



Ingeniería

ISSN: 0121-750X

ISSN: 2344-8393

Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas

Cómbita, Luis Francisco; Quijano, Nicanor; Cárdenas, Álvaro A.
Defending State-Feedback Based Controllers Against Sensor Attacks
Ingeniería, vol. 28, no. 2, e20094, 2023, May-August
Universidad Distrital Francisco José de Caldas

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14483/23448393.20094>

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Research

Defending State-Feedback Based Controllers Against Sensor Attacks

Defensa de los controladores basados en realimentación de estado contra ataques de sensores

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Abstract

Context: This paper is motivated by the need to improve the resilience of industrial control systems. Many control systems currently operating in the industry were designed and implemented before the boom in communications (wired and wireless networks) within industrial control systems. However, nowadays, they operate connected to the communications network. This increase in connectivity has made these systems susceptible to cyber-attacks that seek to deteriorate the proper operation of the control loop, even when affecting only one sensor.

Method: Concepts from fault tolerant control and classic control theory are used to show that it is possible to reconstruct the system state without (any) one of the system outputs. This is employed in the control action signal recalculation through an algorithm of attack detection and isolation, in order to prevent an attack being fed back to the system, mitigating its effect. This work shows the effectiveness of our proposal with simulations on a four tanks testbed using Matlab and Simulink.

Results: This work demonstrates that a bank of unknown input observers can be designed to recover true information from attacked sensors, *i.e.*, the information without the effect of the attack. Therefore, the estimate obtained from said observers can be utilized for computing a control action that mitigates the effect of the attack.

Conclusions: This mitigation prevents a single sensor attack from significantly impairing the action of low-level controllers, improving the resilience of the system by only modifying the digital controller architecture. This development is limited to cyber-attacks on system sensors happening one at a time, which can still seriously compromise the system behavior. Future work will address the extension of the results to situations with simultaneous attacks on more than one sensor and/or consider attacks on the control system actuators.

Keywords: cyber-physical systems, unknown input observer, sensor attack, false data injection.

Article history

Received:
15th/Nov/2022

Modified:
26th/Apr/2023

Accepted:
05th/May/2023

Ing, vol. 28, no. 2,
2023. e20094

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Resumen

Contexto: La motivaci3n de este art3culo es la necesidad de mejorar la resiliencia en sistemas de control industriales. Muchos de los sistemas de control que operan actualmente en la industria fueron dise1ados e implementados antes de que se diera el *boom* de las comunicaciones (cableadas a inal3mbricas) dentro de los sistemas de control industrial. Sin embargo, estos sistemas funcionan conectados en red. Dicho incremento en la conectividad ha hecho que estos sistemas sean susceptibles a ataques cibern3ticos que buscan degradar la operaci3n adecuada del lazo de control con tan solo afectar un sensor.

M3todo: Se utilizan conceptos de control tolerante a fallos y teor3a de control cl3sica para demostrar que es posible estimar el estado del sistema sin una de las salidas del sistema (cualquiera). Esto se emplea para recalculer la acci3n de control a partir de un algoritmo que detecta y aísla el ataque, evitando que este sea realimentado al sistema y, por ende, mitigando su efecto. Este trabajo muestra la efectividad de nuestra propuesta con simulaciones desarrolladas sobre Matlab y Simulink para un sistema de cuatro tanques.

Resultados: Este trabajo demuestra que se puede dise1ar un banco de observadores de entrada desconocida para recuperar la informaci3n real de sensores atacados, *i.e.*, la informaci3n del sensor sin el efecto del ataque. Por lo tanto, el estimado obtenido de dicho banco de observadores puede utilizarse para recalculer la acci3n de control que mitigue el efecto del ataque.

Conclusiones: Esta mitigaci3n previene que ataques en alg3n sensor puedan comprometer significativamente el desempe1o del sistema, mejorando su resiliencia a partir únicamente de la modificaci3n de la arquitectura del controlador digital. Este desarrollo est3 limitado a ataques que ocurren uno a la vez en cualquier sensor, pero que a3n así pueden afectar fuertemente el desempe1o del sistema. Los trabajos futuros abordarán la extensi3n de los resultados a situaciones donde ocurran ataques simult3neos en m3s de un sensor y/o considerarán ataques en los actuadores del sistema.

Palabras clave: sistemas ciberf3sicos, observador de entrada desconocida, ataques en sensores, inyecci3n de datos falsos.

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1. Introduction

The growing incorporation of sensors, actuators, and controllers with digital communication capabilities in process control systems has enabled data collection and analysis from the operational physical world, which allows optimizing manufacturing processes to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Consequently, the inclusion of these digital capabilities opens an opportunity for intruders to gain knowledge of process data and use it fraudulently. However, most of these episodes are not publicly reported, unlike the enterprise cyber-threats and incidents that are widely documented (1).

In the scientific literature, there is evidence of the concern about the security of control systems of critical infrastructures for at least the two last decades. However, it is just about twelve years since some reports of successful cyber-attacks led public policies and funds to increase the security of cyber-physical systems. Some of the vulnerabilities of the process control systems show the need to find tools to build more secure control systems. Public reports of computer attacks on control process systems demonstrate the relevance of these malicious actions since 2000. As a starting point for a discussion on security issues in process control systems, a brief description of the first three known attacks is shown below.

In March 2000, the wastewater system of the Maroochy Shire Council (Queensland) reported issues with its pumping stations. Radiofrequency communications between pumping stations and the control center failed. Hence, the pumps had an improper operation, and the alarms did not signal the faults to the system operator (2).

Stuxnet has been widely considered as the first computer virus to attack a process control system. This computer worm was first detected in June 2010. The purpose was to attack an uranium enrichment process control based on a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The virus penetrated through a USB memory to infect the whole corporate network and went undetected. At the same time, as the virus identified the machines where designated people automated the manufacturing process based on Siemens Program Logic Controllers (PLCs), the worm uploaded the last updated file running on the controller to the Internet. The virus exploited a 'zero-day' vulnerability before the security experts identified it. After achieving the domination of the target, the intruders could spy, in detail, on the operation of the control systems and generate actions that could degrade their performance in the worst way. In this regard, rotor speed and over-pressure strategies were simultaneously used on the centrifuges to attack the uranium enrichment process. Modifying the rotor speed can cause a severe decrease in the useful life of the centrifuge. A chronic over-pressure condition inside the centrifuge can hinder uranium enrichment and erroneously indicate the end of the centrifuge's useful life, which implies the need to replace the centrifuging equipment. Tamper control actions did not generate any alarm activation because the data obtained from the correct operation of the process supplanted the genuine values of the measurements of abnormal situations (3,4).

In 2015, the first known successful cyber-attack on a power grid was reported. In this attack, 30 substations of the Ukrainian power distribution network were successively attacked, which caused

several outages (5). As a result of this incident, about 230.000 people were left without electricity for up to six hours. Similar to the aforementioned cases, there are more incidents across several industries.

The security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) is an issue that has currently sparked great attention in researchers. Among the different topics developed by the control systems community over the years, there are definitions of cyber-attacks, the design of effective attacks, various techniques for attack detection and isolation, and the design of resilient controllers, as well as some works related to attack mitigation, all of them with variations for linear and nonlinear systems, with or without noise, and for either continuous or discrete-time systems. Recent surveys and works in CPS security (6–10) agree on the fact that cyber-attack response has received considerably less attention than attack detection and isolation, which is the gap to which this work contributes.

A relatively new topic related to the one discussed in this paper is *secure estimation*, which consists of the capability to reconstruct the system state even when the CPS of interest is under attack. The authors of (11) establish the maximum number of allowed corrupted sensors in order to be able to recover the information from all sensors in the system. This work requires the corrupted sensors not to change over time. In (12), a more flexible condition for the structure of the corrupted sensors is considered, as well as the practical incidence of noise. However, these works assume that there are low-level control loops that cannot be accessed by attackers, but, in cyber-security, it is well known that this feature is usually related to the available budget of the attacker (13). Besides, an attack on one sensor of a low-level controller is enough to cause changes in the stability of the overall system, which can have catastrophic consequences, as demonstrated in (14).

In the context of multi-sensor schemes, where redundant information helps to improve the security and accuracy of state estimation, some works can be mentioned: (15–17). A particular approach to achieving a fast-secure estimation is presented in (15), where the authors leverage the advantage of sensor redundancy in some systems. Therein, a quantification of the measurements' degree of similarity is defined, which allows for a convenient categorization of the sensors and increases the computational efficiency of the state estimation. For nonlinear systems, in (16), methods of nonlinear fusion estimation in a distributed framework are utilized in order to obtain a secure estimation, in cases where sensor measurements are corrupted with false data injection attacks. In this approach, no prior information about the attack is necessary. In (17), the encryption of the information transmitted and received through a wireless channel of a control system is shown to be effective against linear deception attacks. This work provides valid results even if the attacker has information about the watermark used to encrypt the innovation sequence.

However, the aforementioned redundancy is not a typical property of industrial control systems. The authors of (18) develop an adaptive controller for time-invariant and time-varying deception attacks. The adaptive controller is also effective when both a sensor attack and an actuator attack coexist. They also provide an in-depth analysis of the stability of the control system under attack. In contrast with our work, this strategy requires the total design of a new controller and cannot be used to improve the security of legacy control systems.

Bearing this in mind, this study developed a strategy for low-level controllers in industrial control systems or critical infrastructure. Our goal is to use analytical redundancy to prevent attacks in these low-level controllers from harming the operation of the whole system.

Our main contributions focus on a low-budget defense strategy design and the efficient implementation of this mitigation strategy, which can be summarized as follows:

1. This work shows that a system state without the effect of the attack can be recovered with the design of a bank of unknown input observers (UIOs), as well as providing the necessary conditions for the existence of a solution for each UIO.
2. The mitigation algorithm and the bank of UIOs can be developed in the same PLC where the local controller is implemented.
3. This UIO design shows how to choose the decoupling matrix, which allows the state estimation to be achieved without the effect of the attack.
4. The way in which disturbances affect a system is usually assumed to be known. Hence, it can be used in the design of the UIOs. This is not a valid assumption in the case of the disturbances produced by attacks on sensors. Therefore, this work makes some remarks on how to decouple the disturbance from the original system to be able to estimate the system state using a bank of UIOs.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general setup of an existing, working control system. Section 3 shows how to reconstruct the original system state without the effect of the attack. Afterwards, Section 4 depicts the general scheme to detect and isolate attacks, in order to be able to reconstruct the system state. Later, in Section 5, system state reconstruction is applied to the four tanks system benchmark (19), with the aim to show how a system can recover its controlled operation even in the presence of attacks. Finally, some conclusions are drawn, and future works are proposed.

2. Existing system setup

This study considers a physical system that works with a digital controller in a closed loop through a network, *i.e.*, an existing cyber-physical control system, as depicted in Fig. 1, without considering the attack and the mitigation mechanism (yellow blocks). The controller allows the system to maintain a specific behavior, where the system would normally be able to follow a reference input and maintain specific characteristics in the transient response. Since the real system is considered to be generally nonlinear, its behavior is modeled as

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) &= \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{u}(t), t) + \boldsymbol{\eta}(t), \\ \mathbf{y}(t) &= \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{u}(t), t) + \boldsymbol{\zeta}(t),\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{x}(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\mathbf{u}(t) \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and $\mathbf{y}(t) \in \mathbb{R}^p$ are the system state, input, and output, respectively. The vectors $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ and $\boldsymbol{\zeta}$ represent noise, disturbances, or variations in the model parameters, related to the system state in the first equation and to the system output in the second equation. Since the closed-loop system works with a digital controller, this study assumes that the controller is designed with the more

straightforward approximation, *i.e.*, a noiseless discrete-time linear approximation of the system, which can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{x}[k+1] &= \mathbf{A} \mathbf{x}[k] + \mathbf{B} \tilde{\mathbf{u}}[k] + \mathbf{E} d[k], \\ \mathbf{y}[k] &= \mathbf{C} \mathbf{x}[k],\end{aligned}\quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{x}[k] \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}[k] \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and $\mathbf{y}[k] \in \mathbb{R}^p$ are the discrete-time system state, input, and output, respectively. The signal $d[k] \in \mathbb{R}$ corresponds to disturbances such as noise, nonlinearities, model inaccuracies, or uncertainties; and the matrix $\mathbf{E} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}$ represents how the disturbances affect the system. Note that the system input is not $\mathbf{u}[k]$ but $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}[k]$, which represents $\mathbf{u}[k]$ after passing through the network. $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{R}^{p \times n}$ are the dynamic, input, and output matrices of the system, respectively. This kind of system model defined by (2) can be obtained from either: (i) modeling the system, linearizing it, and discretizing it; or (ii) learning the discrete-time model from input-output data, using an adequate sampling time according to the closed-loop system's dynamical behavior (20).

The controller that works with the system is considered to be a tracking control with state feedback, *i.e.*, a servo system (21), represented as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{v}[k] &= \mathbf{y}^r[k] - \tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k] + \mathbf{v}[k-1], \\ \mathbf{u}[k] &= \mathbf{K}_I \mathbf{v}[k] - \mathbf{K}_S \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k],\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

where $\mathbf{y}^r[k] \in \mathbb{R}^p$ is the system reference input (the one to be followed by the system), $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k]$ represents $\mathbf{y}[k]$ after passing through the network, and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}[k]$ is the estimated state. Note that the first equation in (3) expresses the integrator state (which, in this case, is considered as an interior variable of the controller in Fig. 1), where $\mathbf{v}[k] \in \mathbb{R}^p$ is a discrete-time approximation of the error integral, with the error defined as $\mathbf{e}[k] = \mathbf{y}^r[k] - \mathbf{y}[k]$. The control signal $\mathbf{u}[k]$ is obtained as a linear combination of the states, through the state feedback gain $\mathbf{K}_S \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, and a linear combination of the error integral, through the integral gain $\mathbf{K}_I \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times p}$.




Figure 1. Control systems with mitigation of sensor attacks mechanism included

As usual, it is assumed that not all the system states are available for implementing the part of the controller related to state feedback. In order to estimate the system states, a full-order current observer is used (20,22), with the following dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{\mathbf{x}}[k] &= \mathbf{A} \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k-1] + \mathbf{B} \mathbf{u}[k-1], \\ \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k] &= \bar{\mathbf{x}}[k] + \mathbf{L} (\tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k] - \mathbf{C} \bar{\mathbf{x}}[k]),\end{aligned}\tag{4}$$

where $\bar{\mathbf{x}}[k]$ is the predicted estimate, which is based on a model prediction from the previous time estimate, corrected by the measurement of the output, becoming $\hat{\mathbf{x}}[k]$. $\mathbf{L} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}$ is the observer gain that guarantees that the matrix $\mathbf{A} - \mathbf{L} \mathbf{C} \mathbf{A}$ is Hurwitz, when the pair $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C} \mathbf{A})$ is observable. It is assumed that the controller and the observer have been properly designed.

Since the system and the controller are coupled by a network, the control signal received by the system is not $\mathbf{u}[k]$ but $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}[k]$, and the output signal received by the controller is not $\mathbf{y}[k]$ but $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k]$, where

$$\tilde{\mathbf{u}}[k] = \sum_{i=0}^q \delta[\tau_k - i] \mathbf{u}[k-i]\tag{5}$$

and

$$\tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k] = \sum_{i=0}^q \delta[\tau_k - i] \mathbf{y}[k-i].\tag{6}$$

The Kronecker delta function $\delta[\tau_k - i]$ is used to represent the random communication delays and the missing stochastic data. The time delay τ_k is a random variable considered to be an integer multiple of the sampling time T_s , introduced to describe the possibility of data missing, as well as the size of the delay at time instant k (23).

3. Unknown input observers for the recovery of the state without the effect of the attack

Consider the closed-loop control system of the previous section with a model such as that in (2), a controller as in (3), and an observer as in (4). The system is disturbed with a sensor attack (after passing through the network), with

$$\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a[k] = \tilde{\mathbf{y}}[k] + \mathbf{F}_a \mathbf{a}[k],\tag{7}$$

where $\mathbf{a}[k]$ is a vector of p functions that represents the attack signals, and $\mathbf{F}_a \in \mathbb{R}^{p \times p}$ represents the outputs affected by the attack $\mathbf{a}[k]$, i.e., only one output at a time.

In this particular case, for the system in (2), the disturbances $\mathbf{d}[k]$ are considered to represent the state variables' alteration due to the change in the control signal produced by a sensor attack. Subsequently, under the assumption that only one attack is occurring concurrently, it is considered that these modifications can be encapsulated by a single signal. Therefore, the matrix $\mathbf{F}_a$ represents the unattacked outputs acting on the system state.

This work takes interest in estimating the output signals without the effect of the attack, in order to compensate the control action signal and prevent the attack from feeding back the system and causing

it to collapse. A bank of p UIOs was used, one for each sensor that could be attacked, where each UIO does not take consider the j^{th} output. That is to say,

$$\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k] = \mathbf{M}^j \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a[k],$$

where $\mathbf{M}^j \in \mathbb{R}^{(p-1) \times p}$ is a transformation matrix equal to an identity one without the j^{th} row, with $j = 1, 2, \dots, p$. The hypothesis behind using UIOs without one of the outputs is that, since there is no more than one attack at the same time, if the attacked output is not involved, then an unbiased estimation of all the state variables of the system can be achieved – and, therefore, the outputs.

The j^{th} UIO is described using the following state-space representation, which is inspired by (24),

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{z}^j[k+1] &= \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{z}^j[k] + \mathbf{T}^j \mathbf{B} \mathbf{u}[k] + \mathbf{K}^j \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k], \\ \hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k+1] &= \mathbf{z}^j[k+1] + \mathbf{H}^j \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k+1], \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where $\mathbf{z}^j[k] \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the dynamic (first) approximation of the estimated state vector, and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k] \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the estimated state vector, which corresponds to the UIO that does not use the information of the j^{th} output for the estimation process, i.e., $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k]$ is the output vector $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a[k]$ whose j^{th} component is eliminated. $\mathbf{F}^j \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, $\mathbf{T}^j \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, $\mathbf{K}^j \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times (p-1)}$, and $\mathbf{H}^j \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times (p-1)}$ are design matrices such that the estimated state of the UIO, $\hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k]$, converges to $\mathbf{x}[k]$ when there is no attack, i.e., $\mathbf{F}_a = \mathbf{0}$. When the j^{th} UIO (8) is applied to the system (3), decomposing $\mathbf{K}^j = \mathbf{K}_1^j + \mathbf{K}_2^j$, the estimation error ($\mathbf{e}^j[k] = \mathbf{x}[k] - \hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k]$) is governed by the following equation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{e}^j[k+1] &= \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{e}^j[k] - \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{F}_a^j \mathbf{a}[k] - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{F}_a^j \mathbf{a}[k+1] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{F}^j - (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{C}^j \right] \mathbf{x}[k] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{T}^j - (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \right] \mathbf{B} \mathbf{u}[k] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{K}_2^j - \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{H}^j \right] \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k] + \\ &\quad + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{E}^j d^j[k], \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Note that $\mathbf{E}^j$ is used instead of $\mathbf{E}$ and $d^j[k]$ instead of $d[k]$, indicating that each UIO considers its own perturbations. That is because, for each UIO, a way to approximate the control action modification is to assign more weight to the state variables related with the outputs used directly by the j^{th} UIO.

Consider the UIOs' behavior, neglecting the effect of the attack on the output sensors ($\mathbf{F}_a = \mathbf{0}$), in order to see how the UIOs estimate the system state. For this case, $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a^j[k] = \tilde{\mathbf{y}}^j[k]$ and (9) yield

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{e}^j[k+1] &= \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{e}^j[k] + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{E}^j d^j[k] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{F}^j - (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{C}^j \right] \mathbf{x}[k] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{T}^j - (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \right] \mathbf{B} \mathbf{u}[k] + \\ &\quad - \left[\mathbf{K}_2^j - \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{H}^j \right] \tilde{\mathbf{y}}^j[k]. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

It is known that a proper state estimation is achieved when the estimation error for the j^{th} UIO takes the following form:

$$\mathbf{e}^j[k+1] = \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{e}^j[k]. \quad (11)$$

In addition, the eigenvalues of $\mathbf{F}^j$ must be stable in order for the estimation error to converge to zero. This implies that, for the UIO to estimate the state, all the terms on the right side of (10) but the first must be equal to zero. That is, it must be ensured that

$$\mathbf{E}^j = \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j, \quad (12)$$

$$\mathbf{F}^j = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{C}^j, \quad (13)$$

$$\mathbf{T}^j = \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j, \quad (14)$$

$$\mathbf{K}_2^j = \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{H}^j. \quad (15)$$

When considering the effect of the attack on the outputs ($\mathbf{F}_a \neq \mathbf{0}$) while holding (12)-(15), the estimation error of the j^{th} UIO is governed by

$$\mathbf{e}^j[k+1] = \mathbf{F}^j \mathbf{e}^j[k] - \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{F}_a^j \mathbf{a}[k] - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{F}_a^j \mathbf{a}[k+1], \quad (16)$$

which, depending on the form of $\mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{F}_a^j$ and $\mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{F}_a^j$, will eventually converge proportionally to $\mathbf{a}[k]$ or zero. That is to say, if there is an attack on the j^{th} output, and since the j^{th} UIO does not consider that output, then $\mathbf{e}^j[k] \rightarrow \mathbf{0}$, i.e., $\hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k] \rightarrow \mathbf{x}[k]$, which produces the estimation of the outputs without the effect of the attack. On the other hand, if there is an attack on the i^{th} output, and since the j^{th} UIO considers that output, $\mathbf{e}^j[k] \propto \mathbf{a}[k]$, and the estimated state will not aid in recovering the outputs without the effect of the attack.

In order to design the UIOs, Eqs. (12)-(15) need to be solved. Note that it is only necessary to solve (12) for $\mathbf{H}^j$, which allows solving the rest of the equations if it can be ensured that $(\mathbf{A}_1^j, \mathbf{C})$ is detectable, with $\mathbf{A}_1^j = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j) \mathbf{A}$. A Lemma addressing the existence of a solution to (12) is introduced below:

Lemma 3.1. *Eq. (12) is solvable if and only if*

$$\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) = \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j).$$

If $\mathbf{E}^j$ is full column rank, then a special solution to (12) is

$$\mathbf{H}_*^j = \mathbf{E}^j [(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j]^{-1} (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top.$$

Proof. When (12) has a solution $\mathbf{H}^j$, then $\mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j = \mathbf{E}^j$ or

$$(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{H}^{j\top} = \mathbf{E}^{j\top} \quad (17)$$

i.e., $\mathbf{E}^{j\top}$ belongs to the range space of the matrix $(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top$, and this leads to

$$\text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^{j\top}) \leq (\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top),$$

i.e.,

$$\text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j) \leq \text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j). \quad (18)$$

However,

$$\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) \leq \min\{\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j), \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j)\},$$

and, since $(\mathbf{E}^j)$ is full column rank,

$$\min\{\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j), \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j)\} \leq \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j),$$

then

$$\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) \leq \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j). \quad (19)$$

Therefore, the only way to satisfy (18) and (19) is that $\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) = \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j)$. Thus, the necessary condition is proven.

When $\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) = \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j)$ holds true, $\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j$ is a full column rank matrix, and there is a left inverse of $\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j$:

$$(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+ = [(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j]^{-1} (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \quad (20)$$

Clearly, $\mathbf{H}^j = \mathbf{E}^j (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+$ is a solution to (12). $\square$

Now, a lemma is introduced to show the equivalence of the detectability of an augmented system and the one of the original system.

Lemma 3.2. Let $\mathbf{C}_1^j = [\mathbf{C}^j \quad \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A}]^\top$. Then, the detectability of the pair $(\mathbf{C}_1^j, \mathbf{A})$ is equivalent to that of the pair $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A})$.

Proof. The observability of a system can also be verified if

$$\text{rank} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} s \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C} \end{bmatrix} \right\} = n, \quad (21)$$

for any $s \in \mathbb{C}$ (see Theorem 5-13 in (25)). Therefore, if $s_1 \in \mathbb{C}$ is an unobservable mode of the pair $(\mathbf{C}_1^j, \mathbf{A})$, then

$$\text{rank} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} s_1 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}_1^j \end{bmatrix} \right\} = \text{rank} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} s_1 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \\ \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} \end{bmatrix} \right\} < n.$$

This means that a vector $\alpha \in \mathbb{C}^n$ will exist, such that

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_1 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \\ \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} \end{bmatrix} \alpha = 0,$$

which implies that

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_1 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \end{bmatrix} \alpha = 0, \quad \text{or} \quad \text{rank} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} s_1 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \end{bmatrix} \right\} < n.$$

This is to say that s_1 is also an unobservable mode of the pair $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A})$. Now, if $s_2 \in \mathbb{C}$ is an unobservable mode of the pair $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A})$, then

$$\text{rank} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \end{bmatrix} \right\} < n.$$

This means that a vector $\beta \in \mathbb{C}^n$ can always be found, such that

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \end{bmatrix} \beta = 0,$$

which can be rewritten as

$$(s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}) \beta = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{C}^j \beta = 0. \quad (22)$$

Multiplying by $\mathbf{C}^j$ on the left of the first equation in (22),

$$\mathbf{C}^j (s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}) \beta = 0,$$

which is equivalent to

$$\mathbf{C}^j s_2 \beta = \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} \beta = 0 \quad (\text{since } \mathbf{C}^j \beta = 0).$$

Hence,

$$\begin{bmatrix} s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}^j \\ \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} \end{bmatrix} \beta = \begin{bmatrix} s_2 \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{C}_1^j \end{bmatrix} \beta = 0,$$

i.e., s_2 is also an unobservable mode of the pair $(\mathbf{C}_1^j, \mathbf{A})$. As the pairs $(\mathbf{C}_1^j, \mathbf{A})$ and $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A})$ have the same unobservable modes, their detectability is formally equivalent. $\square$

At this point, it is important to include the necessary and sufficient conditions for the UIOs.

Theorem 3.1. *The conditions for (8) to be an UIO for the system defined by (3) are:*

- (i) $\text{rank}(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j) = \text{rank}(\mathbf{E}^j)$.
- (ii) $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A}_1^j)$ is detectable pair, where

$$\mathbf{A}_1^j = \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{E}^j [(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j]^{-1} (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A}.$$

Proof. According to Lemma 3.1, (12) is solvable when condition 1 holds true. A special solution for $\mathbf{H}^j$ is

$$\mathbf{H}_*^j = \mathbf{E}^j [(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j]^{-1} (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^\top.$$

In this case, the system dynamics matrix is

$$\mathbf{F}^j = \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{C}^j = \mathbf{A}_1^j - \mathbf{K}_1^j \mathbf{C}^j,$$

which can be stabilized by selecting the gain matrix $\mathbf{K}_1^j$ due to condition 2. Finally, the remaining UIO matrices described in (8) can be calculated using (14) - (15). Thus, the observer (8) is a UIO for the system defined in the two first rows of (3).

Since (8) is a UIO for (3), (12) is solvable. This leads to the fact that condition 1 holds true according to Lemma 3.1. The general solution of the matrix $\mathbf{H}^j$ for (12) can be calculated as

$$\mathbf{H}^j = \underbrace{\mathbf{E}^j (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+}_{\mathbf{H}_*^j} + \mathbf{H}_0^j [\mathbf{I}_m - \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+],$$

where $\mathbf{H}_0^j \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times (p-1)}$ is an arbitrary matrix and $(\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+$ is the left inverse of $\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j$, as defined in (20). Substituting the solution for $\mathbf{H}^j$ into (13), the system dynamics matrix $\mathbf{F}^j$ is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}^j &= \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{H}^j \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A} - \mathbf{K}_l^j \mathbf{C}^j \\ &= [\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{E}^j (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+ \mathbf{C}^j] \mathbf{A} + \\ &\quad - \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{K}_1^j & \mathbf{H}_0^j \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{C}^j \\ [\mathbf{I}_m - \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j (\mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{E}^j)^+ \mathbf{C}^j] \mathbf{A} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \mathbf{A}_1^j - \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{K}_1^j & \mathbf{H}_0^j \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{C}^j \\ \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A}_1^j \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \mathbf{A}_1^j - \bar{\mathbf{K}}_1^j \bar{\mathbf{C}}_1^j, \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{\mathbf{K}}_1^j = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{K}_1^j & \mathbf{H}_0^j \end{bmatrix}$ and $\bar{\mathbf{C}}_1^j = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{C}^j \\ \mathbf{C}^j \mathbf{A}_1^j \end{bmatrix}$. Since the matrix $\mathbf{F}^j$ is stable, the pair $(\bar{\mathbf{C}}_1^j, \mathbf{A}_1^j)$ is detectable, as well as the pair $(\mathbf{C}^j, \mathbf{A}_1^j)$, according to Lemma 3.2. $\square$

Once the necessary conditions to design the bank of UIOs have been verified, it is necessary to prove that it is possible to recover the state estimation of the output without the effect of the attack from the j^{th} UIO.

Theorem 3.2. Suppose that (8) is the j^{th} UIO for the system defined by (3). If there is an attack in the j^{th} output, then an estimation of the output without the effect of the attack can be obtained from the j^{th} UIO.

Proof. Considering that there is an attack on the system (3), i.e., $\mathbf{F}_a \neq \mathbf{0}$. In fact, since one simultaneous attack $\mathbf{F}_a$ is considered, this can be written as a set of unitary column vectors with all but one element different from zero. Consider a simpler case, where $\mathbf{a}[k]$ is a scalar function and $\mathbf{F}_a$ is a unitary vector. Assuming that the attack affects the j^{th} output, the form of $\mathbf{F}_a$ is

$$\mathbf{F}_a = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \vdots & \underbrace{1}_{j^{\text{th}} \text{ row}} & \vdots & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^T.$$

Then, $\mathbf{F}_a^j = \mathbf{0}_{(p-1) \times 1}$ ($\mathbf{F}_a^j$ equals $\mathbf{F}_a$ without the j^{th} row. In this assumption, the only element different from zero, and clearly (16), will become (11). The above implies that $\hat{\mathbf{x}}[k] \rightarrow \mathbf{x}[k]$. Therefore, $\hat{\mathbf{y}}[k] = \mathbf{C} \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k]$ can be found, which represents the estimation of the outputs without the effect of the attack.

Now, considering the general case where $\mathbf{a}[k]$ is a vector of p functions and $\mathbf{F}_a \in \mathbb{R}^{p \times p}$, the previous procedure holds, albeit only for the time intervals where each attack is happening, under the assumption that no more than one attack will occur concurrently. $\square$

4. Detection, isolation and mitigation

Note that Theorem 3.2 provides the opportunity to recalculate the control signal to prevent the attack from being fed back to the system. However, this is possible only if we know when and where the attack takes place, which we do not know *a priori*. In order to answer these questions, this study

proposes the use of the already working full order current observer described by (4) to know when an attack occurs within a process known as *detection*, and, since UIOs are used to recalculate the control signal, they could also be used to determine where the attack takes place, in a process known as *isolation*. The complete scheme for mitigating the effect of the attack in a closed-loop control system is shown in Fig. 1, where the decision-making mechanism includes attack detection and isolation and mitigation, which includes recovering the state and, therefore, the sensor output, both without the effect of the attack.

To find out when an attack takes place, full order current observer-associated residues are defined as

$$r[k] = \|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a[k] - \mathbf{C} \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k]\|_2, \quad (23)$$

where $\|\mathbf{x}\|_2$ stands for the 2-norm of a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$. An attack is detected when

$$r[k] > \tau_D, \quad (24)$$

where τ_D is a threshold associated with the maximum estimation error that the system could supposedly tolerate. In order to find τ_D a number of simulations have to be carried out in different conditions, with the aim to minimize false alarms. Then, a binary variable $b[k]$ is used to denote whether or not an attack is active at time k in any sensor of the system, as

$$b[k] = \begin{cases} 1, & r[k] > \tau_D \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (25)$$

The isolation process is carried out using the UIOs bank, each of them with dynamics given by (8). The j^{th} UIO's associated residue is defined as

$$r^j[k] = \|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_a[k] - \mathbf{C} \hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k]\|_2. \quad (26)$$

An attack is isolated in output j when an attack has been detected at time k , i.e.,

$$r^j[k] > \tau_I^j, \quad (27)$$

where τ_I^j is a threshold associated with the maximum estimation error that the system could supposedly tolerate in the j^{th} UIO. In the same way as before, it is necessary to carry out several simulations in order to adjust the value of τ_I^j , aiming to not generate many false alarms while also not neglecting many attacks. The isolation of an attack in the sensor of the j^{th} output at k is denoted using the variable $l^j[k]$:

$$l^j[k] = \begin{cases} 1, & r^j[k] > \tau_I^j \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (28)$$

Because $l^j[k]$ produces false alerts regarding the isolation of an attack, a mechanism based on (26) is used to prevent them. Thus, the new variable $L[k]$ is built, which represents the isolation of an attack on the j^{th} sensor at time k with a reduced number of or no false alerts. Using the variables $b[k]$ and $L[k]$, the variable $m^j[k]$ is defined, which indicates that an attack is detected in the j^{th} sensor at time k and must hence be mitigated. The signal $m^j[k]$ is given by

$$m^j[k] = b[k] \& L^j[k], \quad (29)$$

where $\&$ is the logical operator "AND". In (29), $m^j[k] = 1$ when there is an attack on the j^{th} sensor.

Finally, with the definition of $m^j[k]$, the mitigated state estimation can be mitigated as

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_m[k] = (\overline{m^1}[k] \& \overline{m^2}[k] \& \dots \& \overline{m^p}[k]) \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k] + \sum_{j=1}^p m^j[k] \hat{\mathbf{x}}^j[k], \quad (30)$$

where $\overline{m^j}[k]$ represents the logical operator "NOT" acting on the binary variable $m^j[k]$. In (30), the first term on the right side shows that, if there is no attack in any output, the full order current observer estimation is used. The second term shows that, if there is an attack in sensor j , the estimation of the j^{th} UIO is used. Therefore, the controller that mitigates attacks on the system can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{v}[k+1] &= \mathbf{y}^r[k] - \mathbf{C}_m \mathbf{x}_m[k] + \mathbf{v}[k], \\ \mathbf{u}[k] &= \mathbf{K}_I \mathbf{v}[k] - \mathbf{K}_S \hat{\mathbf{x}}_m[k]. \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

Note that the aforementioned mitigation mechanism is different from the one in (26), which constitutes an improvement, as the use of the mitigated state in the control calculation reduces the effect of the attack on the system even more.

5. Numerical results

This section considers the four tanks benchmark initially proposed in (19). A tracking controller with state feedback is used, working with a full order current observer. The objective of this section is to show (i) the system working in closed-loop before any attack is considered, (ii) the effect of an attack on one output, and (iii) the effect on the system of using the proposed mitigation mechanism.

5.1. System model

The four tanks benchmark system is described in detail in (19). It has two inputs related to the pumps, u_1 and u_2 , which allow liquid to be fed into the tanks. The heights of the four tanks, h_i $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, are the state variables of the system, and the height of tanks 1 and 2 are the system outputs. The four tanks system model can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dh_1}{dt} &= -\frac{a_1}{A_1} \sqrt{2gh_1} + \frac{a_3}{A_1} \sqrt{2gh_3} + \frac{\gamma_1 k_1}{A_1} u_1, \\ \frac{dh_2}{dt} &= -\frac{a_2}{A_2} \sqrt{2gh_2} + \frac{a_4}{A_2} \sqrt{2gh_4} + \frac{\gamma_2 k_2}{A_2} u_2, \\ \frac{dh_3}{dt} &= -\frac{a_3}{A_3} \sqrt{2gh_3} + \frac{(1-\gamma_2)k_2}{A_3} u_2, \\ \frac{dh_4}{dt} &= -\frac{a_4}{A_4} \sqrt{2gh_4} + \frac{(1-\gamma_1)k_1}{A_4} u_1, \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

where A_i is the area of the i -th tank, a_i is the outflow section of the i -th tank (at the bottom of the tank), g is the acceleration of gravity, $\gamma_j \in [0, 1]$ for $j = 1, 2$ is a proportional constant that divides a pump flow u_j in two parts (γ_j and its complement to feed two different tanks), and k_j are the pump gains. The parameters of the system are the same as in (19), as shown in Table I.

Table I. Four tanks system parameters

Parameter	Unit	Value
A_1, A_3	[cm ²]	28
A_2, A_4	[cm ²]	32
a_1, a_3	[cm ²]	0,071
a_2, a_4	[cm ²]	0,057
k_c	[V cm ⁻¹]	0,50
g	[cm s ⁻²]	981
γ_1, γ_2		(0.70, 0.60)
k_1, k_2	[cm ³ V ⁻¹ s ⁻¹]	(3,33, 3,35)
$(\bar{h}_1, \bar{h}_2)$	[cm]	(12,4, 12,7)
$(\bar{h}_3, \bar{h}_4)$	[cm]	(1,8, 1,4)
$(\bar{u}_1, \bar{u}_2)$	[V]	(3,00, 3,00)

The controller used with the system has form as that in (3), with

$$\mathbf{K}_I = \begin{bmatrix} 0,0150 & 0,0037 \\ -0,0016 & 0,0092 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

$$\mathbf{K}_S = \begin{bmatrix} 0,0928 & 0,0086 & 0,0056 & -0,0025 \\ -0,0021 & 0,0797 & -0,0002 & -0,0040 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The full order current observer for the system is as described in (4), with

$$\mathbf{L} = \begin{bmatrix} 0,0736 & -0,0002 \\ -0,0000 & 0,0054 \\ 0,0007 & -0,0000 \\ 0,0000 & 0,0054 \end{bmatrix}.$$

5.2. Closed-loop system behavior

The closed-loop system behavior with the controller and the observer is shown in Fig. 2, considering no delays in the communication network (for information about the effects of the delays induced by the network on control systems, see (27)). The figure shows the behavior of the outputs when a change in the reference input is introduced. The coupling between the system variables is evident, given that variations in one reference input affects the related output and the opposite one.

Fig. 2 also shows the output variables estimated by the full order current observer, $\hat{\mathbf{y}}[k] = \mathbf{C} \hat{\mathbf{x}}[k]$, where the estimates of the outputs are similar to their ideal values. However, since the variables and their estimate have differences, such offset can be used to determine the detection threshold. The




Figure 2. System response to variations in the reference inputs. The top figure shows the behavior of level 1, and the bottom one the behavior of level 2. The reference is shown in red, the measured output in blue, the attacked output as a dotted black line, the estimation of the full order current observer in dashed green, and the estimations of UIOs 1 and 2 in dashed cyan and magenta, respectively.

full order current estimator-associated threshold was selected after performing multiple simulations, considering the system behavior in light of various inputs. This, in order to select a value that does not generate false alarms when there is no attack. In that sense, for the four tanks system, $\tau_D = 0,033$.

5.3. UIOs bank design

Even though the system sensors have not been attacked yet, this subsection deals with the design process of the UIOs, as well as their behavior, in order to show their associated residuals and how to set their thresholds. In order to design the UIO bank, linear discrete-time representation of the system is needed. Such representation is obtained by linearization through the Jacobian, around an equilibrium point defined by $\bar{h}_i$ and $\bar{u}_i$ (Table I). The linearized model is discretized using the zero-order hold technique (20), with $T = 1$ s, obtaining a model such as the one in (2), with

$$\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 0,9842 & 0 & 0,0407 & 0 \\ 0 & 0,9890 & 0 & 0,0326 \\ 0 & 0 & 0,9590 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0,9672 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{bmatrix} 0,0826 & 0,0010 \\ 0,0005 & 0,0625 \\ 0 & 0,0469 \\ 0,0307 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{C} = \begin{bmatrix} 0,5 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0,5 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

With the linear discrete-time model, the design process for the UIO bank may begin. Let us start with UIO 1. First, it is necessary to select the value of the $\mathbf{E}^1$ matrix, which defines the way in which the perturbation $\mathbf{d}[k]$ acts on the system. For this case, the following was selected

$$\mathbf{E}^1 = \begin{bmatrix} 10^{-4} & 1 & 10^{-4} & 10^{-4} \end{bmatrix}^T,$$

which implies that we consider that the greatest effect of the attack takes place in state 2, which is related to the only output that UIO 1 works with (output 2).

After obtaining $\mathbf{E}^1$, (12)-(15) must be satisfied. From (12), $\mathbf{H}^1$ can be calculated. With $\mathbf{H}^1$, $\mathbf{T}^1$ can be obtained from (14). In order to find $\mathbf{F}^1$ using (13), observability must first be verified, or, at least, the detectability of the pair $(\mathbf{A}_1^1, \mathbf{C}^1)$. The rank of the observability matrix of the pair $(\mathbf{A}_1^1, \mathbf{C}^1)$ is 1 instead of $n = 4$, which means that the system is not completely observable. Moreover, there is only one observable mode. Then, the pair $(\mathbf{A}_1^1, \mathbf{C}^1)$ must be transformed into its observability canonical form, in order to (i) verify whether the nonobservable modes of the system are stable and, if that is true, (ii) to define the closed-loop desired mode for UIO 1. Effectively, in this case, the three nonobservable modes are stable and, therefore, a good location for the only observable mode could be $z = 10^{-3}$, in order to guarantee that the convergence of the estimation error is faster than the closed-loop system dynamics. Given the above, the following is found

$$\mathbf{K}_1^1 = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & -0,002 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (33)$$

With $\mathbf{F}^1$, from (15), $\mathbf{K}_2^1$ can be calculated. Finally, $\mathbf{K}^1 = \mathbf{K}_1^1 + \mathbf{K}_2^1$ is obtained, which completes UIO 1 design process.

A similar process is followed to design UIO 2, where

$$\mathbf{E}^2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 10^{-4} & 10^{-4} & 10^{-4} \end{bmatrix}^T.$$

For this case,

$$\mathbf{K}_2^1 = \begin{bmatrix} -0,002 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (34)$$

and the design can be completed as before.

State estimation via the bank of UIOs is very similar to the one obtained with the full order current observers, and, even though the residues have different shapes, the definition of the thresholds is carried out in the same way, with $\tau_I^1 = 0,0315$ and $\tau_I^2 = 0,0420$.




Figure 3. System response with attacks on both sensors. The top figure shows the behavior of level 1, and the bottom figure the behavior of level 2. The reference is shown in red, the measured output in blue, the attacked output in a dotted black line, the estimation of the full order current observer in dashed green, and the estimations of UIOs 1 and 2 in dashed cyan and magenta, respectively.

5.4. Impact of the attack on the system

Attacks in both output sensors at different times are considered. In this case, the attack signal is defined by

$$a_i[k] = \begin{cases} 0, & k < t_{1_i}, \\ -\frac{1}{m_i} (k - t_{1_i}), & t_{1_i} \leq k < t_{2_i}, \\ -1 + \frac{1}{m_i} (k - t_{2_i}), & t_{2_i} \leq k \leq t_{3_i}, \\ 0, & t_{3_i} < k. \end{cases} \quad (35)$$

For $a_1[k]$, $m_1 = 200$, $t_{1_1} = 600s$, $t_{2_1} = 800s$, $t_{3_1} = 1000s$, and for $a_2[k]$, $m_2 = -200$, $t_{1_2} = 2000s$, $t_{2_2} = 2200s$, $t_{3_2} = 2400s$.

Therefore $\mathbf{a}[k] = \begin{bmatrix} a_1[k] & a_2[k] \end{bmatrix}^\top$, and $\mathbf{F}^a = \mathbf{I}_p$. The closed-loop response system with the attack is shown in Fig. 3. Here, it can be observed that the attack mainly affects one output, i.e., $\tilde{y}_1^a[k]$ is affected directly by $a_1[k]$. However, due to the coupling in the system variables, the effect of the attack is also visible in the other output.

In addition, Fig. 3 shows the output variables for the attacked system, as estimated by the full order current observer, UIO 1, and UIO 2, in dashed green, cyan and magenta lines, respectively. The estimate of the full-order observer is not good during either of the attack times. Note that UIO 1's estimate for output 1 matches the real measurement (blue line), while output 2 tends to the sensor value. Something similar happens with UIO 2, where the estimation of output 1 coincides with the sensor value, while the estimations of output 2 tend to the real measurement. As shown in Fig. 3, this is exactly what was expected from the UIOs. It is important to mention that the attacks affect the energy used by the controllers to keep the tank levels at the desired values, given that they have to make a different effort (when compared to normal operation) to increase – or decrease – the tank levels depending on the shape of the attacks.

5.5. Attack mitigation

This subsection shows the results of using UIO estimations to recalculate the control action and mitigate the attacks. Fig. 4 shows the outputs with the reconfiguration mechanism activated. Notice the difference with Fig. 3, where the deviation for the outputs with attacks is higher due to the input change. Meanwhile, in Fig. 4, the deviation is even smaller than the overshoot. Therefore, it can be seen that the proposed mitigation scheme indeed helps to achieve a behavior closer to the system without attack. Note that the same observations holds for each estimation mentioned in the previous subsection. UIO i very closely estimates the output i , and the full order observer lies in the middle, but helps to avoid corrections for longer times.




Figure 4. System response with mitigation of attacks on both sensors. The top figure shows the behavior of level 1, and the bottom figure the behavior of level 2. The reference is shown in red, the measured output in blue, the attacked output in dotted black lines, the estimation of the full order current observer in dashed green, and the estimations of UIO 1 and 2 in dashed cyan and magenta, respectively.

6. Conclusions

This paper we have studied the problem of defending low-level controllers based on state-feedback against sensor attacks. It shows that, for an attacked system with only one attack at a time, using a bank of unknown input observers, it is possible to recover the complete state of the system without the effect of the attack and, therefore, the output. It also shows how the control action can be re-computed with the uncorrupted information once the attack has been detected and isolated. This work improves the results shown in (26), obtaining less oscillations in the steady state for the mitigated response – in that work, only the output was recovered. The proposed mechanism was tested on an existing control system with the four tank system testbed, with no simultaneous attacks on the sensors of the outputs of the system, showing satisfying results. The results of this work show a way to improve the resilience of low-level controllers in order to make them suitable for more sophisticated mechanisms such as secure estimation, where it is assumed that the low-level controller is secure.

7. Acknowledgment

This work was partially supported by the Studies Commission No. 015 of 2014 of Universidad Distrital Francisco Jos3 de Caldas. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their insightful comments and suggestions.

8. Contribution of authors

All authors contributed equally to the research.

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