Abstract

This work analyzes the ideas developed by Arendt and Sartre regarding liberty and action. For Sartre, when we act, we modify the structure of the world, hoping for a foreseen result. The condition for the act is the liberty of the for-it self, as an absolute departure point. The act projects the for-it self toward something that is not, causing motives for action to arise. Then the concept of liberty is analyzed in Arendt, unraveling her concept of action. For Arendt, liberty is not the first condition of the human being as it is for Sartre, but rather constitutes the highest expression of humanity. For both authors, to act demonstrates liberty; nevertheless, while in Sartre action can be realized even in isolation, for Arendt it can only be manifested in the public sphere.

Keywords

liberty, action, ontological liberty, public-political sphere