1. Introduction

The relationship between the metaphysics of laws of nature and the ontology of time is a rather under-explored topic.¹ As it seems to me, the views about laws are mostly considered to be independent of the views about time,² i.e. every metaphysics of laws seems to be compatible with every ontology of time. Secondly, my impression is that according to many authors the crucial issue within the philosophy of time is whether the future is ‘open’ or not. Since the laws of nature are deterministic or probabilistic independently of their metaphysical status, it again seems to be irrelevant what the underlying ontology of time is.

In contrast, it seems to me initially plausible that a passive understanding of laws requires static time, i.e. “eternalism”, whereas an active understanding of laws requires dynamic time, i.e. the “growing block view” or “presentism”, and that both implications are independent of the determinism/indeterminism distinction. The purpose of this paper is to provide convincing arguments in support of this plausibility. Laws of nature are passive just in case they merely supervene on a ‘given’ distribution of objects, events, or properties⁴; this view will be identified with “Humeanism”. They are active just in case they (partly) ‘generate’ such a distribution on the basis of initial conditions; this view will be identified with “Power metaphysics”. So, I will argue that Humeanism requires eternalism, and Power metaphysics requires non-eternalism, i.e. the growing block view or presentism.

My purpose is hence to show that the world is passive-static or active-dynamical, independently of the future being ‘open’. Before going on, there are apparently many terminological clarifications in order, in particular because I am arguing here across several debates (including those from the philosophy of spacetime). Concerning “Power metaphysics”, I should exclude the variant according to which the fundamental physical properties such as mass and charge —considered as dispositions— ‘generate’ the regularities without any help of the laws which merely “flow” (Bird 2007, 2) from them. In that case, the laws would indeed be passive, and active only the properties, but Power metaphysics would still require dynamic time. Then, I in fact exclude the (possible) variant according to which the relation between the disposition and its manifestation is merely a (de re) modal relation. In that case, one may have the vision that there are ‘already’ existing relata between which, e.g., a relation of necessity holds. This would indeed be compatible with eternalism, but would fall prey to Lewis’s complaint with Armstrong’s necessity relation: “metaphysical necessity” is merely a label when not combined with productive sense. “Power metaphysics” is hence restricted to the view that dispositional properties productively cause their manifestations, that the manifestations depend existentially on the dispositions. This view requires non-eternalism.

“Humeanism” is comparatively simple. The fundamental physical tokens such as mass and charge are considered to be categorical, i.e. independent of their actual causal role. The laws of nature supervene on the ‘totality’ of contingently distributed categorical entities (see Lewis 1986, ix). However, note that they are actually dispositional, in the neutral sense of the term that they actually play a causal role. The difference to Power metaphysics is that according to Humeanism mass and charge do not essentially play that actual causal role; they are not essentially dispositional. Thus, Humeanism allows for causal dependence relations between categorical properties, but excludes productively causal dependence relations. Likewise, eternalism allows for several dependence relations between ‘eternally’ existing relata (including alleged non-Humean, but non-productive modal relations), but what Humeanism and eternalism exclude is existential dependency between temporally separated entities. Further, I should stress that I will not defend the packages Humeanism/eternalism and Powers/non-eternalism as biconditionals. Eternalism, the growing block view, and presentism are perfectly compatible with the view that there are no laws at all. Also, “primitivism” of laws seems to be compatible with every ontology of time.⁵

Concerning “eternalism” (“block universe view”) et al., I will need an extra section to spell out the views in an adequate way. Roughly, of course, eternalism says that past, present, and future things exist on a par, while the growing block view affirms the existence only of past and present entities and presentism only of the present ones. However, no reasonable eternalist intends to say that, e.g., dinosaurs exist now so that there is undoubtedly a sense in which dinosaurs do not exist. The challenge is to combine the view that dinosaurs (and future things) do not exist now with the view that they ‘nevertheless’ exist simpliciter.⁶ This challenge is satisfied by self-declared eternalists and by (eternalism-descriptions of) their opponents in different ways, as I see it. That matters for my present purpose. For, if one believes that Humeanism is compatible with non-eternalism, one apparently has a different understanding of eternalism in mind as in the case in which one believes that Power metaphysics is compatible with eternalism. So, both my opponents have different (non-)eternalist views: the first’s view of non-eternalism is —so to speak— not dynamical enough, the second’s view of eternalism is too dynamical. In contrast to both, I intend to show that the most challenging understanding of eternalism —which I will call “perspectival eternalism”⁷— is (still) incompatible with Power metaphysics, and that sharpened non-eternalism is in fact incompatible with Humeanism.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is devoted to spelling out (non-)eternalism to the extent as needed. Subsequently, the metaphysics of laws enter: Section 3 argues in favor of Humeanism requiring (perspectival) eternalism, and Section 4 defends Power metaphysics implying (sharpened) non-eternalism. Humean contingency cannot stand within a (really) dynamical world, whereas dispositions cannot exercise their productive powers within (any sort of) the block universe. Both packages are independent of whether the world is (in)deterministic.

2. Spelling out (non-)eternalism

In this section, I will firstly spell out the most challenging understanding of eternalism. It includes a perspectival sense of existence, namely a temporally restricted way of being according to which as of the time of dinosaurs no computer exists.⁸ Thus, eternalism does neither imply that everything exists eternally in the sense of always nor that existentially nothing happens at all; instead, there is a sense in which from time to time different things exist. It is a sense of temporal variability, however, that must be compatible with the non-perspectival sense of existence according to which dinosaurs and computers exist on a par. Correspondingly, the mere focus on perspectival existence is not sufficient for the opponent views of growing block or presentism; non-eternalism has to be sharpened by rather modifying the non-perspectival sense of existence. In short, eternalism turns out to be more ‘dynamical’ than (perhaps) assumed, and non-eternalism must accordingly be even more dynamical, i.e. truly dynamical.

My purpose in this paper is to say (1) that Humeanism requires eternalism and so that the apparent compatibility of Humeanism with the growing block view is rather the compatibility of Humeanism with perspectival eternalism, and (2) that Power metaphysics is incompatible even with the most challenging understanding of eternalism, but properties as being essentially dispositional require sharpened growing block view or presentism in order to exercise their powers. This implies that (local) indeterminism does not lead to growing block —i.e. “open-future Humeanism” (see Hüttemann 2014, with reference to Beebee and Mele 2002) does not equal “non-eternalist Humeanism” (see Backmann 2016)—, and that determinism as objective metaphysical necessity does not undermine the productively dynamical Power world. Again: (1) even perspectival eternalism assumes, for each physical token, an existential independence without which Humean contingency cannot stand, and (2) the existential dependence of physical tokens on being (formerly) present —as it is required by sharpened non-eternalism— is of a dynamical character without which dispositions cannot exercise their powers. In particular, existential dependence on being (formerly) present turns out to be productively dynamical when combined with Power metaphysics of laws. Further, this is independent of whether the laws are deterministic or probabilistic.

Crucially, perspectival eternalism has to be characterized by a combination of an unrestricted and a temporally restricted sense of existence. Applied to Minkowski’s block universe, one possibility is the following:⁹

(Tenseless) Existence [simpliciter]: event e exists in a non-perspectival sense of existence iff it is located somewhere in spacetime, i.e. at some spacetime point p or other.

(Tenseless) Existence [as of p]: event e exists in a perspectival sense of existence, i.e. (tenselessly) as of a given p, iff it is located at p or at some p' within or on the (so-called) past lightcone of p.

The non-perspectival sense of existence is intended to express the idea that eternalism is a static view of temporal existence. Note, however, that the perspectival sense of existence is not merely pragmatic nor epistemic. For, the temporal perspective is not a perspective that ‘one chooses’, but there rather are objective restrictions in the world. What exists as of p objectively differs from what exists as of p'. What makes this eternalistic is the fact that both restrictions are ontologically on a par, i.e. every entity, may it exist as of p or as of p' (or, both), exists simpliciter. Again, this does not mean that existing simpliciter is existing truly, while existing as-of-p is somehow deficient: according to perspectival eternalism, there simply are two different ways in which an object, event, or property exists.

Note further that the perspectival sense of existence does not necessarily include the (so-called) past. Instead, one may argue, for whatever reason, that as of p there exists only the entity located at p. Alternatively, in Newtonian spacetime all events exist as of p that are absolutely simultaneous (or, earlier) than the given event located at p. In general relativity it may again be different. What matters is that such dispute only concerns the restrictive sense of existence. All these variants can be considered as variants that have in common the given non-perspectival sense of existence. Thus, they all are variants of eternalism. Eternalism turns out to be more challenging, since now the opponents can no longer focus on the perspectival sense of existence but must modify the non-perspectival one.

The sharpened non-eternalist views must hold that the unrestricted sense of existence is temporally variable; what exists simpliciter varies with time. In particular, according to presentism, there seems to be only one single temporal perspective, namely the present one. Reasonably, the so-called present perspective is not even a perspective at all; for, there cannot be, in principle, a different one. Accordingly, the presentist’s non-perspectival sense of existence is tensed (see, analogously, Hestevold and Carter 2002):

(Tensed) Existence [simpliciter]: event e exists in a non-perspectival sense of existence iff it is present.

According to the sharpened dynamical growing block view, it does not only ‘vary’ what exists as of p (or, t) but it really varies what exists simpliciter.¹⁰

Regarding the connection with Humeanism or Power metaphysics, the questions to be answered turn out to be the following:

1. Is it possible that the simpliciter-totality on which the Humean laws supervene is temporally variable (e.g., growing)?

2. Is it possible that the local properties out of which the Power laws “flow” (Bird 2007, 2) are those existing perspectively as of p (or, t)?

Before going on, a short remark on the challenge from relativity is in order here. The challenge says that relativity is incompatible with non-eternalism. If so, the lesson of the subsequent two sections is that Power metaphysics is ruled out by relativity.

However, some arguments in favor of relativity requiring eternalism in fact only strike against the growing block view but not against presentism. It is said, e.g., that the ‘moving’ edge of being constitutes a global time order within the increasing block, but (general) relativity includes models of the universe with closed timelike curves, i.e. without a globally consistent time order. Presentism, by contrast, is perfectly compatible with (or, even required by) the view that time is fundamentally temporal directionality and does not imply that the ‘moving’ Now automatically constitutes a globally consistent time order (see Friebe 2016). Further, Earman argues that the causal set approach to quantum gravity suggests that a growing block emerges by underlying productive causality (see Earman 2008, sec. 7). Here, the growing block is connected essentially with productive causation; so there is justified hope in the kindness of nature that the speculative piece of Section 4 can be naturalized.¹¹

3. Humeanism requires eternalism

onsider, with these ontologies of time in mind, the metaphysics of laws. In this section, I will defend the claim that Humeanism requires eternalism, i.e. that the simpliciter-totality as the supervenience basis for laws (the Humean mosaic) must be the block universe. I offer two arguments. The first argument says that Humeanism cannot answer the changing-laws challenge that arises when one takes seriously the (sharpened) dynamical views of temporal existence. The second says that Humeanism implies contingency in a way that makes everything existentially independent of anything other, whereas in a dynamical world objects, events, or properties are existentially dependent on being (formerly) present.

To begin with, I will firstly debug the impression to the contrary that Humeanism is compatible at least with the growing block view. The impression has to do with confounding “open future Humeanism” with “non-eternalist Humeanism”:¹² In my view, open-future Humeanism is a debatable position, but non-eternalist Humeanism is not. It is important, for my purpose, to firstly clarify this issue because the (mis-)identification of open-future Humeanism with non-eternalist Humeanism is motivated by (partly right) observations on indeterminism. However, I want to argue that the determinism/indeterminism distinction doesn’t matter!

The reasoning (to be debugged) goes as follows: Following Lewis there is a certain sort of indeterminism compatible both with Humeanism and with his underlying eternalist assumption. Let’s call it “global indeterminism”. However, as Beebee and Mele (2002) have shown, there is a quite different sort of indeterminism compatible with Humeanism, call it “local indeterminism”. This sort of indeterminism seems to be non-Lewisian and so contradicts his eternalist assumption. Therefore, Humeanism is also compatible with non-eternalism. Against it, I will firstly argue that even this local indeterminism is compatible with (perspectival) eternalism (whereas, as will be argued subsequently, (sharpened) non-eternalism is in fact incompatible with Humeanism).

Global indeterminism states the following. The Humean mosaic consists in categorical properties distributed over the static simpliciter-whole of spacetime (eternalist assumption). Then, the Best System in accordance with this distribution can contain probabilistic laws. Indeterminism can be identified with these probabilistic laws. This indeterminism is ontological, rather than merely epistemical, although epistemic virtues (simplicity, strength, balance) are involved in the characterization of the Best System. For, in the world there really is, e.g., a 50/50-distribution of spin-up/spin-down outcomes when spin-measurements are made. It is global, rather than local, since the outcome of a spin-measurement at p is indetermined by the events located in (or, on) the past lightcone of p only because the outcome is different at some other point p' where the situation is completely similar. Locally, by contrast, there is only one real future, i.e. there is no branching of different possible futures there. As it seems, global indeterminism is compatible with eternalism precisely because in the local future lightcone of p the particular outcome of the measurement at p is ‘already given’.

Local, but still Humean, indeterminism consists in the (apparent) absence of constraining laws as of a given time t or spacetime point p. Since the Humean supervenience basis of laws must be the totality, the whole of time or spacetime, the eternal simpliciter-laws hold timelessly, i.e. not already at a given time t (or, p). They do not hold always, not at every time, but only at the end of time (if there is any). Before the end of time, namely at t (or, p), hence as long as time progresses, the Humean mosaic is “incomplete”. The reductive laws are fixed only when the world has come to an end; before that, the supervenience basis needs to be completed. Time progresses, and the whole of spacetime successively emerges until, at the very last moment, it will be complete. The eternal simpliciter-laws do not determine the course of events, but the events determine what at the end of the universe these laws will be. All this sounds ‘dynamical’, so that it, seemingly, cannot be said with the eternalist assumption.

With only global indeterminism, the underlying whole is simply ‘given’, the laws are ‘eternally’ fixed, period: nothing happens. With local indeterminsim, in contrast, the local future is not ‘already’ given, apparently in conflict with the ‘givenness’ of all entities according to eternalism. So, global indeterminism requires eternalism, but local indeterminism requires non-eternalism. However, this reasoning is wrong: eternalism, so understood, is misleadingly characterized only by the ‘perspective from nowhere’. By contrast, perspectival eternalism must be characterized both non-perspectivally (from God’s eye) as well as by temporal restrictions, as of t (or, p). Open-future Humeanism (local indeterminism) can perfectly be based on perspectival eternalism and must be so: on the sharpened non-eternalist assumption, the Humean mosaic would always be complete; it is not incomplete presently or as of the edge of being. The simpliciter-totality on which the laws supervene varies with time, e.g., is growing according to the sharpened growing block view. From this it follows my first argument for Humeanism requiring eternalism.

First argument: non-eternalist Humeanism is at odds with the stability of laws. Usually, one assumes that the laws of nature are more or less stable, i.e. they generally do not change over time. Every metaphysics of laws has to provide an explanation for (or, at least, to be in accordance with) the temporal stability of laws.¹³ Taking seriously the difference between perspectival eternalism and the sharpened growing block view (or, sharpened presentism), it turns out that on the eternalist assumption one can properly respond to the changing-laws challenge but on the non-eternalist assumption one cannot. The crucial point is that a complete Humean mosaic contains all tokens that exist simpliciter, i.e. the supervenience basis for the laws includes the simpliciter-totality of all entities. With regard to (perspectival) eternalism, the totality is static, the unchanging whole of spacetime, and so the laws supervening on it are eternal at least in the sense of temporally stable. With regard to (sharpened) non-eternalism, however, the simpliciter-totality changes, and so, with Humean contingency, the supervening laws threaten to change, often and rapidly, as well.

Admittedly, open-future Humeanism is confronted with a similar challenge, but, on the perspectival eternalist assumption, there seems to be a consistent strategy to answer it.¹⁴ Here is the (no-laws) challenge for open-future Humeanism: If it is true that there is not only the simpliciter-totality but also (infinitely many) objective temporal restrictions and if it is true that, as of p (or, t), the mosaic contains only those events that exist as of that p, then the local supervenience basis really is incomplete. So, apparently, no laws are given then, and the arising challenge is the threat that nature starts to behave very differently after p.

My response goes as follows. Since, on the (perspectival) eternalist assumption, the mosaic as of p is a restriction of the mosaic simpliciter, there are indeed as-of-p laws holding at p which result by p-indexing the eternal laws (see, analogously, Backmann 2016).¹⁵ The as-of-p laws, as p-restrictions of the simpliciter-law(s), must be compatible with them. If, e.g., there is no faster-than-light signal so far, there might be a reason why it is so: because the contrary would be inconsistent with the simpliciter-laws supervening on the whole from which ‘as-of-p’ is merely a restriction. In other words, the notion of Humean contingency comes in different strengths. In one sense, namely simpliciter (non-perspectival), the property distribution is contingent in the way that in another possible world the distribution is completely different including completely different laws supervening on it. In another sense, namely from a temporal restriction (perspectival), it is contingent how the world proceeds.

In the latter case, there also is a larger pattern (the totality) —given from nowhere— in virtue of which the perspectival contingency is constrained. Here is room for justified hope in the kindness of nature that it will not behave very differently after p. Although there still might be sophisticated arguments against open-future Humeanism, there is, after all, apparently a consistent defense strategy. There is none, by contrast, on the (sharpened) non-eternalist assumption.

For, if “now” is not only an indexical indicating a temporal restriction, as it would be according to (perspectival) eternalism, but if “now” refers to the ontological (edge of) being, then, presently, the simpliciter-laws are fixed (and not only at the very end of the world). At the edge of being, the (alleged) supervenience basis is not incomplete —not to be completed at the very end of the world— but it is already always complete.¹⁶ However, since it changes over time what exists simpliciter (the totality itself is growing according to the sharpened growing block view), the varying so-far laws no longer are restrictions of eternal simpliciter-laws. Thus, there is no longer a Humean way to eternal laws, so no longer a way to temporally stable laws.

The hope in the kindness of nature is, in non-eternalist Humeanism, no longer justified: the (essential) Humean contingency cannot be constrained, but there is only the strong sense of contingency available in non-eternalist Humeanism. The complete supervenience basis is continuously changing, and this change of the totality is, on the Humean assumption, entirely contingent and independent of the so-far laws. Hence, the reductive laws that continuously supervene on this changing mosaic likely will always be different. Therefore, non-eternalist Humeanism cannot explain (or, is even in conflict with) the temporal stability of laws.

Second argument in favor of Humeanism requiring eternalism: Humeanism is non-productive which requires an ontology of time according to which physical tokens are existentially independent. Even the most challenging understanding of eternalism assumes existential independence of every object, event, or property from anything other, whereas according to the sharpened dynamical views of temporal existence physical tokens existentially depend on being (formerly) present. Perspectival eternalism allows that as of the time of dinosaurs no computers exist; so it allows for succession and coming into being, in the perspectival sense. However, the perspectival sense only is a restriction of the non-perspectival sense of existence, i.e. being located somewhere in spacetime. From this it follows that the perspectival realization relation pRp'—read: whatever is located at p' is realized as of p—is unconditioned reflexive: “R is surely reflexive” (Saunders 2002, 283).

The perspectival sense of existence substantially concerns only physical tokens located somewhere else. All the mentioned variants of eternalism (see Section 2) differ in what is realized as of a given p—whether everything absolutely simultaneous with p, or everything in the past lightcone of p, or what not—, as long as one considers entities located at some other point p'. They all have necessarily in common that the entity located at the given p is realized as of that p. The eternalist assumption is precisely this: everything exists as of the p of its own location. Every non-eternalist ontology of time denies precisely this by claiming that something substantial must be added to ‘being located at p’ in order to be realized as of p: namely being (formerly) presently located at p.

Humeanism requries the eternalist existential independence because it says that nothing substantial will be added to ‘being located at p’ if one states that the physical token has been produced at p.¹⁷ In a Humean world, the (deterministic or probabilistic) laws are not responsible for the distribution of the fundamental physical properties. Thus, they are not the ground for the existence of that development (which is even uncontroversial). Humean metaphysics assumes that either the existence of each object, event, or property is ungrounded or the ground for their existence is internal, i.e. it lies somehow within each entity considered for itself.

Take, e.g., charge and its alleged power to create an electromagnetic field. The Humeans agree with other views, in particular with Power metaphysics, about which physical tokens there are in the world. They disagree about the ontological status of these things, events, or properties. Humean contingency requires that the physical tokens simply succeed one another although some causal relations may supervene on them. The succession is simple exactly if the tokens are existentially independent from anything other; there are no existential dependence relations between distinct properties or events, nor do they depend existentially on laws or whatever else, e.g., not on a ‘moving’ present. Being located at p is the primitive concept, as well as according to eternalism, and nothing substantial would be added if one said that the entity e has been produced at p.¹⁸

The crucial point is that one must take seriously the difference between the ‘dynamical’ becoming, which is accepted by the reasonable eternalists via the perspectival sense of existence, and the dynamical becoming required by sharpened non-eternalism via the temporally variable simpliciter-existence. Humean contingency cannot stand in a dynamical world, because in such a world physical tokens are existentially dependent on the ‘moving’ present.

4. Power metaphysics requires non-eternalism

Let me now turn to Power metaphysics. I will defend the claim that essential dispositionalism requires the sharpened non-eternalist views. The argument says that dispositions only can exercise their powers to bring about other (later) physical tokens if they are present, i.e., with the growing block view in mind, located on the edge of being. Dispositions would be powerless if they existed merely perspectively at t (or, p). For, then, their manifestations would likewise exist merely perspectively at t' (or, p'), and, hence, both the dispositions and their manifestations would be ‘given’ anyway, i.e. they would equally exist simpliciter. Contrariwise, simpliciter-existence must vary with time.¹⁹

Still, there is the widespread intuition that Power metaphysics is compatible with the block universe view (see, e.g., Esfeld 2008, chap. 5). The idea firstly seems to be that the crucial difference between categoricalism and dispositionalism is that the latter recognizes metaphysically necessary connections (or, tendencies) among distinct physical tokens, whereas the former denies them. These modal relations allegedly can hold between (or, even require) ‘already’ existing relata. So understood, Power metaphysics lacks productive sense and is, therefore, compatible with eternalism. Connected with this understanding is the requirement that one needs (a particular sort of) indeterminism to save oneself from the block universe view (see McCall 1976; and Müller 2006, 456). By contrast, I hold that indeterminism gets its (desired) productive sense from sharpened dynamical temporal existence, and not the other way around.

De-re modal relations of necessity or tendency, I suggest, are underestimated if one denies their productive sense. If a necessitates (or, is a tendency for) b, b cannot exist ‘anyway’, i.e. the realization relation cannot be unconditioned reflexive. Rather, b only is located at its time t (or, its spacetime location p) when necessitated or successfully be *tendenced*, i.e. in English: brought about. To mimic Lewis’s complaint with Armstrong’s necessity relation, I would say that “metaphysical necessity” and “tendency” are mere labels when not combined with productive sense.

However, one even may argue that dispositions are productive without bringing the future into reality. Admittedly, a ‘present’ disposition brings about a later event but, the objection goes, if “now” is merely an indexical indicating a temporal restriction —as it is according to eternalism—, this holds for all dispositions, likewise for so-called past, present, and future ones. The dependence of the particular manifestation on the particular disposition allegedly is merely perspectival, whereas from God’s eye —considered to be the truly eternalist ‘perspective’— everything, every disposition together with every manifestation, exists simpliciter. Against it, I argue that even the most challenging understanding of eternalism cannot do justice to the productive Power requirement that manifestations are existentially dependent on dispositions. Even if it is true that computers do not exist as of the time of dinosaurs, they do not existentially depend on something in their past. For, they still exist simpliciter which, in the eternalist understanding, implies that their existence does not depend on anything other. As being argued, the eternalist realization relation is “surely reflexive” (Saunders 2002, 283).

If the essential difference between categoricalism and dispositionalism is that the latter requires existential dependence relations between different physical tokens, then the regularities in the world are not simply given but generated (see Esfeld 2008, chap. 5). A given object, event, or property has been produced. It existentially depends on something external, on other (earlier) dispositional properties, probably together with the active Power laws. Something other is the ground for the existence of the given token; it has had the power to produce the given particular.²⁰ Thus, according to Power metaphysics, something substantial has in fact to be added to ‘being located at p’: entity e has been produced at p. This external ground of the existence of concrete particulars is incompatible (even) with the most challenging understanding of eternalism which requires, instead, that nothing substantial can be added to ‘being located at p’.

Power metaphysics needs the existential dependence on something external which is provided by the sharpened presentist’s or growing blocker’s idea that what exists at p depends on p being (formerly) present. This existentially dynamical presentness can become (and actually becomes) productive in virtue of dispositions and Power laws. According to perspectival eternalism (as well as according to Humeanism) physical tokens simply succeed one another, e.g., along a timelike curve in spacetime. According to growing block and presentism, the present (the edge of being) comes successively into existence simpliciter. (Only) this can be turned into a productive succession by dispositions and Power laws.

To sum up the connected argument from (non-)productiveness/existential (in)dependence: Eternalists and Humean metaphysicians agree that nothing substantial will be added if one states that the physical token is presently located at p or has been produced at p; both “being present” and “being produced”, over and above of being located, sound rather mysterious both for the eternalist’s and Humean habit. In contrast, both non-eternalists as well as Power metaphysicians agree that something substantial could and should be added to that ‘being located at p’. According to dynamical views of time, it makes an essential difference if something is (formerly) presently located at p or not. Likewise, according to the dispositionalists, it makes an essential, ontological difference if something has been produced at p or not. The connection is not casual: for, the Power metaphysicians must argue that “to be present” has productive sense. Thus, only in the (sharpened) dynamical world the dispositions can exercise their productive power.

Everything being said so far is independent of whether the Power laws are deterministic or probabilistic. Also, it is independent of whether the laws hold exceptionless or allow for (few and irregular) anomalies. In any case, Power laws have productive essence as long as simpliciter-existence is temporally variable.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, look at growing blocker’s view about the connection of the metaphysics of laws, eternalism and (in)determinism:

Regardless of whether one adopts a realist or a reductionist view of laws of nature, there is no reason why a static world cannot contain indeterministic laws. (Tooley 1997, 27)

This is troublesome. Though it may be true that eternalism is compatible with indeterminism regardless of whether one adopts primitivism of laws (the “realist” view from Maudlin) or Humeanism, the static world cannot contain indeterministic Power laws. Such a “realist” view of laws of nature is incompatible with a static world but requires the growing block view or presentism. However, this is so independently of whether those laws are probabilistic or deterministic. The productiveness of Power metaphysics does not stem from its laws, let alone from indeterministic laws, but from the dynamical existence of dispositions and their manifestations.

Cord Friebe is mainly interested in questions concerning the metaphysics of science, in particular about temporal existence (and persistence) in spacetime theories but also on (non-)individuality in quantum mechanics. Historically, he works on Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Address: Universität Bonn, Institut für Philosophie, Am Hof 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail: cfriebe@uni-bonn.de

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Notes