


Audo Araújo Faleiro¹

¹Office of the Special Advisor to the
President of Brazil
Brasília, DF, Brazil
E-mail: audo.faleiro@presidencia.gov.br

 ORCID ID:
orcid.org/0009-0000-2472-6189

Copyright:

- This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the original author and source are credited.
- Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da Licença de Atribuição Creative Commons, que permite uso irrestrito, distribuição e reprodução em qualquer meio, desde que o autor e a fonte originais sejam creditados.



Lula 3.0: foreign policy reconstruction and Brazil's return to the world

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202500110>

Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 68(1): e010, 2025

Abstract

The article evaluates the foreign policy of the two first years of President Lula's third mandate, after the isolationist turn of the Bolsonaro years. The author highlights the main aspects conditioning Brazil's initiatives to return to the world stage, by separating them into three levels of analysis: decision-makers, state, and systemic. It identifies that, compared to Lula's previous mandates, the first level is the most stable and that major changes occurred in the other two. The article evaluates Brazil's current foreign policy in the areas of peace and security; climate change and sustainable development; and South American integration. It concludes that Brazil's reengagement with international organizations and bilateral partners in the biennium was broadly favorable. The country has succeeded in maintaining its neutrality in face of the conflict in Ukraine and restored the historically balanced stance on the Gaza conflict. It resumed its leadership role in climate governance and sustainable development, especially in its dimension of combating hunger and poverty. Brazil's efforts, however, were not able to reinstate an institutional framework gathering the whole of South America. The article anticipates that, for the rest of the mandate, defending Brazilian democracy will be a major component of the country foreign policy.

Keywords: Brazilian foreign policy; Lula third mandate; peace and security; climate change, South America.

Received: May 22, 2025

Accepted: July, 14 2025

Introduction

*Le succès de l'épreuve de la guerre,
comme le bonheur dans la vie,
n'existe que par comparaison.
Charles de Gaulle*

The quote attributed to General de Gaulle masterfully captures a fundamental point for foreign policy analysts: no country can have its international actions adequately assessed using abstract

parameters as a reference. It is necessary to rely on tangible elements that consider not only the results but also the decision-making process and its circumstances.

To understand and assess foreign policy in President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's third term, it is essential to contextualize it, especially in a government whose motto is "unity and reconstruction" and which follows one of the most turbulent periods in national political life.

All post-redemocratization governments¹ adopted as the guiding axis of their foreign action a stance centered on principles that resulted in universalism, defense of human rights, multilateralism, and regional integration (Cervo and Bueno 2011; Casarões and Farias 2021). There was no homogeneity in how the country formulated its insertion into the world between Collor and Temer. However, despite recognizing different priorities attributed to some of these themes, Brazil's international insertion maintained relevant traits of continuity (Oliveira 2005²; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Hirst and Maciel 2022).

During Jair Bolsonaro's four-year term (2019 – 2022), this changed radically (Lima and Ives 2024). As indicated in the report of the Technical Group on Foreign Relations of the Transitional Commission (República Federativa do Brasil 2022), there was broad rerouting in several areas of foreign policy (Lopes 2024). In contrast with more attenuated or gradual forms of change, limited in their scope, the changes observed between 2019 and 2022 involved profound reorientation, where several policies and alignments were simultaneously altered³.

This paradigm shift was even claimed by the Bolsonaro government. In many public statements, the former president and the former minister of foreign affairs, Ernesto Araújo, expressed this viewpoint (Araújo 2020; 2021).⁴ The power shift of the Brazilian chancellery in 2021⁵ did not alter this scenario. Even with the change in style at Itamaraty, foreign policy choices remained the same until the end of the term⁶.

To evaluate the effort to reconstruct Brazilian foreign policy from 2023 and highlight the main aspects that condition Brazil's initiatives to return to the world stage, this paper will use

¹ The period herein called "redemocratization" begins with the inauguration, in March 1990, of the first president elected by direct vote after the military regime established in 1964.

² Oliveira (2005) emphasizes that Collor intended to establish some kind of "special alliance" with the US, but he was unable to do so due to resistance from Itamaraty and society, as well as his government's brevity.

³ Elaborated in the context of profound transformations in the international order in the early 1990s, marked by the end of the East-West conflict and the redemocratization of Latin America, the methodology proposed by Hermann (1990) stipulates four degrees of changes in foreign policy, ranging from simple course adjustments to complete reorientation of international insertion.

⁴ In his inaugural speech, the president stated: "We will remove the ideological bias from our international relations. We are in search of a new era for Brazil and Brazilians!" (Brasil 2019). All speeches made by Bolsonaro at the opening of the UN General Assembly between 2019 and 2022 contain the same claim. The former chancellor published two collections of his speeches that highlight his perception of the uniqueness of his foreign policy (Araújo 2020; 2021).

⁵ Bolsonaro's first chancellor, Ernesto Araújo, was dismissed on March 28, 2021. His successor, Carlos Alberto França, took office on April 6, 2021.

⁶ Few analysts argue that there was no rupture between Bolsonaro's foreign policy and that of post-redemocratization presidents and the 1988 Constitution (República Federativa do Brasil 1988). Lopes et al. (2022) consider that there are more elements of continuity between Bolsonaro and his predecessors due to internal and external containment factors. Pecequillo (2023) identifies similarities between Bolsonaro's foreign policy towards the US between 2019 and 2020 (during Donald Trump's first term) and previous Brazilian governments, especially during the military regime from 1964 to 1985.

a resource established in the specialized literature on foreign policy, organizing the factors that influence the behavior of countries into levels of analysis (Singer 1961; Buzan 1995; Breuning 2007). Thus, it seeks to disaggregate potential causal and explanatory elements into three spheres: the individual (decision-makers), the state (domestic political and bureaucratic context), and the systemic (international scenario). However, this methodological choice aims to facilitate the investigation without priorly attributing preeminence to any of these spheres. The focus of this analysis is on the interactions between decision-makers and the internal and external circumstances in which they operate.

Given the above, this paper seeks to assess the foreign policy of Lula's third government and answer three questions: from January 2023, who are the decision-makers in Brazilian foreign policy? What domestic factors limit their choices? What international constraints influence and delimit their options?

This is not about extensively comparing the foreign policy of the current government with that of its immediate predecessor, nor presenting a detailed comparison between President Lula's three terms. The more modest goal is to put into proper perspective the diplomatic effort undertaken in the 2023-2024 biennium.

Attempting to cover the many dimensions of Brazilian foreign policy would be too ambitious for the purposes of this article. Beyond the quantitative aspects related to the number of countries visited, meetings held, and forums where Brazil has resumed its activities, three priority thematic areas of the current administration will be qualitatively evaluated: peace and security; climate change and sustainable development; and South American integration. The choice of these areas stems from the fact that they are listed as priorities in the Guidelines for the Program of Reconstruction and Transformation of Brazil in the Lula-Alckmin Candidacy (Partido dos Trabalhadores 2022), with wide repercussion in internal and external public opinion, and which demanded the President's direct involvement.

In addition to this introduction, this article includes four other sections. In sections two and three, respectively, the main internal and external factors that shaped Brazilian foreign policy actions in the 2023-2024 biennium will be taken into consideration, identifying at each level of analysis (individuals, the state, and the international system) the most relevant changes and continuities between the first two terms (2003 to 2010) and the present day. Section four will specifically address the three abovementioned thematic areas of Brazil's current foreign policy. In the conclusion, in addition to briefly summarizing the main arguments of the article, we will also point out new areas that deserve special attention as part of Brazilian foreign policy in coming years.

Internal factors that currently condition Brazilian foreign policy

Traditional international relations theories, which were consolidated in the second half of the 20th century, prioritize systemic aspects as explanatory elements of the States' position toward the

outside. The main strands of realism⁷, institutional liberalism, and certain currents of constructivism confer preeminence to the international system as a determining factor in how countries relate to each other (Hudson 2005; Lantis and Beasley 2017), minimizing the role of domestic politics, parties, specialized bureaucracy, decision-makers, and government agencies in the choices made in foreign policy.

Only during the last years of the 20th century can a “domestic turn” (Kaarbo 2015) be identified in the specialized literature of the main theoretical schools⁸. Although there is no general theory of foreign policy⁹, there has been progress, especially after the end of the Cold War, in studies on the internal factors that influence it. Significant advances in the discussion about the role of leaders, their closest circles of advisors, institutional variations in decision-making processes, new government agents beyond diplomacy, and non-governmental actors have increasingly conferred multidisciplinary status to the discipline (Salomón and Pinheiro 2013).

However, decision-makers do not exist or operate in a vacuum. Especially in democratic governments, factors related to public opinion, party politics, interest groups, and bureaucratic disputes need to be considered in the definition of foreign policy. This domestic dimension is the starting point for examining the choices made by Lula’s current government. In it, the variations regarding agents involved in the federal executive branch were small compared to his first two terms. The significant change lies in domestic politics, as indicated below.

The first level of analysis: decision-makers

Brazil’s presidential system, defined by the 1988 Constitution (República Federativa do Brasil, 1988), leaves no doubt about the role of the Union, represented by the President of the Republic, to maintain relations with foreign states, take part in international organizations, sign treaties and international agreements, declare war and make peace¹⁰. The distribution of competencies between the branches of government remains unchanged, and there have been no successful legislative initiatives to promote its revision¹¹. The Executive, therefore, retains the prerogative to formulate, decide, and implement foreign policy¹². Within the Executive, this decision-making

⁷ Even classical realism represented by Hans Morgenthau, which conferred predominant agency at the state level in international relations, maintained the premise that states are unitary actors, dispensing with the study of internal circumstances that determine their actions.

⁸ It is surprising that the canons of these major international relations theories and those of foreign policy analysis have coexisted side by side for decades without more organized and collaborative dialogue between them.

⁹ In the manner originally pursued by Rosenau (1966), marked by the attempt to simultaneously integrate a broad range of internal and external variables.

¹⁰ Articles 21, I and II; 84, VII, VIII, XIX, and XX.

¹¹ Proposed Constitutional Amendments (PEC 52/2001 and 345/2001) to alter the competence of the Legislative in matters of international trade negotiations did not go through. PEC 475/2005, which authorized states, the Federal District, and municipalities to enter into agreements with foreign subnational entities, with the Union’s authorization, was deemed unconstitutional and archived (Rodrigues 2008).

¹² The legislative branch has ex-post control competencies over treaties and international agreements (Articles 49, I and II), as well as approval of the appointment of heads of diplomatic missions in other countries. Ratton Sanchez et al. (2006) provide an overview of the distribution of competence in conducting foreign policy between the 1967 and 1988 Constitutions (República Federativa do Brasil 1988).

process occurs hierarchically, as highlighted by Lima (1993): “In Brazilian presidentialism, the parameter that regulates the degrees of freedom or the relative autonomy held by diplomacy is presidential authorization, whether by omission or delegation of power (...)”.

In Lula 3.0, the main decision-making units within the executive branch in foreign policy have resumed the structure of his previous terms¹³. Itamaraty has regained its ability to advise the head of state and coordinate government action abroad¹⁴, with its structure reinforced by the creation of three new secretariats¹⁵, in addition to the seven existing in 2022. The design of the ministry has approached that in effect in 2010, aiming to support the resumption of the country’s international prominence in areas that have once again become priorities.

The team providing direct support to the president once again includes a Special Advisory (AESP) dedicated to international issues and directly linked to the head of state. AESP has taken on some of the responsibilities¹⁶ that for years were performed by the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, which no longer exists¹⁷.

The individuals at the center of the decision-making structure ensure continuity regarding the perception of Brazil’s role in the world, so prominent in the two previous terms. President Lula was at the origin of most of the initiatives that distinguished Brazil’s foreign action from 2003 onwards and has strong interest in continuing to act in this area. His international experience is a valuable asset for the third term, as he is one of the few leaders who actively participated in forums that remain central to global governance efforts, such as the G20, BRICS, G7, and the Climate COP. Therefore, the perceptions of the centrality of challenges faced by the country persist, especially the fight against hunger and inequalities, the promotion of sustainable development and regional integration, and the defense of peace and multilateralism.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Mauro Vieira, returns to the position after having been Dilma Rousseff’s last chancellor. His proximity to the president dates back to when he headed the Brazilian embassies in Buenos Aires and Washington. Special Advisor Celso Amorim was the chancellor during Lula’s first two presidential terms and served as Minister of Defense for Dilma Rousseff between 2011 and 2014.

Other prominent agents in matters relevant to foreign policy, even if sectorally, such as the Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, and the Minister of Finance, Fernando Haddad, are

¹³ During President Lula’s first two terms, the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was altered twice to meet the demands resulting from the greater international projection achieved by the country. The number of secretariats increased from five to seven in 2006, and from seven to nine in 2010. This number was maintained for nearly a decade, throughout the Dilma and Temer administrations. In 2019, however, the number of secretariats reverted to the 2006 level, dropping to seven.

¹⁴ At the end of 2024, there were Brazilian foreign service officers seconded to 27 of the 37 ministries, the Presidency of the Republic, the House of Representatives, the Federal Senate, all the higher courts (*STF, STJ, TSE, and TST*), and four state governments.

¹⁵ The secretariats in Brazilian ministries are administrative units responsible for specific areas of activity within each ministry. They play a fundamental role in the formulation, implementation, and management of public policies related to their respective areas. The current structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is defined by Decrees No. 11,357 and 11,873 of 2023.

¹⁶ Art. 15 of Law No. 14,600 of 2023 establishes the competencies of the Special Advisory to the President of the Republic (AESP).

¹⁷ During the Bolsonaro government, AESP was subordinated to the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs. See Decree No. 10,374 of 2020.

also close collaborators of the head of state and have already worked in his previous terms¹⁸. Both ministries have shared with Itamaraty the preparation of major events that Brazil hosted in 2024 (G20) and will host in 2025 (BRICS and COP 30).

Consequently, the presence of Lula and a group of experienced and trusted policymakers at the center of the foreign policy decision-making process makes the first level of analysis the most stable one, as well as the one with factors of continuity. The circumstances in which they operate, both domestic and international, register the main changes.

The second level of analysis: domestic politics in a context of reconstruction

In 2022, Brazil emerged from the polls divided, and it remains polarized. In one of the country's most fiercely contested elections, Lula was elected for the third time with 50.9% of the votes, the smallest margin in a second round in Brazilian history¹⁹. Although defeated in the presidential elections, Bolsonarism proved not to be a passing phenomenon and persists as an organized movement, with significant parliamentary representation, presence in state and municipal governments, and solid social bases and mobilization power.

This became evident right after the second round of the presidential election. The transitional team's work between the previous and current governments did not take place normally. The cooperative attitude and constructive dialogue maintained with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an exception (República Federativa do Brasil 2022).

The Brazilian state reached the end of 2022 weakened. There was no budget for the main public policies for 2023, and default before international organizations was widespread²⁰. The dismantling of the planning system led to the weakening of development strategies, lack of commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals, regional development plans, and sectoral programs. There was also the dismantling of social participation in the formulation and monitoring of public policies. These facts contributed to the disorganization, lack of coordination, and consequent inefficiency of state action.

Many agencies needed to have their structures restored and teams completely rebuilt. The ministries of Women, Racial Equality (Dolce de Faria and Simoni 2025) and Human Rights,

¹⁸ Marina Silva was Minister of the Environment between 2003 and 2008. Fernando Haddad was Minister of Education between 2005 and 2012. Due to the wide range of topics involved in foreign policy, several other ministers (Chief of Staff, Development, Industry and Trade, Mines and Energy, Science and Technology, Management and Innovation, Planning and Budget) also interface with the international actions of the Executive, although restricted to more sectoral aspects.

¹⁹ Lula received 60,345,999 votes against Bolsonaro's 58,206,354.

²⁰ In 2023, Brazil paid almost US\$ 1 billion in financial commitments to international institutions, distributed among regular contributions to international organizations, capital subscriptions to multilateral banks, and replenishments of international funds. These payments allowed the recovery of voting rights in several international organizations. The Lula government also changed the budgetary treatment of this type of expense in the Annual Budget Bill for 2024, approved on December 22nd by the National Congress, reclassifying as mandatory expenses related to contributions and initial rounds of capital subscriptions to multilateral development banks resulting from commitments provided for in international treaties ratified by Brazil, which will prevent the future accumulation of liabilities with international public law organizations.

Culture, and Labor were recreated. The ministries of Planning and Budget, Management and Innovation, Finance, and Industry and Trade returned to being individual first-tier instances. For the first time in its history, Brazil now has a Ministry of Indigenous Peoples.

Brazil had to resume its activities in international forums and bilateral partnerships in a *sui generis* condition: practically all sectoral policies that provide substance to foreign policy needed to be redone. Besides the lack of resources, there were no environmental, cultural, human rights, health, education, science and technology, trade, or industrial policies.

On January 8, 2023, a failed coup attempt confirmed the extent of animosity installed in the social fabric and in several state agencies. As proven by the Interparliamentary Inquiry Commission (República Federativa do Brasil 2023), there was widespread instrumentalization of institutions and public agents at the federal and state levels. The investigations revealed the involvement of high-ranking officials from various state careers in elaborate schemes to disqualify the electoral process, disregard the results of the polls, and destabilize the newly inaugurated government.

Without a parliamentary majority in the House or the Senate, sustaining coalition presidentialism would require constant effort to approve measures with a direct impact on the country's foreign actions. The institutional disarray resulting from outsourcing budget management to the Legislative during the Bolsonaro government led the country to an unprecedented situation of near semi-presidentialism or cohabitation in the manner of France from 1958²¹ onwards, where the Executive shares its responsibilities for defining and implementing public policies with the National Congress.

On one hand, all 64 nominations for heads of diplomatic mission²² made by the current government were approved in the Senate; on the other hand, highly visible issues such as the Gaza crisis, the conflict in Ukraine, or the resumption of diplomatic relations with Venezuela resonated intensely in the Legislative. Of the 213²³ parliamentary information requests addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 were about the Israel-Palestine conflict, 28 about Venezuela, 28 about expenses on international trips by the President of the Republic, 20 about consular issues, and 10 about the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Among the 84 requests for Foreign Minister summons, 25 were related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, 14 to Venezuela, and 4 to the Russia-Ukraine conflict²⁴.

The approval of Bolivia's accession protocol to Mercosur only occurred in the Brazilian Senate via an agreement that provided for the creation of a parliamentary commission to verify the state of democracy in the neighboring country. The Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives approved a Legislative Decree that withdraws Brazil from the Union of South

²¹ François (2010) describes the functioning of semi-presidentialism in France's Fifth Republic.

²² All of them career diplomats.

²³ Of these 213, 101 were presented by the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) and 37 by the New Party (Partido Novo), both opposition parties to the Federal Executive.

²⁴ The information and summons requests are available on the websites of the House of Representatives (<https://www.camara.leg.br>) and the Federal Senate (<https://www25.senado.leg.br>).

American Nations (UNASUR)²⁵. Another initiative underway in the House of Representatives seeks to suspend the decree that reinstates visa requirements for citizens of Australia, Canada, and the USA, which reestablishes the principles of the national migration policy of reciprocity²⁶.

Brazil still does not have a credit policy for the export of engineering services to face the fierce competition in markets such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia²⁷. Brazilian construction companies have ceased to be players in the competitive international civil construction market. State-owned companies that were once part of Brazil's projection instruments, such as Petrobras, no longer have the same freedom of action, or have been privatized, like Eletrobras.

Rebuilding relations with federative entities is part of the country's institutional rehabilitation initiative and demands constant attention. The presence of parliamentarians, governors, and mayors in the Federal Executive's international agendas, held in Brazil or abroad, has been helping in this effort. The internalization of several ministerial meetings of the Brazilian G20²⁸ presidency and the holding of COP 30 in the Amazon are part of this strategy. The five integration routes included in the new Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) will connect Atlantic ports to Pacific ports and strengthen connections with practically all our South American neighbors²⁹. These infrastructure works create a shared interest agenda with the states of the South, Midwest, and North, where agribusiness is very present, for integration with Asian markets.

Finally, it is worth noting that the plurality of political forces in the coalition that came to power in 2023 imposes on the government the need for constant adjustments and balance between parties and civil society organizations, unions, and business entities with a more liberal profile or a more developmental vision. This is reflected, for example, in discussions about the conclusion of the Mercosur-European Union agreement, the discontinuation of Brazil's accession process as a full member of the OECD, and the speed at which fossil fuels will be reduced in the countries' energy matrix.

In the 2023-2024 biennium, decision-makers in foreign policy experienced daily the metaphor coined by Putnam (1988) about "two-level games", where permanent negotiations with internal interest groups, both in government and opposition, are intertwined with relations with other states and international actors. The boundaries between domestic and foreign have quickly blurred in recent years, whether due to the effects of the technological revolution or the context of political

²⁵ PDL (Legislative Decree Bill) 135/2023 aims to suspend the effects of Decree No. 11,475 of April 6, 2023, which enacts the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR signed by Brazil in 2008. PDL 135 awaits discussion in the Constitution and Justice Committee of the House of Representatives and, if approved, will be submitted to the Plenary.

²⁶ This measure presents clear indications of unconstitutionality, as it interferes with the exclusive competence of the Executive Branch to define visa policies and rules for the entry of foreigners into national territory.

²⁷ The Executive Branch presented to the National Congress Bill No. 5,719/2023, which aims to regulate the financing of exports of goods and services by Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). Since 2016, the bank has suspended the approval of new financing for Brazilian exports of goods and services related to engineering projects abroad. This suspension remains in effect to date.

²⁸ During the Brazilian G20 presidency, 134 meetings were held, 110 at the technical level and 24 at the ministerial level, in all five regions of the country and covering 15 cities (Cardoso 2024).

²⁹ <https://www.gov.br/planejamento/pt-br/assuntos/articulacao-institucional/rotas-de-integracao-sul-americana>.

polarization. It is difficult to find an issue where decisions made in foreign policy do not reverberate internally and vice versa. We will assess the foreign external board next.

The third level of analysis: external factors in an order under deconstruction

The world underwent significant transformations between 2011 and 2024. This period is marked by a summation of crises that feed into and exacerbate each other. The geopolitical rivalry between the US and China has deepened. The consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic are still being felt. War has returned to the heart of Europe, resurrecting fears of nuclear escalation. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has once again shown its most inhumane face, victimizing thousands of innocent civilians, especially women and children, spreading to Lebanon and Syria, and provoking for the first time in history a direct confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Hunger and food insecurity continue to threaten millions of people across various continents. The technological gap between rich and poor countries keeps growing. Democracy remains under intense attack on all continents, threatened by electorally competitive extremist movements. In short, the current international situation is much more unfavorable than at the beginning of the 21st century.

The backdrop of this hostile and conflictive context, involving traditional and emerging power poles, is the deconstruction of the post-World War II liberal order and the absence of renegotiation of global governance mechanisms. The gradual dismantling of the welfare state model, which started in the 1970s, associated with the energy crisis and the end of European communism, made way for an extreme version of liberalism, built on deregulation and financialization of economies, greatly facilitated by technological advances, especially in information technology, which allowed deep and rapid integration of goods and service markets globally (Crouch 2011). The tension between market interests and social justice has been altered in favor of the former. Over the last four decades, this process has led to increasing tax cuts — especially for the wealthiest classes —, reduction of investments in social programs, privatization of assets, and outsourcing of public services (Streck 2014).

Even after the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal dogmas demonstrated strong resilience among the political and economic elites of the West, whose technocratic approach linked to trade liberalization and deregulation of financial and capital markets remained detached from social control. Until Trump's first election and Brexit, the Democratic Party in the US and the main political forces in Europe, linked to Christian democracy or social democracy, had great difficulty conceiving new paradigms that went beyond compensatory policies to accommodate the contingents excluded by globalization (Watkins 2021).

This fracture of the social contract within the capitalist bloc is at the root of the turbulence and uncertainty that plague contemporary international society. The threats to the global order and Western values do not come from China (Stokes 2018). Beijing's phenomenal rise resulted from a new cycle of global capitalist expansion, led by Washington from the 1990s onwards

(Arrighi 2008). The use of economic and trade governance regimes made the Asian country a direct beneficiary of triumphant neoliberalism in the world following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Chinese state knew how to plan and execute its sovereign insertion into the world, based on the rules of the game (Fouskas et al. 2021).

In recent years, China has also become a pillar of multilateralism: it is one of the main contributors to the budget and contingents of UN peace missions, and it plays a prominent role in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (United Nations Peacekeeping 2025).

A scenario of new bipolar rivalry resulting from the broad decoupling of Chinese and American economies is unlikely. Not even the touted race for leadership in the digital economy will automatically imply an irreconcilable fracture of the world into two opposing camps. Although for the US this competition is increasingly related to national security, it is unclear how far the geopolitical repercussions of this dispute can go.

The dynamics of global alliances and the resulting balance of power will certainly impact Brazil's list of priorities. However, how this will occur is still an enigma. The intensification of geopolitical competition in recent years, of which the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a poignant example, reaffirms the centrality of the security theme, impacting the entire UN agenda. Examples include the elevation of nuclear risk, the perception of the failure of the UN Security Council, and the widespread use of unilateral sanctions adopted without support in international law, aggravating the fragmentation of the world economy and creating worrying precedents for the global order.

In this context, the US's reaction has been to seek ways to contain the rise of its main competitor, especially in the domain of high technology. If the contrast between Kamala Harris' and Donald Trump's foreign policies in the electoral campaign was clear in the environmental, human rights, health, and revaluation of the multilateral system areas, the perception of the Chinese military and technological threat is bipartisan and finds strong support in American society.

Brazil's return to the World

Being on the world's sidelines between 2019 and 2022 took a toll on Brazil's ability to understand, reflect on, and act upon the international context surrounding it. As defined by Minister Vieira (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2023), the primary task from January 2023 was to recover the lost space and time, resuming ties with the main international partners.

The space for diplomatic initiatives for a country like Brazil proved to be more limited, even amid expectations generated by hosting major events such as the G20, BRICS, and COP 30 (Amorim 2024). Participation in these forums is fundamental for the defense of multilateralism, in a context of power diffusion and transition to a multipolar order, an essential condition for

emerging countries to find minimum conditions of stability and predictability to plan their development autonomously, without alignment to major powers.

Brazil's return to international forums was successful and began before taking office, with participation in COP 27, in December 2022, in Egypt (Hirst 2023). Since then, Brazil has resumed participation in the summit meetings of CELAC, MERCOSUR, CELAC - European Union, African Union, G7, G77, CPLP, BRICS, and G20, and the president has maintained an extensive agenda of bilateral visits with heads of state and government in Brazil and abroad³⁰.

However, it was not enough to simply be present again in international forums. It was necessary to revisit abandoned dossiers and remake relationship choices with the world. This is what we will assess next by considering three areas of Brazilian foreign policy action in the 2023-2024 biennium.

Peace and Security

A country the size of Brazil, with a long diplomatic tradition of promoting peace, cannot ignore the challenges of the international security agenda. The fact that during the 2022-2024 biennium, Brazil held a seat of non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 11th time reinforced this need to take a stance on the main conflicts of the present.

The Brazilian government restored the historically balanced stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and corrected the inflections adopted between 2019 and 2022 within international organizations, notably in the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, which involved favorable votes for the occupation of Palestinian territories by illegal Israeli settler colonies.

Brazil presided over the Security Council in October 2023 and expressed on numerous occasions its repudiation of terrorist acts carried out by Hamas. It equally condemned the disproportionate reaction of Netanyahu's government against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, which victimized more than 50,000 civilians, 70% of whom were women and children (United Nations 2024). The resolution project tabled by Brazil, which called for the release of hostages and the establishment of humanitarian pauses to support the civilian population in Gaza, received 12 positive votes, two abstentions, and the negative vote of the US, which exercised its veto power.

The protection of Brazilians in the conflict zone became a priority and resulted in two large-scale operations. With Operation Returning in Peace, it was possible to repatriate 1,524 Brazilians and their families who were in the conflict region. There was a total of 10 flights by the Brazilian Air Force, eight of them departing from Israel, one from Jordan to repatriate citizens in the West Bank, and another from Egypt to repatriate Brazilians in the Gaza Strip. With the extension of the conflict to Lebanon in 2024, another 2,662 people were repatriated in Operation

³⁰ Argentina, Uruguay, US, China, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, Vatican, France, Colombia, Paraguay, Angola, Cuba, Germany, Bolivia, Chile, Guyana, Croatia, Romania, and Finland.

Cedar Roots, of which 1,991 were Brazilians, 601 were Lebanese, and 70 were of other nationalities (República Federativa do Brasil 2024c).

The conflict was widely used for domestic political purposes in Brazil, linking the issue to religious agendas and questioning one of the most traditional positions of Brazilian foreign policy: the defense of a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Due to criticism of the Israeli government, the Brazilian president was declared *persona non grata* in that country. In an unprecedented gesture of paradiplomacy, the Israeli prime minister received opposition Brazilian governors who traveled there to show solidarity.

The war in Ukraine required constant dialogue efforts from the Lula government with Ukrainian and Russian authorities, as well as with several NATO members and emerging countries. President Lula held meetings with his counterparts, Zelensky and Putin. Despite the Brazilian government's repeated condemnation of the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity both in the General Assembly and the Security Council, there were recurring demands for Brazil to join initiatives to isolate Russia in international forums and adopt unilateral sanctions against the country. The refusal to sell ammunition for Germany's Gepard armored vehicles, which would be re-exported to Ukraine, fits the stance of not supplying defense products that could be used in the conflict. The joint proposal by Brazil and China (República Federativa do Brasil 2024b), which led to the creation of a Group of Friends of Peace, formed by 13 emerging countries, sought to expand negotiation spaces to end the war.

The paralysis and lack of coherence among Security Council members are evident when comparing how the issue of Palestinian and Ukrainian territorial integrity is treated. Criticism of the Council's actions and reform proposals were widely addressed in presidential speeches. For the first time in history, the foreign ministers of G20, under Brazilian presidency, gathered at the United Nations headquarters in a meeting open to all members of the organization. As a result, Brazil obtained the "Call to Action" (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2024a), a document with commitments to reform and modernize the main international organizations, such as the UN, the Bretton Woods organizations, and the WTO.

At the regional level, two topics were priority. The first was to restrict the Initiative for Atlantic Cooperation³¹, proposed by the US, to activities focused on economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation, without military or defense connotations. The second was related to the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo territory. The risk of escalation of this dispute became real throughout 2023, with potentially serious geopolitical consequences for the region as a whole and for the Amazon in particular. Brazil supported and actively worked towards the Argyle Declaration in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which provides for the renunciation of the use of force to resolve this controversy and creates a permanent dialogue mechanism between the two countries.

³¹ <https://www.state.gov/declaracao-conjunta-sobre-a-cooperacao-atlantica/>

Climate change and sustainable development

It took decades for Brazil to consolidate its leadership in environmental governance issues. In 1992, the country hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), which gave rise to the Climate, Desertification, and Biodiversity Conventions. The organization of Rio+20 in 2012 was the starting point for the approval of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In 2015, Brazil played a decisive role in promoting the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, confirming its status as a central actor in overcoming obstacles in international forums related to climate change and sustainable development.

This legacy was squandered by the Bolsonaro government, which refused to host COP 25, dismantled internal regulatory frameworks, spaces for social control and participation, and state structures linked to the preservation of natural and genetic heritage. To restore the credibility of Brazilian foreign policy in this area, Brazil resumed participation in international forums in a proactive manner. It convened and hosted the IV Summit of Heads of State of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, which resulted in the institutional strengthening of the entity, the only international organization linked to a biome and headquartered in Brasília³².

In partnership with the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia, Brazil articulated an initiative titled “United for Our Forests,” which already brings together 18 countries with humid tropical forests. The initiative establishes a common cooperation agenda between the Amazon, Congo, and Borneo-Mekong basins, reconciling the protection of these biomes with social inclusion, stimulating the local economy, and valuing indigenous peoples and the ancestral knowledge of traditional communities.

Brazil incorporated the climate agenda into its bilateral relations, which allowed the reactivation of the Amazon Fund with the support of partners such as Norway, Germany, the US, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The country also mobilized other developing countries to build an innovative mechanism (Tropical Forests Forever Facility) to be presented at the COP in Belém, which stipulates payment of ecosystem services provided by tropical forests.

Addressing climate change became one of the priorities of Brazil’s G20 presidency, with the creation of a Task Force that brought together climate and finance negotiators from the Group, focusing on promoting national ecological transformation plans that take into account the impact of global warming on the most vulnerable populations and countries.

Brazil resumed measures that will lead to the fulfillment of its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2030 and presented its new NDC for 2035 at COP 29 in Baku, which covers all sectors of the economy and foresees a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of between 59% and 67% compared to 2005 levels (República Federativa do Brasil 2024a).

As a holder of one of the cleanest energy matrices and vast potential in solar, wind, biomass, ethanol, biodiesel, and green hydrogen energy, Brazil has managed to combine the image of

³² Since the Amazon Cooperation Treaty was signed in 1978, the heads of state have only met three times: 1989, 1992, and 2009.

commitment to decarbonizing its economy and an exporter of sustainability. By resuming the fight against deforestation in the Amazon and mining in the Yanomami territory, the country is regaining the trust of the international community and national economic and social agents.

For the first time since 1988, the Multi-Year Plan (PPA 2024-2027)³³ includes the environmental agenda as one of its five transversal agendas (Republica Federativa do Brasil 2024). It appears in 50 of the 88 programs and has 113 specific objectives, reflecting its centrality to the government and the commitment to addressing environmental and climate challenges.

This disposition was reflected in the plans for preventing and controlling deforestation for all biomes in the country, with visible results. According to the Brazilian Biomes Monitoring System Project (Prodes), the Amazon reached the lowest deforestation rate of the decade in 2024, with the largest reduction in 15 years and about a 46% drop compared to 2022 (Secretaria de Comunicação Social 2024). In the Cerrado, the 25.7% reduction in 2024 was the first in five years, avoiding the emission of 400.8 million tons of CO₂ (República Federativa do Brasil 2024b).

The subject of sustainable development also reflected in two other related topics: energy transition and the human dimension. Aligned with the strategic objective of ensuring the country's energy security, the supply of clean energy was expanded. In the last two years, this supply increased by more than 15 gigawatts, coming from solar and wind sources (Ministério das Minas e Energia do Brasil 2023) (Ministério de Minas e Energia do Brasil 2025). Abroad, the decision was made to consolidate partner diversification and to obtain observer status in OPEC and resume the accession processes to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), the latter being the main international forum for promoting biofuels.

The visibility provided by the reconstruction of environmental policies was strengthened by the resumption of growth with social inclusion, combating the triad of hunger, poverty, and inequality. Removing Brazil from the Hunger Map again is a viable and highly impactful goal. In 2023 alone, 24.4 million people left the condition of severe food insecurity. This is why the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty became one of the main results of the Brazilian G20 presidency. Its objective is to provide renewed impetus to the matter of development on the international agenda, aligning efforts on external and domestic fronts. Together with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and as part of the preparatory process for COP 30, a guide was developed for the inclusion of social policies and food system transformation in the NDCs.

South American Integration

South America has once again become a priority in Brazilian foreign policy starting in 2023. Brazil rejoined UNASUR and has been working with the other countries that still maintain ties with the entity (Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela) to find a solution to the

³³ Enacted into Law No. 14,802 of 2024.

complex administrative, patrimonial, and financial situation of the entity, a legacy of its inactivity for almost a decade.

Despite the strong ideological burden that still falls on the organization, especially in conservative circles in the countries of the region, UNASUR hosted quite distinct visions of regionalism until 2016 and produced tangible results as a forum for conflict resolution, notably in the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador and the Bolivian separatist conflict, both in 2008. It also served as a space for political dialogue and coordination of positions on infrastructure, social, energy, defense, and health matters (Lima 2013).

The conservative turn marked by the rise to power of right-wing and far-right forces in the region³⁴ created the conditions for the replacement of UNASUR by two forums whose actions resulted in the dismantling of South American integration: the Lima Group³⁵ and PROSUR³⁶ (Forum for the Progress of South America).

In President Lula's current term, two initiatives to rebuild regional institutionalism were hosted in Brazil in 2023. The meeting of South American presidents in Brasília, which included all South American heads of state and the Peruvian prime minister, and the Summit of the Countries of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) in Belém. Both events aimed to relaunch the integration process. The first left as a legacy the "Brasília Consensus," a kind of charter of principles for integration, but without any degree of institutionalization. The second allowed the resumption of ACTO's work after a period of blockage due to a lack of consensus on the replacement of its secretary-general and directors.

In the case of Mercosur, Brazilian actions have focused on protecting the bloc's common external tariff and preventing its regression from a customs union to a free trade zone, in light of initiatives by some of its members (Uruguay between 2020 and 2024 and Argentina starting in 2024) to pursue extrabloc negotiations in isolation. This has partly justified Brazil's and President Lula's efforts to consolidate an offensive external agenda for the bloc, which led to the signing of an agreement with Singapore and the conclusion of negotiations with the European Union. The resurgence of global protectionism also explains the pursuit of agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Japan, and Vietnam. Brazil settled its debts, amounting to about \$99 million, with the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM), allowing the country to execute new projects aimed at physical integration in border areas (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2023a).

Despite these initiatives, the outlook for the resumption of South American institutionalism is even less promising today due to two conjunctural factors: the election of Javier Milei in 2023

³⁴ Brazil (Bolsonaro), Argentina (Macri), Chile (Piñera), Colombia (Duque), Peru (Kuczynski), and Ecuador (Lenín Moreno).

³⁵ The Lima Group was particularly harmful to regional coordination efforts by advocating for the recognition of Juan Guaidó as the legitimate representative of Venezuela, as well as supporting economic sanctions and activating the TIAR against the country under the pretext that the Maduro government constituted a risk to hemispheric security (Barros and Gonçalves 2019).

³⁶ PROSUR was launched as an alternative to UNASUR. Institutionally and technically weak, and without garnering the involvement of regional leaders, PROSUR failed to articulate the region in response to Covid-19 (Barros et al. 2020).

and the impasse created in the Venezuelan presidential dispute in July 2024, which led to the severance of ties between the Maduro government and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. This reconfiguration of political forces in South American countries resulted in the crystallization of reciprocal political vetoes to the reconstruction of a common agenda for action at the sub-regional level, with Mercosur and ACTO, or South American level, with the Brasília Consensus and UNASUR.

The challenge for Brazil is to find an agenda for the region that is both realistic about the difficulties of reversing the effects of political polarization in the short term and allows the rearticulation of South American interests. In the absence of collective action spaces, Brazil has acted bilaterally with its neighbors through infrastructure integration projects. Lula's visits to Guyana, Colombia, Chile, and Bolivia in 2024 had as their central subject the articulation of the five Integration Routes provided for in the Brazilian Infrastructure Program (PAC).

The relationship with China also has a catalytic effect on regional integration. The Asian country has concrete interests but does not have hegemonic ambitions in South America, does not have a significant community in the region, and its objectives are centered on assets related to energy provision, raw materials, and food. Additionally, it does not have history of interference in South American affairs. The expansion of Chinese presence in Venezuela (a frequently cited example by those who fear Chinese "imperialism") results largely from the vacuum left by the foreign policies of Brazil and the US in recent years, which allowed a regionally encapsulated conflict to become multilateralized.

Even though China's growing commercial presence has contributed to reducing the participation of Brazilian exports in neighboring countries, Chinese investments in South America have been directed towards opportunities outside traditional extractive areas, especially in infrastructure. Furthermore, the presence of Chinese state-owned companies at the origin of a larger share of capital invested in Brazil and the region makes political dialogue more effective (Menezes and Bragatti 2020). This is particularly relevant in a context of resurgence of US commercial unilateralism, the withdrawal of Brazilian construction and engineering companies, and the discontinuation of BNDES financial support. Articulating the relationship of regional countries with China also helps reinforce the need among regional elites to resume a South American project of international insertion.

Conclusion and new challenges

To return to General de Gaulle and his recommendation that successes in war and life should be seen in perspective, it is possible to conclude that Brazil has returned to having a more active and constructive relationship with the world. By the metric of engagement with forums, international organizations, and bilateral partners, the performance of Brazilian foreign policy in 2023 and

2024 was broadly favorable. The country ceased to be a factor of instability and went back to being a respected and active actor, capable of influencing central subjects of the global agenda.

The same objectives that guided Brazilian foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century remain valid: balancing political, technological, economic, and commercial relations with different partners, extracting benefits that interest the country without having to choose exclusive paths.

However, the internal and external contexts are more challenging, which makes the space for innovative initiatives more limited. Maintaining the regained reputation will be a permanent task and will be associated with Brazil's ability to promote domestic advances that grants substance to its foreign policy.

Brazil has resumed its leadership role in climate governance and succeeded in putting the issue of inequality back on the international agenda, especially in its dimension of combating hunger and poverty.

South America continues to have exceptional economic, geographic, demographic, political, and cultural credentials to aspire to a more relevant presence in the global context, but today it lacks governance mechanisms that balance the national interests it harbors. There is no possible political convergence, in its current diversity, capable of conferring unity and willingness to promote collective gains and insert it sovereignly into the world.

Of all these new circumstances, the risks to democracy in Brazil and the world constitute the greatest and most urgent threat to be faced. This challenge was not present in Lula's previous terms and has direct consequences for Brazil's foreign action in the current term.

Extremism and the spread of misinformation have become transnational phenomena that erode social fabric, fuel violence and instability, and foster distrust in institutions. The manipulation of opinions with hate speech and the use of digital militias to spread fear, discredit opponents, and promote attacks on electoral systems are elements that hinder informed participation in public life.

Defending Brazilian democracy will be one of the main internal and external policy objectives of the current administration in the next biennium. The meeting of democratic leaders against extremism held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 is part of the strategy to face the articulation of anti-democratic forces in an organized manner. Events like the attempt by Platform X to avoid complying with Brazilian norms are another chapter of this confrontation that will require joint action by governments, technology companies, and civil society.

Domestically, the importance of social participation in the formulation and conduct of Brazilian foreign policy has been discussed for at least ten years. During the transition team's work (República Federativa do Brasil 2022), the proposal to establish a National Foreign Policy Council, composed of government representatives and civil society organizations, was reintroduced.

In addition to promoting the democratization of foreign policy agendas and the public dimension of its debates, the establishment of a consultative forum would institutionally strengthen the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its relationship with other domestic governmental actors and reinforce the legitimacy of Brazil's international action by expanding the representativeness, credibility, and plurality of voices in society during this stage of foreign policy reconstruction.

The historical contribution of civil society on issues such as the 2030 Agenda; environment and climate change; food security and combating hunger; population and development; and human rights, among others, justifies the urgency and benefits of institutionalizing and implementing this participation body.

References

- Amorim, C. *Aula Magna proferida da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2024.
- Araújo, E. *A nova política externa brasileira*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2020.
- Araújo, E. *A nova política externa brasileira*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2021.
- Arrighi, G. *Adam Smith in Beijing: lineages of the twenty-first century*. London: Verso, 2008.
- Barros, P. S., and J. S. B. Gonçalves. “Fragmentação da governança regional: o Grupo de Lima e a política externa brasileira (2017-2019).” *Mundo e Desenvolvimento* 2, no. 3 (2019): 6-39.
- Barros, P. S., J. S. B. Gonçalves, and S. E. Samurio. “Desintegração econômica e fragmentação da governança regional na América do Sul.” *Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional*, no. 27 (2020): 125–144. Doi: <https://doi.org/10.38116/bepi27art8>
- Breuning, M. *Foreign policy analysis: a comparative introduction*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Buzan, B. “The level of analysis problem reconsidered.” In *International relations theory today*, edited by K. Booth, and T. Erskine. Centre County: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
- Cardoso, R. “UN Reform: one of Brazil’s priorities at G20 meeting.” *Agência Brasil*, February 20, 2024. <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2024-02/un-reform-one-brazils-priorities-g20-meeting>
- Casarões, G., and D. B. L. Farias. “Brazilian foreign policy under Jair Bolsonaro: far-right populism and the rejection of the liberal international order.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 5 (2021): 741-761. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1981248>
- Cervo, A. L., and C. Bueno. *História da política exterior do Brasil*. 4th ed. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 2011.
- Crouch, C. *The strange non-death of neoliberalism*. Cambridge: Polity, 2011.
- Dolce de Faria, V. F., and M. Y. Simoni. “Perspectiva de gênero na política externa brasileira: atuais esforços para a transversalização.” *Revista Tempo do Mundo*, no. 35 (2025): 31-53. doi: <https://doi.org/10.38116/rtm35art1>
- Fouskas, V. K., S. Roy-Mukherjee, Q. Huang, and E. Udeogu. *China & the USA: globalization and the decline of America’s supremacy*. London: Palgrave, 2021.

- François, B. *Le régime politique de la ve république*. Paris: La Découverte, 2010.
- Hermann, C. F. “Changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (1990): 3-21. doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600403>
- Hirst, M, and T. Maciel. “A política externa do Brasil nos tempos do governo Bolsonaro.” *Scielo Preprints*, 2022. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/SciELOPreprints.4771>
- Hirst, M. “A política externa de Lula 3.0 Além do Horizonte.” *Cadernos Adenauer* 24, (2023): 89-109.
- Hudson, V. “Foreign Policy Analysis: actor specific theory and the ground of international relations.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-30.
- Kaarbo, J. “A foreign policy analysis perspective on the domestic politics turn in IR theory.” *International Studies Review* 17, no. 2 (2015): 189-216. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12213>
- Lantis, J., and R. Beasley. “Comparative foreign policy analysis.” In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, edited by E. Hannah, 1-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.398>
- Lima, M. R. S. “Eixos analíticos e conflito de paradigmas na política exterior brasileira.” Paper presented at As políticas exteriores da Argentina e do Brasil frente a um mundo em transição: diversidade, convergência e complementaridade. Buenos Aires, September 3-5, 1993.
- Lima, M. R. S. “Relações interamericanas: a nova agenda sul-americana e Brasil.” *Lua Nova* 90, (2013): 167-201.
- Lima, M. R. S., and D. Ives. “Political Challenges in Implementing the Lula 3 Administration’s Foreign Policy.” *CEBRI-Journal* 3, no. 9 (2024): 103-122. doi: <https://doi.org/10.54827/issn2764-7897.cebri2024.09.02.05.103-122.pt>
- Lopes, D. B. “A política Exterior no ano inaugural do governo Lula III.” *CEBRI-Revista: Brazilian Journal of International Affairs*, no. 9 (2024): 80-102. <https://cebri-revista.emnuvens.com.br/revista/article/view/187>
- Lopes, D. B., T. Carvalho, and V. Santos. “Did the far right breed a new variety of foreign policy? The case of Bolsonaro’s ‘more-bark-than-bite’.” *Global Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (2022), ksac078. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac078>
- Menezes, R. G., and M. C. Bragatti. “Dragon in the ‘backyard’: China’s investment and trade in Latin America in the context of crisis.” *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy* 40, no. 3 (2020): 446-61. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572020-2963>
- Ministério das Minas e Energia do Brasil. “Brasil bate recorde de expansão da energia solar em 2023.” *Notícias*, September 18, 2023. <https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-bate-recorde-de-expansao-da-energia-solar-em-2023>
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. “Brazil settles the full amount of its debt to the Mercosur structural convergence fund (Focem) - joint press release from the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Planning and Budget.” *Press Releases*, April 19, 2023a. Accessed on July 2, 2025. <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/brazil-settles-the-full-amount-of-its-debt-to-the-mercosur-structural-convergence-fund-focem-joint-press-release-from-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-the-ministry-of-planning-and-budget>

Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. “Chamado à Ação sobre a Reforma da Governança Global.” *Agência Gov*, 2024a. <https://agenciagov.ebc.com.br/noticias/202409/segunda-reuniao-de-ministros-das-relacoes-exteriores-do-g20-2013-chamado-a-acao-sobre-a-reforma-da-governanca-global-nova-york-25-de-setembro>

Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. “O Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Mauro Vieira, sobre a ‘Doutrina Lula’ (Americas Quarterly, EUA, 23/03/2023).” *MRE Entrevistas*, March 23, 2023. <https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores/entrevistas-mre/mauro-vieira-2023/o-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-do-brasil-mauro-vieira-sobre-a-doutrina-lula-americas-quarterly-eua-23-03-2023>

Ministério de Minas e Energia do Brasil. “Matriz elétrica teve aumento de 10,9 GW em 2024, maior expansão da série histórica.” *Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica Notícias*, January 10, 2025. <https://www.gov.br/aneel/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/matriz-eletrica-teve-aumento-de-10-9-gw-em-2024-maior-expansao-da-serie-historica>

Oliveira, H. A. *Política externa brasileira*. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2005.

Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT. *Diretrizes para o programa de reconstrução e transformação do Brasil: Lula Alckimin 2023-2026*. São Paulo, 2022. Accessed on December 01, 2024. <https://pt.org.br/baixar-aqui-as-diretrizes-do-programa-de-governo-de-lula-e-alckmin>

Pecequillo, C. S. “Descontinuidades e continuidades bilaterais Brasil-Estados Unidos: a gestão de Jair Bolsonaro.” In *América Latina, eleições e mudanças políticas vol. 1*, edited by F. L. Corsi, and A. Santos, 87-106. Marília: Praxis, 2023.

Putnam, R. D. “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games.” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460.

Ratton Sanchez, M., E. C. G. Silva, E. L. Cardoso, and P. Spécie. “Política externa como política pública: uma análise pela regulamentação constitucional brasileira (1967-1988).” *Revista de Sociologia Política*, no. 27 (2006): 125-143. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-44782006000200009>

República Federativa do Brasil. “Brazil pays off debts with international organizations and strengthens support for multilateralism.” *Latest News*, January 4, 2024d. <https://www.gov.br/planalto.html/en/latest-news/2024/01/brazil-pays-off-debts-with-international-organizations-and-strengthens-support-for-multilateralism>

República Federativa do Brasil. “Brazil presents its new climate target aligned with mission 1.5°C.” *Latest News*, November 11, 2024. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil-presents-its-new-climate-target-aligned-with-mission-1.5oc>

- República Federativa do Brasil. “Federal government announces Amazon, Cerrado deforestation drop; concludes prevention pact — planalto.” *Latest News*, November 8, 2024b. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/federal-government-announces-amazon-cerrado-deforestation-drop-concludes-prevention-pact>
- República Federativa do Brasil. “Os números finais da operação de resgate de brasileiros no Líbano, a maior já feita pelo país.” *Notícias*, December 5, 2024c. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2024/12/operacao-de-resgate-de-brasileiros-no-libano-e-a-maior-ja-feita-pelo-pais>
- República Federativa do Brasil. “Projeto de lei: institui o plano plurianual da união para o período de 2024 a 2027.” *Diário Oficial de União*, April 9, 2024. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Projetos/PLN/2023/msg428-agosto2023.htm
- República Federativa do Brasil. “Proposta conjunta de negociação de paz com a participação de Rússia e Ucrânia.” *Relações Exteriores*, May 23, 2024b. <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2024/05/brasil-e-china-apresentam-proposta-conjunta-para-negociacoes-de-paz-com-participacao-de-russia-e-ucrania>
- República Federativa do Brasil. *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988*. Brasília: Senado Federal, 1988.
- República Federativa do Brasil. *Relatório final da Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito dos atos de 8 de janeiro de 2023*. Brasília: Senado Federal, 2023
- República Federativa do Brasil. *Relatório final do gabinete de transição governamental*. Brasília: Grupo Técnico de Relação Exteriores, 2022.
- Rodrigues, G. M. A. “Relações internacionais federativas do Brasil.” *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais* 51, no. 4 (2008): 1015-1034. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0011-52582008000400007>
- Rosenau, J. “Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy.” In *Approaches in comparative and international politics*, edited by R. Barry Farrell, 27-92. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Salomón, M. and L. Pinheiro. “Análise de política externa e política externa brasileira: trajetórias, desafios e possibilidades de um campo de estudos.” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56, no. 1 (2013): 40-59. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292013000100003>
- Secretaria de Comunicação Social – Secom. “August 2024 Amazon deforestation lowest in six years.” *Latest News*, September 16, 2024. <https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2024/09/august-2024-amazon-deforestation-lowest-in-six-years>
- Singer, J. D. “The level-of-analysis problem in international relations.” *World Politics* 1, no. 1 (1961): 77–92.
- Stokes, D. “Trump, american hegemony and the future of the liberal international order.” *International Affairs* 94, no. 11 (2018): 133-150. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix238>
- Streeck, W. *Buying time: the delayed crisis of democratic capitalism*. London: Verso, 2014.

- United Nations Peacekeeping. *Data: troop and police contributors*. New York, 2025. Accessed on March 9, 2025. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.
- United Nations. “Facts and figures: women and girls during the war in Gaza.” *The question of Palestine*, January 19, 2024. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/facts-and-figures-women-and-girls-during-the-war-in-gaza-un-women/>.
- Vigevani, T., and G. Cepaluni. “A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação.” *Contexto Internacional* 29, no. 2 (2007): 273–335. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292007000200002>
- Watkins, S. “Paradigm shifts.” *New Left Review* n. 128, March–April, 2021.



Available in:

<https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=35881412006>

How to cite

Complete issue

More information about this article

Journal's webpage in redalyc.org

Scientific Information System Redalyc
Diamond Open Access scientific journal network
Non-commercial open infrastructure owned by academia

Audo Araújo Faleiro

Lula 3.0: foreign policy reconstruction and Brazil's return to the world

Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional

vol. 68, no. 1, e009, 2025

Centro de Estudos Globais da Universidade de Brasília,

ISSN: 0034-7329

ISSN-E: 1983-3121

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202500110>