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Different Approaches to the Difficult Relationship between Intelligence and Policy: A Case Study of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 vs. the 2003 War in Iraq
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Introduction

One of the main purposes of this article is to look at the theoretical aspect of the intelligence-policy linkage. This relationship will determine the correct role of intelligence in relation to policy, describing the way outsiders understand the role of intelligence. Furthermore the nature of the intelligence process itself will also be examined, in particular the way in which intelligence sees itself.

The work will be split into two different parts. Firstly different theoretical approaches will be presented relating to the “correct” relationship between intelligence and policymakers. Secondly, I will use a case study (the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) comparing it with the role of U.S intelligence in the aftermath of the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003 (totally different roles) to examine these approaches in practice.

If we go back 40 years to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it is possible to observe similar responses to Iraq and the threat to America’s security. Among the observations to be drawn from that experience is the one that military intervention is not always necessary, despite the need of showing the message of initiatives which challenge American power will be dealt with. The relevant lesson from the Cuban missile Crisis was the importance of revealing to a potential “coalition of the willing” the existence of a threat through incontrovertible evidence and intelligence. In the same way, as Richard Perle pointed out, an important reason for the war in Iraq is the U.S had to strike back and hard after 9/11, to prove that terrorism was not winning. So they needed to show confidence and strength. The main difference in both cases is that the use of intelligence in the 1962 case to justify the military threat succeeded, which was not the case when the same formula was employed with regard to Iraq in 2003.

1 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.

The history of the producer-consumer relation in intelligence is worthy of a thorough book length treatment. There has always been a difficult relationship between intelligence expertise and policy-makers. In liberal democracies there is a clear division in the relationship between Intelligence producer and Intelligence consumer. It is often based on institutional tradition and personal experiences which are difficult to generalize. In this sense the theoretical debate has been strongly developed in the U.S., where this point has been largely, and almost uniquely, studied.

Providing intelligence to the decision makers in general and to the policy process in particular, no matter how it is collected or analysed, is in many respects the “end game” of the intelligence process. Intelligence producers must be able to provide policy-makers with the kinds of relevant, accurate and timely analysis needed to devise their policy options, to reach critical decisions and to implement the final policy mandates. Unless this process is well dealt with, the other moves made by intelligence to collect and analyse information might well be wasted. The key question is how closely should intelligence producers work with policy-makers and still maintain their objective. The different approaches to this question will be presented here.

1. Theoretical approaches to the intelligence producer and consumer relationship

1.1. The traditionalist point of view

The first point of view is the traditionalist one which claims that intelligence must remain distantly aloof from policy interest or face the danger of becoming just another participant in the policy debate. In the very beginning of the creation of the U.S. intelligence community, William J. Donovan, Allen W. Dulles, and Roscoe Hillenkoetter were three of the earlier advocates of this position. They all believed that intelligence should distance itself from policy-making, research independent judgements about world events, and avoid tailoring intelligence judgements to satisfy the ideological drivers or policy preferences of decision-makers.

This view was also supported by Sherman Kent who wrote in 1949 that intelligence performs a service function, arguing that intelligence should initiate no direct interaction with its consumers but rather should respond to requests for data and analysis. He emphasised the independence of the intelligence process. One of Kent’s most finely honed doctrines addresses the relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence. One reason for the continued attention by academic specialists on Kent’s work, now over 55 years old, is that little else of Kent’s thoughts on the subject is readily available.

In the final chapter of Kent’s *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Kent characterized the relationship between producers and consumers of intelligence as the most delicate. For Kent the relationship is problematic for several reasons, the most prominent

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4 Kent, Sherman (1949): *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. In his book Kent pointed out “As Walter Lippmann sagely remarks: “The only institutional safeguard for impartial and objective analysis is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes form the staff which investigate”, p. 200
being the fact that policymakers do not naturally trust the quality and utility of the product of intelligence producers, nor the latter’s readiness to take responsibility for their assessments. He believed that the function of intelligence was to provide expert knowledge of the external world on the basis of which a sound policy would then be made, by those with expert knowledge of national politics. Intelligence has to provide objective scholarship, as getting too close to policy would undercut the whole purpose of such an effort. One cannot forget that Intelligence, once ignored, ultimately becomes useless. Intelligence must be close enough to policy plans and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, but must not be so close that it loses its objectivity and integrity of judgement. It is dangerous if analysts are too far or too close to policy-makers because in both cases they could lose their objectivity.

Sherman Kent was also the first to suggest the need for a conceptual re-evaluation, because without some direct communication with intelligence the consumers could ask for something that the organization is not set up to deliver, or for something not worth the effort and possibly too difficult to achieve. Kent realized that if intelligence analysts were to be prevented from becoming apologists for policy plans and objectives, its objectivity would have to be protected. The role of intelligence is to provide objective information to policymakers, but without the proper guidance and the confidence which goes with it, intelligence cannot produce the appropriate kind of knowledge.

Kent explained that there are a number of reasons why intelligence producers and consumers would have difficulties in achieving an effective relationship. First, strong loyalties along vertical organisational lines tended to increase institutional inertia. Secondly, Kent emphasised the consequences of security precautions taken by both intelligence consumers and producers. “The first rule of security is to have the secret known by as few people as possible and those of established discretion who at the same time must know the secret in order to do their share of the common task.” In this sense when the consumers and the producers rigidly apply the rule, they give the intelligence producers good cause for non-compliance, or the production of useless knowledge. Thirdly, consumers do not want to take risky policy adventures based on the word of those who did not carry the weight of operative responsibility. Fourthly, consumers saw intelligence as an external brain. The offence taken by some consumers at the doubts held by their counterparts in intelligence, concerning their ability to overcome subjective judgements, served to justify a more free give-and-take between them. Lastly, the misunderstanding between intelligence producers and consumers is an understandable reluctance on the part of the consumers to embark upon a hazardous task on the basis of someone else saying so.

The problem of objectivity and integrity, based on Kent’s work, is the other danger of being too close to the consumers. The work of intelligence could be described in two stages: the exhaustive examination of the situation for which a policy is required, and the objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy problems offer. There is however, no universal law which obligates policy, plans and operations to accept and use intelligence products. Although Kent advocates the development of a dialogue between producers and consumers his re-evaluation could be considered as an attempt to fit

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5 Kent, Strategic Intelligence..., op. cit., p. 180
6 Ibid., p. 185
7 Ibid., p. 190
8 Ibid., p. 193
9 Ibid., p. 195
10 Ibid., p. 201
traditionalist theory into practice\textsuperscript{11}. Despite this break from the rigid maxims of the traditionalist school, Kent still viewed the problem in organizational terms. Kent explains that the job of the intelligence producer is to stand behind policy makers.

1.2. Post-traditionalist

Outlining succinctly the position of the traditionalist viewpoint, Jack Zlotnick\textsuperscript{12} in his book *National Intelligence* (1964) argues that intelligence is not the only ingredient of the decision making process. Zlotnick was of the view that intelligence would be of more use when closer intertwined with the policy making process. This would permit more effective policy-making, so that intelligence could review its influence in past policies. He emphasised that it would be proper for intelligence analysts to examine the probable effects in foreign countries of alternative U.S. policies, and that intelligence analysts should be permitted to evaluate the results of policy decisions already made. John W. Huizenga, also a post-traditionalist, supported the traditional point of view in the Murphy commission of 1975, arguing that intelligence producers must be separate from policy-makers\textsuperscript{13}. Huizenga made clear that there must be both a functional separation and a continued dialogue between the two. He argued that intelligence was part of a deliberative process and that organizationally the structures of intelligence production and policy making had been separate.

1.3. The Activist school\textsuperscript{14}

As the U.S. intelligence community developed during the 60’s, experience with policy-makers began to soften the strict independence advocated by the traditionalists. The Activists sought to develop personal contacts with their consumers. Hence policy-makers increasingly sought intelligence advice. Often on an informal basis, consumers were encouraged to communicate their needs more specifically. Intelligence failures during the 1970s forced analysts to re-examine their methods and inevitably their relationship with policy makers. Those that believed in a symbiotic relationship between intelligence and policy advocated a closer association between the two and became part of what would be called the “Activist School”. Dialogue was stressed as the key concept in this framework and this school of thought advocated a closer working relationship between intelligence producers and consumers through the development of a two-way flow of information and feedback.

One of the most important advocates of the “Activist School” was Willmoore Kendall due to his work on the topic, titled “The Function of Intelligence” (1949)\textsuperscript{15}. In this study he


\textsuperscript{13} Huizenga was a member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, (1964-1966); thereafter Deputy Director, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency.


reviews Sherman Kent’s book. For Kendall the function of intelligence was to help policy makers influence the course of events, and saw nothing wrong with a closer relationship between intelligence and policy. Kendall’s review of Kent’s book, *Strategic Intelligence*..., also gave praise for his talent in describing the terminology and organizational map of intelligence. Kendall’s major salvos against Kent concerned the relation of intelligence to policy in a democratic society. He agreed with Kent on the need for guidance from policymakers to get the intelligence job done. More specifically, Kendall charges Kent with a compulsive preoccupation with prediction and elimination of surprise from foreign affairs. Kendall sees the intelligence functions as helping the policymakers influence the course of events by helping them understand the operative factors on which national security can have an impact.

This author had two additional criticisms of what he considered Kent’s flawed theory of producer-consumer relations. Firstly Kendall saw Kent’s endorsement of the traditional separations of intelligence from domestic affairs as self-defeating, if the goal of the intelligence unit is to bring to bear the knowledge on which foreign policy decisions are to be made. Finally, he charged that Kent, yet again endorsing current practices, would have the intelligence unit labouring for a mid-level rather than a top-level audience. Kendall rejected the intelligence function as a research assistant to bureaucratic policy planners.

Roger Hilsman was also of the view that Intelligence analysts should be encouraged to examine how information acquired on policy problems affects the course of action. Furthermore, Intelligence should examine policy situations continually by providing background facts before decisions are made, and monitoring the reactions after policy decisions have been reached. Roger Hilsman\(^{16}\) discovered that among the activist point of view some radicals argued that policy- makers would still have the responsibility to choose. For Hilsman Intelligence should not collect indiscriminately, some sort of feedback mechanism between producer and consumer is needed to counteract feelings of isolation on the part of intelligence analysts, many of whom never know what happens to their reports. It was also Roger Hilsman in his book *Strategic Intelligence and National Decision* (1956) who pointed the need for a more thorough theoretical change. In the book he pointed out that the function of intelligence analysis is to fulfil the need of policy makers with a background of the general situation by providing factual statements without prejudice. For Hilsman intelligence should adopt tools expressly for the needs of policy makers, but the inertia of a large organization and the persistent mind-set of individuals would present serious obstacles.

Benno Wasserman\(^{17}\) in the 1960s presented his views on Hilsman’s opinions. He claimed that if intelligence is divorced from policy it would not result in the best available knowledge and intelligence would start providing irrelevant information to the policy- maker, therefore the maximum interaction between the two of them would be necessary. Wasserman also claimed that Intelligence failures force the intelligence community to re-examine their methods and their relationship with policy-makers.

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\(^{17}\)Wasserman, Benno: “The Failure of Intelligence Prediction,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1960), pp. 156-169
William J. Brands, an activist supporter on the 1975 Murphy commission, argued that intelligence analysis cannot be cut off from the policy process, because their work would become isolated and carried out in a vacuum. For Brands the product of intelligence had to be accurate and useful Intelligence for the policy-makers. Therefore the intelligence community had to know the foci of collection, together with feedback from policy-makers.

2. A case study: The role of U.S. Intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 vs. the role of U.S. intelligence in the last Iraq War.

The Cuban missile crisis is one of the most studied events in the history of international politics. It is in many senses a story about intelligence; a story about intelligence failure and success, and a story about the support of the intelligence to the decision making. In that sense intelligence can tell us many things about the Cuban missile crisis, but as James G Blight points out, intelligence can learn many things from the Cuban missile crisis too. There are many studies about the national leaders (John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro) but there have been relatively few studies on the intelligence dimension during the crisis. Hence, in this part of the article we will try to assess the role of the U.S. intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 compared with the role of U.S. intelligence during the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003, as an empirical comparative example of the theoretical approaches presented below. In that sense in this particular example the main impact of U.S. intelligence in 1962 was informing U.S. policy, rather than providing and adequate solution to the crisis itself. Although in Iraq the use of intelligence under the Bush administration was much more different.

The study of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 compared with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 will be an excellent practical example of the correct relationship between intelligence and policy. Presenting on the one hand the empirical ideas of the traditionalists and Sherman Kent—who claim that intelligence performs a service function, that intelligence should initiate no direct interaction with its consumers but rather should respond to requests for data and analysis, and emphasize the independence of the intelligence process—in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 1962, and on the other hand in the view of the activists, who defend that Intelligence must be close enough to policy plans and operations to have the greatest amount of guidance, as it seemed to be in the 2003 U.S. invasion in Iraq. As it will be seen, it is always dangerous if analysts are too far or too close to policy-makers because in both cases they could lose their objectivity.

As Christopher Andrew points out “In the space of only one year, the threats posed by Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein had succeeded in transforming British government on the public use of intelligence”. In this sense the relationship between policy-makers and their intelligence advisors come under unprecedented public scrutiny in all the Western countries.

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20 In his book Kent pointed out: “As Walter Lippmann sagely remarks the only institutional safeguard for impartial and objective analysis is to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes form the staff which investigate”. Kent, Strategic Intelligence..., op. cit., p. 200
21 Ibid., p. 180.
That was highly motivated when In Iraq in March and April 2003, the United States invaded a country and, with Britain, and other allies using a conclusive military force to overthrow a regime which had been in place for almost 24 years.

In that sense three things happened in Iraq in March/April 2003 – an invasion, a military campaign and a start on the reconstruction of that country. In making the case for this, the UK and U.S. governments drew “with exceptional frankness” on the reports of their intelligence agencies. In using and, maybe, abusing such material the governments laid themselves open to charges of deception in arguing the case for war. In particular the leaders of the U.S. and UK have been charged with purposefully distorting intelligence information in order to justify their decisions to make war in Iraq in April 2003. The need for a better understanding of both the nature of the intelligence process and its importance to national and international security policy has never been more apparent.

As Jake Blood affirms,

The variables of the Tet Effect - bad intelligence used by leaders to portray a disingenuous image to the public and then shown to be wrong with a resultant loss of credibility haven been repeated in the Iraq war during late 2002 and 2003 as bad intelligence, bearing witness that Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction and links with Al-Qaeda terrorist, was used by US and British leaders to convince the public that a pre-emptive attack was justified.

In fact the relationship in the last war on Iraq is really similar of how Kendall and the activists see the intelligence functions, as helping the policymakers influence the course of events by helping them understand the operative factors on which national security can have an impact. Hence, Democrats have typically accused the Bush Administration of exaggerating the threat posed by Iraq in order to justify an unnecessary war. Republicans have typically claimed that the fault lays with the CIA and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, which they say overestimated the threat from Iraq. The issue in the Iraq war, however, was not one of false estimations in either direction, but rather “the deliberate deception of the American people on a massive scale” for the purpose of executing plans for “conquering Iraq”. In that sense, the U.S. had decided even before September 11, 2001 to overthrow Saddam Hussein but the drive for war ran into serious opposition in summer 2003, particularly from respected Republican moderates such as retired general Brent Scowcroft, who warned that an invasion of Iraq “could turn the whole region into a cauldron and, thus, destroy the war on terrorism.” The Bush administration’s response “was to craft a scheme to convince America and the world that war with Iraq was necessary and urgent, a scheme, unfortunately, that required patently untrue public statements and egregious manipulations of intelligence.” In that sense White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card set up a special White House Information Group chaired by Karl Rove in August 2002 to coordinate all the executive branch elements in the campaign.

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23 A claim that carries the unlikely implication that Bush's team might not have opted for war if it had understood that Saddam was not as dangerous as he seemed.
3. The lead-up to the 1962 crisis and the dawn of the Iraq invasion in 2003

One of the main questions usually posed about U.S. intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 has concerned the failure to estimate that the Soviet leadership would deploy strategic missiles to Cuba. Despite this, it was evident that intelligence did identify the missiles in sufficient time.

The U.S. public and government were gravely concerned about the creation of a Communist state and member of the Soviet Bloc only seventy miles from its southern shores; this problem became a major focus of the new Kennedy administration when it took office in January 1961. In response to the potential threat and the administration’s interest in it, the U.S. intelligence community began a new focus on information about Cuba. The National Security Agency also beefed up its coverage of Cuba and Soviet support for the island nation.

In La Havana, one of the consequences of its alignment with the USSR was a fear that the United States might intervene against the new Cuban government. This fear materialized in later 1961 when Cuban exiles, trained by America’s CIA, staged an invasion of Cuban territory at the Bay of Pigs. The operation Zapata failed completely, and the U.S. government and its intelligence apparatus suffered an embarrassing setback. The defeat of Zapata had two important consequences. Firstly, it helped influence Moscow’s decision to defend Castro. Therefore, as John Prados states “The bay of Pigs invasion was followed by an expansion of Soviet military aid to Cuba.” In order to counter Washington’s intention of removing Castro, the Soviet leadership deployed military forces and nuclear weapons on the island (although this must be qualified by the fact that the Soviet Union was also interested in redressing what it saw as its inferiority in strategic forces). Secondly, the collapse of the invasion discredited the U.S. intelligence community in the eyes of President Kennedy, who from then on would trust his own judgement and advisors, thus limiting the role of U.S. intelligence. As Christopher Andrew writes “Henceforth… Kennedy place less trust in the intelligence professionals and more in the opinions of his main personal advisors.”

On the other hand, in 1991, President George H. W. Bush called on the people of Iraq to rise up against Saddam Hussein, and in Shiite southern Iraq the people did it. But the U.S. let these people down. The rebellion was crushed as the U.S. stood by. And now many years later, many Iraqis had not forgotten. America now finds itself locked in a struggle with a fierce insurgency that is using suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, beheadings, ambushes, kidnappings, and assassinations to kill Iraqis, Americans, and coalition forces. The insurgency grew out of the sudden fall of Saddam Hussein and the total collapse of domestic political authority. It drew fighters from the ranks of thousands of hostile, unemployed military veterans armed with an abundance of weapons. But many of the combatants killed or captured by American and allied forces in Iraq are insurgents created by opposition to the U.S. invasion itself. They have little to do with the jihadists that the United States has been actively hunting since 9/11, although some have been converted to al-Qaeda’s ideology since joining the resistance.

Back in the 1960s, early indications of that build-up came from signals intelligence the exploitation of Soviet and Soviet Bloc communications that carried information related to the arms supply operations. Beginning late in 1960 and extending through 1961, NSA intercepted messages concerning Soviet ships headed for Havana. One problem shared by intelligence analysts and administration policymakers alike was the nature of the military deliveries. Most of the military equipment could be described accurately as defensive, but much of it could also be used in taking the offence. At that time one of the primary questions for the Americans was: would the Soviets introduce offensive missiles into Cuban territory?

The CIA at this time was collating the most recent intelligence. Even if Cuba was not being turned into an offensive military base, there was no doubt that there was military aid on an extensive scale. An “unusually large number of Soviet ships” were reported to be delivering military cargoes, with “military construction under way at several locations” and “unconfirmed reports” that Soviet bloc personnel might now total as many as five thousand. The best guess was that the basic objective was to establish an air defence system. It was assumed that any military construction would be defensive in function, “a launching pad directed against the U.S. would be too blatant a provocation.” The State Department concurred that the build-up was a largely defensive move, reflecting concerns about the threat to Cuba.

In the early spring of 1962, there was no evidence of possible Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba. In that sense President Kennedy’s public statements of 4 and 13 September stated, correctly, that the United States had no evidence of Soviet deployment of strategic (offensive) missiles in Cuba. The statements were intended in part to reassure the American public, but also to warn the Soviet leaders.

A special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 85-3-62) “The Military Build-Up in Cuba” was issued on 19 September 1962. It considered the possibility that the Kremlin “would deploy medium-range missiles to Cuba, and noted that such developments would concern considerable military advantage on the Soviet Union”, However this scenario was dismissed as unlikely because such risk-taking would not be congruent with past Soviet behaviour. It led policymakers as well as the intelligence analysts to believe that the Soviet Union had no intention to deploy missiles on Cuban soil. There was insufficient evidence to justify a conclusion that Soviet missiles would be (or still less, were being) placed in Cuba. But there was a possibility to do that. In words of Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) in 1962, “As is quite apparent, the thrust of (SNIE 85-3-62) was that the Soviets would be unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons into Cuba. There is no blinking the fact that we [the BNE] came down on the wrong side.”

31 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 128.
For an extensive period of time the U.S. intelligence community had held the view that the Soviet Union would not attempt to deploy missiles in Cuba. As intelligence analysts often look to the past to foresee the future, no assumption had been made that the Soviets would break from the status quo. Another analytical flaw, that of mirror-imaging, led them to the belief that attempting to deploy missiles in Cuba would simply be far too risky an endeavour to attempt. Intelligence analysts believed that the USSR fully understood American capabilities and that they simply would not risk drawing the wrath of the U.S. by deploying missiles in its own backyard. Furthermore U.S. intelligence believed that the Soviet Union would not want to risk having its missiles fall into the hands of foreign commanders and leaders on a foreign soil.

One notable dissenter had been John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) at the time. He believed that the increased deployment of expensive Soviet antiaircraft weapons (SA-2 surface-to-air missiles) in Cuba must be to protect something really valuable. He concluded that the Soviets wished to hide something of extreme importance from the United States. McCone had held the suspicion for some time, and advised President John F. Kennedy so, that the Soviets would attempt to deploy offensive missiles in Cuba. In a cable to Deputy DCI Marshall Carter on 10 September, McCone had suggested as much:

Appears to me quite possible [Air defence] measures now being taken are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs [Medium Range Ballistic Missiles] to be installed by Soviets after present phase complete and country secured from over flights.

Unfortunately the DCI did not have allies in the Kennedy administration with a similar judgement, and therefore his opinion on the matter was ignored. When McCone’s judgements had finally proven to be correct the Cuban missile crisis had begun. Thus, in the lead up to the crisis, U.S. intelligence (as a reflection of U.S. foreign policy) played a critical role in provoking the Soviet Union into deploying strategic offensive weapons into Cuba, yet the intelligence community’s estimative process failed to predict this potential outcome.

On 10 October 1962 NSA reported that the Cuban air defence system seemed to be complete. At this point, 14 October analysis of photographs in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) taken on the U-2 flights revealed to the U.S. senior leadership that the Soviet Union was preparing sites to install SS-4s, medium-range ballistic missiles, surprising not only Washington but the U.S. intelligence community as a whole. In that sense, DCI McCone, alone among the government’s senior leaders, had been correct about Soviet intentions. President John F. Kennedy secretly convened a series of emergency meetings of his senior military, diplomatic, and political advisors, a grouping that became known as the Executive Committee, or ExComm, to seek ways of coping with this ominous development.

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36 Larson, op. cit., p. 62.
37 Ibid., p. 63.
41 The main US intelligence actors during that time compromised several agencies as well as the CIA. The largest elements were several military organizations under the Department of Defence, Defence Intelligence
In this sense, as Jack Zlotnick has argued correctly, intelligence is not the only ingredient of the decision making process.

In this particular point concerning the analysis the relationship between intelligence and policy-makers, American intelligence did positively identify Soviet missiles prior to their becoming operational, which permitted the Kennedy administration to seize the initiative in attempting to secure their remove. For this reason, many scholars consider this a major intelligence success. If the missiles had become operational before the U.S. knew about them, and President Kennedy was presented a fait accompli by Khrushchev, the U.S. would have suffered a grave diplomatic defeat. As an empirical example of the intelligence producer and consumer relationship, U.S. intelligence’s role in 1962 had been simply to inform the President that the Soviet Union was installing strategic offensive weapons in Cuba. Intelligence could not provide the solution to the crisis. This is another example of the traditionalist view during the treatment of the Cuban missile crisis and Sherman Kent’s ideas arguing that the role of intelligence is to provide objective information to policymakers.

At the same time, during the first stage of the crisis in 1962 U.S. intelligence had been busy attempting to predict Soviet responses to any actions it chose to undertake. The emphasis was placed on actions that the U.S. could take which would reduce as much as possible the risk of harsh responses and more importantly, nuclear war. Intelligence estimates at the time saw an air-strike and increasing military actions as much riskier and dangerous than a full-on invasion. The former option was deemed most likely to force the Soviet Union to respond militarily, but both options were seen as too risky.

On the other hand, in Iraq 2003 questions about the manipulation of intelligence have been underlined about the “cooking of intelligence” for the justification of the war in Iraq. As President Bush has declared, “...in an age in which we are at war, the consequences of underestimating a threat could be tens of thousands of innocent lives.” He continued: “And my administration will continue to make intelligence reforms that will allow us to identify threats before they fully emerge so we can take effective action to protect the American people.” The lesson would be that the consequences of overestimating a threat have already included the destruction of the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqis and over 1,700 U.S., British and other foreign troops. That means acting on threats “before they fully emerged”.

At the same time, these critiques about the “cooking of intelligence are based not only in the WMD but in the connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda.” “The CIA possesses solid...
reporting of senior-level contacts between Iraq and Al-Qaeda going back a decade”, CIA Director George Tenet said in a written statement released 7 October 2002 and repeated in that evening’s speech by President Bush.

It was through the media that details of Al-Qaeda operations were made known to Western populations; yet there were of potential importance in helping prepare the public and political ground for an attack on Iraq. In the intelligence side, the critical intelligence assessment on the October 2002 of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), said that the U.S. intelligence community at that time knew that Saddam Hussein had had WMD programs and stockpiles of especially chemical weapons. In that sense it cannot be forgotten that Saddam had a long history of brandishing those programs. As a result almost all intelligence analysis shared a strong preconception with policy officials: Saddam must still have WMD programs. Senator Hillary Clinton said:

> In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. Should he succeed in that endeavour, he could alter the political and security landscape of the Middle East, which as we know all too well affects American security”.

As Gregory F. Treverton pointed out “ignorance reinforced that preconception”. Surprisingly little new information was collected after the UN inspectors were expelled in 1998.

In that sense, the Senate Intelligence committee concluded that while “most of the major key judgments” in the October 2002 NIE were “either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence report,” the failures were a result of “systematic weaknesses, primarily in analytic trade craft, compounded by a lack of information sharing, poor management, and inadequate intelligence collection” as well as a “groupthink” mentality, rather than administration pressure. In other words, they blamed the lower-ranking analysts.


Another important question that was posed by the policy makers in 1962 was how soon these systems would be operational.

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48 Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, on 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “Iraq’s Continuing Program of WMD”.
The initial reaction of ExComm members to the discovery of the weapons was an immediate air-strike to destroy the missiles before they became operational. The Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara pointed out at the 16 October meeting that it was important that an air strike, if one was decided upon, should be made before the missiles could become operational in case any survived the strike\(^5\). Intelligence experts conclude that it would be a matter of days. In that sense U.S. intelligence was not able to identify the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba at any time during the crisis, although the question was raised in ExComm on several occasions, no information was acquired that could positively answer it. Instead, there was a general consensus that the existence of nuclear warheads in Cuba must in prudence be assumed\(^5\). It is necessary to see that Iraq was a similar case, but with opposite consequences, as the Weapons of Mass Destruction have not been found yet. But in spite of that the invasion took place.

On October 22, President Kennedy appeared on television and announced the U-2 findings to the American people\(^5\). Despite assurances from the Soviet government that the build-up was defensive in nature, he said, “medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles had been introduced into Cuba”. He called for their withdrawal or elimination\(^5\). As one measure to solve the crisis, he proclaimed a naval “quarantine” of Cuban ports to prevent the introduction of additional Soviet armaments. Kennedy also warned that further actions might be needed if the build-up of offensive weapons continued\(^5\).

On 27 October, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, and U.S. military Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Kennedy that the United States proceeded with an air strike and invasion plan\(^5\). Later that day, when low-level reconnaissance pilots reported anti-aircraft fire from the ground in Cuba and photographs showed that some missiles had been placed on launchers, Kennedy told his advisers “time is running out.”\(^5\) According to declassified documents, that day the crisis appeared to be spinning out of control. The next day, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of missiles secretly deployed in Cuba, pressed by U.S. photographic evidence\(^5\) and a naval blockade imposed on the island by President John F. Kennedy\(^5\).

A Navy SIGINT direction finding net in the Atlantic located the Soviet ships by intercepting and triangulating messages that were being sent back to the Soviet Union\(^5\). The ships were stopped dead in the water, outside the ring of American naval vessels waiting for them. A confrontation had been averted, one that might have precipitated war. The president, his cabinet\(^6\), and the American people could breathe a little easier. Later, once the Soviets agreed to remove the ballistic missiles from Cuba, NSA reports also provided evidence to the American government that the Communist Bloc also considered the crisis over. Later on

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\(^5\) Blight and Welch, op. cit., p. 27.


\(^5\) Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 219.


\(^5\) May and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 392

\(^5\) Ibid.


\(^5\) Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., pp. 230-236


\(^6\) Kennedy’s Cabinet during the Crisis, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSA/publications/cmc/cmc.html.
President Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, met with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, and offered a deal that included a pledge not to invade Cuba and the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey 62.

U.S. Intelligence in 1962 was able to verify the removal of the 42, SS-4 medium-range missiles, and later the 42, Il-28 light bombers, assisted by cooperative Soviet measures facilitating U.S. aerial inspection of missiles stored above deck on Soviets ships. Intelligence, as a unilateral means of verification, could not positively determine that there were no additional missiles that had not been seen or declared.

Since the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. Intelligence Community has supplied great quantities of information and analysis on Iraq to policymakers, and the supply increased especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Hence, from late November 2002 to March 2003, UN inspectors combed Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under the threat of war from the United States and a Security Council resolution (1441), but they never did. Indeed, in Iraq neither U.S. intelligence nor the UN inspectors could find the evidence that justified the war. After 16 weeks, inspectors turned up some evidence of undeclared activities (the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted over 750 inspections at 550 sites), but not enough to convince a majority of the Security Council members that military force was necessary. Nevertheless, on March 19, 2003, U.S. and British forces attacked Iraq to forcibly eliminate its WMD.

The UN inspectors failed to find proof that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and the Bush Administration turn to intelligence to make the “case” that the UN inspectors had failed to make, to proof that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Who would make the case to the American public, to the UN, to the world, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and intent to use them? Someone with unquestioned credibility was necessary, so the President turned to his Secretary of State Colin Powell: “You have the credibility to do it” 63.

While Powell was preparing for his UN speech, President Bush was starting the new public relation campaign to prepare America and the world for pre-emptive war against Iraq. On the 28 of January 2003 he gave his State of the Union Address In his 2002 he had introduced the “Axis of Evil Terrorism” and the Rogue States of North Korea, Iran and Iraq. In 2003 he gave an update of each rogue state. The charges had been made; now it was the time for Secretary Powell to provide the evidence.

With Tenet sitting behind him, Secretary Powell addressed the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. “My colleagues: Every statement I make today is back up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions, what are we giving you are facts and conclusion based on solid intelligence” 64. Powell displayed to the UN and the world evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction including biological chemical and nuclear programs. He also provided evidence of Iraq’s links to terrorism.

As we are trying to point out here, intelligence has no goal in justifying anything; its aim in any democratic government is to present the fact to the decision-makers. In fact, in Iraq U.S. intelligence was badly used to defend without any proof the war in Iraq. In the other

62 Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., pp. 359-36.1
hand, Kennedy administration in 1962 with many more proofs in the table and with in many cases wrong intelligence information handled the crisis in a completely different way.

Even if an administration chooses an activist relation with the intelligence producers that does not mean that intelligence has to lose its objectivity. In fact, Kendall’s views for the intelligence community are quite right when he points out that Intelligence tends to know relatively little about the nature and scope of policy discussions. Intelligence has to be as accurate as possible about its level of confidence and must to separate fact from judgement, but as Kendall argues these differences are not always obvious to consumers or even noticed by them.

5. The impact of Soviet deception about the range of the force deployed in Cuba, 1962 and U.S. deception about the range of Saddam Hussein capabilities in 2003

We cannot forget that, U.S. intelligence in 1962 only photographed a limited part of the total amount of SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles placed in Cuba, and never located the nuclear warheads. In that sense the estimate of the overall Soviet military personnel in Cuba was erroneous too. Now after some declassifications we know that the size of the Cuban (and supporting Soviets) forces was underestimated.

The intelligence on the number of Soviet troops available to fight was inaccurate. Instead of facing only indigenous Cuban troops, American forces would have found themselves confronting Soviet combat units. There were estimated to be just 8,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba until 22 October, when this was revised upward to 10,000. Two days later the estimates jumped up to 22,000. Soviet sources later claimed that the actual number was twice as high: 41,902 as against 45,000 planned. Subsequent occupation may have been troublesome as intelligence estimates could not accurately identify how the Cuban population would react to the presence of Americans on their soil. Such uncertainty decreased the likelihood of a green-light being given for an invasion.

Respecting this particular point, it is really interesting to see how the things had made completely different in Iraq. In that sense, in Iraq not one of the claims that the Bush administration made about Iraq’s alleged stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, missiles, unmanned drones, or most importantly, Iraq’s nuclear weapons and ties to Al Qaeda, which let “justification” for the invasion, have been demonstrated yet.

George Bush said on 7 October 2002, in a speech in Cincinnati, “The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.”

But today’s information point out that during the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War Saddam Hussein did not have any of these weapons, did not have production programs for manufacturing these weapons, and did not have plans to restart programs for these weapons. In fact, the most that Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group, was able to tell

65 Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 135.
66 Hilsman, op. cit., p. 88.
67 Fusenko, op. cit., p. 43.
Congress in October 2003 was that Saddam might have had the “intention” to restart these programs at some point. As Duelfer reported, the weapons and facilities had been destroyed by the United Nations inspectors and U.S. bombing strikes in the 1990s, and he found no evidence of “concerted efforts to restart the program” ; although, when the United States and its coalition partners invaded Iraq, the American public and much of the rest of the world believed that after Saddam Hussein’s regime sank, a vast flotsam of weapons of mass destruction would bob to the surface. But that has not been the case.

In the words of David Kay, the principal adviser to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an organization created late last spring to search for prohibited weaponry, “I think all of us who entered Iraq expected the job of actually discovering deployed weapons to be easier than it has turned out to be.” “It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment,” Kay said at the hearing. “And that is most disturbing.”

Our biggest problem in assessing the Iraqi weapons programs was simply that we lacked reliable, independent sources of information about threats that are increasingly difficult to see. The equipment for making chemical and biological weapons is nearly identical to that for making pesticides and beer, and the really essential components are the knowledge inside the weapons makers’ heads. What’s more, we have yet to figure out how to penetrate closed societies such as Iraq. All the other problems followed from this basic lack of data.

“We believe Saddam has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons,” said Vice President Cheney on 16 March 2003, on “Meet the Press.”

Despite of the CIA reports up through 2002 showed no evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. It now appears that after 1998 Iraq did indeed have chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs but they were in a “standby” mode, with Saddam waiting for the day United Nations sanctions would break down. The programs were mainly on paper or in the heads of technicians, and apparently did not amount to much. But when combined with U.S inability to crack Iraqi secrecy, these hibernating programs and Iraq’s past behaviour gave the impression of a much bigger and more successful clandestine effort. When U.S. intelligence spotted an illegal sale, hidden transaction or residue of a program that had been put on hold, U.S analysts concluded that Iraq still planned to develop the weapons. The satellite imagery and telephone intercepts that Secretary of State Colin Powell presented at the United Nations in February 2003 “were real”. The U.S just didn’t analyse all these things correctly.

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71 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/sources.htm
74 “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council”, in http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html. Also see: http://www.un.int/usa/03clp0205.htm
The key document in the Bush administration’s campaign was the CIA White Paper on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs\textsuperscript{75}. The White Paper was quickly produced and distributed to the public in October 2002\textsuperscript{76} as an unclassified version of the NIE that was given to Congress in the same month, just a few days before the vote to authorize the use of force. These documents “convinced” the majority of congressional members, experts, and journalists that Saddam had a powerful and growing arsenal\textsuperscript{77}.

President Bush said in Cincinnati on 7 October 2002: “The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program ... Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminium tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{78}

The New York Times published an article on October 3, 2004\textsuperscript{79}, detailing how the administration manipulated the evidence to support a claim that Iraq had imported aluminium tubes for centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In the same way, David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, presented in his report “Iraq’s Aluminium Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction,”\textsuperscript{80} the main reasons for which the Bush administration did not listen the intelligence reports:

A major reason for the administration’s selective statements can be traced to its need to gain support for going to war against Iraq. When the administration first publicly raised the aluminium tubes in early September 2002, polls showed that the Congress and the U.S. public were not convinced that the administration had made a compelling case against Iraq. The polls also demonstrated that the majority of the public wanted both Congressional and United Nations support for any U.S. military assault\textsuperscript{81}.

In this sense, senior American officials like Condoleezza Rice said that “the tubes are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.”\textsuperscript{82} but she knew it was untrue. She had already been briefed on the disagreements in the intelligence community and knew that leading U.S. experts did not think the tubes were at all suitable for centrifuges.

Long before the war, the U.S. intelligence community knew enough to raise serious doubts about the assertion that these aluminium tubes were specifically intended for gas centrifuges. Key experts of the U.S. intelligence community and experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contested the claim that the tubes were for centrifuges, which was being pushed by the CIA\textsuperscript{83}.

\textsuperscript{75} http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_tenet.pdf
\textsuperscript{77} The first paragraph of the White Paper concludes that Iraq “probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.” This claim was then repeated endlessly to the public. See Cirincione, Joseph; Matthews, Jessica Tuchman; Perkovich, George, with Orton, Alexis: WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, Carnegie, Carnegie Endowment Report (January 2004).
\textsuperscript{78} http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
\textsuperscript{79} http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60D10F73B5C708C05050BC1C497480A92
\textsuperscript{80} Albright, David: “Iraq’s Aluminium Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction”. 5 December 2003, in http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{83} Albright, op. cit.
Comparing the two cases (the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2003 war in Iraq), it is important to notice that despite in Iraq 2003 the Weapons of Mass Destruction have never been founded, the U.S. Government presented the evidences about the WMD to “Justified” the actions on Iraq. On the other hand in 1962 despite of the U.S. Intelligence had no idea about the WMD in Cuba, the military active action was dismissed. We can argue that the use of intelligence in both cases was quite different. According to Ray McGovern, “the evidence in Iraq was simply not there”, they used Intelligence to justify the worst case scenario, with a hypothetical nuclear strike because people fear a nuclear scenario so much.

But in Iraq 2003 as in Cuba 1962 the evidences of nuclear warheads were not there by the time they needed them. As the President of the U.S. George Bush pointed out, “we cannot wait until the final proof… We have to deal with those threats before they become imminent”; or as Donald Rumsfeld said, “we have to take action before is too late”.

6. The role of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Difference use for similar cases

If the entire Iraq invasion in 2003 was an intelligence failure, the failure lies there, with collection and Human Intelligence. Lacking a diplomatic presence in Iraq, the U.S. seems not to have had much HUMINT, that is, spies close to Saddam. In that sense, for HUMINT, the U.S. was dependent on friendly intelligence services, and so found it harder to calibrate what it received. There was a Saddam disinformation campaign. Even after he readmitted the UN inspectors he still behaved like a man who had something to hide.

Intelligence collection, including espionage and other forms of HUMINT, was important in both cases, despite no CIA agents in Cuba in 1962 were able to provide firm evidence of the Soviet development. There were many reports from agents and refugees of suspicious military activities in Cuba, “there were literally thousands of reports of missiles in Cuba in the period before any missiles were actually brought”. That made it even more difficult to credit the few that were later found to be true. So only in late September after the 19 September SNIE a few reports were received that gave valid sightings of the missiles, but that could not determined at the time. In that sense U.S. intelligence analysts assumed that the Soviet Union would no deploy offensive missiles in Cuba, so they were insensitive to the vast amount of human intelligence; such as refugee reports and sightings by operatives in Cuba that suggested a deployment was underway. The CIA may have failed to detect the missiles earlier in part because they did not expect the missiles to be there at all. CIA analysts seek only information that would support their expectations, rather than information that would disconfirm them.

Human intelligence also proved to be useful in raising American suspicions. Reports from Cuban agents and refugees at the same time had informed the Americans of irregular...
activities within Cuba\textsuperscript{89}. Whilst naval intelligence could not ascertain the contents of these shipments, human intelligence reports though helpful, proved to be inexact and unreliable.

The reports of Cuban refugees were often based on rumours and imagination, rather than any hard evidence. Refugee reports would also take a long time to arrive as precautions had to be taken to avoid their discovery.\textsuperscript{90} The large volume of refugee reports, numbering into the thousands, also made it an excruciatingly difficult task to separate the wheat from the chaff. Though the CIA had increased the number of personnel to deal with the refugees, it was simply unable to efficiently deal with the many reports it was receiving. From the reports that it did manage to analyse, only eight proved to be accurate; identifying movements of trailer convoys within Cuba that had previously not been there. Although refugees had identified the convoys, they were unable to tell U.S. intelligence what precisely the trailers were transporting. Another refugee group had accurately described a launch site for a nuclear missile, whilst other refugees had identified a missile storage facility in its early stages of construction.\textsuperscript{91} As most of these refugee reports could not be confirmed this led to the dismissal of the sightings in analytical estimates.\textsuperscript{92} Yet it was these reports that raised the suspicions of analysts about Soviet missiles being deployed in Cuba, although by that time the CIA’s U-2 reconnaissance plane had already helped identify launch sites being constructed.

On the other hand, in Iraq 2003 the U.S. government “uses” the information coming form the defectors as high standard one. Donald Rumsfeld has pointed out that “the most important information that the inspectors have ever gotten what is going on in Iraq here comes from defectors” such as Achmad Chalabi or Sharif Ali Bin Al-Hussein. But we cannot forget that these guys wanted to get back into Baghdad, they could not defeat Saddam Hussein themselves but they knew the U.S. military power could. As we see in Chalabi declaration before the U.S. Congress “there is no risk of a break up of Iraq, none would defend Iraq”\textsuperscript{93}. Here, the U.S. government used the information coming form dissidents and refugees as verdict even knowing that this information was highly conditioned for the political aims and personal interest of these people.

“Curveball,”\textsuperscript{94} was the code name given to an Iraqi defector who fabricated a story that was the source, “of virtually all of the Intelligence Community’s information about Iraq’s alleged mobile biological weapons facilities.” It was the Iraqi defector’s testimony that led the Bush administration to claim that Saddam had built a fleet of trucks and railway wagons to produce anthrax and other deadly germs. The inventions of “Curveball” featured prominently in the speech delivered by then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council in February 2003, on the eve of the Iraq invasion\textsuperscript{95}.

In this sense the Iraqi exiles and their stories were believed a word of God, they got a good hearing, through Vice President Dick Cheney’s office and the Pentagon’s newly created

\textsuperscript{89} Fusneko, op. cit., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{90} Botti, op. cit., p. 149.
\textsuperscript{91} Botti, op. cit., p. 153.
\textsuperscript{92} Fusneko, op. cit., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{95} http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html
“Office of Special Plans” (OSP)\textsuperscript{96}. It was created by the Defence Department’s civilian leadership, as a separate in-house intelligence agency tasked with “spreading the most explicit possible accounts of Iraqi weapons and supposed terrorist ties”. The purpose of the unit was precisely to circumvent the vetting carried out at the CIA. The OSP was focused to the relationship between the Bush administration and the media in the period leading up to the war. According to multiple accounts, those in the CIA who objected to such “intelligence” were subjected to immense pressure by the Bush administration.

### 7. The role of U.S. Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). From 1962 to 2003

Using the U-2’s imagery intelligence the U.S. had realised that arms were being brought to Cuba as early as July of 1962.\textsuperscript{97} Yet imagery intelligence didn’t prove to be useful until close to the final stages of deployment (October 14) when overhead pictures made Soviet intentions very clear. In its early stages it was simply impossible to identify what was being transported onto the Cuban mainland.\textsuperscript{98} It was only in late August that the USSR had acknowledged arms shipments to Cuba and this crucially made no mention of the deployment of long-range nuclear missiles, and was instead cloaked in the guise of ordinary arms shipments and technical military training.\textsuperscript{99} U.S. suspicions had initially been raised with naval and human intelligence.\textsuperscript{100} The U.S. had already been long aware of what ships regularly came and left Cuba so it was an easy task to identify the new Soviet ships that were now making their way towards Cuban ports.\textsuperscript{101} Aerial reconnaissance around and over Cuba by U.S. air Force and U.S. Naval aircraft was the most important direct means of monitoring the military build-up in Cuba (U-2 missions)\textsuperscript{102} because there was no direct satellite photographic reconnaissance over Cuba in 1962.

In the more than two years before that fact was known, SIGINT analysts thoroughly studied the Cuban military build-up. Once the offensive missiles were discovered, SIGINT provided direct support for day-to-day management of the crisis\textsuperscript{103}. At the NSA\textsuperscript{104}, the response to the crisis was led by its director, Lieutenant General Gordon Blake. To ensure timely responses to unexpected needs by the consumers of SIGINT, General Blake established NSA’s first around-the-clock command centre. General Blake also took responsibility for getting NSA’s product to the White House and interpreting its sometimes arcane indicators to the policymakers.

At the end of August a U-2 aircraft over Cuba had spotted SA-2 air defence missiles. This not only put the U-2s themselves at risk in further flights but also implied that there was something worth defending. To McConie the most likely answer was nuclear missiles.\textsuperscript{105} In

\textsuperscript{96} Peebles, op. cit., p. 22.  
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 24.  
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 28.  
\textsuperscript{99} fusenko, p. 73.  
\textsuperscript{101} Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 95.  
\textsuperscript{103} NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00033.cfm, 23 May 2005.  
\textsuperscript{104} Peebles, op. cit., p. 58.
meetings thereafter policymakers had to consider their response. Would the appropriate response be “blockades of Soviet and bloc shipping into Cuba or alternatively a total blockade of Cuba”? Might it be better to take direct action against missile sites in Cuba? What would be the Soviet response? This was bound up with continued discussions of the prospects for the CIA’s operation *Mongoose* and whether this might lead to overt intervention.  

McCone had given a very doubtful response to the likely benefits of possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, while others warned of the need for only covert actions at this time, as overt actions would have serious international consequences. This was in response to Robert Kennedy’s revival of a favoured scheme to provoke action against Guantanamo which would permit the U.S. to retaliate, or involving a third country in some way.

Though the rumours about the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba had been widespread among Cuban exiles in Florida since the middle of the year (1962), only direct evidence, such as aerial photographs, could be convincing. By far the swiftest and most accurate intelligence had come from U-2 photography. The camera, the film, and the aircraft itself were all technologically advanced. At an altitude of 14 miles pictures had been taken with a resolution that permitted objects 21/2 feet square to be identified. 

In the hands of skilled NPIC photographic interpreters these pictures could produce an incredible amount of extremely accurate information.

It was only on Sunday, 14 October, 1962, that a U-2, authorized to fly over the western part of Cuba, brought the first high-altitude photographs of what seemed to be Soviet strategic missile sites, in different stages of completion, deployed on Cuban soil. Once the photographs were analyzed by experts at NPIC, they were brought to President Kennedy who, after a little prompting by a photo-interpreter who attended the meeting, accepted NPIC’s conclusion that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev had taken a fateful, aggressive step against the U.S. by placing nuclear capable strategic missiles in Cuba. These images proved to be crucial in getting the support of American allies. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, spent a few seconds examining the photographs, and accepted the proof on belief. German Chancellor Adenauer accepted the photographic evidence, and was impressed with it. General de Gaulle accepted President Kennedy’s word initially on faith, though later he inspected the U-2 photographs in great detail, and was impressed with the quality of them. With such evidence the U.S. was able to raise a massive effort to blockade Cuba, rally the Latin American governments, and enlist the support of the American people and its NATO allies. In this sense, by the contrary in Iraq 2003 the Technical intelligence evidences presented by Collin Power to the UN Security Council were in all the cases insufficient.

The U.S. did have technical assets, both signals intelligence, SIGINT, (intercepted Iraqi communications); and IMINT, pictures or other images taken of Iraqi facilities. But as Gregory Treverton defends there were two big problems with those sources, Imagery can identified big nuclear facilities but not necessarily small stockpiles, especially if they are hidden. And in the other hand much of the U.S. signal intelligence apparently was devoted to intercepting tactical Iraqi military communications to provide warning of any threats to U.S.

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106 Hilsman, *op. cit.*, p. 133.  
107 Ibid., p. 137.  
109 Ibid., p. 67.  
110 Ibid., p. 72.  
111 Larson, p. 113.  
112 Ibid., p. 114.
pilots patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq. In fact, drawing data from U.S. intelligence inventories related to the technical Intelligence platforms is more complicated that it was in 1962. The ground forces would have to direct the secure Internet browser to dozens of separate classified Web sites for each intelligence platform that may have gathered data. To obtain any available pictures collected by the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft’s sensors, a service member must access the U-2 program’s own secret Web server. For signals data, the forces would have to redirect his browser to the RC-135’s separate Web site and troll for intelligence that aircraft may have collected. The same process must be repeated to locate data collected by the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, as well as a host of other reconnaissance and surveillance UAVs and spy satellites, sources say. To make a long history short, there is no “Google,” no single intelligence Web site where service members ranging from low-ranking privates to top generals can go with some keywords or map coordinates and quickly pull up the information they need.

But it is interesting to notice how in 1962 where the technical advances were limited made Technical intelligence fundamental, although in 2003 in Iraq, after all the technological revolution in military affairs the role of Technical Intelligence was really limited. At the same time, the Iraq War 2003 is warning that even the world’s most advance intelligence systems and more than a decade of intensive intelligence collection and analysis coverage could still leave major gaps and serious intelligence problems.

Given the nature of the problem of assessing concealed Iraqi WMD capabilities, neither IMINT nor SIGINT was likely to be the main source of raw intelligence. The patchwork of overhead images, inference and supposition that made up Colin Powel’s February, 2002 presentation to the United Nations Security Council is a good illustration of how little of any clarity or certainty could be gleaned from overhead imagery in the case of Iraq. Human intelligence was necessarily going to be the main source of raw intelligence about Iraqi WMD.

It is difficult to put these problems into perspective without access to classified material.

In spite of all of the advances the U.S. and Britain had made in technological capabilities, they went to war with Iraq without the level of evidence needed to provide a clear strategic rationale for the war, and without the ability to fully understand the threat Iraqi weapons of mass destruction posed to the world.

In fact, all that Colin Powell presented to the UN Security Council collected from Technical Intelligence was satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers and trucks, and suggested they showed Iraqis surreptitiously moving prohibited missiles and chemical and biological weapons to hide them. At two sites, he said trucks were “decontamination vehicles” associated with chemical weapons. Norwegian inspector Jorn Siljeholm told on March 19 that “decontamination vehicles” UN teams were led to by U.S. information invariably turned out to be simple water or fire trucks.

“None of the hot tips were ever confirmed. I don’t know about a single decontamination truck that didn’t turn out to be a fire engine or a water truck”, Jorn Siljeholm, UN weapons inspector, said on 18 March 2003.113

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Furthermore, Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, writes in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that there is no evidence that Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program. Blix says that the agency now has a “technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program,” despite some missing evidence and gaps in knowledge.

There are no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq’s explanation of its progress towards the finalization of a workable design for its nuclear weapons is considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available program documentation. However, no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of the weapon design when the program was interrupted.\footnote{IAEA Letter UN, 10 June 1997, in \url{http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IAEA/s-1997-779.htm}.}

By contrary, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Intelligence images taken by the U-2 played an important role in convincing the international community that the Soviet Union was to blame for the crisis and exposed the USSR’s denials.\footnote{Larson, Deborah Wheel (1997): Anatomy of Mistrust: US- Soviet Relations during the Cold War. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, p. 85.} Though the U.S. ultimately chose a peaceful course of action it had also drawn up plans for a possible invasion of the Cuban mainland.\footnote{Garthoff, Raymond L. (1989): Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, p. 69.} Estimates of high casualties by the intelligence community together with their inability to predict the subsequent response of the Cuban population made the invasion plans highly undesirable.\footnote{Ibid., p. 70.}

Back in Iraq 2003 we can recap this point arguing that with all of the forms of information-gathering available today, intelligence should be somewhat easier to acquire now than it was even twenty years ago at the height of the Cold War. The events of the current decade would appear to indicate however that such advances have failed to bring with them any guarantee of success in making accurate forecasts the lesson is that whilst intelligence may be easier to gather, the enhanced service provides information which is not always pertinent and indeed, on occasion, is not even correct. As intelligence-gathering methods have evolved, the increasing reliance which was placed on TECHINT at the expense of HUMINT, often served as a handicap rather than a boon, with the analysts becoming the victims of a ‘slaves to the machine’ mentality.

The clearest lesson should perhaps be that there are roles for both HUMINT and TECHINT in the modern intelligence gathering world, and only when taken together can the greatest benefits be gained. A satellite camera with one metre resolution can pinpoint and photograph a group of suspicious buildings outside Baghdad in great detail. However without a human source to confirm whether the buildings are weapons factories or to comment on what military technologies Iraq is trying to develop, the pictures themselves are of limited use.

Ideally, the relationship between policymakers and the intelligence community should be symbiotic: policymakers should rely upon the intelligence community for advice which is a mayor rational of the existence of the intelligence community. In order for the community to produce good advice, policymakers should keep intelligence officers informed about the mayor directions of policy and their specific areas of interest and priority. The lane that divides policy and intelligence (and the fact that policymakers can cross it but intelligence officers cannot) also affects the relationship. Policymakers tend to be vigilant in seeing that intelligence does not come to close to the line. However, they may ask intelligence officers for advice in choosing among policy options, but if the intelligence crosses the line they will lose their objectivity.

In the Cuban missile crisis, during the first week of secret deliberations on what to do, from 16 to 23 October 1962, U.S. intelligence provided very good support to policy makers. The second week the confrontation from 23-27 October was dominated by the question of the Soviet response to the U.S. demand for removal of the missiles.

Two National Intelligence Estimates issued on 19 October (SNIE 11-18-62) and 20 October (SNIE 11-19-62) were the principal, although not the only, vehicle for the intelligence Community to provide its best judgments to the policy makers and their advisers in ExComm. These estimates also provided the first occasion for the intelligence community to assess the Soviet motivations in placing the missiles in Cuba. The intelligence estimates reinforced the cautions of the policy makers by recognizing “the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, though a series of actions and reactions, could escalate in a general war.”

In the first Estimate 19 October (SNIE 11-18-62) the assessment was that “a major Soviet objective in their military build-up in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of force has tilted so far in their favour that the U.S. can no longer prevent the advance of Russia into its hemisphere. Although the SNIEs recognized the Soviet purpose of enhancing their strategic forces in the intercontinental balance, they did not note that the balance was heavily tilted in favour of the United States and that the Soviet Union might have a defensive motivation in seeking to redress the strategic imbalance. Thus weakening Western resolve and unity in countering Soviet moves in the global contest and particularly over Berlin.

Really important for the policy making process was a memorandum from the Board of National Estimates to Director McCone on October 27, seeing that the Soviet reaction would probably be directed toward political pressure against U.S. bases surrounding the Soviet Union, but would not extend to military action against them. The intelligence estimates correctly predicted that Khrushchev would retain authority over any use of the nuclear missiles in Cuba, even in the event of a U.S. air attack on them. The ExComm members, however, were prudently less sure that in the event of a U.S. attack no surviving missiles would be fired by local commanders.

McAuliffe, op. cit., p. 215.
Shortcomings in earlier U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet motivations for deployment of missiles in Cuba also contributed to a failure by intelligence and policy makers during the crisis to foresee the possible terms for a settlement. Believing that the main Soviet purpose was to bolster an offensive Soviet policy on Berlin and other issues\textsuperscript{120}, American decision makers did not recognize the possible key role of an assurance against U.S. invasion of Cuba.

With regard to the Iraq War in 2003, the White House never asked for a National Intelligence Estimate. At the end they published one, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”, but we can conclude that, the government tried to politicize (“cook”) intelligence, using it to defend their facts. As described by Bob Woodward in his book \textit{Plan of Attack} “there was a great expectation that the CIA could make the case that Saddam had Weapons of Mass Destruction\textsuperscript{121}.

The Intelligence community, in their NIE on “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” released on 4 October 2002, was quite emphatic that Iraq had WMD. Indeed, an unclassified White Paper entitled “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Program”, which mirrored the NIE, was released just 3 days later, on 7 October 2002. With the NIE for Congress and the White Paper for the American public, President Bush was given authority to use military force as he deemed necessary against Saddam and Iraq.

In this sense, in 1962 Intelligence Estimates were not really accurate, but there were voices as we have seen that claimed the possibility of the Soviet build up in Cuba. On the other hand in Iraq none of us could see any U.S. Government “dissident” voices about the main issue of the justification of the war, the Weapons of Mass Destruction.

In Iraq, like in the Cuban Missile crisis, the WMD were not found by the time the decision had to be made. In that sense, most analysts inside and outside the U.S. government including those who opposed going to war would have bet that Iraq still had WMD programs and some stockpiles, at least of chemical weapons, but as we have seen in both cases the decisions were different. The clear conclusion here is that intelligence have to be an evidence for the decision-making not interference.

That’s why U.S intelligence needs to focus even harder on improving collection and on understanding the true limits of information at any given moment. Even the best analyst cannot make intelligence out of whole cloth. But the most important lesson to draw from the war in Iraq is appreciating how intelligence really fits into the making of U.S. foreign policy and the always difficult relationship between intelligence and policy. But trying to understand an often-hostile world with incomplete data is, in essence, not an intelligence problem at all. It’s a policy problem, and pivots on the kinds of risks an official is willing to accept on behalf of his country.

Critics of the Bush administration claim officials “cherry picked” intelligence to fit their own preconceptions or relied too much on outside analysts. This suggests that intelligence is or ought to be the most important input for government officials. In reality, intelligence is just one drop in a fire-hose torrent of facts and analysis a decision-maker sees every day. Personal contacts, think tank papers, press reports, and the gut reactions that the decision-maker brings to office are usually much more important. After all, that’s why we have elections. If policy automatically followed from intelligence, what would be the sense in choosing one candidate over another? When used prudently, intelligence can contribute to good policy. But history

\textsuperscript{121} Woodward, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 249.
shows that any policymaker can seize upon bits of intelligence that confirm his or her worst fears or greatest hopes, especially when there’s little to choose from. Even as that data begins to look more fragile, those long-cherished views can be hard to let go. That’s exactly how policy and intelligence should work in a democracy.

In the UK in particular, the main vehicle for the Government’s use of intelligence in the public presentation of policy was the dossier of September 2002\textsuperscript{122}. The assessment of Iraqi WMD capabilities served as the prime justification for a succession of decisions and actions that led to the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. This justification for the war has come under acute scrutiny because of the apparent failure to locate the expected stockpiles of WMDs.

On 14 July, Lord Butler of Brockwell derived his report on the intelligence that contributed to the decision to go to war in Iraq\textsuperscript{123}. It will have to do with the future working of the British intelligence services and their relationship with the Government, rather than the government presentation of intelligence product to a public audience. The inquiry was instructed to take the findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) as its standard of measure against which to assess the quality of UK intelligence prior to the invasion. The need to undertake the inquiry was driven by the apparent failure of the intelligence services to provide a correct assessment of Iraqi capabilities in terms of so-called WMD.

The Butler Inquiry did not extend to an examination of the political decision making process. Any question of wrongdoing had been dealt with by the Hutton Inquiry which reported on January 28 2004. However, the Hutton Inquiry’s terms of reference were limited to the circumstances leading to the death of Dr David Kelly. In the course of his investigations Lord Hutton cleared the Government of deliberately inserting false intelligence into their published dossier on Iraqi WMD. The Hutton Report left the wider questions about the Government’s propriety in its handling of intelligence unanswered. For instance, questions remain regarding the possibility that the Government and Intelligence Services “cherry-picked” intelligence that tended to support the case for war, and/or that the public presentation of this intelligence was misleading. One of the main conclusions of the Inquiry was that key intelligence used to justify the war with Iraq has been shown to be unreliable.

Examining the management of British intelligence in the light of evidence presented to the Butler Inquiry it showed clearly that the failure to find WMD in Iraq six months after Saddam was toppled was ‘a failure of intelligence, not of Government’. Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had not been guilty of inventing intelligence, as had been alleged, to support a policy decision (to attack Iraq)\textsuperscript{124}. If the intelligence community is found entirely at fault, then critics of the government will conclude that the intelligence community has been made a scapegoat.

In trying to diagnose any failure of intelligence it is essential to bear in mind that intelligence is not about whether or not one has complete information; the purpose of intelligence is to acquire fragments of information where otherwise there would be none. One rarely, if ever, has all of the pieces of the proverbial jigsaw puzzle. It is evident that the raw intelligence available was highly fragmentary, and of limited reliability in intelligence terms the raw intelligence was accurate, or as accurate as possible, but it was erroneously assessed by the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. In this scenario, those responsible for

evaluating, collating and integrating intelligence with information from other, open sources reach incorrect conclusions either by basing the assessment on false assumptions about the intelligence target, or by incorrectly weighting or interpreting the available intelligence.

Much of what the intelligence indicated was that the Iraqi regime was still pursuing research programmes in chemical and biological weapons, and had a nuclear research programme in paper but held in abeyance until a lifting or loosening of sanctions allowed its reactivation. Respecting this particular point I strongly think that Saddam was no threat to the West. He may have had weapons but I think he had no means of delivery. More important, he had not motive: no ideological dispute with the West and he was not suicidal. In my view all was material cooked up to try to provide a rationale for the Prime Minister’s decision to back Bush in the Iraq invasion.

For the decision-makers, the only propose intelligence’s product serves is to assist in the formulation and execution of national security policy. But intelligence is not sufficient requirement for effective national security policy. Decision-makers have their own expectations about what intelligence can do for them. In that way how policy-makers choose to be served by intelligence can determined how intelligence information is acquired and the intelligence activities as well, although, policy-makers have devoted little effort to understanding the role of intelligence in the formulation and execution of national security policy.

Intelligence is understood both as “information” (such as in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and as instrument of policy (such as in the role of Intelligence in Iraq in 2003), so intelligence is a function of a set of national security objectives and tasks. In that sense intelligence has to be always something that helps the policymakers to decide among competing options or that can be used as an instrument he can wield in their relations with foreign powers. The only porpoise of the intelligence product for the policy-makers is to serve and assists in the formulation and execution of national security policy, because we cannot forget that intelligence is necessary but not sufficient requirement for effective national security policy.

But for the decision-makers intelligence also is a function of policy in a second less-understood sense, one that is usually neglected in public discussions of the intelligence policy nexus. Intelligence activities, process and organizations can be used to implement national security policy and to achieve objectives. In other words decision-makers have their own expectations about what intelligence can do for them and have both the right and the duty to choose how to meet their needs. How the decision-makers choose to be served by intelligence can determine how intelligence information is acquired and the intelligence activities undertaken serve him in setting and executing national security policy.

Today in the dawn of the 21st century the policy-makers have to prioritize targets. The information available will always exceed somewhat our capacity to collect and process, in that sense the policy-makers must be consciences of the new requirements for the new century. In the remaining years of this century, a great deal of low-intensity conflict and political warfare is likely to take place, “active measures” and covert action, because terrorism is likely to consume most of the policy-makers time and energy. Moreover, such threats are relatively more intelligence-intensive that other aspects of national security policy. Furthermore, they tend to require more human intelligence and specialized, highly targeted, technical collection. Prediction is one of the qualitative measures of intelligence, and it is usually reserved for major political and military events.
Conclusion

It can be said that U.S. intelligence played a hugely important role in most aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. It played a vital role in the lead-up to the crisis and it crucially allowed the U.S. to identify the placement of Cuban missiles, which ultimately led to the confrontation that brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war. Without intelligence sources it is likely that the U.S. would have failed to identify the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba until they had been fully deployed. Crucially though, CIA estimates in the lead-up to the crisis had discounted any likelihood of the Soviet Union attempting to deploy its missiles on the Cuban mainland.\textsuperscript{125}

Events of the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the maturity of the U.S. intelligence community, especially in its ability to disseminate the available information\textsuperscript{126} to the decision makers. There was a good communication and cooperation between the intelligence community and the policy makers during the crisis. In that sense the relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and the Kennedy administration was highly constructive and successful\textsuperscript{127}. The members of the intelligence community in Washington worked well together during the crisis. DCI McCone held meetings of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) every morning. CIA circulated a daily memorandum during the crisis\textsuperscript{128}.

The Intelligence community had erroneously estimated on 19 September that the Soviet leaders probably would not station nuclear range missiles in Cuba. The estimate was not changed until positive evidence of such deployment was received on 15-16 October. But if the Soviet leaders had not decided to include the nuclear missile forces, there would still have been a challenge to the U.S., indeed one that in many political respects would have been even more difficult to meet. If the U.S. intelligence had not discovered the missiles before their complete installation and unveiling by the Soviet leaders, it would have been much more difficult, and perhaps not possible to secure their withdrawal\textsuperscript{129}.

Despite some inaccuracies and the impossibility of offering a full accurate picture, the performance of U.S. intelligence was good. In that sense full intelligence information could have made the resolution of the crisis much more difficult because the danger posed by tactical nuclear weapons would have made a decision to invade more difficult, but countervailing pressure would have been strong to invade in order to ensure elimination of all nuclear weapons on the island.

In Raymond Garthoff’s view, the Cuban missile crisis constitutes a qualified American intelligence success\textsuperscript{130}. Although the American intelligence community, with one notable exception, failed to predict that the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba, In fact SNIE (85-3-62) predicted that the Soviets would not place missiles in Cuba. It succeeded in detecting and

\textsuperscript{126} Allison and Zelikow, op. cit., p. 219.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Blight and Welch, op. cit., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 55.
identifying the missiles in time to allow American leaders to take the initiative to obtain their removal.

In this particular case analytical work was the key, not some intelligence coup produced by espionage, for the success of the American intelligence community. It seems that photographic intelligence had been the masterpiece during the crisis, but we cannot forget that facts never speak for themselves and only take on political or military significance when they placed in the proper context by intelligence analysts.

The one serious failure for U.S. intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis can be seen as its inability to predict Soviet intentions to deploy missiles in Cuba. Yet on the whole its actions did ultimately prove to be successful. In the case of human intelligence, refugee reports contained much accurate and useful information about the Soviet arms build-up, but there was also a tremendous amount of information that had to be analysed. As the interests of refugees from Cuba did not always coincide with the interests of the United States their reports could not always be trusted to be objective.\textsuperscript{131}

The Cuban refugees despised Fidel Castro and his Communist regime to such an extent that they may have provided information that would have required an American invasion. What Cuban refugees wanted to believe therefore may not have been reflective of what was occurring in Cuba, and for this reason their reports were treated with suspicion. The number of reports of missiles in Cuba that were inaccurate had numbered in the thousands.\textsuperscript{132} Yet the tension of war was so great that intelligence analysts had to consider the fact that some of the reports they were receiving may well have been genuine. Every report containing anything specific was in fact verified against photographs or other intelligence.\textsuperscript{133}

The crucial fact for the U.S. was that any action the United States took in Cuba had to be based on intelligence that was not only convincing to the top policy makers in the American government but also to the American people, to America’s allies, and to the neutralist members of the UN. The decision was made that refugee reports would not be sufficient to gain such support. The only intelligence that would really convince the world that the Soviets were putting nuclear missiles in Cuba and justify the kind of action that would be effective against them would have to be supplied by the U-2s.\textsuperscript{134} During the crisis intelligence was able to keep a close watch on the construction of Soviet nuclear missile sites, but most importantly and crucially the missiles were discovered before they were operational, and allowed enough time for the U.S. to assess the situation and decide on an effective policy.

On the other hand, the U.S. in Iraq 2003 seems to have failed to accurately assess information from exiles and defectors, many of whom lied or exaggerated their importance. At least some elements of the U.S. Government exaggerated the value and capabilities of outside Iraqi opposition movements like the Iraq National Congress. In at least some cases, they also failed to objectively assess defector information, using information more because it supported policy than because the source had real credibility.

There have been different authors who point out that the twentieth Century may be seen as the age of secret intelligence, because the intelligence main focus was on penetrate secrets...
and protect secrets. The 21st Century by contrast, may be the age of public intelligence. In that sense Tony Blair revealed a Joint Intelligence assessment about Iraq saying in its preface “It is unprecedented for the government to publish this kind of document”.

It is significant to see how the Bush administration in September 2002 in the National Security Strategy point out the necessity of a good intelligence after the cold war and the appearance of the “new threats” of the 21st century. “In a new environment in which a fusion might occur between the new age’s worst nightmares, terrorism, rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of Mass Destruction…” The document laid down three conditions for the future performance of intelligence: Firstly, the requirement for good intelligence and early warning of emerging threats. Secondly, the need to build international coalitions on the basis of a shared conviction about emerging threats. Finally, the capacity to win pre-emptive wars quickly, with minimal causalities.

Iraq war was the first test case for the strategy of pre-emption. In 16 October 2003, in San Bernardino, California, Bush reiterated American determination to pursue a strategy of pre-emption, when circumstances demanded it. The challenge for America, as Bush put it, was to “show our motives are pure”. And as Wesley K. Wark describes them, “pure motives” require public intelligence:

We conclude that, if intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public debate in future, those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations. It will be essential, too, that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and advocacy are established when doing so.

It could be said that the age of public Intelligence will demand a revolutionary change in the practice of intelligence and the doctrine of secrecy; but we cannot forget that great care will also be required in protecting intelligence sources and methods, to ensure that the intelligence product does not become completely politicized. Intelligence is always important for the decision making and as Christopher Andrew and David Dilks reminded us “intelligence is the missing dimension in our understanding of critical policy-making decisions in the realm of international relations”.

The pre-emptive attack is now official U.S. policy. With such doctrine, the role of intelligence became fundamental. In that sense, the case for a pre-emptive attack based on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability was backed by the intelligence community.

According to Bob Woodward in his book Plan of Attack,  

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137 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
138 Wark, op. cit.
140 Wark, op. cit., p. 126.
the underlying intelligence about the threat from another country, the power and quality of information, was a point worth discussing, Rumsfeld believed. What information would you require and with what degree of certainty before you launched a pre-emptive attack?\(^{143}\)

Except for the disagreement on reconstruction of Iraq’s nuclear program, intelligence solidly backed the Bush administration when they began to argue for military action against Iraq. The U.S. intelligence community was in agreement regarding Iraq having a biological and chemical weapons capability. Unfortunately, this knowledge was based on reliable information in most cases at least 15 years old and, in the best case, over five years old. In fact, no one in the U.S. intelligence community had valid information confirming that Iraq posed weapons of mass destruction. In that sense, there is a big difference between knowing and assuming.

The issue of a link between Iraq and terrorism was more divisive, not within the intelligence community, but between the intelligence community and those in leadership positions. The solution, the policy employees recommended, was to ignore the CIA analysis of the reliability of the sources and just take the raw information at face value. “we know the answers; give us the intelligence to support the answers”\(^{144}\)

In fact, the question of an Al-Qaeda link with Iraq was investigate by the 9/11 Commission\(^{145}\). Unfortunately for the Bush administration, there was no evidence upon which the intelligence community could assess that there was a formalized link between Iraq and Al-Qaeda. There were reports of some meetings, and even of some individual training, but no evidence of an ongoing Iraq-Al-Qaeda connection.\(^{146}\)

The Senate Committee on Intelligence conducted a review of pre-Iraq War Intelligence and issued a report on 7 July 2004. The committee looked into allegations of “pressure” applied by policy-makers on intelligence analysis to change their assessments. The overall committee report stated in its conclusions that “The committee did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities”\(^{147}\). In fact, intelligence supporting a pre-emptive attack against Iraq was shaped, from the top down, by the leaders of the leaders of the Bush administration. The intelligence assessment that there were no formal ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq was correct, but was not accepted by the Bush administration. Lacking the answer they sought from the intelligence community, the administration turned to ad hoc team in the Department of Defense. The Bush administration with intelligence shaped top their needs.

The senate select of committee on intelligence took up the challenge to determine how intelligence had reached its erroneous conclusions long before David Kay came to his revelation. In June of 2003 the Committee reviews of the Pre-War intelligence on Iraq. Nearly a year later the Committee released the first part of his findings of the 7\(^{th}\) July 2004. The Bipartisan Committee agreed to 1017 conclusions, the first being: “most of the mayor key judgment in the intelligence community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),

\(^{143}\) Woodward, op. cit., p. 133.
\(^{146}\) U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on the US Intelligence…”, op. cit., pp. 345-348.
\(^{147}\) Ibid., p. 284.
Iraq’s continuing programs for weapons of mass destruction, either overstated or where not supported by, the underline intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, let to the mischaracterization of the intelligence.\textsuperscript{148}

The Committee limits “group think” to the intelligence community only and stresses in its conclusions that there was no political pressure on analysts to change their assessments. Several members of the Committee disagree about the absence of political pressure.\textsuperscript{149} When it came to weapons of mass destruction there was little need for pressure, everyone from the President down believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction.

When conducting a pre-emptive war, the evidence of eminent danger should be clear. Secretary or Defense Rumsfeld believed, according to Woodward’s Plan of Attack that the Intelligence upon which a pre-emptive attack was based, should be vetted.\textsuperscript{150} The Bush administration, however, admitted that they did not need, nor could they afford, to wait for a smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud.\textsuperscript{151}

The objectivity of intelligence was hindered by a leadership that only questioned assumptions that were contrary to the administration “group think”. Objectivity was further clouded by the dual responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence to implement policy through covert operations, while at the same time providing analysis that could potentially contradict that same policy.

Leaders make decisions and have an intense commitment to the success of their policy, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in an article on the relationship of intelligence and policy-makers.\textsuperscript{152} If intelligence challenges the assumptions of policy, Wolfowitz suggests that intelligence must emphasize the evidence, laying out the facts and their relationships. The analysts must also be prepared to defend their positions. While intelligence community apparently maintained its objectivity regarding the link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and fell victim to a cumulative loss of objectivity and “group think” regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, there is little doubt there is a conflict of interest and loss of objectivity when intelligence crosses over into the realm of implementing policy through analysis without facts. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence criticized the Central Intelligence Agency for not having a single spy with knowledge of Iraq’s Weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{153} In fact, all the technical capability of the United States intelligence community proved inadequate in proving information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ties with Al-Qaeda.

As Richard Perle pointed out “Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Terrorism has become the first priority of the U.S. government”… “President Bush’s war on terror jerked our national security bureaucracy out of its comfortable routines. He demanded that the military fight new wars in new ways,”\textsuperscript{154} In that sense in Iraq, U.S. forces overthrew Saddam Hussein’s entire regime with half the troops and in half the time it took merely to shove Saddam out of Kuwait in 1991 but at the same peace the U.S is losing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 449, 457-459, 500-501.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Woodward, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 133.
\item \textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 179, 202.
\item \textsuperscript{153} U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on the US Intelligence...”, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 260.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Frum and Perle, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 5-7.
\end{itemize}
the peace but it cannot be forgotten that when it is common ground that the first line of defence against terrorism has to be better intelligence, the perceived integrity of the intelligence agencies should have been undermined in this way, by the distortion of the reports in the course of the political process.

For the Bush administration it was a matter of time before Saddam Hussein would regain the resources to acquire the weapons of Mass Destruction that he tried to achieve in the past. In that sense, president Bush and Primer Minister Blair “must” make judgements on the best available evidence, and they must weight the evidence carefully, always mindful of the consequences of acting under conditions of uncertainty derivate of the nature of the intelligence itself. For Richard Perle,

a failure to act on the available intelligence by taking the risk that Saddam did not possess weapons of mass destruction and therefore leaving him in place could have catastrophic consequences. But the dangers to remove him would entail far less risk, far less danger, than discovering too late that he did indeed have the chemical and biological weapons.

At the same time the Bush administration described the threat posed by Saddam’s regime as “global”, not only for the U.S. but for the rest of countries. Although, from my point of view, it is now clear that the U.S. and Britain did not find the right balance of persuasion and objectivity in their public analyses of the threat before the war and in their arguments in favour of the conflict. The fact that no evidence surfaced during or soon after the war that tracked with the previous U.S. and British intelligence assessments, showed that Iraq had the capability to use weapons of mass destruction in war fighting, or indicated had active programs for the production of weapons mass destruction that were creating an imminent threat.

For Kenneth de Graffenreid the decision makers intelligence is only useful only to the extend that it informs, leads to, or assists in the execution of national security policy. Intelligence is much more than information: it is also an active tool of policy encompassing activities, processes and organization that enables the policy-intelligence relationship to function. Despite of some intelligence officers presenting only what the policy makers want to hear, the point is to seek information useful to the implementation of the policies. What some may perceive as a peculiar decision-makers preconceptions and biases may well be the entire proper policy orientation that the elect party want to pursue.

More importantly, as Kenneth de Graffenreid pointed out, the traditionalist view has been inadequate for policy formulation and execution because it has not understood the need for the decision-makers to set intelligence policy. Traditionalist fails in understood that there are different intelligence policies, each of which produces intelligence relevant to different national security policies and to different approaches to those policies. In that sense there is not apolitical intelligence policy, but the intelligence politicization is to adequate intelligence facts to the one party policies. However decision-makers have the right and the duty to set intelligence policy. Because for the policy, intelligence is a product of a variety of factors.

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such as the perception of international threats, the priorities for that party or the opportunities in the international arena.

So the relationship between intelligence and policy depends on the decision-maker’s understanding of the task of intelligence their desires and their vigour in pursuing them without forget the nature of all of those other factors that influence intelligence. Hence the decision-makers are responsible for choosing among alternative foreign and defence policies, and they are the decision-makers who are answerable to the legislative branch and the people for the consequences of the intelligence policy implemented in his name. As we can see here these ideas have been use for the Bush administration for a huge use of intelligence in the Iraq justification of 2003, posing a change in the conception of the intelligence; from Kent and the traditionalist ideas, through the activists, to the final use of intelligence.

I disagree with Kenneth de Graffenreid, because in my opinion Intelligence services are human and imperfect institutions, but is clear that intelligence role in policy-making has to be to present the facts to the policy-makers. Intelligence does not do policy. In that sense, as it had been pointed out in the first part the function of intelligence is to provide expert knowledge of the external world on the basis of which sound policy would then be made by those with expert knowledge of national politics. The very purpose of intelligence is to be used in the decision-making process. But just as worthless as unused intelligence is biased intelligence. Intelligence to be truly useful must be objective. Being objective also means being forthright in what is known and what is not understood. Intelligence has to provide objective scholarship, as getting too close to policy would undercut the whole purpose of such an effort. The decision-maker’s role is to make decisions; intelligence’s is to help in making the decision. Offering different explanations may not seem to be helpful to the decision-maker but to limit an explanation to only one option when more interpretations are possible is, in effect, making a decision, one that is not the responsibility of intelligence.

Let’s finish with these astonishing worlds of David Kay about the correct role of intelligence in the policy process in general and in the war on Iraq in particular:

Wars are not won by intelligence; they’re won by the blood, treasure, courage of the young men and women that we put in the field. And we need to honour that. What intelligence really does when it is working well is help to avoid wars. It gives warning, and it gives policy makers time to craft solutions that do not require military action. Quite frankly, our intelligence is now devoid of credibility—because our capability is largely at the technical end and not at the level of analysis and understanding intentions... We as a nation must address that, or Iraq is prologue to a much more dangerous time ahead than anything we have ever seen”158.