Maximova, Olga Aleksandrovna; Belyaev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich

Generational Indigenation in a Multi-Ethnic and - Religious Society (Tatarstan, Russia)

Opción, vol. 33, núm. 84, diciembre, 2017, pp. 38-64

Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela

Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=31054991003
Generational Indigenation in a Multi-Ethnic and Religious Society (Tatarstan, Russia) ¹

Olga Aleksandrovna Maximova
Kazan Federal University, Kazan National Research Technical University named after A.N. Tupolev. Kazan, Russia
olga_max@list.ru

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Belyaev
Kazan National Research Technical University named after A.N. Tupolev. Kazan, Russia
vlad_belyaev@list.ru

Abstract

The authors researched ethnic and religious factors in order to detect the features of generational indigenation in multi-ethnic and multi-religious society of Tatarstan. The empirical data revealed the generational peculiarities of transferring the ethnic and religious values and the specifics of generational indigenation in Tatarstan. The conclusion is that the maintaining the ethnic and religious tolerance is possible both at society and in the sphere of intergenerational dynamics in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious region; the generational indigenation is limited. The authors revealed a number of specific generational characteristics that indicate the availability of certain generational shifts.

Keywords: generational indigenation; ethnicity; multi-ethnic and multi-religious community; indigenation.

¹The reported study was funded by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) according to the research project № 17-06-00474; by RFBR and the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan according to the research project № 17-46-160490.
Indigenización generacional en una sociedad multiétnica y multi-confesional (Tatarstán, Rusia)

Resumen

La investigación versa sobre factores étnicos y religiosos a fin de detectar características en la indigenización generacional en la sociedad multiétnica y religiosa de Tatarstán. Los datos empíricos revelaron peculiaridades generacionales en la transferencia de valores étnicos y religiosos y detalles de la indigenización de las generaciones actuales en Tatarstán. Se concluye que la tolerancia étnica y religiosa es posible en esta región multiétnica y multireligiosa, tanto en el ámbito social propiamente como en la esfera de las dinámicas intergeneracionales; sin embargo la indigenización generacional resulta limitada. Se revelaron características generacionales específicas que indican la disponibilidad de ciertos cambios generacionales.

Palabras clave: indigenización generacional; etnicidad; comunidad multiétnica y multireligiosa; indigenización.

INTRODUCTION

The macro-social structure of a multi-ethnic society encompasses an extensive conglomeration of subsystems, including ethnic and religious groups. Each of these groups is the bearer of specific traditions and values. The overall stability of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society largely depends on the effectiveness of the intergenerational transmission of the above-mentioned traditions and values. The process of transferring traditions from generation to generation is carried out through the performance of various institutions within the subsystems in question. Family plays a significant role in the process of transferring ethnic and religious norms and values. At the same time, under the conditions of a post-industrial information society, family loses its function of the leading socializing agent. This results in an intergenerational split, the extreme
manifestations of which take place in the form of a generation conflict or a generation gap (MEAD, 1970; SUN, 2016). In addition, in the 21st century, an actual clash between globalization and sovereignization is observed in the entire world (DUNNE, REUS-SMIT, 2017). In addition, in the context of the indigenization discourse (DORE, 1984; HUNTINGTON, 1996, GRAY, COATES, 2010; GRAY, 2010; CHILISA, TSHEKO, 2014), this becomes a factor of the increase in the generation gap.

The authors of this article carried out research in one of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious regions of Russia, the Republic of Tatarstan. The research consisted in studying the specifics of generational dynamics in the context of ethnic and religious factors.

The Republic of Tatarstan is a specific region of Russia, which is characterized by a mix of Orthodox and Euro-Islamic civilizations and a duality (but not bipolarity) of the permanent population's ethnic composition (of Slavic and Turkic origin). In the post-Soviet period, by the end of the 1990s, there was a certain rise in ethnocentric and ethnophobic sentiments that gave birth to a number of social and political conflicts. However, it was possible to maintain traditional inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance in the region (LARIONOVA, MAXIMOVA, 2015). To maintain the achieved stability further and to prevent the growth of ethnic and religious conflicts, a relevant approach is the analysis of the specifics of transferring ethnic and religious values from generation to generation in a combination of the macro-social trends in social development and the micro-social context of intra-family socialization.

The clarification of this specifics in the conditions of this unique multi-ethnic and multi-religious region of Russia will allow developing measures to eliminate both intergenerational and ethnic and religious conflicts and contradictions, as well as help to optimize the socialization process of young people based on the principles of multi-culturalism.

The purpose of this article is to study the ethnic and religious factors in the context of the methodology of generation analysis and
the discourse of the generation indigenization. To achieve the goal of the research, the authors have set the following objectives:

– Reveal the generational peculiarities of transmitting ethnic and religious values in the Republic of Tatarstan.

– Carry out a comparative analysis of the indigenization of the society's three generations in Tatarstan.

– Highlight the specifics of method diversification and indigenization depth of specific categories of the population's "average" generation in the Republic of Tatarstan.

– Determine the level of ethnic and religious identification and tolerance by generations.

– Reveal the differences between particular generations' self-assessment of the indigenization degree and the assessment of this process by representatives of other age groups.

The materials published in this article are relevant both in the post-Soviet space and in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies that face problems of generational indigenization.

2. METHOD

In 2017, based on the methodology of generation analysis and the discourse of the second generation indigenization, a team of authors carried out comprehensive sociological research (study was funded by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) according to the research project № 17-06-00474) within the framework of the project "Dynamics of Real and Conditional Generations in the Informative Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Religious Society (on the Example of the
Republic of Tatarstan). The research methodology assumed a complex combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of sociological research that would allow obtaining detailed information on the investigated problem. The data was to be presented both in the form of statistical regularities revealed in a mass survey or based on personalized information obtained by qualitative methods (in-depth interviews and narrative essays).

In the first stage, a mass survey of Tatarstan’s population was carried out on a representative sample. The aim of the study was to identify the availability/lack of specific ethnic and religious settings in different age cohorts. These settings may allow members of a particular cohort to feel part of a certain generation community on the one hand, and may become the basis for intergenerational conflicts on the other hand. A quota representative sampling was used in the mass survey. The selective summation was calculated according to the data of the All-Russian Population Census of 2010 based on such parameters as gender, age, ethnicity and social status. The total number of the people involved in the survey was 1500. The survey was carried out in a number of cities in the Republic of Tatarstan, among them Kazan, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Almetyevsk, Yelabuga and Zelenodolsk, as well as in four rural settlements, two of which are mainly inhabited by Tatars, while the other two are mostly inhabited by Russians.

In the second stage of the research, the authors conducted a series of in-depth interviews with representatives of different generations. The interviews aimed at obtaining deeper personalized data on value orientations, ethnic and religious views, the availability/lack of intergenerational conflicts both at the level of the society in general and at the level of micro-environments, i.e. families and peer groups. A total of 20 interviews were carried out among representatives of the Russian and Tatar ethnic groups.

As an additional source of qualitative information, the authors used the method of narrative essays on the problem of intergenerational relationships. The informants were representatives of the younger
generation, namely students from various universities of Kazan (the authors collected and analyzed more than 500 essays).

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

As a theoretical basis for interpreting the results of the empirical research, the authors first of all used Mannheim's theory of generations. According to this theory, the shift of generations is a universal process based on the biological rhythm of human life, whereby new members appear in the cultural process, while the old members gradually disappear. Representatives of each generation can act only in a chronologically limited period of the historical process. That is why the society must constantly transfer the accumulated cultural heritage, which is done through the succession of generations (MANNHEIM, 1952; BRISTOW, 2016).

The violation of the above-mentioned succession for this or that reason forms a generation gap, which has a negative impact on the stability of the social system. The generation gap conditions the formation of the so-called “lost generation” in the society. As a matter of fact, this generation falls out of the general social structure. This problem is particularly relevant in the context of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, where an individual simultaneously acts as a representative of his generation and his ethnic and/or religious group. If there is a problem of an inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict in the society, it can be transmitted both into the relationships between generations and within one age cohort. At the same time, the results of the research show that the cohorts of contemporary Russians allocated by age parameters act as bearers of specific entelechies of their generation, which are formed on the basis of collective historical memory. As the respondents' age increases, their identification with their generation manifests itself to a greater extent, while younger generations demonstrate a higher degree of individualism (MAXIMOVA, 2014).
According to S. Eisenstadt, the process of transferring traditions plays an important role in generation succession. At the same time, variability is one of the essential characteristics of tradition (EISENSTADT, 1964). Different groups of society, which were formed on various grounds, are the bearers of tradition variations. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, this concerns ethnic and religious groups as well. Therefore, the authors believe that it is necessary to single out ethnic and religious factors of the dynamics of generations when analyzing the given process.

To interpret the results of the research, the authors used another relevant theory, Mead's theory of the generational gap. According to this theory, human history has undergone a succession of three types of culture: post-figurative, configurative and prefigurative (MEAD, 1970). These types of culture were singled out according to the nature of experience transmission between generations.

The maximum degree of generational gap is characteristic of prefigurative cultures, which go back to the middle of the twentieth century and form a new unique type of social connection between generations. The knowledge and values of the older generation do not prevail over younger generations. In the 1970s, Mead described this new culture, which was still nascent and had an obscure future. However, the authors of the article believe this culture spread in the next decades and strengthened the generational gap even more. Currently, the authors consider the principle of dividing the society into generations quite debatable, because the traditional succession between age cohorts has actually been transformed into the exact opposite process (MAKSIMOVA, 2014; ABOIM & VASCONCELOS, 2014). In an information society, the generation of children, which is called "digital natives" (PRENSKY, 2001; Palfrey, Gasser, 2008; Zur & Zur, 2016), turns out to be more adapted in the dynamically developing technological environment of the society as compared to the cohort of "parents" and "grandparents". According to Jean M. Twenge, "technology is not the only thing that makes iGen distinct from every generation before them; they are also different in how they spend their time, how they behave, and in their attitudes toward religion, sexuality, and politics. They socialize in completely new ways, reject once sacred social taboos, and want
different things from their lives and careers. More than previous generations, they are obsessed with safety, focused on tolerance, and have no patience for inequality" (TWENGE, 2017).

At the same time, it is necessary to agree with HIGGS and GILLEARD (2015), who point out that the generation gap in a modern information society does not exist only between the young and the elderly. This gap exists between those who are young today and those who were once young and refused to miss the opportunities of the second modernity.

According to the authors of the research, the methodology of generation analysis in general has an undoubted heuristic potential, since it makes it possible to fix some typological characteristics of socio-demographic groups in conditions of maximum individualization and fragmentation of the social life.

Donald Dore introduced the concept of “the phenomenon of second generation indigenization” (DORE, 1984), which acquires particular relevance in the conditions of duality of the population’s ethnic and religious composition in the Republic of Tatarstan, the availability of serious axiological differences between Eastern and Western Christianity, as well as between Northern and Arabic Sunnism, and specificity of the intergenerational shift. Dore noted that both in the former Western colonies and in independent countries like Japan and China, representatives of the "first modernizing" or "post-independent" generation were often educated in foreign (Western) universities. One of the reasons for their acceptance of Western values and lifestyle was the fact that they stepped into another world in adolescence, i.e. at the age of active socialization. However, for a number of reasons, the children of this first modernizing generation later reject the axiology of cosmopolitan culture and tend to adhere to local norms and values rather than to cosmopolitan ones.

Developing Dore’s ideas, Huntington points out that indigenization was on the agenda around the non-Western world in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century. At the same time, the religious factor (first of all, the revival of Islam and "re-Islamization") was a central
theme. S. Huntington expands the scope of the phenomenon described by Dore. He substantiates the idea that the indigenization process does not necessarily await the emergence of the second generation. Talented, insightful and flexible leaders of the first generation are themselves indigenized. In his opinion, indigenization is facilitated by a democratic paradox: the adoption of democratic institutions by non-Western societies encourages and paves the way for ethnocentric and anti-western movements (HUNTINGTON, 1996).

Contemporary authors also note the relevance of the indigenization concept, including in the analysis of generation dynamics (MERTENS, CRAM & CHILISA, 2016; WALTER & ANDERSEN, 2016).

According to the authors of the research, the discourse of generational indigenization is largely characteristic of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious region of Russia, the Republic of Tatarstan.

4. RESULTS

When reflecting on the causes and motives of conflicts in Tatarstan’s society which could be characterized as indigenization of the second generation, it is necessary to point out that the older (‘first’) generation is the generation formed in the Soviet era and characterized by dominant atheism and processes of accelerated industrialization in a number of spheres. Despite the declared policy of developing ethnic languages (which was more often of a purely formal nature) and the rotation process of national cadres strictly controlled “from above”, this period can be described as “modernization” typical of an independent state. At the same time, the Soviet population was not accustomed to Western values. It adhered to specific Soviet values that were of a cosmopolitan nature within the Soviet society.

In the 1990s–2000s, in connection with the rejection of the socialist development model and the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the multi-ethnic regions of Russia, indigenization processes of the so-called “titular” peoples (for Tatarstan, these are representatives of the Tatar
ethnos) began to develop. This was manifested in the growth of ethno-phobia and ethnocentrism, and the increase in the level of the population’s religiosity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that the heterogeneity of social and economic reforms and economic instability caused the bulk of the population to be more concerned about their survival than about satisfying their ethnic and religious needs. This had its impact on the medial, nearly non-indigenized “intermediate” generation, which was formed in the conditions of the USSR.

Younger Tatar generations born in the post-Soviet period entered into adulthood in relatively prosperous economic conditions (as compared to the 1990s) and demonstrated indigenization processes to a much greater extent. However, it is necessary to note that this “second” generation of Tatars, socialized in the conditions of post-Soviet reforms, fell into the value gap of the ethnic and religious revival of the capitalist lifestyle in pursuit of profit despite the state’s thorough attention to the revival of religion and “urban” functions of the Tatar language. The latter was taught for 6 hours a week to all students of the republic regardless of ethnicity. For the above-mentioned reasons, the generation was divided into the following groups: the indigenized group actively contributing to the revival of Tatar and Islamic values; the partly indigenized group (i.e. those who seek to combine the achievement of personal success and the development of their Tatar ethnos and the revival of traditional ethnic and religious values) and pro-Western “market-oriented” group adapted to the conditions of the slowly progressing modernization.

The transfer of values from generation to generation traditionally carried out through the channels of the parental example (Do the way I do!) and control on the part of the community (which, thanks to the transparency of life, formed a culture of shame rather than the urban culture of guilt), is largely eliminated, as are the Soviet palliative substitutes for these control systems in the form of the “parallel education” practice (through teams, formal groups or peer-groups). Such conditions determine the generation gap, as well as the partial compatibility of the values of these generations. This is evidenced by the following facts identified by the authors in the course of the research.
During the survey, when answering the question about the relationships between older and younger generations, only 3% of the respondents indicated religious factors as causes for a conflict between generations, while less than 1% of the respondents pointed to the problem of inter-ethnic relations. Thus, it is necessary to state that no significant disagreement on ethnic and religious factors between generations is inherent in intra-family interaction.

At the same time, based on the data obtained during the survey, the authors observed that a rather high percentage of Tatarstan’s population has stable ethnic identification. Nearly half of the respondents (43%) noted that they never forget about their nationality; moreover, to a greater extent these were Tatars (54% of Tatar respondents) and to a lesser extent Russians (54% of Russian respondents respectively).

The analysis of all the respondents’ answers concerning their attitude to their ethnicity, as well as the religiosity degree of representatives of different age cohorts showed that there are generational differences in this aspect at the macro-level.

Thus, according to the relation of their attitude towards their own nationality, the differentiation of generations is as follows. 43% of young people aged 16–34 (the “second generation”) answered that they never forget about their nationality; 22% of respondents think about their nationality only in certain situations, and 29% do not think about their nationality most of the time. Based on the interpretation of the above-mentioned data, the following conclusion can be made. With a slight prevalence of the first group, the young respondents split into three fairly equilibrium segments.

Similar data was obtained for the "intermediate generation" (35–54). The percentage of those who never forget about their nationality was 40%. It is necessary to point out that those who almost never think about their nationality were mostly among middle-aged respondents rather than among young people.
Among the representatives of the "first generation" (55 years and older), the number of respondents who never forget about their nationality was a little more (a little more than 50%) than in other age groups.

In addition, generational specificity can be traced in the distribution of answers to the question about what feelings the respondents have towards their ethnicity. Among young and middle-aged people, about 27% of respondents noted that they had no feelings concerning their ethnicity, while only about 20% of the elderly respondents chose this option. At the same time, the percentage of those who were proud of their nationality was 33.3% among the elderly, 27% among the young and only 18.3% in the intermediate cohort. The parabolic dynamics observed here is characterized by the fact that the middle-aged cohort shows the least degree of ethnic identification. Elderly respondents showed the strongest degree of ethnic identification, while the younger generation demonstrates a certain dynamics in the revival of interest in ethnic issues.

The authors of the article believe that the above-mentioned tendency does not fully fit into the concept of the “second generation phenomenon” and is determined by the historical and social context of the development of the Tatarstan’s society. The elderly cohort (the “first generation”) of Tatarstan’s population (and Russians on the whole) went through the stage of ethnic renaissance in the post-Soviet period, which contributed to the revival of interest in their own nationality and the religion of their ancestors. The younger generation (the “second generation”) socialized in the context of an actualized ethnic and religious identification. The middle-aged generation (the “intermediate generation”) is the most ethnically indifferent one, which is verified by the analysis of the narrative essays written by students of Kazan universities. Below are some of the viewpoints the authors of the essays expressed.

“Our generation does not adhere to any definite principles on inter-religious interaction. At the same time, the elder generation finds it important that their children and grandchildren choose the same religious beliefs as themselves.
This is especially important for elderly people” (female, 19, Tatar).

“I can see that older generations adhere to a certain framework in terms of religious and inter-ethnic relations. For example, when I came to Tatarstan, I discovered that grandparents and sometimes even parents strictly forbid young girls (there are a lot of examples among my Tatar Muslim friends) to look for a partner among the representatives of a different nationality and religion. Young people make friends, interact and have fun with representatives of other nationalities. However, when it comes to forming a family, for some reason, everybody tries to find a partner of their own nationality. This is especially true for Tatars. I was very surprised at this fact” (female, 20, Russian, went to study in Tatarstan from a mono-ethnic “Russian” region of Russia).

The above-mentioned statements show that young people believe it is the older generation of their grandparents that manifests the greatest degree of ethnic intolerance, which is often very close to ethno-phobia and ethnic intolerance. Nevertheless, the results of the mass survey show that older people do not see such a problem in the worldview of their generation.

According to the results of the mass survey, a significant part of respondents (73%) does not dislike or hate representatives of any nationality. It is necessary to point out that this option was more often chosen by people older than 55 years (84%). Only 8% of respondents feel hatred towards other nationalities: more often 24-35 year olds (13%) and less often the elderly (5%). In the mass survey, the highest degree of tolerance is demonstrated by the oldest age cohort of 65 years and older (87%), which is partly confirmed by the interview data: "We had a friendship of peoples in the Soviet years. Nobody was at enmity with anybody. And we are all still friends: Russians and Tatars all together. It is the young people that are fighting for some reason" (female, 75, Russian, Kazan). According to the authors of the research, this fact testifies to a certain generational contradiction, which manifests itself as follows. Young respondents believe that
older people show a lesser degree of ethnic tolerance, whereas representatives of the older generation, on the contrary, consider themselves ethnically tolerant. The difference in the external perception of elderly people's opinions and their self-reflection is probably due to the difference in the "first generation's" assessment at the level of inter-ethnic and inter-religious communication in the society (where a high level of tolerance is demonstrated) and at the micro-level, when it comes to forming a family and transferring pedigree (where the elderly people demonstrate ethnocentrism to a much greater degree). This fact was verified by the data of the conducted research too.

On the whole, at the macro-level, the results of the research showed a high degree of inter-ethnic tolerance of all age cohorts in the Republic of Tatarstan.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that when answering general questions, respondents demonstrated a high degree of inter-ethnic tolerance, they showed a great propensity to preserve mono-ethnicity at the level of intra-family and intergenerational interactions. Therefore, indigenization processes are rather strong at the micro-level in all the three generations in question.

Only one third of the respondents (36.8%) believed that nationality is secondary in marriage. In the opinion of nearly half of the survey respondents, a spouse must be of the same nationality; otherwise, he will be ethnically assimilated (44%). 15% were categorically against inter-ethnic marriages. At the same time, based on the results of the research, the authors observed a generational dynamics on the issue in question: the degree of the negative attitude towards inter-ethnic marriages increases with the age of respondents.

According to the data obtained in the research, the youth (the "second generation") is more tolerant of inter-ethnic marriages, whereas the generation of these young people's parents (45-54 years) and grandparents (55-64 and over 65) demonstrate a greater degree of intolerance. It was precisely this ethno-phobia at the micro-level that the young informants pointed to in their essays. They noted that their
grandparents – and often their parents – do not encourage their grandchildren and children date and subsequently form a family with representatives of other ethnic groups. It is necessary to point out that the above-mentioned negative attitude of the "intermediate generation" representatives is in conflict with their fairly neutral assessment of their own ethnicity.

Russian respondents turned out to be more tolerant of inter-ethnic marriages (41% believe that nationality does not matter in marriage, and 43% are ready for an international marriage based on love). Tatars tend to enter into an international marriage less often (30%). 15% of respondents were strictly against inter-ethnic marriages – more often Tatars (23%) and less often Russians (7%).

For the analysis of ethnic self-identification in correlation with parents’ ethnicity (as a factor of generational indigenization), the authors analyzed the answers of respondents whose mother and father were of different nationalities. The analysis showed that representatives of the younger generation more often identify themselves with the ethnicity of their father rather than that of their mother. It is necessary to point out that this tendency is especially typical of Russians: 76% of respondents, who were born in an inter-ethnic marriage and considered themselves Russians, had a Russian father. 51.4% of respondents, who called themselves Tatars, had a Tatar father. This fact is in contrast with the situation in some post-Soviet countries, where – even when they were union republics within the USSR – the choice of ethnic identification was greatly influenced by the nationality of the parent whose ethnicity coincided with the "titular" ethnicity of a particular region the family lived in.

On the whole, according to the survey data, Tatarstan’s population demonstrated absolute solidarity in the belief that the Russian state should support the cultures and religions of all peoples living in Russia (90.9%). At the same time, no correlations in age cohorts was observed.

The majority of respondents agree with the statement that in Tatarstan it is absolutely possible to maintain inter-ethnic harmony
thanks to the competent policy of the authorities (60%). This point of view was more often supported by the older age group (73.2%, which means that the "first generation" is more loyal to the authorities) and less often by representatives of the "second generation" (about 54%).

In addition, the research touched upon the problem of generations' religious identity in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious region of Tatarstan. Major changes in the socium predetermine a revival of interest in religious identification in any society. As S. Huntington noted at the end of the twentieth century, ancient sources of identity and authority systems are shaken. People leave rural areas for cities; they break away from their roots; they get a new job, or do not work at all. They interact with a large number of strangers and are exposed to new relationship patterns. They need new sources of identity, new forms of a stable community and new moral grounds, which would give them a sense of meaning and goal. However, according to Huntington, people cannot act rationally in pursuit of their selfish interests until they determine their "self". In times of rapid social changes, the previously established identities are destroyed; therefore, new ones must be formed. It is religion that provides convincing answers to people who face the need to answer such questions as "Who am I?" or "Where should I be?". Thus, religious groups become small social communities, which replaced the ones that were lost due to urbanization (HUNTINGTON, 1996). To meet the national needs in Tatarstan, in the 2010s a resacralization of consciousness – and, to a lesser extent, of behavior – came to replace the ethnic renaissance of the 1990s. In the course of the mass survey, respondents were asked an identification question about whether they considered themselves a believer. More than half of the respondents (67%) called themselves a believer. According to studies of other Tatarstan authors, the percentage of Tatars who consider themselves a believer is 75-90%. One of the distinctive features of post-sectarian religiosity is that people's interest in faith affects various social groups. Sociologists record the growth of Islamic identity among people of different age groups having different levels of education and living both in cities and rural areas (GUZELBAEVA, 2014).

It is possible to interpret the indicators of the answers to questions about religious identity as a tendency of growing religiosity among all
age groups of the population in the Republic of Tatarstan. Nevertheless, when analyzing the respondents’ self-assessment of their own religiosity degree, collisions between formal identity and practical behavior are observed. The majority (67%) of respondents, who called themselves a believer, admit that they never or almost never follow the rites and canons of their religion. Only about 3% of respondents who considered themselves a believer strictly follow all the religious canons, while less than a third of respondents (30%) follow only the most important rites. Meanwhile, the majority does not see the necessity of it. The authors of the research revealed a certain generational differentiation on this matter. The representatives of the “first generation” (over 65 years old), 8% in this age group, form the highest percentage among those who strictly follow all religious canons. The fact that people tend to become more religious with age has been repeatedly confirmed. Meanwhile, the increasing level of real religiosity within a cohort that belongs to the upper layer of the youth (25-34 years old) is a completely new phenomenon in post-Soviet Russia. In Tatarstan, there is an increase in the number of religious people among the younger generation, which is verified by the number of female representatives of the “second generation” who adhere to the strict canons of Muslim clothing in public space.

An important peculiarity of Tatarstan’s society is the mutual intersection of the two major ethnicities: Tatars and Russians, who traditionally adhere to the Muslim and Orthodox religions respectively. During the survey, 42.7% of respondents were Russians and 49.1% were Tatars. 95.7% of the Russian respondents identified themselves as believers (including those who do not follow religious canons), while only 3% of the Tatar respondents were Orthodox. 94% of the Tatar respondents and only less than 1% of the Russian ones were Muslim.

Nevertheless, such an intersection of religions does not cause religious bipolarity or serious inter-religious clashes in the society of Tatarstan. On the whole, the population of the republic demonstrates a high-level of inter-religious tolerance.
To differentiate the influence of religious ethics on generational cohorts in the context of the indigenization phenomenon at the micro level (intra-family interaction), the authors have used the materials of students’ narrative essays.

According to the young informants, the generation of their grandparents (the “first generation”) occupies a more uncompromising position with regard to the religious upbringing of the youth, while their parents (the “second generation”) are more indifferent in this aspect. In addition, many respondents noted the special impact of the specifics of the multi-religious region, which determines the mutual intersection of the two major religions: Islam and Christianity.

“We live in a republic of two nations and two religions. I can observe in our society that the older generation (our grandparents) are more categorical in this regard, while the generation of our parents is more tolerant. The current generation of young people and children most probably does not even think about this issue. However, in some families, traditions are reverent. If in a family Tatars tend to marry only Tatars, a young girl from this family does not even have the right to think about an inter-ethnic marriage. The same is true for religion as well. A Tatar has to be a Muslim. I find it unacceptable to be allowed to marry only a representative of your own religion. But I cannot condemn families like this. Maybe these people want to be belonging to a particular thing. I happen to be a Tatar. Not all the members of my family were happy with the fact that I was baptized. My grandmother felt resentful...” (female, 22, Tatar).

It is necessary to point out that the Tatar respondents often pointed to the older generations’ high degree of religiosity in their families. Moreover, it is believed that in recent years young Tatars show a higher degree of religiosity than Russians.

“What concerns inter-religious interactions, the generation of my grandparents tried to somehow preserve their religion, because they had survived the time of atheists. However, since
religion was suppressed, my parents did not know much about their own religion... In my generation, one can adhere to any religion. So Islam slowly began to return to us. Those who sought a way, they did find it. Things are easier for our generation as no one condemns anyone for attending churches and mosques” (male, 19, Tatar).

According to the results of the survey, inter-family relations are generally characterized by a religious harmony. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (83.9%) claimed that in their families there is no disagreement on issues of religion and nationality between the different generations. This opinion was most often expressed by representatives of older generations (over 45 years old, 88%) and a little less by young people (79%).

Important data was obtained in the course of analyzing the respondents’ answers to the question concerning their subjective assessment of the religiosity degree of different generations. The respondents were asked to choose one of the following opposing propositions included in the questionnaire: 1) Contemporary young people are less religious than the older generations; 2) Contemporary young people are more religious in comparison with the older generations, who were brought up in the spirit of atheism.

According to the data obtained, young people identify themselves as being less religious than the older generations (78% of respondents among 16-24-year-olds and 71% of 25-34-year-olds), whereas the representatives of the older generations are less likely to adhere to this point of view (61-62% among respondents older than 55 years). Interestingly, the opinions among the middle-aged generation were as follows. Slightly more than half (58%) of the respondents aged 45-54 years believe that young people are less religious, and 40%, on the contrary, believe that younger people are more religious than representatives of the older generations.

On the whole, when answering the question about their attitude towards people who adhere to strict religious canons in clothing, respondents demonstrated a high level of religious tolerance. Despite
all-Russian and international scandals over the problem of wearing hijabs by women, including school-age and student-age girls, this problem does not cause serious negativity in Tatarstan, which was verified by the data of the conducted survey. The majority (69%) of respondents was indifferent to people who adhere to strict religious canons in clothing. They pointed out that this is a personal choice of any person. No significant differences were observed in the age of respondents who gave the above-mentioned answer. This aspect of religious behavior was negatively perceived by 18% of the respondents: more often by elderly people older than 65 years (24%) and less often by young people aged 16–24 years (10%). 13% of the respondents had a positive opinion about this manifestation of religious renaissance. More often, these were representatives of the youth (19%), which partially confirms that the hypothesis of the indigenization theory of the second generation can be applied to Tatarstan’s society.

On the whole, it is possible to state that the intergenerational transfer of ethnic and religious values is quite effective in Tatarstan. However, the process is sometimes accompanied by collisions. When analyzing the intergenerational dynamics, it is important to take into account the fact that children’s thinking apparatus is actually not developed in their infancy. The basic way of socialization right up to the initiation period is through the process of immersion in the emotional environment, when the child perceives his own emotions rather than his parents’ words through subconsciously perceiving facial expressions, intonations, gestures, postures and even vasomotorics. Initially, the child strives to copy his parents (or one of the parents). This desire of the child determines the initial phase of ethnic and religious identity or its absence. It is through the formation of the emotional base that the parent creates prerequisites for the child’s moral and intellectual development, including his ethnic and religious identity. Without a rich emotional background in inter-family interactions, an unthinking erudite is formed – or an unemphasizing hedonist who reacts only to primary stimuli. The problems of the socio-economic survival of the parents of children who were born in the 1980–1990-ies negatively affected both the parents and their children who did not receive positive emotions from the interaction with their parents and experienced the first “emotional” gap between
generations. Modern media and Internet communications expand this gap by offering bad-quality Western cartoons and computer games, which are capable of destroying national and religious identity. The parents who do not filter through the content viewed by their children noted during the interview that their children cannot watch Soviet cartoons as they are boring to children due to lack of dynamics, drive, colorfulness, and action. Thus, non-spirituality is the only thing such families tend to transfer to generations. In families, where parents could find time for joint activities with children, like discussions of cartoons or books, national and religious identity is transferred to children to a greater extent. As a result, two different types of youth are formed in this respect.

5. DISCUSSION

The research shows that the family continues to be the most important institute in the succession of generations. Ethnic and religious values are mainly transferred at the intra-family level.

In many respects, the results of the research are consistent with the findings of researchers from other countries. On the example of the Italian society, Cavalli notes that generational peculiarities are more apparent in people’s lifestyle, music and leisure preferences. However, they are practically not observed at the level of religious values (CAVALLI, 2004).

A promising research approach that can be applied to the Russian specifics is an analysis of the newest religious practices in combination with the contemporary mass culture which is typical of generations X and Y. The proposed research is similar to A Possamai’s analysis described in his work "Sociology of Religion for Generations X and Y" (POSSAMAI, 2013).

Another relevant approach is the discourse of the ethnic and religious identity in the framework of the educational system, including in the context of studying the process of “third generation
universities''. The discourse was undertaken earlier by the authors of this research (MAXIMOVA, BELYAEV et al., 2016).

A vector in further studies in this approach is the study of the globalization impact (DUNNE and REUS-SMIT, 2017) on ethnic and religious factors in generational dynamics in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, including in terms of responses to migration processes by representatives of different generations in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious region, as well as positive and negative tendencies of the coexistence of the Russian society in the international space.

CONCLUSIONS

The novelty of the materials published in this article is the disclosure of the role of ethnic and religious factors in the processes of generational indigenization in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society under the conditions of radical reforms. The mass survey of Tatarstan’s population, in-depth interviews and narrative essays made it possible to identify the peculiarities of transferring ethnic and religious values from generation to generation, as well as to compare the indigenization processes of the older, intermediate and younger generations of Tatarstan’s society. The authors revealed that the fact that the socio-economic policy (oriented towards globalization, glocalization and market economy) is in conflict with the cultural policy of Tatarstan’s authorities (aimed at the revival of ethnic identity, the national language and sacralization of certain spheres of life). This is reflected, first of all, in the divergence of the indigenization degree of behavior (and, to a lesser extent, consciousness) typical of different categories of the intermediate generation. The authors of the research determined the level of ethnic and religious identification and tolerance by generations, their religions and language preferences. In addition, they made a distinction between the self-assessments of the indigenization degree of individual generations and the assessments of such indigenization by representatives of other age groups.

The research revealed a fairly high level of generational continuity in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious region of Russia, the Republic of Tatarstan, both at the macro- and micro-levels. In the post-Soviet
period, thanks to the fairly competent policy of the regional authorities, it was possible to prevent the incitement of inter-ethnic and inter-religious discord in Tatarstan. Currently, the majority of the population in all age cohorts demonstrates a high level of inter-ethnic tolerance although there are still certain problematic areas. Analyzing the results of the research, the authors observed no generation conflict on the issues in question (with the exception of local contradictions that are usually manifested at the intra-family level), which means that continuity prevails in Tatarstan.

The authors of the research observed large sectors of indigenized population in the older and younger generations and lack of ethnic and religious orientations in the “intermediate generation”. Therefore, the concept of the “second generation’s” indigenization can act in parallel with the recognition of similar processes in the “first generation”. The research showed that pronounced ethnic and religious identification is more typical of the older generation of Tatarstan’s population (primarily of Tatar ethnicity), while younger respondents demonstrate it to a lesser extent. However, the authors observed a tendency of a decrease in the proportion of ethnic and religious indifference among young people as compared with the middle-age group. It is necessary to point out that there were undoubtedly study limitations related to data collection and analysis. For example, there was a 3% sampling error in the formation of the study sampling, which could cause a distortion of theoretical interpretations. In addition, the conclusions drawn from the mass survey apply only to the population of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the results of the interviews reflect only the subjective attitudes of the informants who were interviewed.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the authors of the research believe that identifying the specifics of the generation indigenization processes in the Republic of Tatarstan (characterized by bi-ethnic and bi-religious composition) can contribute to sociological studies of similar processes in all societies having a similar composition of population – subjected to radical socio-economic and cultural changes. This applies to the republics of the Russian Federation (Kazakhstan, Belarus, etc.), as well as countries which might seem too distant, but have a similar ethnic and religious composition (countries of Europe and Latin America).
REFERENCES


TWENGE, Jean M. 2017. iGen: why today’s super-connected kids are growing up less rebellious, more tolerant, less happy -and completely unprepared for adulthood -and what that means for the rest of us. Atria Books (Simon and Schuster). New York (USA).