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The object *a* in the end-of-analysis dreams

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Abstract: This article was devised within the framework of Lacanian psychoanalysis and aims to discuss the theoretical contributions of the depiction of 'object *a*' (*objet petit a*) in end-of-analysis dreams, as well as its relations with the awakening. Conceptual tools of the discipline were used to analyze four theoretical contributions: the proposal of Colette Soler of considering the appearance of object *a* in some dreams as the insertion point of the drive, which leads to the awakening; the developments of Ricardo Nepomiachi about the oneiric depiction of the object *a*'s emptying; the relationship between the object and the awakening without angst highlighted by Frida Nemirovsky and Fabián Naparstek; and the notion of *index-dreams*, postulated by Marcelo Mazzuca, where the object is inserted into an oneiric plot according to associations established between desire and satisfaction in a given moment of the analysis.

Keywords: dream, object, psychoanalysis.

Introduction

The implementation of the pass in schools of psychoanalysis has allowed for the intensification and enrichment of the study about the end of analysis in recent decades. One of the aspects highlighted by several psychoanalysts was the dreams mentioned by passers in their testimonies. That is how end-of-analysis dreams became a topic of interest and a source of numerous questions for schools.

The denomination *end-of-analysis dreams* refers not only to dreams that marked the end of an analytical path but also to those which occur during the final stages of treatment and often participate in the *construction of the fantasy* (Lacan, 1966-1967), the *subjective destitution* (Lacan, 1970/2012; Lombardi, 2015; Soler, 2007), and in the *identification with the symptom* (Lacan, 1976-1977; Mazzuca, Mazzuca, Mazzuca & Zaffore, 2014).

In this article, we propose to review and comment on some issues emerging from the topic in recent decades, during which a central axis of theorization in psychoanalysis was the modification of relationship with the unconscious throughout treatment (Miller, 2013; Soler, 2013).

More precisely, the aim of this work will to study the ways the object *a* (*objet petit a*) appears in these dreams, outlining a journey that goes from the individual depiction through the reason for the awakening, to the articulation modes that show the object and the sublimation inextricably intertwined.

This topic highlights the questioning of several psychoanalysts since the dream, usually conceived as a predominantly symbolical-imaginary formation, has shown through this object a solid articulation with the real. Our hypothesis is that such association acquires different presentations according to the moment of treatment, as we will attempt to show.

First, we will expose the developments of Colette Soler (1988) about the object *a* as an insertion point of the drive into dreams, from where the abrupt awakening seems unavoidable.

Next, we will comment on the peculiar form of object emptying that often occurs in end-of-analysis dreams, which was indicated by Ricardo Nepomiachi (1999).

Then we will consider the case of the awakening without angst, devised by Frida Nemirovsky (2004) and commented on by Fabián Naparstek (2005). This author considers that some dreams lead to a fall from the neurotic myth framework forced into anxiety, enabling the loss of any object substantiality.

Finally, we will resume the category of *index-dreams*, proposed by Marcelo Mazzuca (2011), from where a form of presence of the object *a*, which is mostly veiled and framed into a driven movement associated with sublimation, can be seen.

Without losing sight of each proposal's details, we will try to dialogue with the claims of these diverse authors, aiming to clarify the key elements of each elucidation and their associations. To do so, we will use conceptual operators of Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as *unconscious*, *desire*, *awakening*, *satisfaction*, and *sublimation*, within a bias that attempts to both distinguish and articulate the three Lacanian registers.

Considerations about the pass as a research device

In his *Proposition of October 9, 1967*, Lacan (1967/2012) reaffirms the Freudian idea that only the starting and the ending of treatment can be key points from which psychoanalysis effects can be theorized. As expressed in this text, Lacan hoped that those who offered a testimony about the end of their treatments would account for "the crucial problems in the points to be analyzed, especially insofar as they are themselves involved in the task, or at least in the gap, of solving them." (p. 262).

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The implementation of the pass was to produce knowledge about how everyone solves their own traversals of fantasy, their relationships with the symptoms and, eventually, their desire to analyze (Lacan, 1973, 1967/2012, 1969a/2012, 1970/2012, 1973/2012).

As we know, since the beginning of the analysis experience there was a bi-directional movement of theoretical elaboration and of interrogation about such experience from the theory. Consequently, the productions that resulted from this device and the theoretical efforts in constructing a proper logic of Lacanian end of analysis are extremely useful for research. In our case, they allow, especially, analysis of the role of dreams in the final stages of treatment.

Far from seeking to immerse us into debates on the political vicissitudes of the pass (Lombardi, 2009; Miller, 1973, 2003; Roudinesco, 1988), here we will consider the dreams as resulting from the work done by schools on the clinical material offered by the testimonies.

Regardless the debates and the opposition this device has raised in certain sectors, we believe that its implementation enabled the production of a copious amounts of material about the end of the treatment, which continues to be studied to the present day. We do not believe that the political implications of its implementation or the circumstances around the indication of School Analysts should stop us from using testimonies to investigate the clinical end of analysis; quite the opposite, since thanks to the usage of such a device many points concerning the treatment could be discovered or rethought.

In addition, we believe the dream testimony is one of the elements that were less affected by any political interests or nominations. Even in testimonies where those under analysis point to some aspect of treatment to be worked – when they intend to present a series of reports on a specific topic, for example – the moment in which the dream is reported never strictly corresponds to what is intended to be shown. Without a doubt, this is a basic quality of the dream, never corresponding point-by-point to conscious speech. Moreover, it is where the meaning most escapes us. Every oneiric report in a testimony somewhat escapes from the raconteur's intentions.

Currently, from the review of several pass testimonies – all publicly available –, we have noticed the need for discerning end-of-analysis dreams that have different functions and belong to distinctive logical times. We consider that the study of these kind of dreams can change, from a logic in which the opposition conscious/unconscious highlights the awakening effects, the revealing lighting, and the fall from identification, to a logic posterior to the traversal of fantasy, where the most important is the elaboration of the symptoms' incurable remains and where dreams assume new functions, not so much linked to the effects of surprise but to the encrypted producer of unique inventions – which enables or names new arrangements with the *jouissance*.

This distinction is essential to sort the contributions we will be studying, from which the object *a* is diversely alluded to according to the moment of treatment under scrutiny.

The object *a* as the insertion point of drive in the dream

The first antecedent found of a statement about the dream that considers the teachings of the pass belongs to the book *Finales de análisis* ['Ends of Analysis', not translated into English yet], by Colette Soler (1988), published from a seminar held in Buenos Aires in 1986. The book includes a chapter entitled "Acerca del sueño" [About the dream], constructed by the author from a specific question: "is there an insertion of the drive at the dream level? An insertion of what, in the drive, of *jouissance*?" (p. 75).

Whereas the interpretation does not aim at the subject represented by the signifier but to what Lacan (1955/2003) called *the being of the subject* (p. 341), Soler wonders if the dream, in addition to be the royal road to the unconscious, can give us access to that being. Such an approach is consistent with Lacan developments on the end of analysis.

The author states that dreaming is a sign of hysterization and entrance into the transfer, since usually the dream works as a word vector and invites a chance for the exploration of the desire and, therefore, to the conjugations of the lack in being. But she also wonders if the dream only reaches this threshold, if it cannot sometimes take one step further, as she supposes that "perhaps not only the unconscious is into the dream" (Soler, 1988, p. 77). It is from this that the place of the drive is questioned.

Following the answer Lacan gives (1975) to a question by Marcel Ritter, Soler admits that, if there is an insertion of drive into the dream, it should not be through its navel. This is because the navel is always a significant phenomenon – the impossible to say, which is equivalent to the signifier of the barred Other. In addition, for Lacan, the relationship between this symbolic hole and the holes of the body is only an analogy.

According to the author, the negativity of the dream navel is opposite to the positivity of the *jouissance*, which is present in dreams such as that of the Wolf Man:

Behind the Wolf Man's dream there is something real. A reality which is not timely, which determines forever for the subject the particular pathways of his desire and *jouissance* Not as desiring in general, indeterminate desiring, but as such desiring, in particular. (Soler, 1988, p. 78)

This observation leads the author to say that in some dreams – not all of them – there may be something which is not displaced nor metaphoric: a fixed focus, a presence that constitutes the center around which the oneiric scene is built. Soler affirms that this focus does not belong to the significant game – that would resent again and again the lack in being – but rather embodies another function: showing. Consequently, she proposes to differentiate:

- the *staging* of these dreams, built around an irreplaceable element, an element of *jouissance*.
- the *figuration*, the image translation required in all dreams.

For the author, the staging allows for the location of the drive's insertion point. This eventuality "does not occur with all dreams – some are just signifier architecture –, but it is a potential of the dream" (Soler, 1988, p. 79).

In the case of Wolf Man, for example, the dream shows the *regarded object*. In some dreams reported by passers, it is also possible to locate the *voice* as the central *object* of the dream, as well as the *oral* or *anal object*, around which the significant plot is elaborated. Showing is a matter of construction, not of meaning.

In these object occurrences, Soler locates, in the dream, what could be awoken:

Thus, a young woman dreams: "I turn myself around and suddenly I see, on the wall, the clearer place left by the absence of a family picture". Abrupt awakening. Or also, suddenly, the subject is regarded by a stationary bouquet of carnations. (1988, p. 80)

In this way, the author raises a question that will be taken up by several other authors – explicitly or implicitly – to theorize about the dreams reported by passers. As we will see later, Marcelo Mazzuca (2011) starts from this distinction made by Soler to postulate the existence of *index-dreams*.

Regarding the specific topic discussed in this article, it is possible to indicate that the author thinks the insertion of the object *a* into dreams from the function of *showing*, proposed by Lacan during his seminar on the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (1964/2006). This function, in turn, is closely linked to the awakening, since for Soler the showing of the object *a* in dreams usually leads to the same end.

For our part, this seems unquestionable for most dreams, at least until the traversal of fantasy. However, it is possible to raise yet another question: would the appearance of the object *a* in dreams always respond to this presentation form whose effect is the awakening? From the following formulation of Lacan (1964/2006) it could be assumed that this condition may vary:

After the mapping of the subject concerning *a*, the experience of the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive. What, then, do those who experienced this opaque relation with the origin, with the drive, become? How can a subject who has traversed the radical fantasy experience the drive? (p. 281)

As we will see later, everything seems to indicate that in the final stage of analysis – after the fantasy traversal – the appearance of the object *a* in a dream does not have the characteristics of a fixed focus nor does it cause awakening but sometimes participates in associations between desire and satisfaction that are embodied in the oneiric life, as new arrangements with the *jouissance*. It could be said that what varies is the position of the dreamer faced with which arises from the oneiric scene. The next paragraphs allow us to gradually move closer to this issue.

Emptying of the object *a* in end-of-analysis dreams

In 1999, the book *Pase y transmisión 2* [Pass and transmission 2], of the Lacanian Orientation School (EOL), was published, which includes an article of Ricardo Nepomiachi entitled "Pass dreams". There, the author states the following: "it is possible to insulate a trait which is common to most testimonies: the central place given to dreams for orienting the pass experience" (p. 31).

In this article, the author refers to a conference of Marie-Hélène Brousse (1997), which was central to the topic. In it, she highlighted the almost total absence of interpretations in pass testimonies and, as a counterpoint, the omnipresence of dreams in such reports. Therefore, the main point of Brousse was the way in which dreams supplanted the interpretation, as well as the place this finding would leave to the analyst in the treatments he or she directs. Secondly, the remarkable talent of dreams in expressing important turns of an analysis; hence their value in testimonies, is also highlighted.

Ricardo Nepomiachi agrees to consider such dreams as full-fledged interpretations and adds some comments:

For passers, the dreams are more than dreams; they take them to the letter. According to Freud, they recognize there the place of desire . . . Passers extend to their maximum the interpretation deduced from them, without being presented as interpreted by the analyst. (1999, p. 33)

Like Soler, this author points out that one of the main functions of these dreams is to allow the passers to capture themselves in their condition of a split subject, pointing to an unsuspected knowledge "that is revealed through what they say and show" (Nepomiachi, 1999, p. 33). Equivalently, he considers that the dream embodies the subject's question, it is a hysterization factor and brings about metaphorically and metonymically alluded signifiers.

However, the dreams also refer to another aspect of the analytical operation: "revealing to the neurotic that what sustains the desire is the fantasy, which does not have the status of an unconscious formation" (p. 34). In this sense, he considered that the dream works particularly well to articulate unconscious and fantasy, being able to present the object in a dream scene and give rise to certain emotions such as "disgust, revulsion, fear and/or anguish" (p. 32). This aspect was also commented on by a young Lacan (1962-1963/2006) when he expresses that "it sometimes happens, that appears in dreams, and in a non-ambiguous way, a pure, schematic form of the fantasy" (p. 85). According to Nepomiachi, to those dreams that showed the object *a* the passers assigned "a value of certainty in the way of the fantasy construction" (p. 32).

Coinciding with Brousse, this author singles out that every dream narrated in a testimony is essential for regarding a decisive moment of the treatment:

In almost all cases dreams were presented that were considered to indicate an end, or that accentuated a turn which comprised figurations of the object's emptying and were deciphered as phallic logic outputs: "that object dissolved", "it consisted of going through a hole", or there was either a talk on "skirting a vacuum". (Nepomiachi, 1999, pp. 32-33)

Finally, it is concluded that, while the fantasy is not a subconscious formation and its significance is absolute, the dream enables the passage of fantasy to the unconscious, allowing, through castration, the dialectic of the fixed jouissance. He affirms the passers' dreams, which are on the unconscious side, combine drives; they give rise to the "it shows", which implies in a staging, in a place to dialogue with the fantasy:

If on one hand [the dream] presents to the subject its own division, embodying a question to the Other, it also includes some kind of answer that allows them to navigate through their very way to achieve jouissance. It shows: property of the staging that offers a way out of the fantasy silence. (Nepomiachi, 1999, p. 35)

Consequently, the author states that certain dreams involve a subjectivation of the drive, an elaboration of knowledge about the jouissance that sustains the subject.

As it can be seen, its developments emphasize the articulation between unconscious and fantasy more than the distinction between dreams that *say* and dreams that *show*, proposed by Soler. In fact, Nepomiachi interchangeably uses the terms *say* and *show* in some sentences, while in others he speaks of *it shows* as a specific function of the dream. Like Soler, he points out that the showing of fantasy in dreams "enables finding the real which determines the subject of the dream as a desiring subject, but of a desire singled out for its own jouissance" (Nepomiachi, 1999, p. 35).

It is necessary to point out the fact that, for many analysts, dreams take on a fundamental value when narrating the turns of their treatments, since in many cases it is a dream where the object is presented in various ways. In the reading of several testimonies it is possible to verify that many passers place these dreams as milestones that mark before and after, which enabled the detachment of the anguish from the fantasy framework that gave it meaning (Alderete de Weskamp, 1999/2006; Fuentes, 2011; Gasbarro, 2014; Naparstek, 2005).

Summing up, we could say that Nepomiachi provides the precision that often the object *a* appears in the dream scene as dissolved or empty. Depending on this element, it is possible to hypothesize that in the dreams the author mentions the object had lost its ominous value and enabled articulations that do not immediately produce the awakening. We then have an appearance form of the object *a* in end-of-analysis dreams which, while continuing to occupy a central place in the scene, does not respond to the ominous effect nor causes the awakening.

We believe that, in the developments that follow, this hypothesis is somewhat supported.

Object *a* in relation to the awakening without angst

On the publication of the 7th issue of *Pase y Transmisión*, another article on the specifics of end-of-analysis dreams appeared. It is a text submitted by Frida Nemirovsky in the Congress of the World Association of Psychoanalysis of 2004, in Comandatura. The publication is called "A dream without angst. Clinical consequences" and it starts by pointing out:

The experience I want to highlight points to the situation that makes a passer awake from a dream without angst, despite the striking character of the dream. It refers to the subject trying to kill his eldest son. For the passer, this dream defines his end of analysis The mention to this trait of a dream was not unknown to me since the reading of the testimony of other AE mentioned and emphasized a dream without anguish as a condition to consider his analysis ended. (Nemirovsky, 2004, p. 23)

The dream to which she refers is published in one of the testimonies of Fabián Naparstek, where the author comments to have questioned himself, soon after awakening, for the logic that led him to dream such a thing. To this question, an answer soon arrived, which precipitated the end of analysis. Such an answer, with the consequent fall from certain identifications and the *invoking object*, seems to be the second time of that awakening:

It was an awakening without anguish. I say awakening because it supposes leaving sleep to go to consciousness, but no longer under anguish. It is not the awakening of the crossing over fantasy, that in one hit touches the real, but the one produced under the effect of something that no longer is what it was. When the angst abandons its links with the framework in which it appeared, when it detangles from the encircling the neurotic myth forces on it, the Other falls at last. (Naparstek, 2005, p. 53)

Thus, we can say the author precisely defines what she considers to be an awakening from the inconsistency of the Other, between dream and wakefulness. It is clear that this issue demands a discussion on the sleep-wake notions of common sense. From the teachings of Lacan (1969-1970/2006), we can say that "we wake up so that we can continue dreaming" (p. 60), or even that "there is no awakening whatsoever" (Lacan, 1976-1977, p. 42). However, we often speak of "sleepiness" as if referring to the doze of fantasy, and we recognize in the evanescent moments of awakening the only way out – although precarious and timely – from the fantasy scene. Even though these are merely timely interruptions, the analysis shows that the consequences of such moments are enduring. In every act, the subject emerges transformed, and just as Lacan (1969b/2012) minimally

defines the act as “a saying from which the subject changes” (p. 395), Fabián Naparstek testifies about an awakening under the effect of something that is no longer what it was.

Therefore, the sequence reported by Naparstek is: (1) dream, (2) awakening without angst, (3) asking yourself about the logic of such dream, and (4) awakening as “leaving sleep to go to the myth of sense”

We highlight the value of this sequence because it allows for the questioning of the function of that dream, whose staging was required for the emergence of questioning and of a second awakening. Naparstek (2005, p. 53) says that it was a dream that clearly expressed “the siege the neurotic myth raised around it [the anguish]”, with the consequence that, by showing this siege, it causes its downfall. He will say that this is the moment when, according to Jacques-Alain Miller (2004), “the object *a* loses the charm of its substantial forms (p. 130).

From this event narrated in Naparstek’s testimonies, Frida Nemirovsky (2004, p. 24) emphasizes the fall of the Other, “an impossibility to wait longer, thus unraveling the end of analysis”, and ends her presentation by saying:

To conclude, I should differentiate this feature from other dreams, which I listened on cartels I participated, in which the presence of the Other was notorious and mostly in the form of a demand for recognition, very far from a real without angst. (p. 26)

It is important not to lose sight that the dream told by Naparstek revolved around the *object voice*. The scene in which the author dreams of killing his first-born son corresponds point by point to the biblical account where the *voice* of God asked Abraham – the second name of Fabián Naparstek co-incidentally – to kill his first-born son. Abraham, about to perform such an act of obedience to his Other, is stopped by the *voice* of an angel indicating that his faith was proved.

As we mentioned at the beginning, in his testimony, Naparstek emphasizes the lack of anguish at the moment of awakening. In another testimony (Naparstek, 2007, p. 23), this author recounts a previous dream: standing at the front of the great lecture hall – where he taught classes every week – he notes it was completely empty. The Other with whom he had been talking all this time had lost consistency. From these dreams, the passer “writes” – or retroactively “reads” – its fantasy axiom: “being the *voice* of the Other”.

Therefore, these developments provide a precision regarding the relationship between the depiction of the object *a* in end-of-analysis dreams and the awakening. Although this proposal establishes a close link between the presentation of the object *a* and the awakening, it also highlights that it is not the awakening caused by angst but the awakening as an event, as a demarcation of a before and an after.

Once again, this mention of an awakening without angst allows for an understanding of the insertion of the object in the oneiric scene other ways than just by its ominous side. In the dream of Naparstek, the voice appears to soon

disappear: once awake, he can place the logic that forced him to any sacrifice to embody the Other’s *voice*. It is clear from his testimony that this logic could be recognized because the awakening without anguish from that dream raised a question in the dreamer. Such awakening thus provides a valuable indicator about an awakening mode that does not correspond to the abrupt or immediate one – as the ominous awakening – but that implies in certain serenity – as Naparstek calls it.

In the following and last contribution discussed in this article, this distance between *object a* and *awakening* is emphasized.

The object *a* in the index-dreams

A valuable contribution to our field of research was given by Marcelo Mazzuca, on August 28, 2010, in the *Jornadas sobre el Pase* [Conferences about the Pass] of the Analytical Forum of Rio de La Plata. His presentation, later published as a chapter in the book *Ecos del Pase* [Echoes from the Pass] (Mazzuca, 2011), proposed already from the title a new category: the *index-dreams*.

It consists of a series of dreams – some occurred during analysis and other during the pass –, that the author chooses to emphasize in their value as events.

He starts from the differentiation proposed by Colette Soler in “*Acerca del sueño*” (1988): the figuration and the staging. This division is retaken by Mazzuca to distinguish index-dreams from everyday dreams – usually characterized by metonymy promotion and word guidance. Indeed, the author notes that, while most dreams promote the analysis work and the signifier movement, thus stimulating a dynamic; index-dreams operate more as a brake to such work and mark the turning point of the analysis.

But from what would these dreams be an index? Mazzuca (2011) will say that they are an “*index* of a relationship established between *desire* and *satisfaction* in a particular moment of the experience” (p. 38)¹. This excerpt refers to the notion of *end satisfaction*, coined by Colette Soler (2013, p. 104) to name some findings on the pass device, following a statement of Lacan (1976/2012): “The illusion of truth, from which we can only expect the lie . . . has no other term than the satisfaction marks the end of analysis.” (p. 600).

Consequently, Mazzuca considers that the index-dreams embody a “special state of fastening between *desire* and *satisfaction*” (Mazzuca, 2011, p. 38)², from which we emphasize the word “state”. This state can also be considered as an edge since the author postulates that “the analysis work . . . brought the desire to the edges of the Ideal, to confront it with the drive (especially in its oral and invoking version), and the dream is an index of that edge” (p. 41).

In his presentation, the author relates 10 dreams and attributes to one of them the value of an index for the end of his analysis. It is a very short dream, in which two or

1 Italics in the original.

2 Italics in the original.

three fingers of the hand melted, which was associated with some signifiers of his analysis. The author considers that this index-dream “occurred to signalize the existence of a new desire, and of its relation to the already obtained satisfaction” (Mazzuca, 2011, p. 45). For him, this oneiric production “retroactively sanctioned the end of analysis” and works as a hinge for starting to work on the pass. It is noteworthy that the melting of some fingers alludes to the dilution of a phallic object, which takes us back to the observation of Nepomiachi.

However, the author mentions that later, during his participation in this device, other dreams ensued that were not as easily distinguishable as signifier-dreams or index-dreams:

It was as if each of the dreams of that experience easily remitted, without the need for an associative unfolding, to some elements or aspects of the pivot dream A dream that could not qualify as a Freudian “biographical” dream because there the biography is reduced to its minimum elements until it practically disappears. (Mazzuca, 2011, p. 48)

It is also interesting to note that, once completed the journey as a passer and nominated for the school, Mazzuca once again had a dream with the characteristics of an index-dream, closing the process.

Having said that, the author especially points out the importance of *oral* and *invoking objects* in this series of dreams. However, the object *a* does not appear in them in the usual crude way but rather veiled and inserted into a plot. *Orality* is alluded to by scenes and banquets; the *voice*, through music and conversation. In such dreams, a form of presence of the object that is not of an ominous character, but is linked in a different way to the satisfaction, can be seen. In this sense, these dreams are more similar to the usual ones than to those that occur near the end of analysis. Nevertheless, they have a specific feature: they put an already obtained satisfaction, posterior to the traversal of fantasy and concerning the conclusive effects of the treatment in to the scene (Cottet, 2000; Yacoi, 2002, 2012). In short, this is an oneiric depiction of the change caused by the analysis on the subject’s *jouissance* (Alomo, Muraro, & Lombardi, 2013).

This author does not mention the awakening from those dreams since this does not seem to be a central element of the topic. The object *a* in these dreams is veiled and intertwined, allowing one to notice the movement of the drive after the traversal of fantasy, which is strongly linked with the sublimation.

Final considerations

As we could see in the contributions of these authors, a dream is particularly able to show the construction of the fantasy and the new relations established between desire and satisfaction at the end of analysis. In this sense, it is evident that psychoanalysts who work in the theorization

of the pass agree with the importance the passers give to dreams, even recognizing that the dream is often a protagonist in sessions in which the construction of the fantasy axiom is carried out. Similarly, the dream is usually the unconscious formation that better captures the *symptomatic* arrangements found at the end of the analytical process. This issue is inseparable from the notion of drive conceived for the end of analysis, whose path meets in a more flexible way than something that had previously, painfully insisted in the repetition of the fantasy.

We could see that the contribution of Colette Soler, a pioneer in the topic, begins to outline a panorama to discuss the insertion of the drive into the dream. This issue, directly addressed by Lacan in his response to Marcel Ritter, acquires an essential accuracy in the hands of Soler, by her explaining of the reasons why it can be distinguished between the negativity of the dream’s navel and the positivity of the object’s presence. In that text, Lacan had raised guidelines by stating that the relation between the dream’s navel and the orifices of the body is only an analogy, but Soler, when returning to the issue, explains this insertion of the drive into the oneiric more specifically, establishing a link between the appearance of the object *a* and the effect of awakening.

On the other hand, the contribution of Ricardo Nepomiachi can be put in line with Soler’s since both emphasize specific modes of depiction of the object *a* in the dream. We especially emphasize the author’s description of the dreams where the objects appeared empty or dissolved, as in those it is possible to situate the oneiric depiction of a satisfaction that does not provoke anguish and, therefore, does not cause immediate awakening.

This nuance of the issue led us to the work of Frida Nemirovsky and Fabián Naparstek, whose theory of awakening without angst allows for thought about the inclusion of the object in the oneiric scene, otherwise than by its ominous side. In the dream of Naparstek, the voice appears to disappear soon afterwards, so that the objects there are presented in a manner that is consistent with Nepomiachi’s description. Although it is not about the dissolution of the object in the dream itself, the fall of the superego weight embodied in the voice is expressly emphasized by Naparstek as an effect of that dream. This gives us an indicator on a modality of our second variable that does not correspond to the abrupt or the immediate as awakening due to the ominous, but which implies a certain serenity.

It is clear that the fantasy traversal inaugurates a relation with the *jouissance* that has some distance from the painful repetition, as it is in its center in the castration, promoted in the symbolic and with effects on what is real and imaginary. Some sublimation movement is acquired as *savoir faire* at the end of the treatment and mentioned by each individual analyzed in a very singular way. As explained by Marcelo Mazzuca and mentioned by several passers, this is usually reflected in dreams.

Thanks to the index-dreams reported on and theorized by this author, we could see a kind of embodiment

of the object *a* in the oneiric scene that is not ominous but that is inserted in a plot and participates in the individual *symptomatic* solution.

Yet, the question is, finally, what would differentiate those dreams from usual satisfaction dreams, which we know since “The Interpretation of dreams” (Freud, 1900/2001). We believe that the answer lies in a fact clearly referred to by the dreamers: it is one thing to dream of a desired satisfaction and another thing to have the firm conviction that this satisfaction already happened and that it is ascribed to the dream. As we said, index-dreams allow us to appreciate the drive movement after the fantasy traversal, which is strongly linked to sublimation.

We believe these elaborations around the object *a* in the end-of-analysis dreams are inseparable from the notion of *subjective destitution*. As we know, the sublimation, unlike the other drive destinations, comes

from the castration instead of masking it. We could notice the differences between some oneiric depictions of the object that lead to an abrupt awakening and others that show it inserted in a plot concerning the satisfaction found, through figuration of the object emptying and a distinct form to awake without anguish as described by one of the authors.

It is, therefore, possible to conclude that the progress of the treatment towards subjection destitution leads to the object as a real embodiment of the subject, inevitably creating a relationship with the castration, which is reflected, among other things, in the dreams. It could be thought that the dissolution of the object in the dream scene accounts for the loss of a certain deadly *jouissance*, while the sublimation exercise is gaining place and allowing another relationship with the object, which starts from castration and allows for a more flexible drive.

O objeto *a* nos sonhos de final de análise

Resumo: Este artigo situa-se dentro da psicanálise lacaniano e tem como objetivo discutir as contribuições teóricas sobre a figuração do objeto *a* nos sonhos de final de análise e a sua relação com o acordar. Se utilizam as ferramentas conceituais próprias da disciplina para analisar quatro contribuições teóricas: a proposta de Colette Soler, quem considera a aparição do objeto *a* em alguns sonhos como o ponto de inserção da pulsão, que leva ao acordar; as contribuições de Ricardo Nepomiachi sobre a figuração onírica do esvaziamento ou dissolução do objeto *a*; a relação entre o objeto e o acordar sem angústia destacado por Frida Nemirovsky e Fabián Naparstek; e a noção de *sonhos-índice*, proposta por Marcelo Mazzuca, na qual o objeto insere-se numa trama onírica, segundo uma relação estabelecida entre desejo e satisfação em determinado momento da análise.

Palavras-chave: sonho, objeto, psicanálise.

L’objet *a* dans les rêves de fin d’analyse

Résumé : L’article se place dans le cadre de la psychanalyse lacanienne et son but est le débat de certaines contributions théoriques sur l’expression de l’objet *a* dans les rêves de fin d’analyse et sa relation avec le réveil. On utilise des instruments d’analyse propres de la discipline afin d’examiner quatre contributions théoriques : la proposition de Colette Soler de considérer l’apparition de l’objet *a* dans certains rêves comme le point d’insertion de la pulsion, ce qui conduit au réveil ; les développements de Ricardo Nepomiachi autour de l’expression onirique du videment de l’objet ; la relation entre l’objet et le réveil sans angoisse souligné par Frida Nemirovsky et Fabián Naparstek ; et la notion de rêves-indices, proposé par Marcelo Mazzuca, où l’objet s’insère dans une trame onirique, selon une relation établie entre désir et satisfaction dans un moment donné de la cure.

Mots-clés : rêve, objet, psychanalyse.

El objeto *a* en los sueños de fin de análisis

Resumen: Este artículo se ubica en el marco del psicoanálisis lacaniano y su objetivo es la discusión de aportes teóricos sobre la plasmación del objeto *a* en los sueños de fin de análisis y su relación con el despertar. Se utilizan herramientas conceptuales de la disciplina para analizar cuatro contribuciones teóricas: la propuesta de Colette Soler de considerar la aparición del objeto *a* en algunos sueños como el punto de inserción de la pulsión, que conduce al despertar; los desarrollos de Ricardo Nepomiachi acerca de la plasmación onírica del vaciamiento del objeto *a*; la relación entre el objeto y el despertar sin angustia destacado por Frida Nemirovsky y Fabián Naparstek; y la noción de *sueños-índice*, postulada por Marcelo Mazzuca, en los cuales el objeto se inserta en una trama onírica, según una relación establecida entre deseo y satisfacción en determinado momento del análisis.

Palabras clave: sueño, objeto, psicoanálisis.

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