Preservation, Legal Reserve, and Restricted Use; logging, supply of forest raw material, control of the origin of forest products, control and prevention of forest fires, and the forecasting of economic and financial instruments to achieve its objectives; The Forest Code is inserted in the National legal framework and legal instruments that guide and discipline the use of land and the conservation of natural resources in Brazil.

It brought the creation of an important instrument: the CAR²⁹, regulated by Federal Decree No. 9,578/2018, within the scope of the SINIMA System³⁰, and the implementation of State level Environmental Regulation Programs³¹ (MMA, 2016; 2016a; 2016b; 2018; 2018b; 2018c; BRAZIL, 2018; SEMAS, 2018).

The Green Municipalities Program (PMV) is an innovative municipal-level environmental governance mechanism. It has been put into practice national and State provisions that incorporated changes in the Forest Code³², introducing the CAR³³, the LAR³⁴ –Licenciamento Ambiental Rural (Environmental Rural Licensing) as well as several subsidiary set of policies and programs³⁵, and others initiatives like Bolsa Verde³⁶ (Green Grant). Technically, the PMV is a territorial policy with a significant impact on the legalization of land use. Moreover, it is also a complex policy of command, control, and ordering, implemented and executed through an established pact among the involved actors in the three scales of powers: Federal, State, and Municipal levels (Da Costa and Fleury, 2015).

In 2011, the PMV became a State Government program³⁷ developed in partnership with municipalities, civil society, the private sector, IBAMA³⁸, and the MPF³⁹. It was launched through State Decree N^o 54/2011, being coordinated by the Civil House of the Government of Pará, specifically in the figure of the SEPMV⁴⁰.The objective of the PMV is to combat deforestation in the State of Pará, to strengthen sustainable rural production through strategic environmental and land management actions and also environmental management, focusing on local pacts, monitoring deforestation, implementing the CAR, and in structuring the environmental management of the participating municipalities. Figure 1 shows the institutional arrangements and governance framework articulating multi-level environmental policies, programs, and governance schemes.

Figure 1.
Institutional Arrangements and Governance Structure of the PMV
Source: Programa Municípios Verdes (GoP), 2013.

The raw origins of the PMV date back to 2006-2008 period⁴¹. The Brazilian government published a Critical Deforestation List⁴², with the inclusion of 17 Pará State municipalities⁴³ in the deforestation list of the Brazilian Ministry of Environment (MMA). The list was a policy measure to prioritize efforts to combat deforestation in critical areas (Viana et al., 2012) –which was later updated to 43 municipalities⁴⁴–, in an attempt to tackle critical levels of deforestation in the Amazon basin. The government action served as an essential input for resource allocation through several environmental policies and programs to combat deforestation at the local level, followed by the signing of Terms of Adjustment of Conduct by the meatpacking industry and livestock producers (IPAM/IMAZON/ISA, 2013; GTS, 2013; GTPS, 2014; GoP, 2015).

The creation of the deforestation list, which included the municipality of Paragominas in the State of Pará, prompted the municipality to develop an innovative environmental concept called «Green Municipality»⁴⁵. The municipal response aimed at getting the municipality off of the blacklist and recover its access to federal credit and assistance⁴⁶, but according to several authors, ended up going much further due its success in combating the historical dynamics of deforestation in that municipality (PARAGOMINAS, 2008; Guimarães et al., 2011; MPF, 2012; MAPA, 2013; GoP, 2015).

The PMV is the result of a participative process enabled through trust-building, by the establishment of partnerships and agreements between NGOs⁴⁷ (The Nature Conservancy-TNC, and IMAZON⁴⁸), municipal governments, large-farmers, ranchers, and the government at the local, regional and national level. In the face of the success observed in the Municipality of Paragominas in responding to Federal environmental Laws and actions to combat deforestation, the State of Pará soon adopted the PMV as a State Policy framework, expanding the actions to many other municipalities in the State. The participant municipalities shared similar socioeconomic and environmental issues. Besides, the actions adopted under the PMV aimed at mainstreaming a set of federal and state policy, measures, and actions into the local level policy framework, providing critical inputs for the arrangement and promotion of better resource allocation and better management of natural resources.

The participation in the PMV is based solely on the voluntary co-management of natural resources. It has been enabled by pooling public and private interests to implement existing provisions for environmental protection under the context of the current environmental policy formulation, leveraging licensing mechanisms, such as the LAR⁴⁹ and CAR, promotion of more sustainable value chains at the municipal level, adoption of more sustainable management pacts, and deforestation-free commitments.

The establishment of natural resource and land use management was facilitated by the adherence to the CAR, which has already covered more than 75% of the territory, within a target of 80% by 2017.

The PMV contains a specific axis for decentralization. It prioritizes shared environmental management in the participant municipalities. It works by pooling public and private interests among the main actors (e.g., the big companies involved in agricultural, cattle breeding, mineral, forestry supply chains). It seeks to set up and carry out their commitments at a common base. Also, the actors are subject to punitive political measures as well as fiscal and economic sanctions under the CAR and LAR schemes. In this framework, NGOs and universities offer technical and scientific instruments to advance the process and support informed compliance to environmental regulations (Da Costa and Fleury, 2015).

In a nutshell, Guimarães et al. (2011); Viana et al. (2012); and, Miccolis et al. (2014), also described this program as an innovative governance mechanism. Mostly because it promotes more sustainable value chains at the municipal level, by bringing stakeholders together to establish improved natural resource and land use management pacts. There is a strong normative framework behind all choices and actions, supported by federal and State provisions of technical assistance and resource availability for the adoption of more sustainable production techniques, ensuring land tenure and environmental regularization.

The decentralization, the governance structure as well as the clear definition of roles among partners remains as key features supporting the success in reducing deforestation rates under the PMV framework –19% drop in deforestation rates among participating municipalities, compared to 16% in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (GoP, 2019). However, the latest government data indicates most of the deforestation still occurred in the states of Mato Grosso and Pará, and marked a 13.7% rise over last 2017’s figures (PRODES, 2019). While the rate does mark a significant rise between 2017-2018 period –when the rate of deforestation dropped 16% in a 12-month period –, it still marks a 72% drop from 2004 (the year Federal government launched command and control measures and policies to combat deforestation).

Moreover, the PMV demonstrated to be a useful tool to raise awareness and commitment among local stakeholders through the implementation of deforestation-free commitments, and by increasing the adoption of sustainable forest management, reduction of deforestation, and improved agricultural and grazing practices (GoP, 2019). However, further studies are required to confirm the level of awareness and commitment implications through the implementation of deforestation-free commitments in the Amazon basin. The review of the PMV framework showed that strategies were developed in line with local realities, aligned with needed territorial interventions driven by national and sub-national policies, such as the Sustainable Amazon Plan (PAS)⁵⁰, the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)⁵¹, and the Plan for Prevention, Control and Alternatives to Deforestation in the State of Pará (PPCAD/PA)⁵². As result, by March, 2019, from the total of 144 municipalities in the State of Pará, a significant number of 124 had adhered⁵³ to the PMV, reaching 75,61% of the municipalities registered in CAR. Also, 16 municipalities entirely comply with the Green Municipalities strict environmental rules and procedures.

The PMV worked well to mainstream national and State⁵⁴ climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and programs into the local level, as well as a mechanism to enforce the new Forest Code directives in the Brazilian Amazon (IMAZON, 2015). The success of the PMV can be attributed to national environmental policies well articulated with the market forces, and supported by a robust technical and institutional capacity. However, the ongoing weakening of the environmental legislation and the re-characterization of monitoring and control bodies may pose some real risks related to the constitution of existing political and environmental arrangements resulting incompatible with local environmental needs (BRAZIL, 2019; 2019a). It may create gaps and overlaps of power, reducing the room for collaboration in the next phases of the PMV, as they might affect how the stakeholders adhere and respond to this environmental governance mechanism. Moreover, some features of the PMV reflects historical patterns adopted to combat deforestation that proved unreliable to promote sustainable development in the Amazon Basin. For this reason, many questions remain, often related to the risks imposed by political changes, and the recent restructuration of political forces at all levels –an important aspect that relates to the origins of PMV. The emergence of this innovative governance mechanism has deep roots in the need to respond to Federal command and control policies and actions.

Also, the PMV is structured around market-driven components based on different programs and policies that have limited capability to considerate smaller actors participation (MAPA, 2012; MAPA, 2018; Ferreira Costa, 2014; 2016a). Big players benefit most of PMV actions, since it has strong productive features. They have more opportunities to seize the benefits of their commitments in this forest governance scheme, while smaller actors and traditional communities face enormous challenges to committ to this mechanism. Small­holder farmers and traditional communities lack reliable conditions to participate in the decision-making process in the PMV because they lack economic representativity. Therefore, it is common for them to lack power and access to benefit from policies aligned with the market that has been systematically developed by previous governments to support agribusiness activities. In this regard, Nepstad et al. (2014), adds that punitive measures need to be complemented by positive incentives and finance at scale for landholders, smallholders farmers, indigenous communities, counties, and States to allow a sustainable transition to achieve lower deforestation rates, GHG emissions reductions, productive inclusion, and sustainable rural development.

The study shed some lights on the risks represented by promises of weakening Federal environmental legislation by the newly elected government of Brazil. Recent political instability brought uncontable changes, mostly culminating in far-right forces rising to power in Brazil (PSL, 2019; BRAZIL, 2019; 2019a). These forces may pose a threat to the continuity of Brazil in the Paris Agreement, and future climate negotiations, as Brazil withdrew its offers to host the COP 25 UN Climate Conference⁵⁵. Besides, ongoing changes in Federal climate governance schemes⁵⁶, through the restructuring of key ministries, and prioritization of productive issues over the environment foresee a real risk of regression throughout the normative and environmental governance apparatus created over decades.

The threats to the rainforest⁵⁷ and its people⁵⁸ and a still possible withdraw from the Paris Agreement are among the promises of the newly elected government. These changes came into force with the weakening of the Federal environmental bodies and environmental legislation emptying the powers of the Ministry of the Environment, and strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture (MMA, 2019; BRAZIL, 2019; 2019a), coupled with the extinction of the climate and renewable energy divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁵⁹, with negative effects on the national climate governance framework. The recent government decision that pulled out Brazil of hosting 2019’s United Nations global summit meeting on climate change⁶⁰, may indicate that the Latin America’s largest nation no longer aspires to be an influential player in efforts to mitigate the negative effects of a human-induced climate change.

In this regard, a crucial aspect of the PMV –the environmental decentralization– is highlighted. As stated by Toni (2006); Sandbrook et al. (2010); and, Viana et al. (2012: 3), the decentralization of environmental policies can be positive if it delivers more power to the hands of municipal actors. However, some authors have claimed that in democratic countries special interest groups may enjoy disproportionate influence on policymaking (Mancur, 1965; 1982; Midlarsky, 1998). As a result, decentralization can have negative environmental impacts if governments (at all levels) lack the capacity for good governance. It allows major political and economic forces to have too much influence on what are often politically weak environmental arrangements (local level), negatively influencing enforcement of environmental legislation (Ribot, 2004). A situation that seems to be materializing in Brazil shortly, contrasting⁶¹ to what advocated Ferreira Costa (2016: 135), when he described the previous Brazilian political discourse on climate change –focused on the elimination of deforestation and conservation of lands and forests –as fundamental features of the new international strategic repositioning of the Brazilian government in international climate negotiations. Something that emerged from the country’s need to adapt to changing global circumstances⁶².

If stakeholders find it harder to operate (and cooperate), that could mean less oversight of environmental responsible choices and actions, weakening voluntary commitments, which could have a negative impact far beyond the pooling of public and private interests. It may reduce the overall scrutiny on climate change actions and deforestation at the local level, contributing to increased deforestation rates and conflicts over land tenure in the Amazon Basin.

In this regard, the PMV still has some deficiencies, such as the lack of actor-tailored approaches to integrate less powerful actors, both in alternative production activities and in the provision of personalized technical assistance, as well as in the offer of high-quality, productive inputs and insufficiencies in transportation and infrastructure. In contrast, these productive features, and channels to new consumer markets, are significant factors that attract larger players (Heredia et al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2012; Viana et al., 2012; and, Ferreira Costa, 2014). Still with much to evolve, the PMV must create bridges and involve countless potential actors. Smallholders farmers as well as traditional communities are still left on the sidelines under the PMV, as it has been struggling to include sufficient tools that go beyond productive features.