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EDITORIAL

POLITICS AS A REQUIREMENT. ON THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AS AN ETHICAL CATEGORY

To speak of democracy today implies having an idea of the evolution of law as a guarantee for its exercise. Nobody can express himself around the elements that constitute it without making references to its fundamental structure, that is, the right to an autobiography. Let us see what is meant by such.

When a ruler reaches the control of the power that the political right gives him through the organs of legitimacy, that base his exercise in democratic terms, it means that he submits in an unrestricted way to the limits that the same power consecrates for its materialization. Thus, when the Law that legitimates him, orders him to make all the necessary efforts to guarantee a life not only viable but satisfactory in social terms for all the citizens that make up the political conglomerate, he is reaffirming that it is him (the political class or, the party in power) justly responsible for the viability of the system, formally speaking, and the personal viability of each member of the polis, in material terms, including governance institutions. The mere mention in the Constitutional Letters of the countries that call themselves democratic by way of their political declaration, is enough argument to attribute not only political responsibility when these guarantees are not evident from the daily social praxis, but from what is much more profound, of the moral responsibility that every democratic order wields, just as an ethical guarantee of compliance

with social benefits, especially when it does not take the necessary measures so that society, and the individuals considered in it, achieve the level of satisfaction in terms of the materiality that is its own, translatable in social achievements and promotions, projected towards what all ethics, whether formal or material, conventional or non-conventional, point to as a way of realizing the humanly human, that is, to dignity. The legal discourse is based precisely on these arguments with demands of compliance under justly binding parameters.

Materiality is then constituted in a system of frameworks that political praxis resolves in terms of satisfaction, thus dignity is the ethical category that today is raised as part of the conceptual structure of material ethics; this, together with the formal ethics of procedural type, lead to the conformation of a constitutional State in consonance with what has been called in the contemporary Philosophy of Law, democratic State of law; precisely because it assumes a concept of law beyond legal positivism, reductionist by definition, thus encompassing what a philosopher of our era has called "the third way of law", to mention a third party not excluded, beyond classical logic, in the dualism positivism-iusphilosophical naturalism, which focuses its action on the process action of fundamental rights.

Well, in that ethical framework of political action, the responsibility of the ruler is not properly an option when it comes to giving an account of his leading role in those societies materially poor; it is their obligation, because their leading role in directing resources

and actions towards the "de-impoverishment" of the pauper fest gives them a north in the search and contribution for the closing of that disgraceful social gap, which tends to widen in times of economic crisis product of political crisis; This occurs especially when a model of action tries by force of circumstance to take a place, while the struggles to leave the "blind streets" in which the path has been changed become everyday life; and while the weak ones of the political event could literally end, and actually die, it is logical to think that this gives strength to that action, in all the ethical senses in which it can go. Hence, action is by definition an ethical category, as classical philosophers and contemporaries think (Heraclitus, Socrates, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant, Arendt, Dworking, Habermas).

In this way, then, democracy becoming a necessary link in the chain of "disempowerment" of those more and more numerous thrown on the edge of the road product of literally "irresponsible" models, acquires a moral commitment from which to make efforts for to contribute in the satisfaction of the needs that the social claimants demand every time also with much more force, and to try with much more reason the construction of an autobiography of life. Thus, the life of every person who lives in a society that has become impoverished for the sake of politics becomes a necessary link to build another chain, that of the right to self-fulfillment in the context of a participatory democracy. However, this usually does not happen without trying to arm it, close it and hang it as a tassel both in the "social neck" and in each subject, there is no commitment in terms of responsibility of those called to guide the impoverished, not to drive it

to inaction, because it would take it along opposite paths, already demonstrated by praxis and history; for in this way he would remain poor to the point of being clearly without a soul, that is, without encouragement for action; but that the impulse he receives is so that his impoverished corporeality can cross the heavy threshold that prevents him from seeing the light of biographical self-realization, and with it alleviate his daily burdens of despair and insomnia due to the absence of coexistence, overarched by that burden of extreme poverty in which it is submerged by the "democratic oblivion"

Building an autobiography in literally poor societies then becomes a struggle for life. And this in ethical terms is demand to the authority, but it is also interpellation. Every construction of autobiography in times of crisis has this duality, which is why it becomes at the same time a fight of supposed opposites; it is said "assumptions" because in reality a self-fulfilled autobiography through the struggles for life and through political, personal and social interpellations, are from these sides the same face of the same coin: any interpellation if successful becomes recognition, which in ethical terms is necessarily of life. Thus, as a consequence, constructing the roads through which those interpellant subjects will have to transit to political authority, means having a clear vision of the personal and social horizon, since it is in the latter where the first will be carried out, thus generating an unequalled synergy between individuals and society: it is precisely the commitment of responsibility that is acquired in the face of the devastating force of self-satisfaction.

All of the above makes us think that all autobiography, in situations of extreme poverty, involves making attempts to awaken the soulless, that is, the one who has been left literally without a soul; that is to say, to the poor man who has been left without spirits, asleep, for the sake of circumstances, to follow the path, since he has been thrown to the shore during his march; it is necessary that he learns even to feed himself and to recover reasons so that in his dream of self-fulfillment of life he can reach the levels of satisfaction to the point that he can again start walking towards that horizon that he had forgotten, or that he had forgotten due to forces alien to their own understanding. Guiding the members of a society towards self-fulfillment of their own biography begins by trying to give an intelligence of their situation of subject with possibilities and dreams, but also of shortcomings and ambitions to overcome them by their own efforts.

On the other side, that is to say, of the person questioned as the possessor of resources and of the force of the Law that he has fundamentally received, he is also given to contribute with the reconstruction of that chain of self-fulfillment of the subject, in highly impoverished societies by force of circumstances, beyond the State's own resources, and often caused by its "inaction", or in better words, by an inoperative action. To persist in an action that does not contribute at all in the fulfillment of the autobiography of each subject, is to maintain a stubborn effort to dissolve a society that has possibilities of realization by counting a country with sufficient resources for all, however that individual is out of date. Such

circumstances do not have the strength and intelligence to understand their own situation as subject with rights; that is, he lost everything on the road. The respondent's responsibility is then to give the "unhappy" reasons to continue his path to self-realization. This individuality is insisted on, because in the attempts to collectivize and generalize the individual as an interpellant, the interpellant merely "erases" him from the social map of demands to which he is bound by the moral circumstances to be met: from so much collectivism, the individual he ends up martyred as an indispensable subject for his own autobiography.

From all this it is understood then that an autobiography in extreme situations of fulfillment requires that mentioned duality: of the motor forces that the action makes to resurface, and of the political responsibility of those who possess not only political but moral power. Let us dedicate some lines to this last category. What is it that makes political power become moral power in a context of confrontation caused by extreme circumstances? Actually the question is tricky, because what it is about is to look at the moral power that political action generates by force of its moral commitment. If you want, the answer is already included in the question, that is why it is "malicious"; every political force, if you will, is already possessed of a moral force, because all political power serves the circumstances of good; so that if he is not able to produce it, then it means that his moral forces are exhausted or not present for action. Hence, moral forces are the gene of all political force. Their absence makes the political forces

monsters of social organization, condemned to death by malicious and malicious; they become "political defects".

The moral forces that every political force possesses as the foundation of its action, come precisely from thinking about the possibilities of self-realization of the subject; not in feeding it, because it is not even a characteristic in other beings of the animal kingdom (beyond Darwinism, of course), much less in endowing it with material goods necessary for subsistence; precisely the most outstanding characteristic of the human being is that of being autonomous and not self-sufficient, because according to the first, he is endowed with reason to understand it in that way; but in relation to the second, the cooperation to be able to satisfy all the material requirements although it is also derived from the reason, is much more complicated to understand more here of the individualism, because it is also of its corporeal nature. And Kant made the first aspect very clear to express that morality is autonomous, and that the individual has a social nature, meaning that the strength of moral resides in the decision-making power of every subject called to action in a context of sociability; that is, in the context of every being belonging to the human species. The Philosopher of Königsberg is not very clear about the latter.

Thus, the moral forces come from our own human condition, so there is no political force that can destroy this essentiality that is genetic in every member of the genre. For that reason, political decisions cannot materially eliminate this essentiality, even if it

depletes all formal efforts in the attempt; moral autonomy is irreducible before any political action. Rather, political action is limited by the moral forces that are proper to it, because they function as the genetic code of political action, and by the autonomy that underlies all action. This is the sense of understanding that we could have in front of the reality of autobiography as a moral requirement. Now let us see it as a political requirement.

Previously it had been said that autobiography in societal terms has two dimensions: autonomy as a moral essence, and interpellation as the ethical requirement of every subject in moral and political terms. In this last sense, a transcendental role plays not only the character of the petitioner of that interpellation, but also that of the passive subject as the center of the act of petition as well. In this way, all political projects are drawn to remove from poverty all those who have lost their north as a subject of action. It is there where the demands that democracy itself makes rest on the head of the political order, that is, the society legally speaking, come into play, as suggested above. Democracy in these terms becomes a political order thanks to the ethical spirit of its institutions.

In the order of these ideas, a need arises that from the ethical point of view becomes a call for compliance as formal democratic, political and legal demand, beyond materiality but not bypassing it but rather considering it in its very essence moral. Thus, the need for attention and consideration of one who is in the democratic oblivion, is no longer an ethical issue; has become a legal requirement of essential

order as essential is human nature. The natural right based on natural law is combined with the procedurality of rights that are positively consecrated to give a new impulse to coexistence, in view of the novel political resources that have been emerging by political malpractice to manipulate the democratic order. In this way, the positivization of rights together with the arguments to demonstrate that democracy is no longer a project without more but the ethical guarantee of fulfilling the call to the solidification of the person as a human person, that is, as the protagonist of the moral order instituted by the fundamental rights contained in the Constitutions, contribute to the formation of a binding opinion that assembles a framework of defense of the rules of institutionalization for the administration of resources based on the Law in a way that guarantees that attempts of overcoming critical poverty are really that, true hopeful attempts at a better life in coexistence, transforming the expectations of a good life into the right to possess an autobiography.

In this way, that right to an autobiography, translated in terms of ethical and political demand, permeates all the spaces of individuality that make up society as a whole, from which each subject carries a right to the free development of his personality, as the modern democratic Constitutions usually point out. Then, the Human Rights in all their extension can be condensed in this category now elevated to the rank of Fundamental Right. From there to his judicial demand there is nothing but mediation between ethical action in terms of legal and political action.

Finally it can be affirmed that the autobiography of each person is a right to which he has access based on the right to design his own life according to the eligibility criteria of options that democracy as a value presents to him; that is, by virtue of their right to action. That is the north of all procedural democracy in the double perspective mentioned: formal and material. There is no other way without it being non-conflictive or devaluating. However, this is another issue.

Dr. José Vicente Villalobos Antúnez
Editor in chief



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