Abstract
The purpose of my paper is to explore the meaning and scope of the changes in perspective that occur sometimes either when viewing things from a theoretical point of view- there is a change of knowledge paradigm or when viewing things from a practical point of view- there is a change of personality or a 'conversion'. The very question of the possibility of a radical change in epistemic perspective suggests the existence of a field of knowledge that would be free from specific categorical projections or determinations that depend on the transcendental subject. If that were so then it would be possible sometimes to see things from a radically different point of view, one that would not be available from within a knowledge paradigm. First, I suggest that the question about the nature of changes of epistemic perspective, metaphysical though it is, is more important to epistemology than has been acknowledged by analytic philosophy. Secondly, I suggest that this question need not be tackled within a metaphysical framework but could be approached as a question about the nature of reason. The intelligibility of changes of epistemic perspective depends on a unified conception of reason; a conception which has been neglected in favor of an emphasis on reason's instrumental side. Finally, I suggest that if we theorize changes of epistemic perspective from the viewpoint of a unified concept of reason then we gain an account of knowledge that would be more fluid and more closely linked to the practical use of reason than is the traditional account that is popular in some analytic philosophy of the last century.

Keywords
Change of perspective in theoretical and practical contexts, Kuhn, "worldview" in phenomenology, rational foundation of knowledge