Abstract
This article assumes the premise, supported by doctrine Romance majority, that the crime of damnum, in other words, the granting of direct actio issued by the lex Aquilia, supposed meet for both the first chapter, and for the third, corpore corpori principle, that required an immediate contact between the author's physical damage in the body of the item damaged. From this point of view, the article explores the jurisprudential extension mechanisms governing verb first and third chapter. In relation to the first chapter, he examines the origin, evolution and admission Celso's famous distinction between occidere and causam mortis praestare. According to this formula, provided that it complied with the principle corpore corpori the outcome of death, came the award of direct action. In contrast, in the cases of omissions that led to a fatal outcome, that Celso's formula means causam mortis praestare (give time of death), it was appropriate action decretal. The problem is that, as discussed in the text, the formula was recently profiled in the classical period, with a background in Ofilio and once drafted by Celso, was not followed in all cases contemporary jurists or after him, which is asking the reasons that led some jurists to give a direct action cases of acts of omission. Finally, in relation to chapter third, the article essentially stops the extension from rumpere interpretation by corrumpere both cases mediate causation, as in those in which the thing was not destroyed, but lost functionality to the owner.

Keywords
Actio Legis, Damnum Corpore Corpori, Actions in Factum, Actio Util, Legitimization, Verbs of the Law.