Cosmopolitan democracy and polycentrism of power - Initial debates

Democracia cosmopolitana y policentrismo del poder - debates iniciales

Daniel Francisco Nagao Menezes
Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie., Brasil
nagao.menezes@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9151-5699
Ernani Contipelli
United International Business School, Países bajos
ernanicontipelli@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3506-9326

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Resumen: El mundo vive actualmente un déficit democrático de instituciones representativas producto del contexto de globalización y policentrismo del poder. En este artículo analizaremos el modelo de democracia cosmopolita tal como lo conciben David Held, Anthony McGrew y Daniele Archibugi. Para ello, en primer lugar, presentaremos los fundamentos del modelo democrático cosmopolita de los autores investigados. Luego, nos ocuparemos de las propuestas institucionales concretas presentadas por ellos. Finalmente, discutiremos las principales limitaciones y críticas del modelo analizado. Con base en estas consideraciones, enfrentamos el problema de investigación: ¿cuál es el potencial del proyecto de democracia cosmopolita para suplir el déficit democrático de las instituciones representativas brasileñas resultante de la globalización y el policentrismo del poder?

Palabras clave: Democracia, policentrismo, Instituciones, Representación.

Abstract: The world is currently experiencing a democratic deficit of representative institutions resulting from the context of globalization and the polycentrism of power. In this article, we will analyze the model of cosmopolitan democracy as conceived by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi. To do so, firstly, we will present the foundations of the cosmopolitan democratic model of the researched authors. Then, we will deal with the concrete institutional proposals presented by them. Finally, we will discuss the main limitations and criticisms of the analyzed model. Based on these considerations, we face the research problem: what is the potential of the cosmopolitan democracy project to supply the democratic deficit of the Brazilian representative institutions resulting from globalization and the polycentrism of power?

Keywords: Democracy, Polycentrism, Institutions, Representation.

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1. Introduction

Preliminarily, it is necessary to situate the model of cosmopolitan democracy by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi in the theoretical context in which it is inserted. The recognition that globalization imposes limits on state sovereignty and representative democracy led to questions about the link between democracy and citizenship to the space of the national state (Reis, 2006), the presentation of several possible scenarios for the international order, as well as alternative democratic models or complementary.

First, there are, on the one hand, proposals of communitarian nature, according to which, in the face of pluralism and the multiplicity of centers of power resulting from globalization, the future of democracy lies in strengthening the identities and cultural values of local communities, that will allow the engagement of individuals in the decision-making processes of these collectivities; and, on the other hand, globalist ideas, according to which citizenship is not only linked to belonging to the national State or to local communities, but also to the fact that individuals are part of humanity, so that democratic political participation must be extended beyond state borders. Evidently, cosmopolitan democracy falls into the second group (Giddens, 2007).

Among globalist theories (McGrew, 2003), two important differentiation criteria stand out: (1) the emphasis given to the institutionalization of decision-making processes at the global level; and (2) the degree of centralization or decentralization of such processes.

As for the first criterion, the model of cosmopolitan democracy analyzed in this article is included among the proposals that attribute special relevance to the institutionalization of democratic decision-making processes (Hayden, 2004; Floh, 2007). In contrast, the proposal for deliberative democracy at the global level, without disregarding the importance of institutions of liberal democracy, nor the cosmopolitan proposal for the reform of international institutions, understands that such mechanisms are insufficient, proposing the development of an international public sphere, which would allow the dialogue between the different decision-making and executive instances with all possible stakeholders in their decisions and actions (Nanz, Steffek, 2007).

As well as at the national level, the formation of public opinion is essential for democracy at the global level, as it is through it that the will of the people (own or heterodirected) is manifested on a daily basis regarding the problems that affect them, with a growing role of the various means of communication in forming this opinion (Castells, 2005; Carvalho, 2006). However, the analysis of the institutional mechanisms through which decision-making processes

take place is essential, because, no matter how good and broad the debates are, at a certain moment it is necessary to decide – and it is not possible to make decisions democratically without institutionalized organizations and procedures (Archibugi, 2004; Neves, 2009). Here, then, is an aspect that demonstrates the importance of the approach to cosmopolitan democracy presented in this article. As for the degree of centralization or decentralization of decision-making processes at the global level, there are proposals: centralizing, in different degrees, even the most radical ones, such as the formation of a "World State" (Höffe, 2005; Tavares, 2000; Neves, 2008); and decentralizing (Faria, 2009), from moderates to neo-anarchists (Castells, 2005).

Along these lines, Sanches (2004, p. 75) presents a classification of cosmopolitan authors, dividing them into "centric" and "polycentric". According to the "centrics", the new global space tends to assume a centralized and hierarchical structure of power, in which the States will occupy an important position, however the space of citizenship, historically linked to the territory of the State, can be associated to the "interstate space", within the perspective of "eventual creation of structures for a world State". The "polycentrics", who "in general, have more abstract and non-uniform observations among themselves", present "elements for the interpretation of a more fragmented cosmopolitanism" and identify "the relevance of new forms of interaction and the recognition of mechanisms of self-regulation, in a polycentric structure".

The theory of cosmopolitan democracy by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi can be classified as "centric". However, the idea they develop does not move towards the formation of a "Global Government", but rather towards "Global Governance" (Cassesse, 2003; Longo, 2010; Mueller, 2004; Nogueira, 2004; Canotilho, 2006; Rosenau, 2003; Bercovici, 2008), since, although they propose the creation or strengthening of institutions of a global and centralized nature, they defend that they should act in network, in an articulated and subsidiary manner with other institutions at the global, regional, state and local levels (Held, McGrew, 2007; Habermas, 2001)..

By the way, Archibugi (1995) considers that the proposal to form a federation of States (with a global authority) proves to be both unfeasible, as there are no signs that national States are willing to give up their sovereignty in the name of common objectives and the need to create a powerful supranational entity, as undesirable, because it would be very difficult to operate democracy in such a system without achieving some degree of historical-cultural homogeneity, in addition to the risk of transforming it into a despotic institution.

To close these preliminary considerations on the theoretical context in which the model of cosmopolitan democracy by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi is inserted, we will

present a brief history (Herz, 1999) about the origins and development of the ideas that underlie such model. More recently, the following works can be mentioned that complement this discussion: Gadinger and Scholte (2023); Müller (2022); Leffel at al. (2023).

2. The cosmopolitan democracy

The first conception of cosmopolitanism was developed by the Stoics, who referred to themselves as cosmopolitans. At the center of their thought was the understanding that men, in addition to living and belonging to a local community by virtue of birth, also inhabit and belong to the human community, constituted by ideals and aspirations. Given this, deliberations and problem solving should always focus on what people have in common as citizens who are rational and belong to the world. This notion of "citizens of the world" is also based on the argument according to which political borders are historically arbitrary and often built through violence, in a way that ends up undermining the understanding of the common condition of all as humanity (Held, 2007).

The second conception of cosmopolitanism was introduced in the eighteenth century, in general, by the various peace projects presented in the period and, more specifically, by Kant's project of "Perpetual Peace" (Hayden, 2004), which developed the idea of participation in a cosmopolitan sphere as a right, the right of everyone to dialogue with any other person without restrictions, regardless of the question of belonging to a State, which implies the duty of tolerance and peaceful coexistence (Held, 2007). Kant's proposal did not include the creation of a world State (Cruz, 2005) – States should remain distinct and with their own law –, however, it would be necessary to introduce a new branch of law, namely cosmopolitan law – which would imply some restrictions on state internal sovereignty (Kant, 2004).

The third conception of cosmopolitanism began to be formulated at the end of the seventies, in works by authors such as Beitz, Pogge and Barry, who sought to explain the classic idea according to which every man belongs to the human community, and defended three fundamental principles: (1) the ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings, not states or any other forms of human association; (2) everyone must recognize the equal worth of all human beings; (3) equality of conditions and mutual recognition among human beings requires that each person should enjoy impartial treatment in relation to their aspirations (Marchetti, 2010).

The idea of cosmopolitan democracy itself, that is, that democracy "as a concept and a practice could and should be applied beyond nation-states", begins to be developed only in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century (Herz, 1999), in the context of

the end of the Cold War and a new movement towards the democratization of states in different parts of the world. Before 1989, both in the field of International Relations and in the Theory of Democracy, written books made no reference to democracy in the context of international politics, beyond the borders of the national State. Currently, the situation is quite different, as both International Relations and Democratic Theory have incorporated the discussion of "democracy beyond borders", even in their manuals (Marchetti, 2010).

On the other hand, there is no consensus on whether cosmopolitan democracy is necessary or desirable. In fact, there are more authors who oppose than those who defend the proposal[3]. It is noteworthy that the objectives of the cosmopolitan democracy project are not limited to the scope of academic discourse, intending to provide intellectual arguments for transformations in the real world. However, while in the academic field there have been significant advances in the last twenty years, the same has not happened in terms of transformations in world politics, but at least a change in the rhetoric of state actors and international organizations is perceptible, which have come to consider the idea of global democracy (Archibugi, 2011).

[3] For Arriguchi (2011, p. 3), the following authors are:Robert Dahl, Ralf Daharendof, David Miller e Philippe Schmitter.Já entre os autores que, a partir de diferentes disciplinas, contribuíram para o desenvolvimento dessa concepçãode democracia, o autor cita: Richard Falk, Mary Kaldor, Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, Andrew Linklater, AnthonyMcGrew, Jan-Aart Scholte e Saskia Sassem.

In summary, the model of cosmopolitan democracy by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi is inserted among globalist theories, which emphasize the institutional aspect of decision-making processes at the global level, and defend the strengthening and creation of centralized global institutions , which, however, must be inserted within a multi-level global governance system, governed by the principle of subsidiarity (they do not, therefore, propose a State or a world Government). It is a democratic model that has its philosophical foundations in Kant's ideas of "Perpetual Peace" and cosmopolitanism, which were resumed in the late 1970s, but which began to develop as a political-institutional proposal only in the late eighties and early nineties, and which has objectives that are not limited to the scope of academic discourse, intending to provide intellectual arguments for transformations in the real world.

2.1. The Cosmopolitan Democracy Model by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi

2.1.1. Assumptions and Objectives of the Model

The model of cosmopolitan democracy presented by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi has as assumptions (Archibugi, 2004) two observations about the current political-legal context. On the one hand, due to globalization, national states – which are the seat of institutions of representative democracy – are no longer able to satisfactorily regulate a series of issues with great repercussions on the lives of their citizens, especially in the field of economic policy. On the other hand, the international organizations built by the States to try to fill this regulatory deficit have a very questionable efficiency in fulfilling their missions (Archibugi, 1995) and suffer from a significant democratic déficit (Marchetti, 2010). This occurs because, in general, they are not transparent, and the control mechanisms to which they are submitted, in addition to being fragile, refer exclusively to the States, not responding to the populations. Added to this is the fact that other important global actors, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations with an international dimension, are also not representative, nor accountable to the people. The consequence of this is that the different agents who were assigned the role of promoting global governance do not act with a view to the public interest, but their own interests, contributing to the growth of social inequality (Hayden, 2004).

From this diagnosis of regulatory and democratic deficit in global (and national) governance, David Held and other authors understood that there is a need for democratic government and political theory to adjust to a world in which globalization and interdependence have eroded autonomy of the nation-state, proposing, as a response, the cosmopolitan model of democracy (Hurrel, 1999). That is, as explained by Archibugi (2000, p. 143),

> cosmopolitical democracy is based on the assumption that important objectives – control of the use of force, respect for human rights, selfdetermination – will be obtained only through the extension and development of democracy. It differs from the general approach to cosmopolitanism in that it does not merely call for global responsibility but actually attempts to apply it principles of democracy internationally. For such problems as the protection of the environment, the regulation of migration and the use of natural resources to be subjected to necessary democratic control, democracy must transcend the borders of single states and assert itself on a global level

It is a democratic project that aims to formulate alternatives that allow the development of democracy across states, regions and global networks. It is not intended, with this, to reduce the capacity of global action of the States (Archibugi, 1995), but rather the development of democratic institutions at the regional and global

levels, which allow to complement the national ones, as well as the guarantee of real conditions for the participation of individuals in the decision-making processes (Held, 2007). The objective is, therefore, to submit issues that currently escape the control of national representative institutions (such as international capital flows and international trade rules) to new forms of democratic control (Faria, 2009).

So, as explained Archibugi (2002, p. 28), "the political project of cosmopolitan democracy can thus be expressed very simply: it is the attempt to reconcile the phenomenon of globalization with the successes of democracy". A democratic theory that develops the analysis and presents the objectives described above, as stated by Archibugi (2002, p. 32), is not politically neutral. As cosmopolitan democracy presents a program that seeks to address an existing vacuum of democracy in global governance (which only favors a minority of economically or politically powerful subjects), it will benefit, above all, "those excluded from the decision-making process – the majority of the planet".

The cosmopolitan democracy project is therefore linked to a theory of social justice. It is not possible to conceive that everyone has an equal right to participate in the decision-making processes that affect their lives and, at the same time, accept the enormous social inequalities that, in practice, make such participation unfeasible. Therefore:

> if you take seriously that all human beings share a common universe, that all human beings have equal dignity and value and that all human beings have a right to an active agency, then we must be alarmed by any form of political and economic system that systematically denies or threatens the basis of their agency (Held, 2001, p. 7).

The understanding of the cosmopolitan democracy project cannot, therefore, be restricted to the political-institutional aspect, requiring an understanding of four articulated strands of cosmopolitanism: legal, political, economic and cultural cosmopolitanism (Held, 2007). "Legal cosmopolitanism" aims to establish a global legal order in which all people are equally respected, with this condition guaranteed by norms of cosmopolitan law that subject political, social and economic powers, as well as the formation of a global network of legal systems, and also the submission of all to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, or, perhaps, the creation of a new international court of human rights (Held, 2003). "Political cosmopolitanism" requires adequate global and regional governance, through the creation of political organizations that allow the establishment of a regulatory network and mechanisms to ensure that the rules are complied with. "Economic cosmopolitanism" requires the reform and regulation of the means of manifestation of economic power that undermine the possibilities of equal participation and

human activity, and that make satisfactory conditions of competition and economic cooperation unfeasible, as well as the creation of a system of transfer of resources. Resources that allow for the creation of conditions for the compensation or minimization of suffering arising from economic conditions, including through new forms of regional and global taxation. Finally, "cultural cosmopolitanism" refers to the promotion of the harmonious coexistence of different national traditions, communities and alternative lifestyles.

It is therefore concluded that the model of cosmopolitan democracy presented by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi is based on the diagnosis according to which, due to the phenomenon of globalization, there has been an erosion of the autonomy of the Nation-State, and we are living in a context of democratic and regulatory deficit in the spheres of global and national governance. To face this problem, the authors propose a democratic project that aims to formulate alternatives that allow the development of democracy across states, regions and global networks, so that real conditions are guaranteed for the participation of individuals in decision-making that affect them, preserving the roles that States can still play, but developing new democratic institutions at the global and regional levels. It is not a politically neutral theory, as it intends to benefit those excluded from global decision-making processes, being linked to a theory of social justice and should be studied from the different articulated strands of cosmopolitanism.

2.1.2. Cosmopolitan Democracy and Cosmopolitan Citizenship

The formulation of alternatives that allow the development of democracy across States, regions and global networks, based on the verification of a regulatory and democratic deficit in global and national governance, is based on a new concept of citizenship. If territorially based representative democracy is based on national citizenship, cosmopolitan democracy requires cosmopolitan citizenship.

Held (2007) explains that citizenship is not exclusively linked to belonging to a territorial community, and can be based on different criteria, such as general rules and democratic and human rights principles, which grant all people equal rights to freedom and opportunities to participate in all instances where decisions are made that affect their vital needs and interests, regardless of their nationality (Marchetti, 2010).

Furthermore, the linking of citizenship to the territory of the national State is a historical contingency, and not a logical determination, so that it is possible to articulate citizenship in other ways, for example, around the international community, humanity itself, and not nationality only (Evangelista, 2006). Therefore, cosmopolitanism is based on the understanding that all human beings

are equal (and deserve the same political treatment), so that their interests must be equally considered, regardless of where they live or where they were born (Reis, 2006). Consequently, citizenship should be actively performed both at the national and global levels (Dowbor, 2001) through different instruments to be analyzed, including the creation of new levels of political representation (Archibugi, 2002).

It is observed, however, that cosmopolitan citizenship should not depend on national citizenship, that is, the possibility for citizens to have a voice in global affairs should not require the authorization or mediation of national States. To this end, political representation instruments must be created that go beyond national borders and are independent of the respective governments, through the recognition of global citizenship rights. This implies the formation of a set of institutions parallel to the States and the limitation of state sovereignty by the global rights of citizenship.

In addition to its legal ethical foundation, the recognition that there is a world citizenship, finds its factual substrate in the performance of "social movements, NGOs, groups for the defense of rights (advocacy), which are organized in networks that cross borders" (Castells, 2005), the which, for part of cosmopolitan authors, would form a "global civil society" (Castells, 2005). In this sense, world citizenship would not be "just a theoretical issue, but an ongoing process", since the finding that global civil society would be an empirical fact would be supported, above all, by the "emergence of a transnational activism around issues of global interest, particularly in areas such as the preservation of the environment and the protection of human rights" (Reis, 2006, p 17).

According to Archibugi (2000), these new actors demand adequate institutional mechanisms to ensure the adequate participation of all citizens of the world in global decisions, and to overcome the democratic deficit resulting from the current lack of representation in global decision-making instances of such interests. organized transnationals (Carvalho, 2006).

This implies an understanding of democratic participation that is not limited to the state sphere, to voting and the election of representatives through political parties to take control of state power, as well as opening up the possibility of creating new forums for participation and new forms of aggregation of interests (Floh, 2007).

It is observed, therefore, that the project of cosmopolitan democracy analyzed is based on the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship, which is not exclusively linked to belonging to a territorial community, but rather to the understanding that every human being is equal (and deserves same political treatment), so that their interests must be equally considered and they have the right to participate in all instances in which decisions are taken that affect their vital needs and interests, regardless of their nationality. And more: the

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attribution of cosmopolitan citizenship does not depend on national States, being assured directly by global citizenship rights. Cosmopolitan citizenship, in addition to this ethical-legal foundation, has as its factual substrate the action of different transnational social movements, which, for part of cosmopolitan authors, would form a "global civil society".

2.1.3. Cosmopolitan Democracy and Global Governance

As we have previously highlighted, the cosmopolitan democracy project developed by David Held, Daniele Archibugi and Anthony McGrew does not propose the creation of a global state or government, but rather a system of democratic global governance at multiple levels (Archibugi, 2004).

This is because the aforementioned cosmopolitan project starts from the diagnosis that we live in a context characterized by the existence of different globally interconnected centers of power and authority, which need to be democratized. Now, in a political scenario like this, the possibilities of realizing democracy are necessarily related to the expansion of networks of States and other democratic organizations, through the constitution of a system that is adaptable to different realities and that guarantees the rights inherent to democracy in intergovernmental and transnational manifestations of power (Evangelista, 2006).

Therefore, in the first place, cosmopolitan democracy requires both the existence of democracy in particular communities and the relationship between communities to be democratic (Held, 1995)

Second, cosmopolitan democracy must be structured through different levels of government and political decision, depending on the problem to be faced, from local to global (Held, McGrew, 2001). There are issues that can be better resolved at the local level, such as those related to people's daily lives: traffic, security of public spaces, etc. (Archibugi, 2004). Others must be faced at the national level, such as those that affect the entire community of a State, but that do not go beyond its borders. Decisions that require transnational mediation due to their connection with different national decisions, or because individual States are not in a position to refer them, must be attributed to the regional level of governance. Consequently, the global sphere will only be responsible for those issues that cannot be resolved at the local, national or regional levels, due to their level of global interconnection – for example, environmental problems and international economic regulation (Resende, 1997). Therefore, the viability of this model of democracy depends on an adequate division of powers and competences at different levels, which must be properly interconnected (Held, MacGrew, 2001).

With this, the objective is to ensure that all those who are potentially significantly affected by any decisions can, directly or

indirectly (through political representation), participate in the decision-making processes in the most intense way possible. Evidently, participation tends to be more effective in smaller and closer decision-making instances, as well as in relation to the problems that more directly affect the subjects and that are closer to them. In this way, cosmopolitan democracy is guided by the principles of subsidiarity (Kaldor, 1995) and inclusion: the decentralization of decisions occurs with the objective of creating different levels of democratic forums, which allows for the expansion of participants and greater intensity of participation; centralization should occur only if necessary to avoid excluding people significantly affected by decisions.

Similarly, Archibugi (1995, p. 157) ponders that "what the cosmopolitan democracy model proposes is, in the end, simply the creation of the appropriate institutions where citizens of the planet may discuss the problems and take the decision that shape their Destiny". This does not necessarily imply a substantial transfer of power from states to new institutions, which seems neither feasible nor desirable, but rather facing the challenge of reducing the role of force in politics and increasing the influence of procedures, all without the claim to solve all the world's problems, but only to create one more way to face them.

3. Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposals

In this topic, we will present the institutional arrangements proposed by the theorists of cosmopolitan democracy that we analyzed, through which they intend to materialize their conception of democracy.

Within national States, some institutional changes may favor the development of cosmopolitan democracy, such as expanding the rights of immigrants, reducing existing differences between natural citizens and foreigners in terms of rights to political participation. Furthermore, there would be important changes in foreign policy priorities, especially for the most powerful countries in the West, which could start to support political parties and militants who fight for democracy in authoritarian states, instead of trying to export democracy using coercive means, which has not been efficient (Barreñada, Kaush, 2005).

At the global level, the starting point presented by Held, Archibugi and McGrew for the implementation of their model is the United Nations system (Giddens, 2007). However, it is necessary that the UN Charter (Carvalho, 2006) be complied with and its predictions implemented, because, although all States are formally equal, in practice, there is an enormous inequality of power and resources in the international system, which manifests itself both in the military

field and in in economic policy. To this end, the UN needs to be reformed to build more democratic global Governance (Held, 1995).

Especially because, as asserted by Held and McGrew (2007), the institutions of global governance were efficient in promoting economic globalization, but they are not in the performance of their redistributive and promotional functions, that is, they are capable of promote the market, but not correct it (Habermas, 2001).

Second, the guarantee of the effective democratic participation of all citizens of the world is conditioned by the establishment of a consistent set of civil, political, social and economic rights, in order to model and format the democratic decision-making process (Held, 1995).

Third, Held and Archibugi note the need to form a legitimate assembly of all states and democratic agencies, reforming the UN General Assembly or creating a parallel and complementary structure. This second General Assembly should represent the peoples, independently of their governments, so that the representation of citizens at the international level would no longer be the exclusive prerogative of governments, and citizens would have a voice of their own (Herz, 1999), complementing the action of rulers (Archibugi, 1995).

Several reasons justify the creation of this second General Assembly, such as the following: (1) the current system in which each State has the right to one vote is undemocratic, as it creates a disproportion of representation between people from less and more populous countries, as well as and in relation to the participation of each of the States in the world economy, so that a review of this situation is a precondition for expanding the powers of the UN (Kahler, 2007); (2) the representation of States in the UN is determined mainly by the de facto control of their power, and not by the legitimacy of the government, so that it may not represent all citizens (thus, if a State refuses to appoint the representatives of the people elected according to democratic norms, the Assembly itself could recognize the authority to represent political forces that demonstrate to represent the people); (3) even in democratic States there are significant differences between the opinions of the rulers and those that may be expressed by the representatives of individuals, as the Assembly of Peoples will also represent minorities and the opposition (Höffe, 2005); (4) there is no global instance in which the effective participation of subjects and civil society is ensured, nor instruments that allow accountability of international organizations for their decisions and for their acts (Held, 1995); (5) finally:

> only with the construction of dedicated political institutions is it possible to test how many of the issues advocated by social movements are supported by the majority of the population of the earth. At the same time, the very existence of these institutions would raise awareness of the possibility of

> addressing global issues through joint political action (Archibugi, 2004, p. 451).

Regarding the composition of the "World Parliamentary Assembly", Archibugi (2011, p. 9 – 10) argues that it should have the European Parliament as a model, and provide political participation in global discussions both for individuals and groups excluded from the current system (such as ethnic and political minorities, people living in States under authoritarian rule, immigrants and refugees, etc.), as well as those living in consolidated democracies, who would have the possibility to engage in "a new level of governance and representations". With regard to the functions of the "World Parliamentary Assembly", the author understands that it will be able to: (1) contribute to bringing people all over the world together to deliberate together on common problems; (2) in the medium term, to present binding legislative powers to all States and inhabitants of the Earth; (3) at first, function as a forum for reflection and deliberation to form world public opinion, playing an important role in identifying and confronting different political alternatives for world issues (Kaldor, 1995); (4) offer suggestions for resolving issues that cross borders; (5) serve as a deliberation forum for political communities composed of individuals with common interests who live in different States and do not present an adequate forum in which their interests can be represented. Finally, it is noted that:

> this Assembly would not necessarily be involved in every aspect of global political life, but it could concentrate on the most relevant and pressing issues: for example, those with high impact on global life (e.g., the environment) or those with huge political significance (e.g. major violations of human rights).

The fourth proposal for institutional organization of the cosmopolitan democracy project analyzed is the creation of Regional Parliaments where they do not exist, as in Latin America and Africa, and the expansion of the role of the existing ones, such as the European Parliament, so that their decisions are originally recognized as independent sources of law (Held, 2006).

Still in the legislative field, Held (1995) defends the holding of national, regional and global referendums, on issues involving relevant and controversial common interests, and on the organization of regional authorities, to be formed in accordance with the peculiarities of interests and problems of each region.

In the Judiciary scope, Archibugi (2011, p. 7) understands that "the rule of law and its enforcement is an essential component of any democratic system". However, the author assesses that international organizations, including the European Union and the United Nations, although they have a sophisticated regulatory framework and an embryonic Judiciary, their capacity to impose their decisions is

quite limited (Barreñada, Kaush, 2005). Thus, the cosmopolitan democracy project "supports the development of a more effective global rule of law, while remaining skeptical of the enhancement of coercive supranational powers in general".

To face this limitation, Archibugi (2004, p. 462) argues that "it is therefore neccessary to strengthen the rule of law in its legislative aspects as much as in its legal components": gaining greater democratic legitimacy, the institutions in charge of those applying the law will have greater power to enforce their decisions, otherwise they are treated as mere moral rhetoric. Hence the importance of legislative institutions of cosmopolitan democracy also to make international (or cosmopolitan) norms more effective.

More specifically, Archibugi (1995, p. 143) presents the following proposals for the international judicial institutions, especially the International Court of Justice, to become more effective: (1) make the Court's jurisdiction mandatory; (2) expand the Court's jurisdiction to questions involving the relations between individuals and their governments, which has the theoretical meaning that the relations between them are also of interest to the international community; (3) hold individual rulers accountable for war crimes and human rights violations. It adds that the Court must judge according to cosmopolitan law and that it cannot directly apply its sentences, which can be executed by any legitimate authorities of the States or, in the event that they abstain, by a global institution endowed with executive powers.

Regarding executive bodies, the role of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization stands out, which needs to be reformed, as it does not have a democratic structure and does not respect the principle of equal sovereignty of States provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, it is proposed, for example, the abolition of the right of veto in the Council as essential for the democratization of the international order.

The issue of accountability and transparency in international organizations is also discussed (Kahler, 2007). As Held and Koenig-Archibugi (2007) explain, in the current system, the accountability of global policy makers to those affected by their decisions is very precarious, which can compromise both their effectiveness and their legitimacy, making it necessary to think of viable alternatives to address this accountability deficit, which particularly affects institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the UN Security Council. If, previously, the legitimization of international institutions used to be accepted indirectly, that is, through the consent of the governments that participate in them and their ability to solve the problems due to which they were created, today this is no longer satisfactory. The current prevailing conception of political legitimacy requires the accountability of any form of power in relation to the subjects over whom it is exercised, especially in relation to those who

are most affected. To this end, it is not enough to expand the State's control over international organizations, requiring the creation of control mechanisms in which all people affected by its decisions participate (Held, Koenig-Archibugi, 2007).

Finally, considering the importance attributed to the participation of non-governmental organizations, as representatives of global civil society, in international decision-making forums, it is also necessary to establish transparency and accountability mechanisms for national and transnational organizations of civil Society (Kahler, 2007)

In summary, the main proposals for reforms and institutional creation of the cosmopolitan authors studied are: (1) the expansion of immigrants' rights within each state and directing their foreign policies to support internal movements for democratization in authoritarian countries; (2) promote full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and the reform of its structures, in order to build a more democratic global governance; (3) establishment of a consistent set of civil, political, social, and economic rights; (4) reform of the UN General Assembly and creation of a second General Assembly (World Parliament or World Parliamentary Assembly) for the representation of peoples, independently of their governments; (5) creation of Regional Parliaments where they do not exist and expanding the role of existing ones; (6) holding national, regional and global referendums on issues involving relevant and controversial common interests and on the organization of regional authorities; (7) strengthening regional and global judiciaries and expanding their capacity to enforce their decisions; (8) reform of the UN Security Council, aiming at its democratization; (9) expansion of accountability and transparency mechanisms in international organizations; (10) establishment of transparency and accountability instruments for national and transnational civil society organizations.

4. Limits and Critics to the Cosmopolitan Democracy Model

The cosmopolitan democracy project suffers severe criticism from authors of quite different lines (Reis, 2006), who question both its analytical correctness (arguing, for example, that it treats the duty as if it corresponded to the reality of the contemporary world), and its prescriptions, stating that such a model would be neither viable nor desirable (Costa, 2003). In this topic, we will analyze the main limits of the cosmopolitan democracy project presented by some of its critics.

4.1. Analytical and Conceptual Limits of the Cosmopolitan Democracy Model

With regard to the analytical correctness of the model of cosmopolitan democracy, critics argue that global civil society, which would be the factual support of cosmopolitan citizenship, does not actually exist, and that the affirmation of the universality of human rights, which would be its ethical foundation, is nothing more than a discourse for the imposition of Western ideology.

In this sense, Costa (2003) argues that, although there are ongoing mobilizations of non-state social actors at the global level, with significant political relevance, there is no reason to establish a parallel between these realities and national civil societies. This is because, while the national civil society is formed by cultural and communicative identities built over centuries of particular national histories, in the phenomenon observed at the global level there is no such identity: the global networks of actors mobilized around certain causes (such as the environment) are fragmented, there is no convergent discourse. Furthermore, not everyone has effective access to this discussion space, but only an "internationalized elite of militants". In view of this, the author concludes that the "concept of global civil society is a mistake", because, contrary to what it denotes, "a social agenda is not being formed based on the experiences accumulated in different regions of the world", and such an agenda does not submit itself to the "scrutiny of a porous and democratic global public sphere" (Bull, 2002). Therefore, in the author's understanding, "the rhetoric of cosmopolitan democracy ends up hiding the unequal distribution of chances and power that reigns in world Realpolitik" and presents the risk of lending itself to the diffusion throughout the world of the values of a restricted number of civil societies (Zolo, 2006).

Archibugi (2004) does not ignore the various criticisms of cosmopolitan democracy related to the inexistence of a civil society or a global demos. The author even believes that the idea of a global civil society is exaggerated, because minorities and elites remain the main participants in discussions related to global politics. Furthermore, he shares the idea that there can be no democracy without the people. However, Archibugi argues that there is no consensus on what makes a group of people a people, not being necessarily associated with the limits of the borders of a State. Therefore, "demos is not antecedent and independent from institutions", that is: in many cases, institutions can give rise to the people, as occurred in the formation of the United States of America, despite all religious and cultural differences (Held, 1995).

In this line, Ferrajoli (2006) argues, firstly, that if there is no political and cultural homogeneity in the global or European sphere, which would be a prerequisite for democratic institutions and the guarantee of rights through, for example, of a European or world Constitution, such homogeneity does not exist in national States either. Secondly, the author points out that the existence of a people,

a civil society or a public sphere are not presuppositions for constitutionalism and for the rule of law, since, in fact, these are what allow the formation of those - there is no true public sphere without the guarantee of equality and fundamental rights. Finally, the purpose of a continental or world Constitution (and also of democratic institutions) would not be to express the existence of a demos, that is, of some cultural homogeneity or collective identity or social cohesion, but, on the contrary, the to ensure, through these rights, peaceful coexistence between subjects and interests that are virtually in conflict.

Regarding the ethical support of the cosmopolitan project, that is, the universality of human rights, Costa (2003) states that cosmopolitan authors use the discourse that the understanding that societies must spread throughout the world located in the North Atlantic region have these rights, as they would be morally more advanced and would represent the vanguard of humanity, which would not find factual support. However, with this discourse, cosmopolitan theory would be putting itself at the service of a new form of cultural imperialism that only legitimizes and makes the power of rich countries grow (Mouffe, 2003).

Faced with considerations like this, Held (2007, p. 319) responds, firstly, that "the origins of principles should not be confused with their validity", that is: the fact that the principles of human rights were originally constructed in the West does not mean that its validity is restricted to that sphere of the world. Second, Held (2001) argues that the celebration of cultural diversity and differences does not mean that national cultures alone will be able to provide the necessary means to address global political issues. Cosmopolitanism does not, therefore, defend the cultural hegemony of the West or the suppression of differences. Emphasizing the value of cultural diversity (Sousa, 2006), it is proposed the creation of democratic institutions capable of mediating the relationship between different cultures, and of allowing all peoples to develop according to their particularities, but without this representing an obstacle to the search for solutions to common problems by assigning rights and responsibilities to everyone. Finally, Held (2001) points out that cosmopolitan democracy recognizes the importance of developing autonomy and cultural differences, but not the asymmetry of power that limits the opportunities of many people.

It should also be noted that Costa (2003, p. 28), despite the severe criticism he presents to the concepts of world civil society and a universal ethics of human rights, recognizes that "these restrictions on the concepts of cosmopolitan democracy do not solve the political and moral problems that such contributions seek to face". In view of this, it proposes "unlinking the political dimension from the cultural dimension of civil societies", so that "the democratic achievements obtained by social movements in pioneering industrialization

countries are no longer necessarily associated with the concrete cultural forms of life verified in these contexts".

Another line of criticism of the cosmopolitan democracy model in the analytical and conceptual field refers to the very conception of politics adopted by it, because it would reject the fact that the dimension of antagonism is an essential constitutive part of politics and would overvalue consensus and rationality.

Mouffe (2006, p. 3) considers that modern democratic theory was built on the foundation of an idealized vision of human sociability and, above all, on the belief that the viability of democracy depends on the goodness of human beings. According to the author, it is in this direction that cosmopolitan democracy would move, presenting a "post-political" vision, that is, it would refuse the fact that antagonism will always be present in politics, by proposing "the establishment of a world "beyond left and right", "beyond hegemony", "beyond sovereignty" and "beyond antagonism" (Barreñada, Kaush, 2005), based on the idea of a universal rational consensus.

Alternatively, Mouffe (2006, p. 130) proposes that, as it is not within our power to eliminate conflicts or avoid the human condition (marked by passions, selfishness, irrational choices, etc.), what we can do is create instruments so that conflicts take an agonistic form: a contest between adversaries, not enemies. That is, democratic theory must abandon the dream that a world is possible in which humanity is all reconciled, without sovereignty and hegemony, recognizing the inevitable dimension of antagonism present in politics and seeking ways to treat it appropriately.

Archibugi (2004) is aware of realistic criticisms, such as those presented by Mouffe, which point to the fact that the world and human beings are very different from those dreamed of by defenders of cosmopolitan democracy, as they would not be guided by rationality and solidarity, but by force and interest – therefore, with relationships based on conflict, on antagonism. However, the author counter argues that, although he accepts that force and interest are important, they cannot be considered the only elements that drive policy. Furthermore, it is not correct to assume that the interests of all political actors are against the democratization of decision-making processes. In addition, Archibugi (2002, p. 33) considers that:

> is not enough to repeat, as Hawthorn does, that force is the principal source of political legitimacy; it is also necessary to ask whether force can be domesticated. The populations of the majority of nation-states have now constituted themselves as citizens of democratic communities. Ballot papers and judicial systems have replaced the cannon fire of the battlefield: antagonistic systems have turned into competitive ones. Why should global society not undergo a similar metamorphosis? Only prophets and astrologers can claim the mission is impossible. Everyone else, sooner or later, will have to take sides. This is not a theoretical question but a political choice.

> Cosmopolitan dreams are programmatic counter to horror of the modern world.

4.2. Is the Cosmopolitan Democracy Project Undesirable?

In addition to criticisms of the analytical and conceptual aspects of the cosmopolitan democracy model, there are theorists who, from a value perspective, understand that the project would not be desirable.

Mouffe (2003), for example, states, firstly, that the cosmopolitan project, by justifying the right of international organizations to establish limits to the sovereignty of States, based on the rights of cosmopolitan citizenship (which it considers a fiction), would end up sacrificing the sovereign rights (self-government and democratic participation) of citizens of many states. Second, the author understands that, even if founded on a social-democratic perspective, and representing a progressive alternative to neoliberalism, Held's cosmopolitan project will not be able to expand the possibilities of self-government for the "citizens of the world", but, if implemented, will result in the imposition of the liberal model of democracy all over the world, and in the enlargement of the people directly subject to the control of the western powers. Finally, the author warns that the implementation of the model of cosmopolitan democracy could facilitate the development of dangerous antagonisms.

Archibugi (2004) responds that the understanding of sovereignty that we have today has not served to prevent the economically and militarily more powerful countries from using their forces so that their interests prevail, but it has been useful for authoritarian governments to oppress their citizens (Archibugi, 2002). In this way, more powerful international institutions guided by democratic values may be more effective in forcing the United States and its allies to conduct their foreign policies as prescribed by their own constitutions.

Hurrel (1999, p. 56) presents three restrictions to cosmopolitan democracy: (1) there is suspicion of the possibility of a centralized authority of a global nature acting more efficiently than the States, for example, in the economic field; (2) as the greater the power and degree of centralization of an authority, the greater its threat to the freedom of individuals, and the more difficult it is to submit to social control, a global authority would represent a great risk to freedom; (3) the construction of such authority would perhaps become the focus of bitter conflicts that would divert attention from the resolution of urgent practical issues. Given this, the author concludes that one should think more in terms of global governance, and in the multiple levels, arenas and actors involved in it, instead of reasoning in terms of centralization and global government.

In relation to this type of criticism, aimed especially at the risks of inefficiency and threat to freedom resulting from the proposal of

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centralization of power, which would characterize the cosmopolitan project, Archibugi (2004) considers that his model does not propose a world government, but voluntary alliances between governmental and meta-governmental organizations, as well as a multi-level governance system, as advocated by Hurrel. Secondly, Archibugi (2004) points out that the alleged risks of a global technocracy to the freedom of individuals and the autonomy of States, which would result from the cosmopolitan project, in fact, already manifest themselves in the interference of international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, in various locations. There is, therefore, no relationship between such risks and the project of cosmopolitan democracy, which, in fact, will imply new forms of transparency, accountability and accountability in international organizations.

Another type of criticism, with a Marxist bias, argues that theorists of cosmopolitan democracy focus on the institutional superstructure instead of taking care of the economic infrastructure, where the center of power and the fundamental causes of contemporary problems are located. However, Archibugi (2004) responds that many economic interests are quite satisfied with the current situation and have no interest in expanding the democratization of institutions that regulate, for example, international trade.

Finally, we highlight a set of criticisms in the sense that cosmopolitan democracy would not be desirable, because the proposed mechanism to overcome the democratic deficit of national representative institutions and international organizations by the defenders of such a project (participation of non-governmental organizations, which make up global civil society, together with global organizations, such as the UN General Assembly to be created or before existing institutions) would be as or less representative and legitimate than the current instruments (representative democracy, participation of State representatives in International Organizations etc.). In this sense, a first problem is to know which criteria will be used to choose which non-governmental organizations will participate in global decision-making forums and, consequently, what is the basis for their representativeness. Second, there are difficulties in establishing accountability and accountability mechanisms for these chosen organizations. Thirdly, there is the risk that non-governmental organizations will not act in favor of cosmopolitan interests, but rather to favor particular groups and interests, so that sectors with less political and economic power will be excluded from any form of representation, even because there is great inequality between non-governmental organizations and they reflect the prevailing hierarchy in the political and economic Fields (Kahler, 2007; Woods, 2007; Carvalho, 2006).

On the other hand, Reis (2006) states that it is necessary to consider that, given the inability of States to resolve transnational

problems alone, the action of non-governmental organizations finds substantial legitimacy, as they often face such issues more efficiently than the states.

In addition, the analyzed authors' cosmopolitan democracy project considers the need to create instruments for transparency and accountability of non-governmental organizations, as well as other forms of representation in regional and global Parliaments, such as direct elections.

4.3. Is the Cosmopolitan Democracy Project Unfeasible?

Finally, it is necessary to analyze a series of questions about the feasibility of the cosmopolitan model. First, as presented by Neves (2008), there is a set of obstacles of a structural nature to the implementation of the model of cosmopolitan democracy, namely: socioeconomic and political inequalities, cultural differences (Sousa, 2006) and existing conflicts of interest among states and regions.

On the other hand, as Archibugi (2010) observes, there are also "structural" conditions that favor the realization of the cosmopolitan project. For example, interaction between States resulting from economic and cultural globalization, the hegemony of democracy as a political system, and some advances in the field of international organizations, such as the creation of the International Criminal Court, despite recognizing the fact that the most important bodies of coordination of global governance, such as the G8 and the G20, do not adopt democratic principles (Held, 2007).

Secondly, Neves (2008, p. 273) highlights the existence of institutional limitations for the realization of the project of cosmopolitan democracy, since the policy "still remains fundamentally segmented into States as territorially delimited units", not proving to be viable both to promotion of centralization and rationalization of decisions, such as the reproduction of institutions of representative democracy in the global sphere (Faria, 2009).

In this sense, several questions are relevant, such as: how, in practice, would "popular sovereignty" manifest itself in the regional and global spheres? Would Continental and World Parliaments, composed of representatives elected by the people, be viable? What interests would be represented in these bodies? Cosmopolitan or national? Public or private? How to transpose the representative model, considered in crisis at the national level, to the international one? Would it not suffer from the same vices? Would it be through the expansion of the representative form beyond the borders of the National State that the challenges of contemporary democracy can be overcome? Or would it adopt some form of direct or semi-direct democracy? But isn't the national state considered too big for direct democracy? So what about the international scope? In summary:

would it be possible to deal in the global sphere with the same categories used in national politics?

It so happens that, as Archibugi (2010a, p. 85) explains: "any form of democracy at the post-national level could not, and should not, be just a replica of the forms of democracy we have experienced at the national level". This is because the scale of decision-making processes and the issues to be decided on are very different, so that innovative forms of governance will be needed, which, to be built, will require a great capacity for institutional imagination. Although the development of these institutional innovations is not an easy task, it is not an impossible goal either, as democracy has already experienced a major transformation in the passage from direct to representative form, preserving its essential values. Therefore, a similar transformation is needed today to adapt and expand democracy to the new global era. As a sign that indicates the feasibility of building new democratic forms beyond the borders of the national State, Archibugi (2005) points to the experience of the European Union (Archibugi, 2002).

A third objection raised against the viability of the cosmopolitan democracy project refers to the absence of means independent of national states to impose decisions taken by global organizations and to establish a global law of a coercive nature (Hurrell, 1999). In this sense, Mouffe (2003, p. 100) considers that, respecting the good intentions of the defenders of cosmopolitan democracy:

> given the enormous disparity of power among its members, it is completely unrealistic to believe in the possibility of reforming the United Nations in order to simultaneously to strengthen them and to make them more democratic. The central proposal of the cosmopolitans is therefore revealed as impracticable. But one should also be aware of the consequences arising from the attempt to extend the concept of rights beyond the nation-state

To this type of criticism, which points to the idealistic character of the cosmopolitan project, Archibugi (2002, p. 38) responds with a question:

> cosmopolitan democracy has been called ingenuous and ineffective; but after years of Realpolitik, what is the result? A new conflict has moved onto history's stage, one that the political and military supremacy of the United States and the West has proved incapable of preventing. There could not be clearer argument for turning to the politics of cosmopolitan dreams.

Held (1995), while recognizing the importance of questioning his project with regard to the means of implementing the decisions to be taken, for example, by a new democratic international assembly (Hurrell, 1999), believes that they can be overcome or circumvented. First, because any global legislative institution must be embedded in a network of institutions. Secondly, it is necessary to distinguish the norms that will have the status of law independent of the

negotiations and actions to be developed in specific regions or localities, which will require their own discussions. Furthermore, the issue of law enforcement mechanisms at the regional and global levels is not yet in the process of being resolved, but the military issue may become secondary within a new international configuration of power. Finally, the author points out that, on the one hand, his responses to the objections raised to his model of cosmopolitan democracy do not mean that he is arguing that it is immediately achievable. But, on the other hand, he understands that many political advances that were thought unrealizable, such as the peaceful unification of Germany, took place. In this way:

> the political space for a cosmopolitan model of democracy has to be made, and it is not inconceivable that some space will be made – for elements of it at least – in the wake of, for instance, a severe crisis of the global financial system, or of the environment, or of war (Archibugi, 1995, p. 156)

Finally, several restrictions are pointed out to the achievement of the objective of political institutions of a cosmopolitan nature to exercise control over the economy (Bull, 2002). It is, as we have already highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, one of the greatest challenges of democracy, however, there is no alternative to the search for democratic control over the fundamental decisions of the economic sphere, because, as stated by Archibugi (2002, p. 29): "if we still want our society to be managed in response to the will of citizens, we will have to adjust our institutions to meet socio-economic change". To conclude this analysis on the viability of the cosmopolitan democracy project, it is highlighted, following the evaluation of Archibugi (2011, p. 4), that:

> if we ever achieve a form of global governance that embeds some of the values and norms of democracy, it is very unlikely to happen as a result of a single grand plan. It is, on the contrary, more likely that various changes and reforms introduced at the local, national, regional and global levels will together contribute to a progressive transformation of world politics, and that each individual innovation provides inspirations and encouragement for further changes

Furthermore, as Archibugi (2011, p. 17) reports, there are a number of social and political actors who can act as agents in the promotion of cosmopolitan democracy because they show some interest in the proposed reforms. Therefore, as "political change occurs when there are interests at stakes and agents willing to mobilize", there are reasons to believe in the viability of the cosmopolitan democracy project. For example, the most excluded groups around the world, who are most vulnerable to environmental, economic and political crises, are the first to have an interest in the realization of cosmopolitan democracy, not least because, in addition to their socioeconomic exclusion, they are also deprived of

participating in important decision-making forums and could gain access to them. Another important group is that of immigrants, who, in search of better socioeconomic conditions, enter different countries where they face great difficulties in terms of guaranteeing their rights. There are also groups that, due to their profession or life situation, can be sociologically defined as cosmopolitan, such as music, cinema and sports stars, intellectuals, executives of large companies, civil servants who work in the field of foreign policy and social activists. Global leaders and social movements with interests in specific areas that need institutionalized global forums to express themselves should also be considered. Although political parties continue to be fundamentally national in their objectives, it is increasingly difficult to maintain this position, given the global dimension that the problems they deal with have acquired, so that the agenda of the parties begins to change and they begin to develop the perspective of acting globally, as with the Greens. Trade unions and workers' movements are also challenged by economic globalization, especially the difficulty in maintaining jobs and labor rights in a context of global competition and market dominance by transnational corporations. Faced with this, they need to develop the transnational solidarity of the working class, which, incidentally, is a point that has always been present in their ideology. Finally, even transnational corporations may be interested in some advances in terms of global governance, especially in the field of economic regulation and Administrative Law (McGrew, 2003).

5. Final Considerations

As we could observe in the considerations made above, the project of cosmopolitan democracy is questioned in relation to its analytical correctness and its prescriptions (both with regard to the evaluative aspect and its viability). First, critics argue that, although mobilizations of non-state social actors are underway at the global level, there is no reason to believe that there is a “global civil society” similar to national ones. However, model defenders understand that the existence of civil society (as a cultural identity and convergence of projects and discourses) is not a condition for cosmopolitan citizenship, also because, many times, the institutions themselves can give rise to the people.

Secondly, it is often said that the discourse of the universality of human rights (the ethical foundation of the cosmopolitan project) is at the service of cultural imperialism, which legitimizes and favors the expansion of power in the richest countries. On the contrary, defenders of cosmopolitan democracy argue that they do not defend the cultural hegemony of the West, but only that, respecting the differences of each people, democratic institutions capable of mediating the relationship between different cultures and allowing

the search for solutions should be created. for collective problems, based on the dignity and rights common to all men. Thirdly, it is argued that the conception of politics of the cosmopolitan democracy model is wrong, as it would reject the presence of antagonism as an essential constitutive part of politics and would overvalue consensus and rationality. This objection is answered by accepting that force and interest are important, but they cannot be considered the only elements that drive policy.

Furthermore, it is not correct to assume that the interests of all political actors are against the democratization of decision-making processes. Fourthly, there are those who understand that the cosmopolitan model would not be a desirable form of democracy, for different reasons, such as: (1) it would limit the sovereignty of States and the autonomy of their citizens; (2) it would favor the expansion of the control of the world powers over the rest of the peoples, and would not achieve any results in terms of democratization of global governance; (3) due to its centralizing character, it would not be efficient and would represent a threat to freedom; (4) by focusing on the institutional superstructure, cosmopolitan democracy would fail to take care of the economic infrastructure; (5) the proposed mechanism to overcome the democratic deficit of national representative institutions and international organizations through the cosmopolitan project (participation of non-governmental organizations in international and global organizations) would be equally or less representative and legitimate than the current instruments.

In contrast, cosmopolitans respond that: (1) the understanding of sovereignty that we have today has not served to prevent the economically and militarily more powerful countries from using their forces to make their interests prevail, but it has been useful for authoritarian governments to oppress their citizens; (2) the proposal does not comprise a world government, but rather voluntary alliances between governmental and meta-governmental organizations, as well as a multi-level governance system; (3) the alleged risks of a global technocracy already exist, and cosmopolitan democracy would act to reduce them; (4) the expansion of the democratization of institutions that regulate the market goes against the dominant economic interests; (5) the action of non-governmental organizations finds substantial legitimacy, the cosmopolitan democracy project considers the need to create instruments of transparency and accountability of non-governmental organizations, as well as other forms of representation in regional Parliaments and global.

Finally, the unfeasibility of the cosmopolitan democracy project is questioned, due to: (1) obstacles of a structural nature (such as socioeconomic and political inequality between States) and (2) institutional (linking politics to the territory of States, unfeasibility the centralization and rationalization of decisions at the global level,

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and the inadequacy of the reproduction of representative democracy institutions at the global level); (3) there are no means independent of national states to enforce decisions made by global organizations and to establish a global law of a coercive nature; (4) it is not possible for cosmopolitan political institutions to exercise control over the economy.

Responding to these questions, cosmopolitan authors claim that: (1) there are also structural conditions that favor the realization of the cosmopolitan project (such as the interaction between states resulting from economic and cultural globalization); (2) democratic institutions, at the global level, cannot and should not simply reproduce the democratic forms known at the national level, proposing the construction of innovative institutions of governance; (3) if it is true that the cosmopolitan project is naive, the "realistic" path also does not present results that justify continuing to be followed, in addition to the fact that new institutional arrangements and a new democratic culture, in the long run, may reduce the importance the use of force in the political (including international) sphere; (4) although democratic control over fundamental decisions in the economic sphere is one of the main challenges of democracy, it needs to continue to be pursued.

Our position on the objections to the model of cosmopolitan democracy developed by David Held, Anthony McGrew and Daniele Archibugi and the answers they presented will be explained in future investigations, when we will discuss the central question that motivated this research: what is the potential of the democracy project cosmopolitan supply the democratic deficit of Brazilian representative institutions resulting from globalization and the polycentrism of power?

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