introduction

In a surprise move, in June 2019, Mexico’s National Gard was deployed along its Southern and Northern borders in an attempt to control transit migration. Later on, the government stated “Mexico is not a country of transit “. These were important and significant changes, a sharp turn (viraje) of migration policies from those of the past, mostly traditional and rhetoric or declaratory, moving de facto the country’s migration policies into a new direction. The paper seeks to interpret these policies within their context and explore opportunities and challenges that could be encountered by this new direction from the perspective of migration governability.

Most countries, prominently among them Mexico, currently have as their goal to reach an acceptable state of migration governability as embodied in the Global Compact for a Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration by the international community since 2018. The Global Compact functions as the analytical framework from whose perspective recent change in Mexican migration policy is analyzed.

To sense the magnitude of the change in migration policies, it is useful to review briefly past Mexican migration policies, before Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)´s presidency and during his administration prior to this turn. Equally important is to review the context of regional migration policies, particularly the US context, specifically that of the Trump presidency since early 2017. Similarly, it also is convenient to review past migration trends and tendencies as well as the conjuncture of the migratory phenomena in the region.

Let´s start by reviewing trends and the migration situation. CurrentMexican migration to the United States is a decades-long phenomenondating back to WWII and the Bracero Program. Over the years, thismigration, however, has gone through profound changes. It started andlasted for a long period as a temporary, seasonal, and circular movementof workers. It was, and continues to be, predominantly an economicdriven phenomenon. However, over time, migration networks wereestablished not only laying foundations sustaining these flows apart to some degree from economic forces, but also gradually changing thenature of this phenomenon, from migration of workers to one also offamilies, and from a temporary and circular migration to one morepermanent and settled in the United States.¹

Migration originates in nearly every corner of the country, currently the characteristics of migrants resemble, although skewedly, those of the overall population. Migration has also spread throughout the United States. Mexicans settling there approached the half million mark yearly in the early 2000s, and by the same years Mexican population residing in that country –more than 11 million - represented around a tenth of the total Mexican population. According with those trends, the numbers of Mexican-American have been growing steadily, to the point that population of Mexican descent has amply reached the mark of 25 million in the late 2010s.

Over the years, these flows and patterns have had the feature of being authorized and non-authorized, namely the indocumentados. The proportion of each group has certainly changed through time. Around half of the flows cross without authorization and around half of Mexicans residing in the Unites States do not have legal status. Due in part to this feature of the migration phenomenon– particularly after September 11, the economic recession of 2008-2009, and the deportation measures under the Obama and Trump presidencies— return migration to Mexico, of non-voluntary but also voluntary nature, as is the case of those retiring to Mexico, has been on the rise.

However, the economic and political factors in place in the U.S. inthe last two decades have greatly influenced the dynamics of Mexicanmigration. Since the recession and the intensification of the immigration enforcement practices, the number of crossings is on the declineand for many years returns are more numerous than exits. Returns are voluntary -–often for retirement purposes— as well as non-voluntary, from individuals and families, including children –many of them U.S.citizens, who have not socialized in Mexico and with scant knowledge of Spanish-, whose return is often not to their places of origin. Nevertheless,this does not mean that there is no movement of migrants between the two countries. This movement continues at the same time experiencing changes in its patterns. Around the year 2000, entries bylegal temporary workers began to climb, what had been a system ofcircular undocumented migration is been replaced by a growing systembased on the circulation of documented laborers.

Civil wars in the 1980´s in Central America meant that many displaced transited through Mexico to seek asylum or a job in the United Sates. Transit migration has gained importance, particularly after 2001, as the U.S. reinforced security at its borders. The number of transit migrants, without papers and authorization, increased so did the returns and deportations from Mexico, at the same time transit became hazar- dous and migrants vulnerable and victims. Transit migration of Central Americans -particularly from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras- has been an individual and family phenomenon, most recently joined by non-accompanied children and by huge groups of caravanas intensi- fied under dire economic, social and political conditions, as well as the ambition of hacer la América during the Trump administration.

To sum it up, steadily Mexican and Central American migration flows, coupled with reverse flows from the United States and Canada to Mexico and Central America, have created a regional migration system that stretches from Central America to Canada; system that slowly but surely has become more and more complex (Alba, 2016; Giorguli, García and Masferrer, 2016).

Immigration into Mexico has been historically rather small, although also always present. Entry of refugees, except for a few notorious cases, has also been meager. Foreign-born population in the country comprised in 2020 a little less than 1 percent of its total population. In addition, the 2010 and 2020 censuses revealed that among foreign-born population around two thirds are U.S.-born immigrants, and out of them, the majo- rity are children under the age of 15.

Regarding migration policies in the region, and their overallgeneral context, Mexican migration policies are reviewed first. Sincethe times of the Bracero Program, Mexico made for decades defenseof their migrants –regardless of their legal status—a migration policypriority, and almost its unique priority (Alba, 2010). Mexico´s attitude–government and society— towards emigration of its nationals aboard has been mixed and ambiguous, from disappointment and denunciation,regretting its departure but not limiting it, certainly not openly encouragingit, to rather recently animating its integration into Americaneconomy and society. Acknowledging that there is not much that can bedone to alter the strong economic forces –neighboring countries withtremendous economic, social and institutional differences and conditions--that drive Mexico-U.S. migration, the country has accepted thisphenomenon as a fact of live, seeking respect of migrants rights, takingadvantage of remittances sent back and promoting a sort of transnationalism–reinforcing strong ties to Mexico-- among its migrants andMexican-origin population abroad.

However, gradually the country engaged in the process of resha- ping its migration policies considering the changing faces of migra- tion phenomena. A declining emigration and an increasing return in the context of a former U.S. permeable border to a mounting fortified one, a transit migration that from been rather inoffensive -a non-issue- became a dangerous and vulnerable -a big issue-, and an emerging demand for refuge from those in need, poor and hopeless at home. Out of this process emerged the current legal framework for migration policy, the new 2011 Migration Law and the Law on Refugees, Complemen- tary Protection and Political Asylum (Ley sobre Refugiados, Protección complementaria y Asilo político) also of 2011. Within this legal framework Mexico has to perform as a country of emigration, return, and transit, not yet as a country of destination and refuge.

With the 2011 Migration Law the country attempted to create a new migration narrative (Alba, 2013), considering emigration concerns, transit challenges, and immigration opportunities. The Law is unambi- guous in the defense of rights of all migrants, irrespective of their legal status. The Law also aims to facilitate international mobility of people, and promotes immigrants´ integration. The 2011 Law on Refugees also contemplates full recognition of rights of refugees and asylees. However, the Law is rather procedural and does not particularly specify its purposes and objectives.

The revision of the regional context encompasses mainly the one inthe US and the one in Central America. On the U.S. context, the ImmigrationReform and Control Act (IRCA) meant the beginning, in 1986,of serious attempts of U.S. administrations to curb the non-authorizedflows of migrants. Paradoxically this law also offered a path to consolidate these flows by introducing a generous regularizationprogram that allowed the establishment in that country of severalmillion migrants and their families. Since then, the attempts to curtailthese flows have been on the rise: in 1993-1994, the first “Operations”appeared along the U.S.-Mexico border and the beginning of the constructionof the wall; after September 11, 2001, it followed the emphasison security at the national level and at the borders; recently, the Trumpera with his “America First” and anti-immigrant rhetoric, epitomizedby “The Wall” discourse, the “zero tolerance” and the separation offamilies (Alba, 2020).

The Central American context characterizes as one of widespread poverty, violence, insecurity, and inequality, as well as weak public administration and limited institutionalization of migration policies, which also lack specificity. In general, migration law provisions are “standard”. El Salvador is the only country that has relatively well- developed border controls. To advance regional integration, since 2004 the nationals of four countries –Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua— have the right to move freely throughout the CA-4 countries with only an ID -no passport-. However, they have no right to work. Mexico has signed agreements with the CA-4 counties for a secure and orderly repatriation of nationals of those countries (Alba and Castillo, 2012).

These are the inheritances and the context that President López Obrador faced at the start of his administration. Having made these revi- sions, the paper describes the meaning of the “new migration policies” under the AMLO administration, and explores its short-term effects and long-term implications.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, a revi- sion of the early migration postures and policies of the AMLO admi- nistration. Second, the sharp turn on borders and transit management, occurred by mid-2019, is described. Third, the short-term effects of this migration policy turn are analyzed. Forth, the long-term opportu- nities and challenges of this turn are surveyed. Finally, as concluding comments, the future prospects of the direction migration policy might take in a new American context are explored.

1. Early migration policies: in line with traditional positions

The Andrés Manuel López Obrador government started his term stating that his migration policies were new, just as he claimed that most of his policies were. However, his initial migration policies were not as new, and little he knew at that moment that the “newness“ of Mexican migration policies laid ahead, not too far in time. To have a sense of the magnitude and profoundness of the sharp shift (viraje) in these policies, a prerequisite is to know with certain detail, and from a historical pers- pective, the initial migration positions of the current administration.

These initial positions have come to constitute what I consider, from a “historical perspective”, the first phase, or stance, of the Mexican migration policies under AMLO’s administration. Five main features characterized this phase. This new policy is claimed as a Sovereign Policy; it is based on a Human Rights Perspective; it intends to achieve Flexibility in Transit Conditions; it places faith on Development as Solution to Migration Trends and Issues; it relies as guidance on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration.² In addition, the AMLO administration maintains that it will prevail, in general, a non-confrontational attitude vis-à-vis US initiatives and actions.

The “Sovereign Policy” feature carries an innuendo, perhaps, that sovereignty was not equally important in the past. However, most probably, it was just a manifestation of an inward-looking world vision of the new administration. The attribute of sovereignty, however, is nothing new; past Mexican migration policies have also been predi- cated on this assumption and it is well known that migration policy is widely considered by most countries as one of the few remaining domains of sovereignty.

The Human Rights Perspective is grounded on the full respectof human rights of migrants and on the centrality of the migrant as aperson. The actions envisaged under this perspective have been grantinghumanitarian visas -with a greater saliency-, the openness to asylumand refuge –that has been more vocal-, the acceptance of asylum petitioners to the US to remain in Mexico while their petition is processedin that country –this action is certainly new–, and the protection ofMexican migrants in the US –this responsibility, including the indocumentados,has been a long-time endeavor of Mexican governments–.Short, respect of migrants’ rights has been traditional tenet of Mexicanmigration policy.

The Flexibility of Transit Conditions and the declarations on free mobility as a right are new initiatives. Actually, in the first months of the administration the numbers of Temporary Visas (Tarjeta Visitante Temporal) for humanitarian visas increased sensibly, and there were also handed out an important number of salvoconductos, to the point that, to many observers, these initiatives acted as incentives that fueled migration flows to the Southern Mexican border to cross the country to try to reach the US. Indeed, this instance shows that policies have effects and implications.

The apparent novelty on promoting development to diminish emigration pressures is nothing new. The Plan de Desarrollo Integral del Sureste Mexicano, Guatemala, Honduras y El Salvador, presented in May 2019, is an approach that has already been tried on many occa- sions and circumstances. Most prominently, by example, with Plan Puebla Panamá to accelerate the development of Central America and Southern Mexico, and with NAFTA to develop Mexico under the premise of “trade vs migration”. Incidentally, the delimitation of this international regional entity is interesting, comprising parts of Mexico and the Northern Triangle of Central America.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration is in many respects an achievement of the previous administration of Peña Nieto when Mexico played an important role as one of the two coun- tries that acted as facilitators in the international negotiations that ulti- mately reached quite important agreements on migration governance principles under this international instrument.

The non-confrontational attitude vis-à-vis the US perhaps could be considered “surprising” coming from the AMLO administration, but it is nothing new. What is new is that this attitude is openly embraced, while in the past such an attitude was a tacit assumption given the notorious asymmetry of power between the two countries. Probably, since the 1930´s an attitude of understanding and “good neighbors” has prevail, with only a few episodes of confrontation.

Thus, most of the discourse, principles, actions and initiatives in this first phase related to migration policy were very much in line with traditional Mexican positions and narrative. These initial positions were presented as a different, new migration policy, they constituted, instead, what I call “a naive stance”, and what a respected analyst signaled as “the errors of December” (Durand, 2019).

2. The sharp turn on borders and transit management

The actual novelty in migration policy came just a little more than half a year after AMLO´s inauguration as President of Mexico, under moun- ting border crossings and intense US pressure, there was a sharp turn of migration policy precisely in those areas where resided its newest features, namely the flexibility in transit conditions and some compo- nents of migrants´ human rights perspective. This turn was accom- plished in two steps. First, a very significant action was undertaken and, second, a “rationale” for that action was found. In June 2019, Mexico’s “Guardia Nacional” (National Gard) was deployed along its Southern and Northern borders in an attempt to contain transit migration. Later on, the government provided the rationale for that action. Olga Sánchez Cordero, Minister of Interior, in mid-January 2020, declared, in the context of an imminent arrival of a caravana, that Mexico is not a lawless territory to migrants, that it does not deliver transit visas nor salvoconductos (in other words, that “Mexico is not a transit country”), that it is not uniquely a country of transit, but one open to immigrants and refugees. These were important and significant changes that caused a sharp turn (viraje) of migration policies that moved the country into a new direction. This was also a sort of “about-face” from former mostly traditional, welcoming migratory postures in line with a humanitarian and human rights perspective.

Multiple motives played in the deployment of the National Gard.³One of these motives, probably a non-insignificant one, was the comingto terms of the strong structural forces pushing migrants out of their Central American countries –despair, violence and insecurity-, but also the migration realities of the changing dynamics of regional migration–family migration and social networks—that increasingly sustain theseflows. Another motive was, surely, the awareness of the unintended implications of the policies of the naïve stance that acted as incentives,as an invitation to cross the border and the country to reach the desiredUS destination (Durand, 2019). The number of Central Americanspresented to Mexican migratory authorities roughly tripled betweenJanuary and June 2020, from more than 7 thousand to more than 26 thousand (dropping thereafter). Similarly, on a year to year basis,Central American aliens apprehended in the U.S. more than doubledbetween 2018 and 2019, from 272 thousand to more than 668 thousand(that was not the case with Mexicans apprehended, whose numberremained almost unaltered around a quarter of a million).

However, perhaps the most “persuasive” motive were US pressures for Mexico to put obstacles to transit migration. Prominent among those pressures was the threat to impose high tariffs on Mexican exports. A sign of the decisive role played by those pressures in the Mexican deci- sion to deploy the National Gard along the border is that this action steamed out of the Mexico-US Accords of June 7, 2019. In this case, the “action-reaction” framework developed by the Binational Study on Migration between Mexico and the United States (Commission on Immigration Reform and Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1997) to analyze the interplay of Mexican-US migration policies did not prepare us to understand the “compliance” of the Mexican government to US demands for containing transit flows.

Before the “shocking” deployment of the National Guard, there had been another instance, in May 2019, where the “action-reac- tion” framework could also serve as analytical tool. The “relative compliance” to US demands and pressures by accepting, on grounds of upholding the human rights of migrants, the Migrant Protection Protocol program, also known as the “Remain in Mexico” program, by which those applying for asylum in the US should remain in Mexico while their applications are processed.⁴

As already mentioned, about half a year later in early 2020, adiscourse took shape somehow serving to provide substantive principles to actions undertaken to contain transit migration flows andbetter control the borders. This discourse has two components; first,the country´s laws have to be respected, including the migrants, andMexico does not provide transit visas, and, second, besides the countrybeing a country of transit, it is open to immigrants and refugees. Itseems as if this second component intended to compensate the harshnessof the first.

The meaning that the laws of the country have to be respected signals that there is not anymore a tacit “open borders” posture. Those who want to cross have to identify themselves, show the migration authori- ties appropriate papers, and do it in an orderly manner. This declaration clearly wiped out the ambivalences of the past, when over the years, former Mexican governments and during the first months of AMLO´s administration had adopted an accommodating stance versus migratory realities, by not enforcing nor being able to enforce existing laws and dispositions, which made of Mexico a de facto “transit country”.

The meaning and the intention of the statement that the country is not only a country of transit, but is also open to immigrants and refu- gees is less clear as well as less concrete. In any event, those actions and the accompanying discourse send a very clear message. There would no longer be conditions for an almost free and relaxed transit for mass migration or for migrants´ caravanas. This message, indirectly, also played down the expectations for an easy access to labor markets in Mexico –-nor even in Southeastern Mexico. Clearly, this was a “prag- matic posture” taken, on the one side, under mounting border crossings and, on the other, intense US pressure. It was also a realistic one, in terms of real politik, namely in terms of the freedoms and limitations contextualizing Mexican policies.⁵

I have labeled these measures steps toward “mature migration policies”because, irrespective of the motivations that triggered them andof their unpremeditated implementation, they ended up addressing realissues (Alba, 2021). Namely: on one side, the lack of controls, order,and security at the borders as well as the dire conditions of migrants;on another, the solidification of a barrier at the U.S. border as well asan increasing vulnerability of migrants in their transit through Mexico; and also, mounting demands for transit, refuge and immigration. Thedeployment of the National Guard as well as statements on the rule ofthe law were a step to address some of the above issues. These wereconcrete actions –not mere rhetoric-, tacitly addressing objectives,costly, difficult and controversial –obviously not to the liking of manyimportant migration actors-. I underline that I consider these measuresas steps in the direction of mature migration policies; although, notfully mature policies. Policy formation is, besides, an ongoing process.

In any event, this big shift (viraje) of migration policy was,obviously, a pressured decision, ideologically difficult, costly and, ofcourse, controversial.⁶ However, this shift was also a step, certainlyimprovable, in the right direction –toward a safe, orderly and regularmigration-, charged, as it were, with plenty of opportunities andchallenges as discussed ahead. Those actions and declarations hadimportant short-term effects and could have potentially profound implicationson the longer-term.

3. Short-term effects

The shift of migration policy that took place in June 2019 produced almost immediate effects. In fact, short-term effects of the second phase of Mexican migration policies, the pragmatic phase, can almost entirely be attributed to the deployment of the National Guard and the clear message it sent, as well as the notice of no more transit visas. These immediate effects relate to migration trends and patterns of those trying to cross the Southern border in an unorderly and irregular manner, and of those trying to transit through the country in a similar manner. There were also diverse short-term effects in various realms, such as in US-Mexico migration relations as well as in reactions and perceptions within Mexico.

The contention strategy worked and migrants´ caravanas werealmost completely deactivated. There was an inflexion and reductionof Central American migrants –specifically from Honduras, Guatemalaand El Salvador— along the Mexico-Guatemala border and along the U.S.-Mexico border. On the Mexican side, there was nearly 80% reductionof Central Americans presented before a migration authority in theJune-December 2019 period, from more than 26 thousand to less than6 thousand. On the U.S. side, there was a 75% reduction of total apprehensions–of Central Americans, Mexicans and other nationalities- insix months, between May and December 2019, from around 133 thousand,the highest point, to around 32 thousand.

However, irregular entries and transits through the country did not end. Certainly, after the sharp drop in the attempts to enter forcefully into Mexico using caravans, irregular transit migration continued along its previous traditional patterns -individually, by family members, and small groups-, although it lost somewhat its dynamics of previous years. The number of Central Americans presented to Mexican migra- tory authorities in 2020 was similar to the number in 2017, somewhat below 81 thousand.

On another front, the decision to send the National Guard to theborders affected the US-Mexico migratory relation. The former relationshipoverwhelmed by “pressure” changed into one of “appreciation”.US pressures on Mexico began to subside to the point that PresidentTrump praised on several occasions President López Obrador forhis collaboration on curbing down the numbers of migrants trying toreach the US. Most significant was the reference to the President ofMexico in Trump´s very last visit to the Wall on January 12, 2021 (White House, 2021). The Central American countries, given their uncomfortableposition, remained mostly silent. On this side, President López Obrador continued to state that the U.S. relationship was of respect.

Domestically, quite understandably, there were reactions of rejectionand disbelieve that such a decision could have been taken, mostlyby migrants’ defenders and advocates, but not exclusively by them. Thetariffs-migration trade-off was heavily criticized as was amply seen thatwith this action the country was doing “the dirty work” for Trump andfor the U.S. At the same time, there is the perception that a tacit acceptanceexists for relying on the National Guard to intercept the caravansand to attempt to exercise control along the Southern border.⁷ This acceptance, however, probably was not different from the generalized tacit acceptance of the utilization of the National Guard inmany other instances of insecurity and violence in the country, sincethis public security and law enforcement body was created under the AMLO administration. The acceptance of the tariffs-migration agreementwas also generally considered as something inevitable, given theeconomic asymmetry between the two countries, specifically Mexicandependence of exports to the U.S.⁸

It would also seem that the AMLO administration prefers silence on this action. No more congratulatory speeches on migration policy, like those at the beginning on the “new migratory policy”. There is hardly any mention to the de facto new policy, although in the Informes there are references to the National Guard operatives. Revealingly enough, the sharp shift in migratory policy is ignored in the mañaneras, AMLO´s morning press conferences.

The short-term regional effects –in the Southeast- of this interfe- rence at the border are not known in general. It seems, however, that these effects have been rather weak or almost inexistent. This can be assumed given the fact that the contention strategy focused on transit migrants –specifically the caravans. It seems that this action does not particularly affect the economic activities of the region. Commerce does not seem to have suffered either. There is no information to suggest that the patterns of customary transborder migration, temporal and sectorial, have been particularly altered. This interference, instead, could have brought some relief to diverse social and political activities, as those related to the provision of services to satisfy migrants’ demands for assistance and protection. Even, it might have diminished manifesta- tions of friction between diverse sectors of society.

4. Opportunities and challenges ahead

Beyond short-term effects that the actions and declarations related tothe turn in migration policy have had so far, those actions and declarationscould also have on the longer-term profound implications. Thesharp turn meant a substantial shift from a “principled” discursive and rhetoric posturing of Mexican migration policies toward concreteactions and positions. This shift towards concrete and specific policiesoffers plenty of opportunities, which also convey challenges. In fact,there will also be serious challenges in the process of concretion ofprinciples and of further advancement of actions already undertaken. Inmany respects, opportunities and challenges are intertwined; they arelike two sides of the same coin.

Opportunities are defined here in relation to achieving an expanded degree of migration governability in terms of allowing for a safe, orderly and regular migration. Opportunities are then occasions to move towards that end, towards those objectives. This is not an easy task, and there is a multitude of challenges on the way. Moreover, most of the time, the policies and measures designed to the advancement of those objectives imply difficult decisions, having to choose among varied options and conflictive demands, realities and obligations (Alba, 2019). This is the reason why I have labeled said policies “mature migration policies”. They are labeled “mature” because they aim, consciously or unconsciously, to reach balances and equilibria between, on the one side, principles and objectives, on other, realities and limits, and, on yet another side, norms and obligations. Not an easy road because decisions of a mature policy usually are difficult, painful. One has to choose between different options, limited possibilities, and conflictive demands. By example: questions on migrants’ selectivity; objectives for immigration; its volume; accommodation and integration.

In the second section, dealing with “the sharp turn on borders and transit migration management”, I wrote that the deployment of the National Guard and governmental declarations, stating that Mexico is not only a country of transit but one also open to immigrants and refugees, were steps in the direction of mature migration policies. I underline that those actions and declarations were steps in the direc- tion of mature migration policies, in the right direction. However, to advance in this direction it is necessary to take additional steps and develop additional mature policies. Again, not an easy task, because the development of those mature policies confronts opportunities -to be realized- and challenges -to be overcome-.

Exploration ahead of opportunities and challenges relates to themain domains of the new Mexican migratory policy introduced by the AMLO administration in 2019-2020. There certainly are also opportunities and challenges related to other migration policy domains notdirectly affected by this new migration policy. However, those arebarely explored here, in a document that is focused on the sharp turn ofmigration policy.

While exploring opportunities and challenges, I will rely on a few guiding ideas or concepts that could help in the delicate process of upholding principles and objectives, of building institutions and infrastructure, and of keeping up to norms and obligations. These ideas or concepts are meant specifically to each one of the four domains of interest here. Regarding the use of the National Guard to manage borders and migrants the concepts are substitution, institutionalization, and complement measures. Regarding Mexico as a country of transit flexibility and negotiations could be the guiding ideas; convenience and contribution regarding immigration; generosity and humanitarian reception regarding refuge.

Regarding the use of the National Guard to control the borders, key concepts are substitution, institutionalization, and complement measures. Most observers have questioned the use of the National Guard for purposes of borders and migrants’ control, thus the opportu- nity presents itself to transcend the use of the National Guard for that function. However, once deployed, the opportunity and the challenge into the future are its substitution, its “phasing out”, by another security body specialized in borders control, and to monitor the entry and exit of persons –nationals and non-nationals- into and out of the territory. The purpose is not to seal borders, but to have a reasonable control of them as to have the availability of exercising sovereignty over the territory.

In this process of phasing out the National Guard, there would be many opportunities to shape appropriately the new body for migra- tion control and supervision functions. This substitution or phase out process is also an institution building process, which if successful could have long-lasting positive implications. The institutionalization process extends itself into a full professionalization of personnel to perform control and related administrative functions as well as the building of physical infrastructure to house and carry out all migration related functions and administrative activities.

The deployment of the National Guard at the borders was certainlya shocking event. Paradoxically, this action can also be seen as a steptoward a “mature policy” in as much as it aimed to contain mass migration and put borders under own control. However, this step has to befollowed and accompanied by many other steps in order to secure asafe, orderly and regular migration. Prominent among these otheradditional steps are the complement measures that have to do with theimplementation of laws, particularly of Migration Law, regarding themigrants´ situation and conditions at borders.⁹ Entries into the countryand transit migration have to be orderly and regular events, but alsosafe. The opportunities to redress those conditions are huge. However,the challenges are also great, given the dire conditions of “the rule oflaw” in the country.

These accompanying measures need to address respect of legal guaranties of migrants and of their human rights, and, in terms of princi- ples, the world lives in an era that prioritizes the binding nature and the respect of human rights to all persons. Mexico should continue along its long traditional path of defense of those rights to all migrants -national migrants and non-national migrants-, no matter their legal situation. Of course, care has to be taken also overseeing the correct application of laws and of migrants’ obligations, as well as of their rights.

At the end, the decision to deploy the National Guard at the borderscould end up having positive long-term implications if said deploymentis transformed and institutionalized, and at the same time, complementedand accompanied by additional measures attending concernsrelated to migrants’ conditions and rights. Additionally, administrativeand personnel professionalization as well as physical infrastructurebuilding would be required and would extend to the other three domains–not a country of transit, immigration, and refuge. The need to enhanceinstitutionalization should be an overarching concern to the country.

To sum up, specialized institutional building epitomizes the areas where most of the opportunities and challenges reside. It relates directly and immediately to the substitution by another body of the National Guard at the borders, and indirectly and on a longer-term relates to future avenues to transform the legal apparatus and administration of immigration and refuge.

By geography, Mexico is a country of transit. Thus, declaring that Mexico is a country of transit calls for flexibility and negotiations if one wants to explore the opportunities and challenges regarding transit through the country. One of the most difficult challenges is allowing some degrees of flexibility on migrants´ migratory status to be able to become a country of transit, in a safe, orderly, and regular manner, without becoming “a transit country”.

In a world of increased mobility, people transit through countries on a routine basis. Opportunities to enable order into that movement pass through the negotiations of regional mobility accords as well as regional migration cooperation agreements. It is no easy task; at play are interests, quite diverse, of the countries involved. The governability of migration requires most of the time government flexibility to make some multilateral concessions. Moreover, it also calls for a well-deve- loped legal, institutional, and operational infrastructure to adequately monitor transit conditions, its temporality, its rights and obligations.

Regarding the statement that the country is open to immigrants and refugees, I wrote toward the end of the section on “the sharp turn on borders and transit migration management” that its meaning and the intention of the country being open to immigrants and refugees lacks on concreteness. Thus, in this case, the opportunities and challenges rest on the process of their concreteness.

Regarding immigration, the guiding principles and criteria should be convenience and contribution. The criterion of “convenience and contribution” is in accordance with Hollifield’s (2004) analytical framework of “the migration state” in which the fledging countries are the ones profiting of increased mobility of populations, by being open to people, facilitating movement, and attracting those most able to contribute to the economy and society of the state.

To open the country to immigration means to attract immigrants,even to invite in those that can contribute to national development objectives.However, in this process, the country faces difficult decisionsbecause to be open to immigrants does not have to mean an indiscriminateopening, but a selective one according to defined and precise objectives.Opening the country to immigration requires a legal, institutionaland administrative infrastructure to deal with selecting immigrants, toevaluate the capacities of labor markets to absorb them, and to accompany their economic and social integration.¹⁰ Of course, convenienceand contribution could and should not be the only criteria. For example,there should be openness to and latitude on “family reunification”.

Regarding refuge and asylum, the supporting elements should be generosity and humanitarian reception. Generosity and humanita- rian reception should be as ample as possible. However, in terms of governability, there should also be a founded and orderly adjudica- tion process in the reception of refugees and asylees. Moreover, the generosity cannot be unlimited, some limits are unavoidable to bring that process to a manageable level, given the availabilities of resou- rces, from financial to a wide range of indispensable facilities, as well as restrictions and constrains regarding personnel and infrastructure. Thus, in the process of concretion of principles and the materialization of opportunities there will be serious challenges to the opportunities for the country to exhibit its generosity and humanitarianism in a commen- surate manner to potential needs.

Last but not least, declaring that the country is open to immigrants and refugees, must also advance concrete measures to make sure that migrants and refugees have the possibility to fully integrate into the economic, social and political life of the country. This objective also calls for quite targeted specialized institutional building, from a posi- tive narrative regarding non-nationals to avoiding discriminating them and actively promoting their integration.

Opportunities and challenges will exist in other migratory domainsthat are not explored here because they have not been the object of thissharp turn in migration policy. Some of those domains also form partof the migratory agenda of the AMLO government. Prominent amongthem is the defense of Mexican migrants abroad -particularly in theUnited States where numerous reside or work without authorization-,the development migration nexus, where upon if development occurspeople would not migrate out of necessity. Related to this domain, is thesearch to develop Central America, and Southern Mexico, ambitiouslyrelying on multilateral cooperation. On this regard, there is space for“shared responsibilities” by cooperating, particularly with the U.S. and Central America, on financially founding and technically assisting the economic, social, and political “reformation” of the region, specificallyGuatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador -the so-called Northern Trianglecountries of Central America.

In addition, there are other domains missing in the migration government agenda, like the implications of migration on –mostly via remittances—or the necessity of engaging on regional mobility accords and institutionalizing regional migration cooperation, or return migra- tion. On this last domain, policies and measures should be implemented to ensure that there is a full reinsertion into the country’s life of migrants returning to the county, voluntary or non-voluntarily, on equal footing with nationals living in the country.

The above exploration on opportunities and challenges regarding these four migration policy areas means also to scout on the extent of the potential long-term implications of the sharp turn on migration policy. What are the chances that the country moves along those lines in the years ahead; not only in the remaining years of this administration, but also future ones. The task ahead is a continuum and never-ending process that stretches over very long periods. The concluding comments attempt to address this question.

Concluding comments: prospects for advancement

I conclude this exploration of the redirection of migration policy byconsidering the prospects for advancing on this new direction, changingcourse or returning to the past in face of the new context withthe arrival of Biden to the Presidency of the United Sates. In my view,there is no clear indication of the future direction of migration policy.The López Obrador administration in really divided between two quitedifferent forces and tendencies. On the one side, the profound legacyof former traditional -“principist”, abstract, and even moralist- policiesand attitudes. On the other, the also persistent reactive nature of migrationpolicy. Thorn between these two powerful forces, future courses ofaction are not easy to envisage. An additional element of uncertainty isthe fact that migration has not been a subject of particular interest in theAMLO administration. Of the 18 sections of the government programof López Obrador political party, Morena, none has migration in itsheading (Morena, 2018). Thus, it is doubtful that the country might move forward in the process of institutionalization of measures andinfrastructure building in the various domains surveyed.

The arrival of a new administration in the United States, however, potentially offers innumerable opportunities to advance in the direction of building mature migration policies. However, there would also be challenges in the reshaping process of the bilateral relationship (Alba, 2021). The Biden administration has from day one embarked on undoing a series of Trump´s measures and policy orientation. Biden´s agenda goes further, he envisages to reform immigration legislation, grant a road to legalization –even eventual citizenship—to resident non-autho- rized population, and support development in Central America. His administration promises to create a rather different regional context. However, most probably, it will also safeguard national security and it is unlikely that he deviates from the old aim to stem non-authorized migration and to foster orderly and regular migration.

Thus, in face of a complex context, both domestic and international, there is an opportunity -and a challenge- to show Mexico´s resolve, by own conviction and not as a conjunctural episode, to continue working towards a reasonable control of its borders and the institutionalization of migration management, including transit, as well as immigration and refugee admissions and integration. Mexico could also advance instances of migration cooperation and agreements with the United States –similar to the USMCA—while at the same time pursuing its own objectives towards the viability of the long-term endeavor of forging a mature migration apparatus. The chances for advancement along these lines increase significantly under the new Biden administration in the Unites States, but the temptations to drop them, to slow down or return to the past are not negligible.

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Notes