Transformation of Communist Media Content and Public Space According to the Discourse ‘39Pact: Exiting the “Labyrinth” as an Act of Communication

Esta obra está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución 4.0 Internacional.

In a Moscow library a person finds a book published almost 30 years ago and reads in surprise:

– I have to tell you a secret that I was leading a very robust course. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia came to us in 1939 and I told him “you will not return back until you sign the accession deal with us”. The Minister of War came from Estonia (I can’t remember his name, he was popular), and we told the same thing to him. We had to take such extreme steps. – Such kind of declaration on the annexation of the Baltic States and the division of Poland was made by a former Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Molotov in 1971¹. However, the interview was published only on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

That reader must have been confused: the official Russian Federation, the transferee of rights of the USSR, is in denial that the USSR have used blackmail and occupied neighbouring countries. This is the position maintained by the nationalised Russian media, which is similar to that of the Soviet propaganda period: on the eve of World War II and during the war critics of the USSR as an aggressor is not tolerated in the controlled public space. Notwithstanding the fact that in the end of 1989 in the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR a resolution was adopted on the political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty: “The Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR condemns the fact of signing the secret protocol on 23 August 1939 as well as other secret agreements made with Germany. The Congress declares the secret protocols legally unjustified and invalid from the moment of signing”². A reader might not know about this Resolution of the Soviet parliament as the authorities of Russia and officials representing its position consider the document as a non-binding declaration and identify three subjects – Stalin, the existing government and the Russian nation³.

Another person in the European Parliament (EP), Strasbourg gets to read memoirs of Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda of the Reich: “23-03-1939. Draft notice is received from Kaunas. Completely inappropriate. Still lacks final decision. Meanwhile Kaunas announces his own version of the notice and afterwards ministers go to sleep. Well, enough of kindness. Our envoy is authorised to pull them out of their beds and put a gun to their heads. Either – or. Those little deceivers of Versailles must now return what they have plundered. Otherwise it won’t be good! At three a.m. a message is received that everything remains in force. A notice comes in: Lithuania gives up on the Memel⁴ Region”⁵.

Such person enters the hall – he will have to vote on the draft EU Resolution, which states that after 80 years the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on 23 August 1939, still has an issue of unsolvable consequences: the world shares different views towards circumstances of the start of World War II and responsibility for division of Europe. Even though the European Parliament adopts a Resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe⁶, no one knows how that member of the European Parliament has voted⁷. He/she might not have been interested in V. Molotov’s confession that the government of the USSR was engaged in blackmailing other nations, because the person has not read anything about it, however, he/she was well aware of the fact that, for example, the Nazi Reich occupied France and exterminated its residents⁸. But maybe it is that member of the Parliament, who while trying to explain the motives of his/her voting has been interrupted, – which is not an important issue of communication, as the Resolution is still adopted and the document does not require additional historical data?⁹

However, if the member of the European Parliament notes that the “Masters of dezinformatsiya” have since the very start of World War II convinced the world that the USSR have led a peaceful mission in Poland, and afterwards in the Baltic States and Finland, this means that the Stalinistic political communication was so effective that we still feel the consequences.

Moreover, may we guess what does a person in Moscow do with that book on Molotov’s interview?

Most probably he pushes the book back on to the shelf, as the public discussion on the “secret” of the former Commissioner of the USSR concerning the “robust course” in 1939 would contradict the official Russian historical propaganda narrative. The fear of that person is an issue of Russia’s political communication when the audience have to follow government-constructed historical politics transferred via media. He finds himself inside an Umberto Eco’s “Labyrinth” as he is not granted a right to find what may be achieved and known. I take a free approach to interpreting U. Eco’s thought¹⁰: it is not necessary for a person inside a labyrinth to find something new, but he needs the exact something that shows the connection between phenomena and provides basic grounds for a dialogue. A labyrinth is meant not for a search of a symbol, but for a reason – according to “The Name of the Rose”. The official Russia seeks to demonstrate its strength by placing historical responsibility for World War II and division of Europe on other countries (preface of the above mentioned EP document includes 13 motives for it to be adopted also including the fact that contemporary Russia “is currently promoting the view that Poland, the Baltic States and the West are the true instigators of WWII”¹¹).

The fear of acknowledgement of the deal is obvious. It is witnessed by reaction of the official Russia to the adoption of the EP Resolution when the blame is imputed to the Western countries¹². Acknowledgement that authorities of the USSR have divided Europe might not only bring adjustments to history schoolbooks, but also cause a new discussion on historical responsibility not only for persecution, annihilation, deportation of population of other countries (not only politicians – leaders of the occupied countries) but also for historical factors being denied once again or being falsely interpreted, which is much like the position exercised by the USSR until 1989. Back then, having secret protocols of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in its archives, authorities were in denial that it (the proof of international crime) exists anywhere. Such discussion bearing the ability to dissociate oneself from crimes on the one hand means a shift in social consciousness, liberation from the framework of the false narrative.

On the other hand, it would mean political crisis in Russia itself. The myth of strength and honour would be destroyed, which is the ideological and value background of the existing regime. First off, Russian media would have to change its content and awaken the audience, which would replace the political regime. However, Russia would leave the “labyrinth”.

Or maybe it’s a misleading hypothesis?

It must be reminded that in the whole USSR, also in its territorial units (hence, in the Baltic States occupied in 1940), called “republics”, also in every country of the Warsaw Pact the communist media model was constructed in accordance to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) political propaganda and agitation structure. The system had the same name in every region:[system of mass media and propaganda tools (MMPT)], which included national, regional, local and departmental information channels, both universal and specialised. Thus the subject of the Pact, showing transformation of the discourse in its contents is the subject of this study.

The scope of the above mentioned transformation included three stages of media content transformation:

• Denial of a historical narrative unacceptable to the authorities;

• An attempt to adapt (interpret) the historical truth according to the position of the leaders of CPSU (in other words, to merge “own” narrative with the “truth” of the opponents);

• Substitution of the historical narrative imposed by the CPSU with a completely new one.

All of them may be defined as exiting the “labyrinth”. The text indicates six conflicts of communication, which are revealed during those stages.

During such stages of transformation the communist model media has undergone the transformation of the contents and the propaganda system. Transformation of the structural propaganda system shows action of communication while transition of media philosophy of the same system: it may not be stated unambiguously that one kind of newspaper and journalist was substituted with the other newspaper and journalist. First off, they transformed their contents, then the status and relation to the communist authorities depending on the interest of the audiences.

Of course, the breaking point of the USSR propaganda system (MMPT) has been analysed by media researcher Brian McNair: having lived in Moscow during the period of the USSR announced Glasnost politics he has observed modifications of the communist media, which, in his opinion, was influenced by an attempt of USSR authorities and media to conceal the danger of contamination caused by Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant explosion¹³.

Having discussed the consequences of the disaster with CPSU leadership among other conclusions Michail Gorbachev, the Secretary General of CPSU, announced that a straightforward cooperation with the people should be maintained¹⁴. However, the media of that period was still restrained in writing on CPSU mistakes or, what is more, responsibility, which may be seen from the following remark of M. Gorbachev: “Everything must be said to general secretaries in Budapest (i.e., the Meeting of communist parties’ leaders of the Warsaw Pact). And it should not look like facts disclosed in our newspapers. They are building nuclear power plants with our help, according to our projects. And have a look what kind of signal that is!”¹⁵.

The informational context of the USSR period contained two historical concepts –“Perestroika” and “Glasnost”¹⁶. They stand for political declarations of the USSR, which were preconditions for change in the USSR’s economic relation and public discussion on its development issues. However, the declarations did not change the viewpoint of neither the USSR authorities nor the authorities of other countries of the Warsaw Pact¹⁷ what concerns responsibility of the communist parties for historical mistakes and criminal offenses. Inside CPSU the USSR denied any discussion on the subject.

Thus, the different conception of the declared principle of Glasnost must be highlighted: “our newspapers”, i.e. MMPT system had no right to publish the news until pressure from their audience was felt. I think, the actual breaking point of MMPT started a bit later – considering its and its owner’s (CPSU) relation to the historical truth, i.e. to responsibility for past political decisions. And the fear of such political responsibility, in the encounter to D’39Pact, made CPSU political bureau consider an idea of economic independence of the Baltic States¹⁸.

Interpretation of Glasnost is reflected in the aspect of such issues in 1987 when CPSU’s top leadership decided to solemnly celebrate the 70th anniversary of October 1917 revolution, called the Great October Socialist Revolution, as it would then have a historical chance to acknowledge Stalinistic offences and declare responsibility of CPSU. However, leadership of the CPSU has hardly moved anywhere near to an unbiased assessment apart from the condemnation of the cult of Stalin in the congress of the CPSU on 25 February 1956, as it only reprehended Stalinist repressions. Ultimately, during the solemn celebration M. Gorbachev states: “Today the West actively analyses the situation on the eve of [WWII]. The truth is being mixed with half-truth. Special fierce comes from those unsatisfied with the outcomes of the World War II, which are political, territorial and social, those who keep thinking how to fix them. That’s why they are interested in inverting the historical truth upside down, smoothing out causative and consequential ties, and faking the chronology. In this case they use any possible lie seeking to shift the blame on to the Soviet Union for World War II, which was purportedly caused by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of Non-aggression”¹⁹. In 2019, Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, speaks similarly about the cause of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: he calls the above-mentioned European Parliament resolution a “shameless lie” speaking to officials organizing festivities for the 75th anniversary of the II WW‘s end²⁰. At the unformal meeting of the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): “Yes, we know who Stalin is, yes, we gave him our assessments. But I think that the fact remains that it was fascist Germany that attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviet Union on June 22”²¹. Because: “When it comes to the Soviet Union, it is about us”²². Putin reads a message to CIS leaders according to archival documents, but does not mention Molotov’s confession of how the USSR executed the D’39 Pact.

This may be defined as adjusted demagogy of the Soviet historiography and propaganda – an invitation to stay in the “labyrinth”. Such categorical statement shows that a “communicative action” (according to J. Habermas) is simply not possible. While, pursuant to the same theory of the act of communication, the social environment (lifeword) loses power in everyday communicative practice,²³ when actors seeking consensus only follow interpretative accomplishments of their own. Act of communication predetermined by open speaking in order to achieve a certain agreement, requires truthful, argument-based knowledge. It means that while making an act of communication the speech has to transform if we seek that social changes would come without an act of violence. The media also has to transform the language in order to reach the audience in the increasing competition of opinions. Namely on the issue of D’39Pact. When the language transforms it is a sign that public space loses the control of the authorities.

August 23, 1987, Sunday, demonstrations are being held in Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, attended by thousands of people demanding a solution to the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. For example, in Vilnius, participants of the gathering at the monument of Adam Mickiewicz demand the withdrawal of the USSR occupational army from Lithuania. The event is filmed by a channel of MMPT system – governmental television channel²⁴, shortly called Lietuvos TV (Lithuanian TV). Until then such or the like actions could not be generally imagined on the state television. Both journalists, who were carrying out an assignment to misrepresent the contents of the event (as it is obvious from the remaining material) act as investigators among the gathered, they demand explanation of the participants on how they have come across the secret protocols of the Pact²⁵. There are also foreign journalists in the demonstration – for the first time ever the USSR government allows western media to enter Lithuania and to take part in the event, which is not acceptable to the authorities: Ann Cooper, National Public Radio Manager of Moscow office interviews participants of the demonstration. On August 24, the front page of the New York Times includes a note that around 500 people participated in the demonstration in Vilnius: “Participants in the demonstration in Vilnius said they were disappointed by the size of the crowd. They said people stayed away because of fear of the authorities and the distraction of special entertainment events staged by the local government today to divert attention from the demonstration”²⁶.

Meanwhile in Riga militia prevents demonstrators, who were invited by a group of dissidents named Helsinki-86, from laying flowers at the monument of freedom. According to various sources, the number of participants ranges between five and ten thousand people – from the remaining record²⁷ it may be called the most massive event in comparison to Vilnius and Tallinn, where people were invited by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact publishing group in Estonia, established a week before (“Molotov-Ribbentropi Pakti Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp”: MRP-AEG); however, the permit granted to gather in the city hall was repealed and the demonstrators had to gather in a different place, participants carrying posters of the hammer and sickle, which were shown as being equal to the Nazi cross of swastika came to the Hirvepark.

The event in Vilnius, as well as demonstrations in Riga and Tallinn, show the strategic goal of the communication – to remind that the D‘39Pact is a topical USSR’s internal and foreign issue. This reveals a threefold conflict of communication, when during the first stage the authorities having in control the public space keep denying the unacceptable historical narrative of D‘39Pact:

1) MMPT in the Baltic Region and in Poland keep criticising the idea of gathering and slanders the participants notwithstanding the publicity policy, which was officially declared by the top occupant authorities in 1986. Foreign radio stations²⁸ comprehensively present organisers of the event and political support granted to them by the USA. For example, the component of Vilnius CPSU – Central Committee of Lithuanian Communist Party, officially orders the media to reprehend the so-called event of “extremists”, both before and after the events. Vocabulary typical of MMPT might be illustrated by an article of editor-in-chief of weekly newspaper Gimtasis Kraštas²⁹, which back then was a popular reading in Lithuania: “Bashing of bourgeois nationalists on 23 August was thus understood in all Lithuania – it was a bashing, a provocation. […] August 23 of this year will neither become an important date, nor a milestone of change. It is just another signal marking the amount of strength given to socialism in our Republic, the depth of roots it has in the nation”³⁰. He highlights the organisational role of Western radio stations: “synchronicity” – synchronised in capitals of three Soviet Baltic republics as visited by foreign journalists. These are the very same “voices” and their advocates who previously urged to fight against the Soviet authority, not join the “kolkhoz”. Weren’t they responsible for the death of a large number of Lithuanians that died on “both sides of the woods” back then? Those “voices” didn’t then care much of Lithuania, our people, neither do they now. They care of their own interests, their own global politics”.

The “both sides of the woods” mentioned by the author is a reflection of the “class struggle” theory, which the USSR tried to present as a “civil war” after World War II, when it was the armed resistance to sovietisation of the Baltic States and Poland. And the author points the finger at the designers of the demonstration – those based in America, the same people who prevents the communist authorities of Poland from succeeding³¹. “Who are they”?

On 18 August 1987 twenty USA Senators sign a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the USSR’s CC reminding of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, according to which the Baltic States became part of the Soviet influence zone in 1940. Copies of the letter are also addressed to First Secretaries of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian communist parties (units of CPSU) so nobody could deny knowing that governors of regions knew all the details of the statement.

Expressing deep concern “on the suppression of discussions on the most important events in the history of the Baltic states and the free word” senators state “they have noticed a will of M. Gorbachev” to manage the USSR’s past facts with integrity, “especially in relations with Poland”, therefore they expect such view would be expanded to historical past of these countries too. Senators express their hope that peaceful ceremonies, like the one in Riga held on 14 June, will be allowed in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn on 23 August, and the organisers – dissidents Antanas Terleckas, Vytautas Bogušis, Petras Cidzikas, Nijolė Sadūnaitė, Tiit Madisson – “will not experience any negative consequences”³². The senators offer to publish the annex to the agreement between the Nazis and the Soviets – secret protocols. The author of the text who criticised the gathering is referring to the interfering of the USA. The author himself is one of most adept opportunists – in a modern-day Lithuania he is a well-known figure with a 30-year experience as a publicist and presenter of an independent Lithuanian public television (which operates instead of the above mentioned Television and Radio Committee of LSSR)³³.

The media of the neighbouring countries, parties of the Warsaw Pact, was in solidarity, staged according to the standard of MMTP. A heading of Poland’s regional communist daily newspaper, published in Krakow, announced an “attempt” to organise an anti-Soviet demonstration in Vilnius.³⁴ This extensive message (as it is characteristic of the TASS’s propaganda style) is linking the demonstration to the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency. It is full of words, which not only bring doubt to the meaning of the event, but also defame it by comparing the participants to criminals of the WWII knowing that a reader having no access to archives and not knowing the people described will not be able to deny such disinformation³⁵. However, the actual organisers – members of the Lithuanian Liberty League A. Terleckas, V. Bogušis, dissident P. Cidzikas (signatory to the Baltic Appeal of 1979), secret Catholic activist N. Sadūnaitė, were not mentioned in the TASS news.

Poland’s press agency PAP³⁶ in Moscow announces that on Sunday a meeting took place in “Estonia’s capital Tallinn” inspired by radio stations the Voice of America, Free Europe and Svoboda (Freedom), also by a small group of people who have been previously tried for anti-Soviet activity”³⁷. This press release includes a statement that participants of meetings both in Riga and Tallinn have linked the events to “some resolutions of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939”).

Similar attitude is also formed by the Warsaw committee daily newspaper of the Polish joint workers party: Failure of anti-Soviet demonstrations in Vilnius, Tallinn and Riga³⁸. However, not a single name was mentioned of the so-called “eminent representatives of the Lithuanian nation”, who as announced by TASS-PAP professedly “expressed outrage concerning similar provocations in their statements”. Nevertheless, the above mentioned releases of TASS sort of reveal the information on existence of “some decisions” of the 1939 Soviet-German Pact for foreign readers. Thus, regardless of the negative propaganda, the public is being reminded of previously non-disclosed facts, only from a biased and deceitful position: it was Poland that was first attacked and divided by Germany and the USSR after the agreement, signed on 23 August 1939³⁹.

The above mentioned daily Žycie Warszawy – unlike the key communist mouthpiece Trybuna Ludu – gives attention to an ultra-delicate subject and publishes a cycle Last Month of 1939, which analyses the circumstances of signature of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In general, the main subject of the publications is the responsibility of the Western countries and Hitler in preparing for war with Poland: Hopes and Games of Interests⁴⁰ and Chamberlain did not Find the Way⁴¹. However, no explanation on the division of Europe, which was prepared and harmonised between the USSR and Germany, was published: the preparation of the agreement by the USSR is purportedly urged by leaders of the West and the undeclared decision of Hitler himself that Poland will be invaded on 26 August 1939. The fact that such texts were published for the interest of the public to be informed was undoubtedly an advantage; however, they did not reveal the role of the USSR as an instigator of war. The USSR’s inspirations to occupy more territories in Europe were diminished by blaming the leaders of the Western European countries, especially Britain and France, of inflexibility, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland – of arrogance. The statement holds a certain amount of truth: political conformism of the period between the wars is criticised in both research and memoires sources. However, this truth is consciously being confused with Hitler’s predatory policy in justifying the criminal decisions of the USSR. And contextual presentation of such history interpretations in the newspaper was presented as releases on commemoration of victims at the sites of former Nazi concentration camps. An issue of Katyn massacre, which was significant to Poland, was still kept secret in 1987.

Thus, the language of dissidents and MMTP is different: with the help of MMTP, in the language of propaganda, authorities present the reminder of the Pact of 23 August 1939 as an action of “extremists”, thus the key issue is on language required by the general public. Observing the public space it may be stated that it has two proposals on how to exit the labyrinth: one is seeking economic changes without discussion on historical responsibility (which is obviously the position of CPSU leadership); another one is seeking changes in all the fields of human rights not only evaluating reasons of economic crisis, but also of political one.

2) Communist authorities, who usually stated one way and acted quite the other way, this time may seem open: they did not induce violence to disperse or arrest the demonstrators⁴². This is a deceptive impression. Meetings only created an illusion that the public space is getting wider, yet it remained under control. Under the pretence of Glasnost, after the event authorities kept persecuting organisers and participants of demonstrations in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn, using traditional methods: arrest, inquisition, instruction to dismiss from a job⁴³, in other words – criticism is being constructed of ideas of the meeting and its organisers, which is ostensibly expressed by “ordinary people” to reporters”⁴⁴. A conclusion was drawn in the meeting of central committee bureau of Lithuanian communist party that “meeting organisers failed to reach their established goals” and “people did not support provocateurs”.⁴⁵

The 1987–1988 political season was a challenge to the CPSU and regional communist authorities of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia as the subject of commemoration of declaration of independence of the mentioned countries (in 1918) popped up. The commemoration of such historical decisions was once again targeted to criminal contents and consequences of decisions of D’39Pact documents. Therefore, communist authorities, which declared their support of publicity, have organised official meetings in Riga on 18 November 1987, in Vilnius on 15 February 1988 and in Tallinn on 24 February 1988 with the purpose of showing that people, supposedly, were protesting against the interference of the USA in the internal affairs of the USSR.

Corporate employees were given time off work to take part in the campaigns of the authorities. On 2 February 1988 in Tartu Soviet militia repressed a march commemorating the 1920 Peace Treaty of Tartu signed between the Republic of Estonia and Russia; some of its participants were arrested. Thus, the authorities sought to suppress the commemoration of historical events dedicated to the celebration of declarations of Independence and to show that the policy of the USA which refused to recognise the occupation of the Baltic States was ineffective. MMPT increased commissioned “historical” contents, which sought to discredit the activity of 1917-1918 political elite of the Baltic States. For some time CPSU engaged in an information war against people of the Baltic nations, who raised an issue of D’39Pact as topical to Glasnost: it sought to deny the essence of fight by Poland’s Solidarnosc, urgings of the Pope John Paul II “to not be afraid” of keeping moral values. The Catholic Church, which has been prosecuted for decades ever since the start of the occupation by the USSR, was dragged into an information war by the Lithuanian propaganda system. On 17 February 1988 TASS agency published a message to the world: “Liudas Pavilonis, the Head of Bishops’ Conference of Lithuanian SSR⁴⁶ has welcomed (…) a group of foreign journalists and made a presentation on existing situation of the Roman Catholic church in the country; and put a highlight on the fact that Catholic churches are not being exploited for political purposes in Lithuania”. The message was re-posted by other communist information agencies’ reporters; Poland’s PAP⁴⁷: “This was stated taking into consideration press releases of the Western stations on ostensibly nationalist manifestation after the mass in one of the churches of Kaunas on the occasion of 70 years of Independence of 16 February 1918.” Further it specified that “Lithuanian public expressed indignation on the statement of President Reagan and the joining of the Congress to anti-Lithuanian action, taking it for interference in the affairs of Lithuanian SSR and as an insult to Lithuanian national self-esteem, who without the instructions of Americans know what to do and which commemoration days they should celebrate. Vilnius and Kaunas, to the contrary to what has been published by propagandistic centres of the West, lead regular lives. The only manifestation that took place recently was the manifestation against the interference of the USA in the affairs of Lithuanian SSR.” CPSU and KGB, which have constructed a hierarchy of adaptation, fear and pandering, may not admit that in the society of conformists⁴⁸ a discussion was raised on the meeting as a significant event, its contents and negative historical factors of the USSR in general.

3) There are informational factors precluding the USSR from maintaining deceitful construction of D‘39Pact in the international public space. It was important for authorities to make a favourable impression abroad (as it is typical of the politics of the USSR). Authorities of CPSU and government of the USSR, seeking international dialogue due to a difficult economic situation was forced to imitate a discussion of the public of the USSR: TV connections between the USSR and other countries, for example, audience of Germany, the USA were established. On 26 August 1987 central USSR TV show Vremia provides broadcasting to millions of audiences from the town of Chautauqua in the USA on III discussion held between representatives of the USSR and the USA. During the broadcast a reporter claimed that purportedly unlike the Soviet representatives, the Americans have debated violations of human rights in the USSR. The audience, which were used to reading the official propaganda in contrast to negations or statements, were prompted to interpret the publicity policy in a slightly broader nature than it was first defined by the CPSU. From the communicational viewpoint, the witnessing of one of the participants Bohdan Nagajlo, a Ukrainian journalist, is valuable, when he describes the Soviet delegation of 240 people: “Their belief in bright future of the USSR explains their superficial understanding of upsetting factors of the Soviet history, a complete indifference towards them, as well as careless approach to Soviet young people, the majority of which is politically passive and sceptical of the politics of the Soviet government”⁴⁹. The witness highlighted the conference being rather innovative in comparison to the previous on, as participants were ready to discuss the offered painful subjects: war in Afghanistan, the Baltic States, a situation in the Eastern and Central Europe; and KGB officials neither observed every participant nor disturbed the communication.

It was a sign of a breaking point of the propaganda system: CPSU CC, differently to the way it has acted in the past, allowed and authorised the selected representatives to speak on various subjects abroad, but in order to maintain its influence, instructed to keep supporting the position of the politics of CPSU. In other words, to stick to the performance of reform in which CPSU would lose all its historical responsibility. Thus, an act of communication was sort of based on several levels, which showed that in an international discussion on economic and defence relations it was not enough to be detached from ideological background: the above mentioned historical narrative included an inevitable factor of human rights and rights of nations. Such factor was a right of the Baltic nations to make a decision closely connected to D‘39Pact, and more often became a subject of international dialogue. On 6 November 1987 the USSR’s central TV news show Vremia for the first time broadcasted to millions of the USSR’s viewers a meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze and the United States Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, which was held in Moscow, followed by text of the announcer that “in focus were issues of safety”, a preparation of M. Gorbachev for the visit to the USA was discussed for the purpose of leading debates on the agreement to destroy short and medium range missiles. Finally news on “thorough exchange of mutual opinions on humanitarian issues and other important aspects” was given. A quick-witted viewer may understand that it was the statement that also meant discussion on self-determining of nations. The news was followed by a release from the street of Moscow, where three deputies of the Supreme Council of Latvian SSR come to deliver a letter of protest to the Ambassador of USA, as if the “selected” representatives of Latvia were resenting “the interference with Latvia’s internal affairs” by the USA Congressmen.

Although a right to decide on internal and foreign affairs was taken away from Latvia by the Soviets back in 1940, the statement attempts to show that the Soviet delegation of Latvia reacted to America’s political position on its own, without actions of the top authorities of CPSU. Kārlis Rūtenbergs, interviewed in the coverage is indignant about the fact that on 18 November Americans consider it appropriate to “send us a representative of the President of USA – a controller who was sent to observe the life in our Republic”. Similarly, K. Rūtenbergs was quoted by Latvian CP CC daily newspaper Cīņa published in Riga⁵⁰: the publication of major Latvian newspaper of MMTP system was captioned Act of Disrespect to the Latvian Nation. It not only applied to the Congress of the USA, but also to the former Ambassador of the USA in the USSR Jack F. Metlock, who did not host the so-called representatives of Latvian SSR. The publication revealed the reason: an advisor of the Embassy Thomas Greham informed that USA did not recognise the annexation of the Baltic States, thus they may only be admitted as private individuals. Thus, propagandistic protestors have to leave with nothing. In the mentioned coverage of Vremia, K. Rūtenbergs was resentful and promised to search for other ways to deliver the important document to the USA Congress”. However, viewers may understand how petty is an individual, who was kept a puppet of the Soviet regime. The overall act of communication must be understood as change of an individual. And exactly the transformation of an individual together with social, economic, informational systems’ changes was the most significant factor, as it revealed the background of values, on which the public was based on. And which must be followed by the media if it wished to achieve massive audience. That’s why after two years, in 1989 upon the Resolution of the Supreme Council of Latvian SSR “on the political and legal assessment of agreements signed between the USSR and Germany in 1939-1940”⁵¹ the mentioned Latvian deputy became a member of the commission which evaluated political and legal effects on Latvia made by agreements between the USSR and Germany in 1939–1940⁵². The Commission provided conclusions on the violations of international law of 1939-1940 and this was published in the media of Latvian SSR on the eve of commemoration of the Independence Day (1918). In Estonia a member of CPSU, a painter Enn Põldroos who have made a statement in the meeting of communist authorities “against USA’s interference in the affairs of the USSR” has brought shame of the public to himself, later became a member of Eestimaa Rahvarinne council and in 1990 sought to chair a newly established Party of the Estonian Liberal Democrats. Public space enforced changes.

If nowadays a student of social science finished a book of Ralph Keyes “The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life”⁵³ he may draw a conclusion that he currently lives the epoch of lie. And what is liberation from a propaganda system worth when he finds out that the Post Truth theory was started to form back in 1992?⁵⁴ However, we have to distinguish between mechanism of political lie: one is the situation when authorities force us into believing false data, in our case – twisted history, by controlling public space with censorship and physical violence; the other – when authorities seek it by manipulating data, however, fearing criticism and denunciation, as any discourse may cover several narratives of the issues in the public space.

The USSR’s propaganda system used to mask criticism, different views to phenomena and decisions with new words, which was only different in words that the authorities substituted with new ones. Propaganda officials used generalised statements and clichés to cover particular facts in the publications, as appropriate, with negative or positive connotation, that the content of information would not encourage an inner user to critically assess the politics of the USSR. The definition of Glasnost is no exception. Thus, the press release of TASS agency on the meeting between M. Gorbachev and M. Thatcher in London in 1987 also included repudiation of ostensibly British interference with internal policy of the USSR: “Concerning the agreement to-be-signed (…) Margaret Thatcher discussed that it would be important to ensure its ratification at the USA Congress in relation to the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union. Afterwards a slight debate followed, during which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev reminded the Prime Minister of an agreement, reached in Chequers in December 1984, on the fact that each country will independently make decisions concerning its internal affairs and will avoid interference in the affairs of other countries”. This and the like statements were a sign to the audience of the USSR that the leader of the British Government and later the President of USA were not raising abstract issues on human rights in the USSR, but issues on the rights of people of the occupied countries. After the previously mentioned meeting in an interview to the Soviet central TV M. Thatcher highlights: “The relations between East and West Europe are not just those of arms control. They are those of largely European peoples. We are also interested in the enlargement of human rights. We see perestroika and glasnost as being an enormously significant move forward. That is freeing-up people, ideas, movement, personal responsibility, personal initiative”⁵⁵

These propagandistic methods did not have a significant effect: having declared publicity on D’39Pact it became clear that the subject of public space may not be silenced. The leadership of CPSU thought they may overcome a D’39Pact narrative on the USSR’s responsibility for segregation of part of Europe, publicly declared in demonstrations of August 1987. Having failed since Spring 1988, it sought to over-write this narrative by aiming to show that the CPSU itself have suffered repressions of the Stalinism era. Therefore, communist authorities have started to partially transform the narrative of the CPSU. The second stage – a narrative on historical truth is sought to be adapted in line with the position of the management. As the Perestroika is a process of convincing the same authority about the possibility of applying different means of governance. Thus, two types of conflict arise:

4) The contents of MMTP formulated an opinion inviting to take an ostensibly “unbiased” look at the past. That’s why in May 1988 CC of Lithuanian communist party organised a meeting in Vilnius at the monument of Zigmas Aleksa-Angarietis⁵⁶, an activist of bolshevik CPSU. People were invited to participate in the event via MMTP channels – radio and television. Thus, the propaganda presented viciousness of Stalinism, which purportedly everybody had experienced in equal parts: both the communists, and other people, including citizens of the occupied countries. The agreed contents of speeches must have disoriented a participant of the meeting with less understanding, as criticism to deportations made by the USSR, as the son told a story about the arrest of the family of his father Augustinas Gricius, journalist, writer of Lithuanian period between wars, was associated with the help sought for the deported people by some activists (collaborators) of the soviet puppet Lithuanian government: “they have taken measures to ease our fate” ⁵⁷. Unexpectedly another speaker said: “It is time to say the words: don’t forgive them as they were well aware of what they were doing. Stalin knew, creators of Stalinism knew”⁵⁸. So far it was an abstract requirement for responsibility for implemented crimes, however, it was the first time that it was publicly announced in a meeting arranged by authorities in the presence of communist party leaders. Speaking like this must have disturbed almost everybody – not only those who have directly implemented persecutions and operations of massacre, but also those who were relatives of executioners of post-war resistance movement, militia officers, servants of repressive structures. MMTP system having received a role to make a narrative on historical wounds into a general narration faced a dilemma: the journalists find out that some personal stories, especially of those in the regions, are targeted to requirement of responsibility.

Is it possible for public space to further remain under control by turning historical truth into a manipulative tool so that public opinion remains false? In summer 1988 newsletters were started to publish by initiative groups of public movements of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvarinne), Latvia (Latvijas Tautas fronte) and Lithuania (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis)⁵⁹, which were first signs of possibility of alternative public information to that of MMTP system. Nevertheless, the members of such movements treated the official MMTP system media as information channels informing the society of what is most important, therefore, they required an unbiased work of journalists in informing about events and requirements to authorities as thousands of audiences would have preferred to know the truth⁶⁰.

Observing such transformations the leadership of the CPSU tried to understand where they were heading. According to it, speaking, in contrast to the decision, may help in maintaining the influence, although manipulative political communication was evidently ineffective. In August 1988 Aleksandr Yakovlev, the Secretary of the central committee of CPSU, visited Latvia and Lithuania, who after being asked wouldn’t it be worth to suppress public movements replied: “in order to find out what should be suppressed, let it evolve first”. Witnesses of the meeting say: “After the visit we have felt that many matters may be solved easier. The press and other means of information were no longer unreachable”⁶¹. As CPSU prepared for the XIX conference of the party in Moscow for the purpose of discussing perestroika politics, its delegates from Lithuania were seen off and afterwards met by legal massive demonstrations in Vilnius, where communist authorities tried to reconcile the announced radical requirements to transform communist politics with the support for perestroika. Thus, publications were not only allowed but attempts were made to offer the public solutions that would contribute to favourable impression on the CPSU politics. Until spring of 1988 people of the Baltic States were prosecuted for public raising of flags of the period of between wars of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in Vingis park in 1988 the following was stated:

– Here I see an abundance of tricolour flags, and if they are raised and many people today came holding them, what does it stand for? Obviously, it means a lot to our people and I would like to say that we have discussed this issue in the government of the Republic and assigned the Presidium of the Supreme Council to take a positive decision concerning this flag by legalising three national colours in the nearest future⁶². Cheers of joy and applause fill the meeting of thousands of people – authorities have acknowledged the flag of “bourgeois nationalists” as a symbol of their own. This is comparable to the council of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party in autumn 1988, the so-called discussion between party secretaries of different levels, where the role of the communist party in initiation of “the round table” – a dialogue with the opposition concerning the reform of the state, was discussed. Publication of the daily newspaper under the heading Listen Carefully, Act Consistently explains the strategy of authorities to keep power: “Such initiative was not found in a vacuum (…): it is an evidence of pragmatism, also proof of serving of the party to people and their essential interests. It is an element of a line of agreement with the people implemented by the party in a coherent manner. (…) The condition of success of the round table is that its discussions would be held under a calm public atmosphere; participants may not be people acting in an anti-socialistic and anti-grassroots position. (…)”⁶³. A viewpoint is formed the essence of which is reflected in the following statement: “Representatives of all social groups must join this table, including the opposition, but it must be people the main goal of whom is better, more secure and more peaceful life in Poland for us”⁶⁴. It must be pointed out that Vaino Väljas, the First Secretary of the Estonian communist party, chaired the Extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of Estonian SSR and offered to adopt a declaration on the sovereignty of Estonian SSR.

Meaning that MMTP has to change its language: not only the criticism of “bourgeois” symbols must be deleted from its contents, but also the associated concepts used in the USSR for political and cultural elite of the period between the two world wars. It stands not only for the change in the vocabulary, but also for the changes in the historiography.

5) Back then, as well as today, observers and researchers evaluate the period as an instance of nationalism: “Many stories on the collapse of communism picture nationalism only as a consequence of fall of communism, as a stage of post-communism, not as an independent or contributing power in the collapse process itself”, notes Mark R. Beissinger, of course with reasonable note of the meaning of national movements and their influence in the collapse of the USSR: “(…) From this point of view the critical dimension of political mobilisation of 1987–1992 is completely disregarded. Massive concentrations of million people were raised in the Soviet Union and nationalistic requirements were the most significant among slogans which collected people.” However, are those “nationalist requirements” only issues of ethnic exclusion based on cultural features, or broad issues of human rights? Further events show that people of the Baltic States posing requirements according to D’39Pact were first of all seeking justice and democratic values.

The harm made to the post-war society was included in the contents of MMTP and alarmed the regime. In other words, the contents of MMTP underwent substantial transformation (there were several cases when publications did not support the narrative on D’39Pact, but it was insignificant in the evolution of history). In this case we also have one conflict:

6) People, who have executed decisions of repressions were afraid of the perspective of transformation which came out from the contents of medias. Because it implied responsibility.

350 representatives of “people’s defence”⁶⁵ signed a letter to the Minister of the Interior of the Lithuanian SSR (MVD) and evaluated the stories in the media as “persecution of the party, veterans of war and labour, former people’s defence and active members of post-war Soviet community and of the party”⁶⁶. They were alarmed by the “draft law of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR put forward by the Association of Lithuanian Lawyers and supported by Sąjūdis movement on the Responsibility for Crimes Against Lithuanian People”, even though the letter also included the acknowledgement of liability “with bitterness and regret” for “participation in deportations, which were arranged for the purpose of elimination of economic base of terrorist groups, as it was then explained by authorities of the time”⁶⁷. Another application sent to the CC of Lithuanian communist party and the Supreme Council of LSSR, signed by 36 former representatives of “people’s defence” was a demand “to reject the proposed draft law on the Responsibility for Crimes Against Lithuanian People, especially the part where deportation of people of 1940–1953 was referred to the laws then in force on responsibility for complicity in qualified homicide, as unjustified, illegal, bearing a purpose to crackdown fighters for consolidation of the Soviet regime in Lithuania”⁶⁸. The second application witnesses fear, anxiety and awareness of repression politics of the USSR: “deportations of the mentioned years [as provided in 1940–1953] was applied as means of fight with enemies of the Soviet authorities without a purpose to kill, destroy people, but only to isolate underground activists who were back then fighting against the Soviet authorities, firs of all, their armed squads”⁶⁹. They were indignant over the fact that “recently members of nationalist squads were started being called national heroes”. And in the end of 1988 a letter on the topic was sent to the Central Committee the USSR’s KGB Lithuanian Unit, “Chairman of General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press under the Council of Ministers of the LSSR”, i.e. head of the censorship institution, and head of the alliance of activists who implemented Soviet occupation and repressions against people⁷⁰. The statement includes a list of MMTP system newspapers in Lithuanian regions⁷¹, which, as noted by the empowered persecution functionaries, “started having more publications, which purposefully misrepresent revolutionary processes in the Republic, especially facts on war, which reprehend and compromise the activity of the party and Soviet officers, activists.”⁷² The statement firstly arises from apprehension that the texts switch sides of historical heroes: “Soviet regime is illegal in Lithuania, that actual patriots of Lithuania are not the Soviet activists but other people, who were and still are fighting for a “free and independent” Lithuania”⁷³. The letter shows that those who were not used to read or hear a different opinion, but to only suppress it (“Masters of dezinformatsya”), gave a manipulative evaluation: the newly described facts of Lithuanian regions were called disinformation. Thus, “disinformation” was described as the contents of newspapers of communist MMTP system – this marked a considerable transformation. In this context a notification on the meeting of KGB officers in Moscow for the purpose of discussing analysis of historical experience, was of significant value. In the event in a way characteristic to the Soviet propaganda, victims were taken for executioners and vice versa, as it may have been understood from a publication of Moscow weekly newspaper AiF: “Massive repressions of the period of cult of an individual have taken hundred thousands of innocent people, including chekists – is sadly part of our history”⁷⁴. However, the most significant part of information is as follows: “Chekists, as claimed by the participants of the conference, will not have to opt out and do not opt out from the thorough and comprehensive analysis of repressions. Moreover, they are active participants of this investigation and cooperate in creating an unbiased picture.”⁷⁵ In other words, it is announced that investigations of Stalinist sufferings will be performed by the executioners themselves and at the very least accomplices of crimes.

Either media system is closely connected to the decisions of political authorities and the information it is willing to transmit and is transmitting. Such relation may be based not only on significance of socially important news but also on economic and political interests. It directly effects the framing of news in mass media, which is based on an interaction between owner, editor, journalist and an event, which is evaluated by them based on the approach or decision of the authorities and its representatives. However, in theory framing of subjects also means creative decision of journalists and editors depending on audience, in the propaganda system as well. William Gamson and Andre Modigliani, who have prepared a topical publication of the time on the discourse of medias and the public opinion⁷⁶ on framing issues, state that thus media packages are generated which (in line with common vocabulary of communication technologies) should be defined as tools of media. In general, framing of topics implies a specific scale of positions⁷⁷, thus, we may in fact agree that it is the thing that gives an opportunity to argue for those who are united by such framing. The above mentioned authors distinguish framing devices that suggest how to think about the issue (a) and reasoning devices (b) that justify what should be done about it: (a) metaphors (i.e., historical examples from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, depictions, and visual images; (b) roots, consequences, appeals to principle.

To generalise, I may offer an assessment of the framing issues by tools of at least two groups: opinion formation and argumentation. In propaganda system the tools are merged, in a system of democratic (or liberal) medias they must be parallel in the process of media and public opinion. That’s why D’39Pact becomes part of the contents of MMTP media in Lithuania, which belongs to CPSU propaganda structures, also in other Baltic States and in Poland.

The discourse opens up as testimony on particular public experiences of what was happening during the periods of occupation. D’39Pact – CPSU narrative is a propaganda construction, which after the public space for discussion has been opened, collapses in comparison to the narrative of the opposition based on experiences, i.e. proof. Here editors of MMTP system have to make a choice: following the interest of the audience by completely transforming the contents or ignoring that interest, which in media market will eventually cause the loss of audience. Some cases may be compared to an attempt to deceive a reader by manipulating the relevance of issues⁷⁸. Nevertheless, MMTP channels were more often forced to choose between doctrines of CPSU and viewpoints of the audience⁷⁹.

On 23 August 1989 demonstration the Baltic Way was organised – the joining of hand of people spanning from Tallinn to Riga and from Riga to Vilnius, which completely transformed the limits of public space: CPSU understands that it is out of control of D’39Pact and has to search for explanation of facts that were told to be concealed by MMTP medias ever since the start of perestroika. The Political and Legal Assessment Commission of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 chaired by A. Jakovlev, the above mentioned Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, provided first recommendations to CPSU political office in summer 1989⁸⁰. This Commission is of interest to MMTP, as it finds a secret of Molotov in the “labyrinth” – secret protocols, the key item of D’39Pact. However, A. Yakovlev tries to formulate such recommendations, which would at least in part correspond to communist state interest to narrow the historical responsibility of CPSU: “It would not be purposeful to mention other regions in the conclusions of the Commission apart from the Baltic States, although the secret protocol of 23 August also includes Finland, Bessarabia and Poland. Our relationship with Finland, Poland and Romania are regulated by unilateral and multilateral agreements, and current disputes on agreements between the Soviets and the Germans of 1939 do not apply to them directly”⁸¹. However, public opinion may not be formulated in a way that an act of communication concerning it would give an opposite result to its interests. As stated in the introduction of the article, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR set forth the following: “a secret additional protocol had been signed which determined the spheres of interest of the signatories from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and from Finland to Bessarabia”⁸².

The document published in the major CPSU daily newspaper in 1989 was of historical value – the Resolution was an evidence in acknowledgement a D’39Pact as a topical issue, which might have been solved not as requirement of the “nationalists”, but as a right of the Baltic nations to decide upon the political perspective. However, the contemporary official Russia keeps ignoring statements of the document⁸³: on the one hand, Resolution of the USSR is the lowest legal act, thus it may be stated that in today’s Russia it may not be held the legal norm; on the other hand, upon return to D’39Pact “labyrinth” Russia’s government claims to not being engaged in keeping secrets but a myth of its own power. D’39Pact is merged with another narrative – on heroic fight of the military and civilians against Fascism, ignoring the genesis of reasons of WWII and aggression of the USSR in Poland and Finland. Construction of its power on the basis of such historical narrative the official Russia equals identifying itself with Stalinism politics.

In the case of D‘39Pact analysis, the transformation of MMTP contents by at first denying the narrative of truth, then trying to “adapt” it and finally by acknowledging it, indicates a fundamental factor of interpretative accomplishments – personal experience, which is a record of historical memory, reflected as witnessing in documents and stories of participants. In media contents such witnessing is the public’s weapon against lie.

Therefore, an “act of communication” caused by the transformation of language may cause a consensus and help countries/parties exit the “labyrinth” only when the public space is free from control of the authorities or other parties with financial or political power. In this case, any media becomes dependent from the interest of the public/audience. But it was and is a mistake to think that D’39Pact loses its relevance: if the public of Russia fails to acknowledge the narrative of truth on D’39Pact it will not escape myths of the current regime. Official Russia, returning to the USSR narrative, tries to convince the West that this is historically true, and the decisions of 1988-1989 have no legal force.

Requirement of historical responsibility and justice stand for an aspiration to reveal the truth, which is a stronger imperative than the possible judgement of any court or tribunal, as in public space it acts as a factor causing political changes. After the Tribunal of Nuremberg in the USSR and countries of the Warsaw Pact public space controlled by the communist authorities not only prevented the opportunity to publish the truth, but it was also targeted at concealing subsequent criminal acts of CPSU and its puppet regimes for decades. Glasnost politics gave a possibility to people to express their historical experience, but the USSR regime tried to restrict the D’39Pact and therefore have settled certain “boundaries of publicity”⁸⁴. Liberation from the public space boundaries made authorities of the USSR acknowledge the historical truth, however Russia sees it as weakness.

D‘39Pact may also be treated as a symbol marking a conflict between history and contemporary politics of countries arising from fostering different values and experiences. Analysis of such discourse allows noticing personal transformation – irrespective of it being sincere or a psychological decision: in the presence of truth liberation of historical memory may also be a strong act of communication, which overcomes propaganda and makes a person change his views. In this case, interpretative accomplishments make it possible to let go of myths supported in the public space and to be based on knowledge. From a historical point of view, transformation of vocabulary meanings is subject to contextual condition, what is being turned upside-down is the reconstruction of the truth:

Even if the same individual transforms his vocabulary towards public, he may decide by himself when he really feels free to publish a piece of news or to comment on the events. From a personal point of view transformation or adaptation is a different subject; author only provided several most significant cases as his analysis was first targeted at transformation of media contents as an act of communication. It is obvious that official Russia replaces the above elements in places: on the D‘39Pact “returns” falsifiers of history.

The contemporary D‘39Pact may witness a conflict not concerning historical narrative on separation of Europe on 1939, as Molotov’s “secret” is already revealed, but for the purpose of setting experiences of the West against those of the East, which are restricted to knowledge on victory against the Fascism. It is important to emphasize that the D’39 Pact discourse has more than two narratives - the European Parliament’s resolution testifies that there are more of them, so Russia can follow the historical approach laid by the USSR. The fact that D’39Pact narrative on the USSR’s division of Europe and crime against nations, personalities, their cultural heritage and structures have overcome deceptive narrative of CPSU and finally the overall communist regime, might stand for a significant warning to Russia: identifying oneself with lie may not be the basis for long-term politics. However, the Kremlin and official Russian foreign policy consider the narrative of the D’39 Pact to have the same content as in the period of the USSR. However, the topic remains relevant: Russia’s official relations with history are based on the discussed narrative of the USSR that Russia was not and is not an aggressor. Such a position, when justified by the Pact, determines the appropriate relationship with other parties and countries.