Abstract

In México, the political change at local level is less studied although it reveals new aspects of the institutional design of democracy in the country. The lost of hegemonic majorities, the conformation of plural spaces of representation in the local Congresses and the change of party of the Executives, have increased the veto points of decision making. In this frame, have appeared what we called Mechanisms of Direct Democracy like institutions that allow to reduce to the costs of negotiation between powers because it openness the game to a third actor of citizen veto player. From 1998 have been appeared figures like the referendum and plebiscito in sixteen states. This article proposes a model of analysis of the MDD as veto points within the framework of local democratization. It studies the institutional design and elaborates a priori postulates to explain some scenes of possible future utilization.

Keywords

Divided government, political change in México, veto players, local Executive-Legislative relations.