1. Introduction

Since the second Gulf crisis in 1990, it has been thought that Russia can no longer protect its allies or exert influence on regional issues, and that the United States is the only actor in international and regional affairs. This impression was confirmed by the NATO strikes on Serbia in 1999, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the NATO strikes on Libya in 2011. But the Russian position on the Syrian crisis came counter to expectations and closer to the Soviet positions during the Cold War, when Moscow stood firm in confronting Washington to protect its interests and allies. Syria is an important strategic ally and a foothold for Russia means losing the entire Middle East, which is inconceivable for Moscow. This is evidenced by the clear diplomatic activity that Russian diplomacy has witnessed in the region since Vladimir Putin took power in Russia in 2000 and the jumps in economic and technical cooperation between Russia and a number of countries in the region (Sheikh, 2014).

As the war in Iraq wanes and America begins withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, the United States is on the verge of a shift in its foreign policy towards the countries of the region. Over the past 10 years, the United States has devoted enormous resources to those demobilized. However, it has recently moved to act regularly on where to invest money and energy, so as to position itself in the best position to continue its leadership, protect its interests and offer its values. One of the most important goals of US policy over the next period is to invest increasingly diplomatically, economically and strategically, and more in the Asia-Pacific region through six tracks of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening America’s relations with emerging powers, including China and Russia; Dealing with multilateral regional institutions; expanding trade and investment; intensifying large-scale military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights, which means a reorientation of American foreign policy towards Asia (Shalaby, 2014).The policies of major powers and the future and shape of the international system have been largely linked to regional developments in the Middle East. What is happening now is a series of episodes of this.

The fate of the Middle East, consisting of two main issues: the Syrian issue, and the war on terror, which is calling for a future for major powers, is not only in the region, but in the form of the next international order. There seems to be some imbalance between the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and the United States, that still exists. The United States has sent strong messages to the Gulf states to rely on themselves to achieve their interests and security. There was also a great divergence of views between the Gulf states and the United States on the issues of the region (Hagras, 1981), especially in the Syrian file, and the different vision of the Gulf and the United States on ways to resolve it. The United States has also reduced its dependence on Gulf oil by diversifying its oil resources and directing it to Latin and African oil. Also new oil discoveries in the United States known as rock oil will increase its oil productivity; hence the strategic importance of this region will gradually decrease for the United States of America (Tawfiq, 2012).

In connection with the events in Ukraine in (March, 2014), Moscow has challenged the international community again and was not subject to pressure and threats of economic sanctions against it, but Moscow is imposed a new reality in its immediate vicinity, in order to return to the Club of the world’s great powers. In addition, Moscow has dramatically increased its military presence in Syria, which has stabilized the geopolitical role of Russia in the region and the world. Beijing has also risen to the highest economic level in world markets, giving China a range of strategic options to reach its geopolitical goals to consolidate its influence in the region.This was followed by a decline in the role and position of the United States that led to a vacuum that allowed for further instability and a decline in international security, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. This decline was due to the growing role of Russia and China in influencing the management of international crises (Shinker, 2013) .

2. Strategic position of the Middle East

The Middle East is strategically, geographically, politically and geographically important because of the geopolitical importance of this region in the global political movement. The study will address the geo-strategic importance of the Middle East region, Of the geographical and cultural importance of the region, especially the economic importance, and this is what made the foreign policy of the major powers are active because it is a key bet for the future to achieve their interests and increase its strength, especially today in light of the return of traditional disputes that were in the framework of freedom B is cold among its traditional leaders, but in a new way away from the ideology and soon not moved within the depth of the interests of the opponents of the equation the United States of America as a party, Russia and China on the opposite side (Madani, 2018).2.1 Defining the Middle East region and its strategic importance:

The world powers that dominate the areas outside its geographical framework have adopted concepts and terms that have been linked to multiple dimensions, including geography, economic, political and military-security goals dictated by the vital interests of these forces at a certain historical stage.

The term Middle East is a group of diverse regions in south-western Asia, which is the middle of the world. It is the Middle East and the Far East. Turkey includes Anatolia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Egypt and Pakistan (Ismail, 1997).

This change in the meaning and meanings of the term in accordance with the British vision in 1951 during a meeting of the House of Commons. In a question asked by a British lawmaker about the countries that fall within the Near East terminology, the Undersecretary of State at the time said: “The expression of the Near East, which is required by the Ottoman Empire, is now in Great Britain, which is too late, and is now replaced by the term” Middle East “ Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen, “meaning the Arab nation, with the withdrawal of the Great Maghreb and the addition of Israel as an alternative to Palestine (Riyadh, 2007).

After the events of September 2001, the Middle East witnessed a cycle of crises and wars. The war broke out in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. With the eruption of the Arab revolutions, the Arab region plunged into a quagmire of crises, from Tunisia to Egypt, to Libya, then Yemen and Bahrain. The dominoes led to the explosion of the situation in Syria,(Mufti 2015), which increased tensions and unrest among the countries of the region. After the confrontation between the regime and the opposition turned into an open war, many outside players entered the battlefield and the Front of Nasra and other jihadist and Salafi movements and armed groups in the ranks of some of the opposition parties,(Middle East Report 2012).

The conflict over the Middle East was no stranger to the conflicts of the Middle East itself. The policies of external powers and their calculations entered the directions of local forces. All local forces entered the schemes of external forces. Local forces themselves sometimes pushed the edge to the brink, to intervene to prevent disaster (Lawrence, Henry 1992). The response from these forces was quick to meddle in the Middle East, depending on the strategic importance of the region as it enjoys a strategic location (connecting the continents of the world) with natural resources and a wide economic market (Noureddine 1971).

The Middle East region - especially the Arabian Gulf region - has its own distinctiveness from the rest of the world. The most important feature is excellence in economic and strategic aspects, as follows:

1- Economic side: The economic importance of the Middle East region is due to several advantages:

(A)

The presence of oil which is estimated oil reserves in the Middle East, with 66% of the world’s oil reserves, and at the end of the twentieth century produced the Middle East about a third of world oil production and this region is the main supplier of oil to the world advanced, especially Europe, the United States, Russia, Japan , and this gave to some countries in the Middle East economic power greatly affected the peoples of the region, the Middle East oil is abundant in the Arabian Gulf region, and on this basis are trying to major countries that oversees the region, and today the only supervisor of the region Is the United States of America, and especially oil in the Middle East because it is inexpensive, from each well oil is extracted large quantities and no need to dig many wells and deep.

(B)

The existence of countless economic resources, and precious metals in the new Middle East, such as uranium, mercury, phosphate and gas. The Middle East is one of the largest arms-consuming markets. The countries of the region have spent a lot of money for wars and arms purchases in the Middle East, where they have cost billions of dollars. This huge money could have turned the Middle East into a paradise and moved its people to the ranks of developed nations.The presence of important human and scientific energies, and the majority of these scientific minds are displaced in America and Europe, as well as the abundance of labor.

2. Strategic aspect:

This region is of great importance because of the many theories that show the importance of this region and that the one who controls this region controls the world. The importance of the Middle East is very different.

2.2 Focus considerations on the Middle East

One of the American schools’ views on the meaning of interventionism in the Middle East is centered on the interests of the United States in two of the most strategic areas - the Middle East and the Far East - that Washington, as the dominant unifying force, should focus on the Middle East. She believes US policymakers have traditionally worked to reduce US involvement in the Middle East, but Middle East problems have always attracted the United States. For example, George Bush was not particularly interested in the region and showed little interest in it before the September 11 attacks. As Obama came to power, he planned to remove Washington’s ties to the Middle East. But this school believes that the problems of the Middle East interfere with US national security interests and the US economy that forces the US administration to show greater interest in the Middle East.

Is the United States of America, and especially oil in the Middle East because it is inexpensive, from each well oil is extracted large quantities and no need to dig many wells and deep, (Attiyah 2017).

- the existence of countless economic resources, and precious metals in the new Middle East, such as uranium, mercury, phosphate, and gas. The Middle East is one of the largest arms-consuming markets countries of the region have spent a lot of money on wars and arms purchases in the Middle East, where they have cost billions of dollars. This huge money could have turned the Middle East into a paradise and moved its people to the ranks of developed nations.The presence of important human and scientific energies and the majority of these scientific minds are displaced in America and Europe, as well as the abundance of labor.

- Focus considerations on the Middle East 0ne of the American schools’ views on the meaning of interventionism in the Middle East is centered on the interests of the United States in two of the most strategic areas - the Middle East and the Far East - that Washington, as the dominant unifying force, should focus on the Middle East. She believes US regulators have traditionally worked to reduce US involvement in the Middle East, but Middle East problems have always attracted the United States (Shalaby, 2014). For example, George Bush was not particularly interested in the region and showed little interest in it before the September 11 attacks. As Obama came to power, he planned to remove Washington’s ties to the Middle East. But this school believes that the problems of the Middle East interfer with US national security interests and the US economy that force the US administration to However, this school recognizes that Asia is central to US foreign policy but should not be at the expense of the Middle East given the importance of both points.

The most important considerations for focusing on the Middle East can be summarized as follows:

1. Energy security considerations through the consolidation of relations in the Middle East: Of the Middle East ambitions of Russia and China in energy security and trade considerations. On the Beijing side, it is keen to protect energy sources and crossings in the region to become the “factory of the world”. The region witnessed a remarkable increase in Chinese investments (from $ 1 billion in 2005 to $ 11 billion in 2009), especially in the field of construction and infrastructure related to energy resources. Here we mention China-Egypt cooperation in the development of a special economic zone around the Suez Canal. Trade between China and the region rose from $ 25.5 billion in 2004 to $ 100 billion in 2009 (Wang Yi 2014), reaching $ 222 billion in 2012 and $ 238.9 billion in 2013 (Jeffery 2011).

2 - The strategic pillars in the Middle East arena to push towards a multipolar worldDuring President Putin’s last visit to China on 20 and 21 May 2014, the will of the two countries (Russia and China), to maintain their capacity to influence has manifested itself, perhaps not in the international arena at large, but at least in their immediate neighborhood, (Maxime Lefebvre 2008). In line with these goals, Russia has managed to bridge the Euro-American opening towards Eastern Europe and North Caspian, as the crises in Georgia in 2008 have taught us China hand the recent focus on.

To defend their interests in the Pacific and Central Asia as we see ongoing tensions with Japan or India (Jean-Pierre, 2010).

Since taking office in March 2000, President Vladimir Putin has been calling for “an end to the one-pole rule and the reconfiguration of international alliances (Derek, 2008) “ after his country was ousted from the Smutnoe Vremya period, the “period of unrest” following the collapse of the Soviet Union, For “geopolitical degeneration” in the world, quoting President Putin himself, the latter considered that “the collapse of the Soviet Union is the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century (Hélène, 2010).

So, Russia and China decided to take advantage of the “war on terror”. Russia and China, through increased intervention in the Middle East in the last decade, have sought to protect their strategic security, in line with three axes agreed to combat, according to the expert on Russian-Chinese affairs terrorism, separatism, extremism (Bobo, 2008).

From the Syrian arena, the political and strategic position of Russia and China aspires to shape the post-American world represented by Bush›s decade-long policy and push toward a multipolar world. In an open letter to the New York Times on Russia›s position on Syria, President Putin called upon the Americans (and the rest of the world) «to cease using force and return to «Putin aspires to» find a suitable location for Russia on the international arena with the power and influence of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the role of protecting the Syrian regime provides Russia with the right way to confront the American agenda and fortify the positioning of its naval forces on the White Sea The average in Tartous (Vladimir, 2013).

Thus, after two decades of strategic marginalization in the interests of American hegemony over international resolutions, Russia and China emerged as ambitious countries that were gaining influence in the region and internationally, leading to renewed rivalries with some countries. “The latest developments [since 2008] have pointed to the post-Cold War end of the world and its replacement with the post-Western world in which Russia and China play an increasingly important role,” said expert Andrey Tzegankov (Andrei, 2009).

2.3 US dominance in the Middle East is declining:

The United States remains the dominant pole of the new world order that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Some political literature on possible scenarios for the future of the international system went on to say that the world will continue to live the “American age” horizon for an estimated five decades (At least) (Jamal, 2014), while other literature went on to say that the current period is a transition period, and that transition periods as history suggests are very dangerous.

The present period is a period of transition, and transitional periods, as historical experience suggests, are very dangerous to both regional and international security, where the dominant powers try to maintain their place at the top of the system, while the new forces seek to change the shape of the power relations. Moscow was the direct initiator in the diplomatic field in the Syrian situation, which brought the idea of aggression out of the geopolitical equation, with strategic support from China. It is mentioned here that Vladimir Putin crystallized the idea of Syria joining the Chemical Weapons Convention as an alternative to the military strikes announced on 9 September 2013 by the Russian Foreign Minister, which resulted in the decision to withdraw and destroy the chemical stockpile from the grip of the Syrian regime through the organization Prohibition of chemical weapons (Mufti, 2015).

At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on the United States in a telephone conversation with his US counterpart John Kerry to exercise utmost caution and return to the United Nations to discuss the situation in Syria. It has become clear that US priorities in the region complementing Washington’s decision to withdraw from Iraq (in December 2011), (Tim, 2011), and from Afghanistan in late 2016 (Mark, 2014) , and to keep the pace of intervention in current crises to a minimum, commensurate with the strategic objectives Of the United States today in the Arab / Islamic world. The rising role of Russia and China in the arc of Middle Eastern crises stems from the theory of filling the vacuum. In addition to shifting American attention to Asian space to find a new balance with China’s rising economic and military power, we have already mentioned the decline of the US focus on the Middle East. Changes in energy.

Since the discovery of the ease of extraction of shist gas (or shale gas) at low cost, this material has become a major source of energy in the United States, and this represents about a quarter of the gas production of America from The current natural gas is through tens of thousands of wells, while this percentage did not exceed 1% in 2000 (Régis, 2013). In the meantime, the US was dependent on oil in the Gulf and the Middle East, which was a key driver in its war on Iraq in 2003. Today, the data changed and the priorities changed as the traditional energy market, which was the movement of oil exports from the former Soviet space and the Middle East, shifted to major consumer markets imported in the United States, Europe and China. Today, America is on course to lead to Self-sufficiency in energy security within 2030 (BP Energy Outlook 2030 (2013). US oil imports have gradually declined in recent years, with the dependence on oil now less than China.

3. The interests of China and Russia and their objectives in the Middle East

That the interests of Russia - in particular - in the Middle East concentrated in three main sectors: the first sector, “energy sector,” which is the essence of the Russian partnership with the countries of the region and the main pillar, especially after the recent energy crisis, As a result of the damage suffered, therefore, we find Russian oil companies working in the field of oil exploration in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. Russia is the second largest arms exporter in the world and relies heavily on arms sales as a major source of Russian national income. The Middle East is the second largest market for Russian arms after Asia (Beheiry, 2015). The third sector is related to space technology. There is cooperation between Russia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in the field of launching satellites for telecommunications, navigation and remote sensing by Russian missiles, as well as terrorism. Counterterrorism is a top Russian priority in its relations In the Middle East.China is no different from the United States, and the region is a major source of energy security for decades to come, while avoiding any hostility in the region by keeping its army out of the Gulf, leaving that role to the United States.

Appearing as a “peaceful businessman in the region (Iakovos, 2014).

3.1: Opportunities and determinants of the Russian-Chinese role in the Middle East .

The Russian intervention in the Middle East coincides with a gradual retreat of the United States from the region and a concentration in East Asia and the Pacific to deter China’s growing power. This does not mean that the United States will Is packing up its bags and migrating from an important strategic area such as the Middle East, but means that American influence is gradually limited, leaving a strategic vacuum that the big countries seek to fill, especially Russia and China, as well as Britain, which is now active in the Gulf region. On the third hand, fresh and qualitative tensions between Washington and its Arab allies have allowed Russia to regain some of its lost influence in the Middle East, seize some arms deals from American rivals, and embarrass an old adversary to show weakness. There were concerns among some Arab rulers that the United States was no longer the reliable ally because of the belief that Washington was increasingly reluctant to act as a policeman in the region, perhaps because it was less afraid of Arab oil shocks due to increased production. Arabs feel that the balance of world power is changing, and the belief that the United States is weak with the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, that the Gulf Arabs have a difficult choice. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s firm support for the Syrian leadership was highly appreciated even among the Gulf Arabs, who differ sharply with the Kremlin’s policy.

On the fourth hand, in light of the increasing pressure of the economic situation in Russia, especially with the continued decline in the rate of growth of the Russian economy compared to the global rate, which led to convergence with countries that can revive its economy, which is based on the pillars of arms and energy, Is the “savior”, especially as these countries seek to diversify weapons sources away from the United States, and to ensure a stable level of oil prices, by controlling the volume of production, which corresponds to the Russian orientation, where Russia seeks a strategic partnership in the sense of economic and technical , Based mainly on energy and adaptation Military Wen (Iman, 2013).

Russian interest in the region comes as part of a broader Russian strategy to create new markets for Russian arms in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia. Last October, the Russian defense minister made a trip to Latin America to market air defense systems, helicopters and military armor. It is noteworthy that Russia is looking for new markets for its sophisticated weapon (especially air defense) in countries experiencing economic boom, such as India and Brazil (Iman, 2013) or have oil surpluses such as the Gulf States, Iraq and Algeria Arab On October 2012.On June 5, 2014, Beijing held the sixth session of the Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Arab Cooperation since the launch of the latter in 2004, leading to enhanced cooperation between the two sides in the fields of trade, investment and human resources development, which is a guide to the steps to develop Sino-Arab relations in the future.

China’s import of Middle East oil will reach 75 percent by 2030 (Barthélémy, 2011), and now imports its oil from Saudi Arabia, which rose to the top spot in 2008, exporting 5.6 million bpd to China , Angola, and Iran ,(Alastair Sloan 2014). In the gas field, China’s growing needs have led to several agreements with Gulf countries, particularly Qatar. Beijing also plans to work with Tehran to build pipelines across the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan to supply it with gas. Russia, which accounts for 25 percent of the world’s gas reserves and is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas (Liu, 2006), is concerned with securing access to its resources through “strategic control of gas supply and transport terminals” such as the existing North Stream and the planned South His, in the European facade of Russian gas export. Moscow succeeded in freezing and then blew up the Nabucco pipeline project, which would have destabilized Russia under European efforts to break the Russian monopoly on gas supplies (Timothy, 2011). Thus, the use of soft power elements helped the two countries put their interests on the global agenda, as well as highlight the steel side of their influence in the military and the sharp positions in the international bodies.

3.2: The limits of the Russian-Chinese role in the Middle East

Speaking about the role of Russia in the Middle East, it is always necessary to discuss the relationship of this role to American influence in the region, which despite its limited recently revealed, but cannot be ignored, what role can be played by Russia in the region, will be linked to the compatibility with the United States , And it is expected that there will be Russian roles, linked to the most intractable issues in the region, which Washington was unable to manage individually over the last period, within the framework of “flexible understanding” between the two countries. Despite Russia’s increasing influence in the Middle East, and its transformation into a direct and unavoidable factor in analyzing the situation in the region, its role in the region continues, as for China, its foreign policy towards the Middle East is twofold: the economic dimension, which is divided into two parts: the flow of oil and raw materials from the region to China, what we can call “China’s energy security” and the region’s market for Chinese products. The political dimension, in which China has stayed away from interference in regional issues.

3.3: Prospects for cooperation between Russia and China in the Middle East

The Middle East has traditionally been under the influence of outside powers. The United States’ desire to play a less active role in the Middle East, marked by the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011 under the Obama administration, coincided with the increased participation of Russia and China in the ongoing operations in the region. The emerging crisis of democratization in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism and the general state of global politics, Moscow, which has a long history of cooperation with the Middle East, have played a role in the affairs of the region. Beijing’s involvement is also largely unrelated to the potential threats of the country as it relates to internal development processes, economic integration with the countries of the region and a strategy to become a major force acting responsibly (Middle East Makes U.S. 2018).

4. Russian and Chinese role (current and future) in the Gulf region

The Gulf region includes the six Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) as well as Iran and Iraq. If the United States confirms that Gulf security is a priority of US national security, to exist in this region through the presence of allies or direct presence through economic interests or political military, and therefore any Russian or Chinese presence in the Gulf is a threat to US interests.

4.1: The limits of the Russian-Chinese role in the Gulf region. There are several bases in which the Russian-Chinese role in the Gulf region affects three main axes:

1-The Iranian nuclear file.

2- Oil and gas.

3- US competition in the Gulf.

4.2: the consensus and the emergence of Russian-Chinese role in the Gulf region.The second decade of the twenty-first century saw the beginning of a new era in international relations, with a gradual transition to a multi-power international order of a clear Asian character. The American star has been in decline since the middle of the last decade, as American hegemony is declining in the light of the urgency of its internal economic problems and the relative failure of its foreign tendencies, especially in Iraq. This coincides with a clear tendency in the balance of economic power in favor of Asia, especially in the light of the financial crisis that nearly hit the European entity, while the capacity of other countries such as Russia and China. And other influential and regional Asian powers that wish to play an influential role in a more balanced and equitable international order (Sheikh 2014).

4.3 The future role of Russia and China in the Arabian Gulf versus the American role.

Everyone knows that the US relationship with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, is not at its best at the moment. There is a clear divergence of views between Washington and Riyadh about what is going on in Syria and Egypt, the Middle East peace process and the Iranian-American rapprochement. Saudi dissatisfaction with Washington’s policies has emerged in Saudi Arabia’s apology for accepting a temporary seat on the UN Security Council, before Saudi Arabia canceled its speech at the last UN General Assembly meeting in New York. The cooling off of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States, the rapprochement between the latter and Iran on the one hand, and Russia’s dissatisfaction with this rapprochement, may lead to a Saudi-Russian alliance in case Riyadh succeeds in persuading Moscow to change its position on events in Syria, the lion (Al-Salami 2013).

5. Future scenario

We are not going to review the different possibilities for the development of Chinese policy towards the Middle East in general and the Gulf region in particular, but go directly to what we believe is the most likely in the next five years:

- The next Chinese leadership in 2012 suggests - if true, our initial prediction - that the pragmatic policy of ensuring oil and the market in the Middle East will remain dominant and will seek to distance itself from indulging in internal conflicts in the region. The absence of China in the Quartet committee responsible for settling the Arab-Zionist conflict is indicative of this trend, because it wants to maintain an equal distance from the opponents for the reasons (Al-Jazeera Center for Studies 2011).- China will continue to support Iran in its strategic direction without agreeing to some details of the strategy, given the importance of Iran in terms of market and oil imports and the power that is hampering the growing American influence in the region, which is a vital area for China. So, it sees that Iran’s nuclear program is not a military threat so far, and the embargo on Iran will not stop it.

- China’s general assessment of US policy in the region suggests that it is “doomed to failure, as the United States has an exaggerated psychological sense of power, and US capabilities are less than that, (According to veteran Chinese diplomat Qian Qichen 2004).

- As Saudi-Iranian relations are closer to unstable relations, this puts China in a critical diplomatic position between the two countries, especially as indicated by the publications of a number of American institutions about the American pressure on Saudi Arabia to get closer to China and offer its temptations to break its ties with Iran, This is evident in the fact that it was King Abdullah who made the first Saudi king’s visit to China since the establishment of the two countries, in 2006 after growing tension between the United States and Saudi Arabia (Abdul Hai, 2011) .

Russia also looks forward to the Middle East being a market for the smell of arms exports because the Russian economy depends on the revenues of military industrial exports significantly (Russia has been able to increase the volume of exports of weapons during the period (2010-2014) by 37% compared to the period (2005-2009) Ranking second in the world ranking as the largest arms exporter).- Several studies have indicated that the United States, Russia, China, Germany and France controlled 74 percent of the world’s arms trade, while the United States and Russia controlled 58 percent of the world trade, ahead of the rest of the competition. Military rival to Russia. Arms exports are no longer a requirement only for the national security of countries, but important for the activation of military industries (arms exports have become a demand for Tazir, (Zidane 2015),

(Arms industry). The report pointed out that the Gulf States and the countries of the region of the Levant doubled their arms imports from about once in four times during the period (2013-2015) to the circumstances surrounding the region and Russia has reached an advanced position of arms exporters to the Middle East.

6. Conclusion

The Russian-Chinese role towards the Gulf region is in line with the vision of the two strategic countries of the global international system. The unipolar period that has prevailed since the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to chaos and the spread of terrorism; hence, there is no return to unilateralism; Their external role is to achieve an international order based on multipolarity (Taha, 2016) , which will achieve the balance and interests of its parties, and thus the stability of the international order, and end its chaos. The role of Russia and China in the Middle East has increased through direct intervention in resolving the Syrian crisis and the Iranian nuclear file, given Russia’s strategic importance to Russia, where the Russian naval base of Tartous in Syria, military cooperation and arms deals, explain Russia’s clear support for the Syrian regime. , Despite the dominance of the United States in the Middle East to ensure security interests. Washington, following its withdrawal in May 2018 from the 2015 agreement, called on all countries to halt all Iranian oil imports by November 4 if they wanted to avoid US sanctions, (Report “SIPRI International Center for Peace Research in Stockholm).

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Información adicional

CITAR COMO: Mazin Said , M. A., & Mikhaylichenko, K. (2019). The future of the Russian-Chinese role in the Middle East under the decline of US hegemony: “The Arabian Gulf region is a model”. Religación. Revista De Ciencias Sociales Y Humanidades, 4(13), 181-193. https://revista.religacion.com/index.php/religacion/article/view/206

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