



Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales

ISSN: 2216-1201

Universidad Católica Luis Amigó

Guevara-Aristizábal, Juan Felipe
LA TRANSPARENCIA DE LA PALABRA
Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales, vol. 10, núm. 1, 2019, Enero-Junio, pp. 13-15
Universidad Católica Luis Amigó

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21501/22161201.3056>

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EDITORIAL

THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE WORD

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Way to quote this text in APA:

Guevara Aristizábal, J. F. (january-june, 2019). La Transparencia de la palabra [Editorial]. *Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales*, 10(1), pp. 16-18
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21501/22161201.3056>

If the Word is transparent, it would be necessary to distinguish what results transparent through you, of what not. Maybe we look familiar and a little bit problematic say that, in the word, if some contents or specific referents do not become transparent, if a disposition or mental process becomes transparent. So, it happens, for example, with Miranda's Fricker proposal (2017) around the concept of epistemic injustice, in general, and also of testimonial justice, in particular. The constitution of the testimony through the word works for Fricker as a starting point of her analysis. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the injustice of which she speaks does not fall directly on the testimony and who says it, but on who listen it, so that the listener incurs in an injustice when disparages the epistemological value based on racial prejudices, of class or gender, to name a few. The prejudices highlight the presence of the asymmetric structures of susceptible power of submit certain subjects to the silence, to do not be listened. The listener, nevertheless, constitutes the center of the attention of Fricker for its reflexive quality, same that allows her to glimpse its prejudices, modify its attitudes in relation to its interlocutors and increase its epistemological virtues during this process of reflection and continuous auto correction.

The word acquires a special load in the reflexive process and enters in scene under a way that, for its own peculiarity, will let us distinguish the transparency of the word. To analyze the reflexive process, Fricker uses fiction of some passages of Harper Lee's work, Kill the *nightingale*, why resort to fiction? Despite the fact that in the course of his interpretation does not offer a clear justification for such movement, the use that makes to the narrative offer clues about it. The reflection constitutes, in general, a moment in which the word retracts from the public domain, surrendering to the internal monologue, to the voice of conscience. In this sense, the fiction offers a clear privilege: The narrator has the capacity of *giving the voice* to those internal discussions, to that tension thought that each character handle. The narrator, in other words, deploys the reflection

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process and arranges it for his own consideration and, thus, epistemic. There is the transparency on which Fricker bases her analysis both the testimony and of the injustice. Through the word we can access to the discursive consciousness of the subject; in the word, the consciousness becomes transparent.

From a common sense perspective, it is difficult to be contrary to that conclusion; from a narratology perspective, the things change. It is here where the resource of the fiction becomes important, since, as a narrative gender, admits reading ways and different analysis to mere common sense or to the logical breakdown of arguments. The narrator's irruption in the passages used by Fricker to make explicit the reflective processes accentuates what, according to the narrative theories of Käte Hamburger (1995) and Dorrit Cohn (1998), constitutes the very thing of fiction: The capacity of represent the internal life of the characters that habit in the narration, an internal life that is not revealed to the other characters but to the reader. Likewise, since, the emergence of a "discursive intelligence who communicates with reads about the characters behind the back of these last ones" (Cohn, 1998, p. 25). Nevertheless, this peculiarity of the fiction comes with a set of questions and problems. Let's see what Cohn says with respect to the narrator:

Not only can order and explain the conscious thoughts of the character better than the character itself; as well can articulate in an effective way a psychic life that keeps without verbalizing, in the gloom or dark. According to this, the psychic narration usually traduces [Renders], in the words that the narrator knows, which the character "knows", without knowing how to make it words (1988, p. 46).

Cohn could not express it better, the psychic life in which the narrator gives the voice, it is not the character's own consciousness; the narrator is who sets up and articulates the discourse of the characters *better* than how the characters could do it. The narrator supposes an epistemological privilege that let the access to the character's consciousness. The voice that the narrator's word grants to the psychic word of the characters does not make it transparent to that consciousness, but puts in evidence the narrator's privilege.

We arrived to another perception of word's transparency. While for Fricker the narrator's word becomes transparent and let's track the mental statuses in which the prejudices are questioned, as well as the moment of its cracking, and the emergence of the epistemic virtue, that same voice encloses, for Cohn, the paradox of the transparency: Which is only possible at expenses of an actor, the narrator, knows more things than the others, the characters¹. From the narratology, the narrator's voice sets up as a possible perspective, even though privileged, to articulate the events of the narration without reducing it only to that perspective.

The transparency of the word, in consequence, shows us a word without a determine background, without content or specific referent which gives expression; the word is far from being the curtain that hides the mental or psychic machinery of which is product. Rather, the transparency shows

¹ Of course, this situation does not occur in the same way in all the fiction works. There are different types of narrators and each one highlights different problems

that the word is conflict and tension; that the same psychic life is articulated around the word and, thus, can be formed, deformed and reformed. In sum, does not make transparent what is behind of it; the word transparencies its own surface.

INTERESTS' CONFLICT

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