Pet ownership is becoming more and more deeply rooted in our society. Although it is challenging to pinpoint the number of households living with non-human animals – because many of them are not officially registered – estimates indicate that 44 % of European households are home to at least one pet, with dogs and cats being the predominant species. In Spain alone, there are more than 28 million pets and, remarkably, there are more pet dogs than children under the age of fifteen. These figures invite us to reflect on the particular situation of these animals and their welfare.

The pet phenomenon goes back a long way. We have reason to believe that, during the Palaeolithic and Neolithic periods, hunter-gatherer societies systematically captured wild animals in order to keep them exclusively as companions (Serpell, 2015). Given that this occurred very early, some authors consider that pet ownership may have been the precursor to one of the greatest ecological and cultural revolutions in the history of our species: domestication.

This tradition has remained more or less stable throughout history, with a few exceptions. For example, pet ownership was frowned upon in colonial North America and Europe between the 17th and 19th centuries, largely because moralists and theologians of the time considered animal – human relationships to be a form of heresy (Serpell, 2015). However, with the advent of industrialisation and the increase in people’s quality of life, the popularity of companion animals began to grow and led to the current situation (Spencer, 2006). But the question remains: what exactly do we mean by companion animal?

In 2005, a video game distributed by Nintendo was released that broke sales records in America, Europe, and Japan. We are referring to Nintendogs, whose objective was to take care of one or more virtual dogs with which users could interact in various ways through the console’s touch screen. Children began to play endlessly with their virtual pets and, over time, began to develop significant emotional attachments to them.

It may seem surprising, but finding a precise definition of a companion animal is quite complex. Barnbaum (1998) analysed this problem by considering whether a Tamagotchi – an earlier electronic pet launched by Bandai – could be included in the category and proposed four fundamental criteria: affectivity, i.e., the fact that the caregiver feels attachment to the animal; domicile, the animal lives under the same roof as the caregiver; discontinuity, there is a significant difference between the life of the caregiver and that of the animal; and dependence, because the animal needs the caregiver to satisfy its basic interests.

Based on these criteria and making some adjustments, Varner (2002) developed a typology that distinguishes three categories within the general concept of a pet. Firstly, mere pets, which must meet the four fundamental criteria mentioned above and additionally, not belong to any of the categories mentioned below. Secondly, companion animals, a subset of pets that engage in rich and meaningful social interactions with their caregiver; ideally, they would voluntarily choose to stay with their caregiver because of the emotional bond between them. Note that these animals may or may not be domesticated (e.g., parrots). Finally, domesticated partners are a group of companion animals that, in addition to maintaining an affective bond with humans, actively collaborate with them in activities that favour the healthy development of their mental and physical capacities. Unlike the previous category, these animals necessarily belong to domesticated species. These proposals allow for more nuance regarding the particular situation of each animal kept as a pet. In this analysis, I will focus on domesticated companion animals, even if I refer to them simply as companion animals.

Ethical theories and animal welfare

The concept of animal welfare encompasses three fundamental components: the proper functioning of the organism, which involves, among other things, health and adequate nutrition; the emotional state of the animal, which implies the absence of negative emotions such as chronic pain and fear; and the ability to display normal behaviours inherent to the species (Fraser et al., 1997). However, even if we are clear about the notion of animal welfare, we would still need to justify why it is morally relevant and what its implications are in terms of rights and duties. For this, we must discuss ethical theories.

Ethics can be considered on the basis of radically different theoretical frameworks and our choice will ultimately condition the results we obtain. There are numerous proposals in the literature, but the most frequent are those derived from utilitarianism and classical rights theory.

According to the classical utilitarian approach, maximising happiness and minimising suffering is fundamental and we must factor in the well-being of individuals capable of experiencing both positive and negative sensations. This approach fits the consequentialist framework, where the moral validity of an action is determined by its consequences. In other words, an action will be considered ethically permissible as long as it generates an amount of well-being that outweighs the resulting discomfort.

Applied to animal ethics, utilitarianism holds that we should consider the welfare of animals because they are sentient beings who can feel pleasure and pain. From this perspective, an action will be ethically permissible if the positive experiences it generates outweigh the negative ones in the context of the animals involved. One of the best known representatives of this theory is Peter Singer (2009).

In contrast, the classical rights theory defends the existence of rights that must be respected absolutely. Here we can distinguish two different approaches. On the one hand, from a naturalistic point of view, we can argue that individuals possess intrinsic, universal, and natural rights. In the field of animal ethics, Regan (2004) is one of the main proponents of this theory. He postulated that any being with consciousness and a certain cognitive level possesses an intrinsic value and, therefore, a series of inalienable rights. On the other hand, from a contractualist perspective, rights are understood to arise as a result of agreements and negotiations between individuals and groups within a community (Rowlands, 2009). In any case, both proposals take a deontological approach and state that these rights must be respected regardless of the circumstances.

However, in order to avoid confusion, we must note that the reference here is to moral rights and not legal rights. The difference is that while legal rights are subject to formal recognition by institutions, moral rights can and should exist even if they are not legally recognised. In fact, this distinction is important because moral rights are themselves usually the basis for demanding that they be classified as legal.

In any case, some authors have highlighted a series of limitations for both utilitarianism and classical rights theory. Two of these are the emphasis on negative duties and its bias towards the possession of certain capacities.

When we speak of negative duties, we refer to those that involve refraining from certain actions that may be morally wrong or harmful. In this sense, utilitarianism and classical rights theory have traditionally defended a kind of laissez faire doctrine or, in other words, non-interventionism regarding the lives of animals (perhaps from an idealised image of nature and animal life, from which animals in general are understood to enjoy full autonomy and independence from humans). However, it should be noted that more current utilitarian proposals such as those by Horta (2017) advocate the opposite, arguing that humans have a moral responsibility to intervene in natural processes to mitigate the suffering of wild animals, provided that action is possible and will not cause further harm. In turn, the appeal to capacities seeks to base the moral status of animals on the possession of one or more ethically relevant capacities, such as consciousness or sentience.

These approaches, while helpful in extending ethical consideration to animals, have difficulties in dealing with all the moral issues that emerge from interactions between them and us, and also fail to consider the specific particularities of the species in question. As Burgess-Jackson (1998) said, it makes no sense to see animals as a mere undifferentiated mass. Indeed, thanks to the empirical as well as conceptual work of the various disciplines that make up what we now call animal studies, we are certain that there is a broad and complex spectrum of capacities and contexts among the many complex life forms comprising the phylogenetic tree.

Therefore, an alternative has been proposed that accounts for our positive obligations towards animals, not as a homogeneous block, but as concrete beings immersed in particular situations: the relational approach. It draws on the ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982), new theories of citizenship inclusive of nonhuman animals (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2018), the critique of ableism, and the claim for compensatory justice (Palmer, 2012), argues for the existence of positive duties by virtue of the context and our relationship with animals.

For the relational approach, special relationships generate special duties. For example, we owe basic respect to all people simply because they are people: in this sense, some of the negative duties that we all generally assume are not stealing, insulting, or hurting others. However, we do not care as much for our neighbours as we do for our close relatives, just as we do not care as much for the swallows nesting on our building as we do for the family dog. These particularities, generally ignored by classical ethical theories, are crucial for understanding our duties and responsibilities towards companion animals.

It could be argued that appealing to social ties as a basis for moral status carries significant risks. On the one hand, it makes it difficult to justify universal negative duties towards individuals with whom we do not have specific relationships; on the other, it could lead to morally unacceptable forms of discrimination (Faria, 2022).

To avoid making the text overly complex, my position is that the relational approach should not be seen as a self-sufficient ethical framework but rather, as a tool to tackle specific problems that other approaches do not adequately address, such as positive obligations towards companion animals. This implies that there should be no harm in resorting, for example, to rights theory to substantiate universal negative duties, while using the relational approach to explain certain positive duties. In this sense, this current text assumes a plural and integrative ethics dependent on the moral context (Walker, 2003).

Domestication and vulnerability

Animal and plant domestication allowed humans to stop wandering in search of resources and to settle in more permanent and socially complex sites. This transition from nomadism to sedentism introduced novel practices that would transform the relationship between humans and other forms of life on the planet.

Domestication has been described in different ways, but all generally refers to a process by which an animal population is adapted to humans over generations through genetic and environmental modification (Price, 2002). In other words, we are talking about a process of deliberate human intervention that modifies the development of certain animal species in order to adapt their nature to specific purposes.

Selective breeding and genetic modification of different companion species is itself a complex ethical problem that can be analysed within the moral debate of eugenics. However, what is most relevant to our topic is the vulnerability domestication generates in animals.

This is apparent in the light of some of its side effects: respiratory problems typical of brachycephalic dogs such as bulldogs; joint diseases such as dysplasia in breeds like Rottweilers, or cardiovascular diseases in the case of Dobermans. This is also common in species destined for the meat or dairy industry, including cattle, which suffer from numerous hereditary diseases such as achondroplasia.

It could be argued that this is not the result of domestication, but of irresponsible selective breeding. However, as we have seen, domestication is by definition a process of deliberate adaptation of certain animals to humans. This is actually almost a euphemism, since what we mean by adaptation is that domestication has been and is structurally oriented to satisfy our interests and not those of the animals concerned.

On the other hand, in addition to these congenital anomalies, there is the important factor of neoteny. Neotenisation is a biological and evolutionary process referring to the retention of juvenile characteristics such as physical, behavioural, and physiological traits, into adulthood. It is a typical result of domestication, although it can also occur through natural selection, and has been sought after by breeders over the centuries because it greatly favours the integration of animals into human communities.

Although there is a complex debate surrounding neotenisation – with some considering it disabling and others incredibly adaptive (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2018) – something is clear: while it is helpful in terms of cohabitation with humans, in terms of survival and autonomy it is, more often than not, rather limiting. For example, neoteny in dogs, in addition to causing morphological changes in the size and physical power of the animal, also modifies their behaviour. It makes them more docile, reduces their alertness, and impairs senses such as vision and hearing (Coppinger & Schneider, 2016).

Therefore, we can say that the moulding of certain species by humans to fit their preferences without regard for animal welfare has caused domesticated animals, including companion animals, to suffer from a kind of vulnerability that makes them particularly dependent on human care. Thus, according to the relational approach, which states that humans have deliberately created vulnerable and dependent beings, our responsibility seems to be considerably greater.

However, we could argue that since not all humans have directly contributed to perpetuating domestication and indeed, many people do not own companion animals, the responsibilities derived from the relational approach should not apply to society as a whole.

In this sense, some authors such as Palmer (2012) and Norlock (2017) argue that society as a whole is responsible for these animals because, directly or indirectly, it perpetuates the existence of the institution of domestication. According to Palmer, the only way to avoid responsibility altogether would be to stop consuming products derived from domestication and to become an activist. Norlock, on the other hand, emphasises the need to establish social mechanisms aimed at supporting the dependency generated by taking care of a dependent subject. For both of them, responsibility is not only acquired through direct ownership of a domesticated animal; it is up to all of us, as a society that benefits from domestication, to take care of these animals. Examples of these benefits are the supply and consumption of food derived from domesticated animals and the use of these animals in biomedical research and as a workforce.

Animals that flourish and the species norm

From what we have seen so far, we can conclude that we have a number of positive and special relational duties towards companion animals. However, we still do not know exactly what this means: is it enough to provide them with food, water, and shelter, or do our responsibilities go beyond that?

Going back to the definition of animal welfare, the physical and emotional health of our animals, as well as their ability to manifest behaviours inherent to their species, are fundamental aspects that should guide our work as caregivers. Martha Nussbaum (2006) argues something similar in her well-known capability approach.

Broadly speaking, this approach says that there are a number of basic capabilities, seen as intrinsically good, that individuals need to express to ensure that they flourish as the kind of beings they are and thus, achieve a dignified existence. For Nussbaum, the concept of flourishing refers to how living beings, both human and non-human, can fully develop their potential in accordance with their specific capabilities. It is based on the idea that every being has a set of fundamental capabilities which, if properly cultivated, allow for a good and fulfilling life. According to this idea, all organisms have a certain thelos, a natural tendency towards certain activities or behaviours, which guarantee the realisation of their capabilities.

Not all species have the same capabilities and, therefore, the way to fulfilment or flourishing will not be the same either. Nussbaum recognises this difference and proposes what she has called the species norm, which refers to the specific needs and capabilities inherent to a particular species, fundamental to its well-being and development. In the context of animal ethics, the species norm suggests that animals should be treated according to these species-related capabilities and not evaluated as an undifferentiated block.

To understand this, Nussbaum proposed an example: Bear, a German Shepherd whose hips are beginning to fail with age, is progressively losing mobility. Eventually, Bear will lose the functionality of both hind legs and will be forced to drag them on the ground and to give up activities he once enjoyed very much, such as going for walks in the park or playing with the family’s young children.

From a capabilities approach, losing freedom of movement compromises Bear’s welfare because running, playing, and interacting with other dogs or humans are important species-typical behaviours without which his flourishing would be significantly impaired, unlike in the case of other species such as sea sponges. Therefore, for Bear to have a good life, it would be insufficient to keep the animal’s minimum physiological functions in order. The human carer is thus presented as a fundamental figure in guaranteeing the achievement of a dignified life for companion animals. In accordance with the relational duties derived from domestication, the carer should promote, whenever possible, the development of the animal’s basic capabilities. In other words, they must ensure that it flourishes.

Relationship and responsibility

As we have seen, companion animals have been with us for much longer than we might imagine. Analysing the kind of relationships we have, and have had, with this subcategory of pets is extremely important to understand the moral responsibilities we have towards them, but not to other animals.

However, many nuances that we have not discussed here could also be analysed. For example, dialogue with other radically opposed approaches – not so much in their ethical argumentation but in their conclusions – such as abolitionism. Also, in contrast to the idea that companion animals are generally vulnerable and dependent on humans, there is still the question of feral animals: those that, despite being descendants of domesticated species, live independently without the need for human intervention. Likewise, some authors such as Donna Haraway (2003) propose alternative ways of conceiving the relationship between species, defending a paradigm of co-evolution and affirming that humans and domesticated animals such as dogs should both be considered as companion species. In any case, the prevailing idea in most approaches is that animals need us to flourish and develop properly as they are, and that we owe them as much.

References

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