



Revista de Relaciones Internacionales,  
Estrategia y Seguridad

ISSN: 1909-3063

[cinuv.relinternal@unimilitar.edu.co](mailto:cinuv.relinternal@unimilitar.edu.co)

Universidad Militar Nueva Granada  
Colombia

Arratia Sandoval, Esteban  
BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO'S FAVELAS  
Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, vol. 12, núm. 2, julio-  
diciembre, 2017, pp. 231-265  
Universidad Militar Nueva Granada  
Bogotá, Colombia

Available in: <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=92751348011>

- How to cite
- Complete issue
- More information about this article
- Journal's homepage in [redalyc.org](http://redalyc.org)

[redalyc.org](http://redalyc.org)

Scientific Information System

Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal

Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative

rev.relac.int.estateg.segur.11(1):231-265,2017

## BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO'S FAVELAS\*

Esteban Arratia Sandoval\*\*

### Abstract

During the 2016 *World Economic Forum*, the strategy of pacification in Rio's *favelas* was recognized as the most innovative public security policy in the last decade. From this scenario, and using *Competition State-Making*, this paper analyzes, under a qualitative approach, the design and implementation of that initiative. Then, we seek to assess its results after implementation, and finally outline main lessons to extract from the Brazilian case. The main conclusion of this survey is that the Brazilian pacification strategy was based on three pillars: operational decriminalization; adoption of comprehensive approach; and coordination between three government levels (federal, state, and municipal).

**Keywords:** Brazil, competition state-making, organized crime, pacification.

Recibido: 3 de septiembre de 2016  
Evaluado: 10 de noviembre de 2016  
Aceptado: 24 de enero de 2017

Artículo de Investigación

Referencia: Arratia, E. (2017). Beyond pacification. Competition state-making in Rio's favelas. *Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad*, 12(2), 231-265. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18359/rries.2221>

\* Artículo de investigación financiado por Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE)

\*\* Analista en Políticas y Asuntos Internacionales mención en Seguridad y Defensa. Universidad de Santiago. Magíster en Estudios Internacionales. Universidad de Santiago. Investigador Asociado Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, Santiago de Chile. Correo electrónico: [jarratia@anepe.cl](mailto:jarratia@anepe.cl)

## MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PACIFICACIÓN. *COMPETITION STATE-MAKING* EN FAVELAS DE RÍO

### Resumen

Durante el *Foro Económico Mundial 2016*, la estrategia de pacificación aplicada en las favelas de Río fue reconocida como una de las políticas de seguridad pública más innovadoras en la última década. A partir de este escenario, y utilizando el concepto *Competition in State-Making* (Construcción Competitiva de Estado), el presente artículo analiza, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, el diseño e implementación de la iniciativa. Luego, buscamos realizar un balance de los resultados obtenidos tras su ejecución, y finalmente, examina las principales lecciones que pueden extraerse del caso brasileño. La principal conclusión de esta investigación es que la estrategia brasileña de pacificación se fundamentó en tres pilares: descriminalización operacional; adopción de enfoque integral; y coordinación entre los tres niveles gubernamentales (federal, estadual y municipal).

**Palabras clave:** Brasil, competition state-making, crimen organizado, pacificación.

## ALÉM DA PACIFICAÇÃO. *COMPETITION STATE-MAKING* NA FAVELAS DO RIO

### Resumo

Durante *Fórum Econômico Mundial 2016*, a estratégia de pacificação nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro foi reconhecida como uma das mais inovadoras políticas de segurança pública na última década. A partir desse cenário e usando o conceito, *Competition in State-Making* (Construção Competitiva do Estado), este artigo analisa, sob uma abordagem qualitativa, o desígnio e implementação da iniciativa. Em seguida, faz um balanço dos resultados obtidos após sua execução e finalmente, examina as principais lições que podem ser extraídas do caso brasileiro. O trabalho conclui que sua aplicação foi baseada em três pilares: descriminalização operacional; adoção de foco integrante; e coordenação entre os três níveis de governo (federal, estadual e municipal).

**Palabras-chave:** Brasil, competition state-making, crime organizado, pacificação.

## Introduction

According to a report prepared by the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, *Qualified Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges*, organized crime is largely an economic phenomenon in the sense that criminal organizations provide goods and services that were originally provided by the State. This process gives to the abovementioned organizations, in some cases, more social legitimacy than the State has in those territories (DCAF, 2012, p. 17).

However, it should be noted that, unlike the insurgents or terrorists, criminal groups are motivated primarily by economic incentives, not for political or social objectives. In that sense, Ioan Grillo (2016) uses the neologism *gangster warlords*, which is considered as more appropriate to define a set of hybrid criminal leaders characterized by *concurrent presence*, controlling certain territories, and threatening the fundamental nature of the state, not trying to dominate it completely but to seize some of its parts and weaken it, operating in it instead. In certain areas,

they meddle into the State monopoly of violence or, more precisely, in the state monopoly of war and justice. So, to protect the borders of their domains and kill armed enemies that enter their territory, they charge vaccines, exercise judgments, provide political support, and carry out social work.

The main deficit of many Latin American countries is the inability to restore their presence in its respective territories, not only from the security perspective but also in a comprehensive range of goods and services (see Table 1). That way, integral presence of the State has two levels: firstly, there are social actions that will serve to restore the confidence between the coercive power of the State and the citizens, and, in a second level, there are actions concerning specific responsibilities of the State in mentioned places. The first have operational immediate value to occupy the zone, motivated by the forces on their role as peacemaker and modifying the attitude of their inhabitants towards the police. The second was proposed to transform the factors that reproduce violence and crime (Buxton, 2015).

**Table 1.** Configuration of State presence in Latin America

Dimension	Limitation on regulatory capacity	Limitation on force monopoly
Territorial	All territory vs. zones of the national territory	All territory vs. zones of the national territory
Sectorial	All policy areas vs. specific policy areas	All policy areas vs. specific policy areas
Social	Total population vs. population segments	Total population vs. population segments
Temporary	Sporadic vs. permanent	Sporadic vs. permanent

**Source:** Elaborated by author from Maihold, 2015.

Thus, the more absent the State is from its territory or the poorer the services provided by it, the more susceptible will be the communities to depend on criminal organizations that promote illegal economies to become their supporters. In contrast, “if these services are provided to the population and their well-being is improved, this will discourage citizens to collaborate in illegal activities for income and as a result support for criminal organizations will be reduced, further hindering penetration” (Felbab-Brown, 2010, p. 12). It shouldn’t be forgotten that the development of criminal economies is directly linked to the lack of alternative livelihoods in neglected areas. Generally, authorities perceive these zones as sanctuaries for criminals and show no interest in improving the socio-economic situation for their inhabitants.

Following the above, Alda Mejias (2014) argues that in strong states which respond effectively to the needs of their societies criminal groups can’t replace the authority. But in areas of social and political marginalization and poverty in many Latin American countries, non-state actors often displace the state, gaining the loyalty of large segments of society. For this reason, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011) suggests that governments stop thinking about crime only as an aberrant social activity that must be eliminated, but rather require conceptualizing institutional response to violence as *Competition in State-Making* between public bodies and Non-state Armed Actors (ANSA’s)

whose ultimate goal is to win the loyalty of the population.

That way, a political response adapted to this phenomenon can’t be based only and exclusively in the vigilance and the application of the law in the classic sense or the enforcement of police – military operatives. Though the repressive element is a crucial component of the strategy, often it’s possible that it could be complemented with other socioeconomic policies, so that the dependence of the populations breaks in relation to the criminal enclaves created by ANSA’s (Felbab-Brown, 2016).

Under this logic, when it comes to urban areas permeated by illicit economic and violent crime and where state presence is weak, governments need to follow two interrelated objectives: First, they must establish better their own physical presence. In some cases, for example in Rio’s *favelas* (slums), that statement (or even insertion) of state authority may require the physical retake of territory controlled by violent non-state entities. In others, to establish such presence involves demonstrating that the prevalence of physical power, if not actual monopoly of violence, lies in the state apparatus and its enforcement. Second, the government needs to regain the population’s loyalty in those areas and away from criminal organizations, so its presence should not only be strong, but multifaceted and positive (Patterson & Blain, 2014, pp. 61-62).

Therefore, an appropriate policy option to deal with the aforementioned phenomenon must provide means of access to public goods and services so that people transfer their loyalty to the state, strengthening the ties between the latter and citizens, and hence the links among the population and ANSA's weaken.

In other words, the strategic participation of these ANSA's affects the fundamental purpose of the State and has political implications because they act as *competitive state-makings*, undermining its functionality and legitimacy. Thus, the more order, security, and providing of economic goods to win the hearts and minds of local population, the greater the possibility of becoming *de facto* proto-state rulers with a high degree of political capital (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 6).

However, socio-economic programs to reduce violence aren't a substitute for security. For this reason, prior to the reconstruction of state, a militarized approach to security should be applied to rescue that territory, breaking the intimidating power of criminal organizations, restoring the state's authority, and arranging it to the proper implementation of government programs because, "it can't enter an area dominated by [gangs] with assistance plans of the *Madre Teresa* type, nor is it likely to encourage citizen participation in places where drug trafficking has terrorized society" (Villalobos, 2015).

In short, the success of *Competition in State-Making* depends on the mee-

ting of two interrelated objectives: to achieve a better establishment of institutional presence and to regain the loyalty of population in areas controlled by ANSA's, highlighting its potential deterrent against criminal organizations and demonstrating to society that State is stronger than them. In that vein, it's useful to comment what recently happened in Rio's *favelas* where a fierce war between drug trafficking organizations and the state, which has lasted for a quarter century, is in the process of profound transformation. This is due to the implementation of a pacification policy by the Carioca's government rescuing the Felbab-Brown thesis, designing this strategy as *Competition in State-Making* between government and *facções criminosas* for the population's loyalty.

### Research design

This survey is based on a qualitative analysis which is grounded in a non-experimental design. In this particular case, we use a longitudinal approach, combining the use of three key instruments: discourse analysis, to comprehend the substantial logic behind the *pacification strategy*; trends description, to understand the main results of its implementation and; ex-ante – ex-post contrast, to assess the impact of the UPP in the implementation of the above-mentioned strategy. In second place, this investigation is based on a synchronic-diachronic study and, at the same time, is an exceptional case (Gerring, 2007). In this sense, the fight

against criminal organizations in Rio was executed by means of the implementation of a security policy that emphasized the military-police cooperation as a substantial component of pacification including, at the same time, a relevant and consistent socio-economic support to the civilians living in critical zones.

### War in Favelas

Closely related to the issues raised in the previous section, it should be noted that the absence of State in *favelas* generated power vacuums that criminals covered opportunistically in order to control and develop their operations when drug trafficking on a large scale took off in the South American country, endangering the residents of these communities and, incidentally, questioning two state functions under a *Weberian* basic matrix: territory control and maintain the monopoly of violence within its borders. Following this logic, Rio's Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame argue: "*favelas* were islands where the state simply decided to leave. Its residents were forgotten and ignored, were cooked in a toxic juice of extreme poverty, domestic violence and, since the late 80's, the omnipotence of drug traffickers, who specialized in abusing entire communities" (Glenny, 2012).

From this perspective, Robert Muggah (2016) views Rio as a *fragile city* because municipal authorities and their institutions are unable or unwilling to provide basic services for its residents. That is, the cities become brittle when the legitimacy, authority, and capacity of its institutions properly violate the basic functions such as guaranteeing the safety of citizens, property, infrastructure, access to water, electricity, and the preserving of basic rules, causing a break in the *social contract*. However, it's clear that *fragile cities* not necessarily lack of State presence, nor are *ungoverned areas* where therefore citizens rely on their own resources or other actors to meet their needs, creating a hybrid government system, order, and security. So, Rio was transformed into a *Cidade Partida* (split city) between *asfalto* (formal city) and *favelas* (informal city).

The political transition in the country that allowed it to return to democracy in 1985 coincided with an explosive increase in crime rates. This can be attributed largely to the proximity of Brazil with cocaine-producing countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (drug trafficking at that time experienced a boom) creating favorable conditions for distribution and transfer. Thus, *facções criminosas* began to capitalize this opportunity and took control of many communities<sup>1</sup> that were disconnected, without access to city services

<sup>1</sup> According to research conducted by Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP) and State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), 370 favelas (37% of total) remain under the control of drug traffickers. See: Goulart, 2013.

and basic infrastructure such as electricity, sewage, and garbage collection. Added to this, these have been traditionally considered illegal settlements, so they remain socially and politically remote from the decision-making are; such conditions of favelas transformed them into ideal centers of operation for *facções criminosas*.

In order to consolidate their power in these areas, criminal organizations replaced the state providing security, economic support, and basic services to their people. Assuming the role of *Donos do Morro* (owners of the hill), they established not only a territorial control, but also a social one, maintaining this *parallel authority* or *criminal governance* based on extrajudicial violence used by each criminal organization to punish those who break the rules or resolve conflicts within their domains (Grillo, 2014; Sampó & Troncoso, 2015). In other words, subjecting residents of communities to control and forcing them to avoid crossing *linhas vermelhas* (red lines), drawn to prevent interference from other criminal gangs in its territory. In fact, once it establishes territorial claims and in need of protection, one can only access the settlements by force or by obtaining the permission of the respective criminal organization.

In October 2009, a helicopter with four soldiers flying over Morro dos Macacos community was shot down by drug traffickers after police launched an operation in the area to control heavy fighting between criminal

gangs *Comando Vermelho* and *Amigos dos Amigos* (Phillips, 2009). Regarding their war borders and the effect that episode generated on the local population, Beltrame said that “in some Rio’s *favelas*, urban warfare is developed for territorial, economic, and social control” (IISS, 2015, p.2). Often when a band leader dies or is captured by the police, rivals try to expand their territory and invade the *Boca do Fumo* (sale point) in communities dominated by the criminal group. This fierce rivalry has led to a deeply rooted animosity between drug trafficking organizations and the birth of schisms competing to maximize the benefits of drug trafficking in 763 Rio’s *favelas*, home to about 1/4 of the Carioca’s population (Klaubert & Kruger, 2014).

There are four *facções criminosas* controlling *favelas*. The oldest of them is *Comando Vermelho* (CV), which emerged in the late ‘70s with the aim of monopolizing the Carioca’s drug trafficking. Then, in the mid-80’s *Terceiro Comando* (TC) was born, violently disputing territories with CV, thus initiating an arms race between the two commands for possession of more efficient and lethal weapons to make them able to ensure control of *Bocas do Fumo* and its expansion into other *favelas* (Sampaio, 2014). In the mid-90’s, a dissidence emerged that came into conflict with both criminal gangs: *Amigos dos Amigos* (ADA) and *Terceiro Comando Puro* (TCP). The fierce struggle for territory between the various criminal organizations, and between them and the police, led to unprecedented violence levels that

resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of fatalities in *Marvelous City*. Indeed, during the 90's, the homicide rate reached a *peak* of 85/100,000 people (UCDP, 2016). However, it's clear that confrontation involved three other actors:

First, there are the militias, defined by sociologist Ignacio Cano (2012a, p. 15) as formed by former or active police officers and characterized by the following features of paramilitary groups:

- Rivaling *facções criminosas* in the territorial domain of communities;
- Exert coercion among the population living in the *favelas* through violence and extortion;
- Main motivation is financial gain;
- Legitimated themselves as positive alternatives to drug trafficking through the provision of services such as order and sale of gas, private transport system, and installation of underground cable TV or Internet connection;
- Their chain of command acts under high officials of State.

These illegal armed groups are another source of criminal violence, which dates back to the '90s. At that time, the militiamen expelled drug traffickers in some communities, selling protection to residents and merchants in Rio's *favelas* located mostly in the west of the city. Members of the police apparatus were always present in these groups, but from the 90's on they stopped mediating between political interests and the *favelas* people, controlling them as

politically legitimated. Under this logic, International Amnesty has raised awareness on the risk of the Carioca's authorities participating, either by complicity or omission, in the establishment of a *non-government* in areas controlled by these groups noting that "so far, the government of Rio de Janeiro has been far from fulfilling its responsibility to combat these vigilante groups, and this has reinforced their sense of legitimacy" (Nuñez, 2010).

Militias wield significantly extensive clandestine support of authorities since their operations are based mainly on political favors, maintaining direct links with representatives of the legislative and judiciary powers. Even they use their policies to influence state elections connections, coercing *favelas* residents to vote for certain candidates proposed by the militias. So those illegal security forces whose power of extortion and land area increased rapidly ended up having an increasing influence on the local government act. In that vein, a report prepared by the Institute of Social and Political Studies notes that between 2005 and 2010 militias tripled the areas under their control in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, according to data provided by the Research Center on Violence, in 2013 the militias dominated 41.5% of Rio's *favelas*, while drug trafficking controlled only 56% of them (Efe, 2013).

Accordingly, it is possible to observe that in the case of militias, there would be a transversality between powers, a synergy between formal and informal

institutions, becoming difficult to be distinguished, for example between the police and the militia. This is because the police is perceived as a *lesser evil* militia compared to *facções criminosas* and this allow them to continue operating given that many of its members were former colleagues. Similarly, militias avoid clashes with the security forces, unlike drug organizations, generating mutual acceptance and contributing to strengthen the impression that militia controlled *favelas* are safer than those dominated by drug traffickers. However, although the militias prevent drug traffickers to install in area under their domain, there are situations in which, for a long and established practice of patronage, some of them, in case they don't get the expected revenues, *sell* control of its territory to *facções criminosas* and they end up serving as protectors of criminal organizations (Koonings & Koenders, 2012).

On the other hand, government and the police, although sometimes considered actors, are two forces that exert different types of control within *favelas*. During the 80's and 90's, as economic power of *facções criminosas* grew into communities, networks between ANSA's and state authorities were created as well as with the police; even some politicians funneled resources from *favelas* to end up at the hands of drug traffickers in exchange for votes. Links that remain in force, although less visible, until today. In that sense, Desmond Arias argues that "the persistence of high levels of violence [*in favelas*] is not the result of the inability of institutions,

but rather of criminal networks involving community leaders, politicians, and the police" (Arias, 2006, p.293).

Proof of this is that *facções criminosas* and militias charged at municipal and state candidates between US\$35,000 and US\$45,000 for campaigning on their territory, and up to US\$132,000 to ensure the support of community leaders in elections. Criminal groups also create *blacklists* of applicants and conducted informal surveys, charging applicants according to the size of the electorate. And while in the past criminal organizations of political campaigns were profitable, according to *O Globo*, the standards set by these organizations are now more stringent, and the phenomenon has spread to areas that in the past weren't affected (Gurney, 2014).

Michael Misse suggests that dynamics as described previously obey to *political goods* "produced in an asymmetric exchange, often compulsive, beyond the interest that both parties have to do so. Its price depends simultaneously on a political calculation and on a correlation of forces to acquire economic characteristics" (2015, pp. 79-80). Likewise, they can be produced by the privatization of state powers by a public official as is the case of corruption, or simply the possession of information, strength, power, or anything enough to force somebody into exchange in a relationship of violence, such as extortion.

Finally, the police also plays a role as a gravitating coercive apparatus that

is physically present in communities and which attempts to meet the government's agenda. Historically, the security forces acted independently of the government in *favelas*, establishing connections with criminal groups to obtain individual benefits, that is, there was no effort to combat *facções criminosas* as long as they paid off. Indeed, it's estimated that up to 50% of the profits of drug trafficking organizations were to police officers (Glenny, 2012). Thus, practices such as *arrego* (weekly payment from local traffickers to corrupt police to do not hinder the development of their activities) became the rule, while the attacks, shootings, and extrajudicial executions the exception.

Even the police didn't usually enter *favelas*, but merely patrolled their perimeter, leaving the population under the rule of ANSA's. This model of policing, which is basically a strategy of containment, reinforced the isolation of communities in relation to *asfalto*. Consequently, corruption practiced by police officers who were involved in *favelas* through the relationship of extortion and protection of drug trafficking, contributed to the inhabitants of these communities to have a negative perception regarding the police presence.

### UPPs... Challenging the conventional response

Historically, the strategy adopted by Rio's government in *favelas* could be described as *War on crime* consisting on launching sporadic offensives mo-

tivated by complaints from neighbors or ongoing investigations, emphasizing the element of surprise (Cano, 2016; Stewart, 2012). In other words, the previous strategy was the military operation, but weapons and drugs seizures were soon replaced and the operation had side effects: police deaths, bandits and neighbors victims of this confrontation. That, in the end, only increased violence: "gangs began recruiting more and more children soldiers, who initially only warned criminals when police approached; and soon they had guns and community residents saw certain romanticism in them, as protectors, but they were cruel" (Turati, 2012). Besides being extremely ineffective, this strategy stigmatized and victimized the people of the communities, the vast majority of which didn't belong to organized crime groups, but they lived under the constant oppression. Consequently, *favelas* became not only the reason for the war, but also the scene of conflict.

In 2000, already subjected to reverse the counterproductive outcomes generated by this erroneous approach, a new policy option emerged that was the direct antecedent of the current anti-crime strategy: Police Grouping in Special Areas (Grupamento of Policiamento em Areas Especiais, GPAE) created under the mandate of Governor Anthony Garotinho (1999-2002). As the name itself suggests, it was a police strategy for special areas, territories that were, at first, conquered by traffickers and then controlled by Special Forces physically located in the area. Unlike the approach described above,

GPAE was carried out following these guidelines: intolerance to the presence of firearms circulating within communities; intolerance to the presence of youth in criminal activities of any nature; and intolerance to the presence of the police, military, or civilians in random acts of violence, abuse of power, or criminal practices (World Bank, 2012). These pillars, retaken later by the current approach, represent one of the major doctrinal adjustments applied in the Carioca police action.

Although the program began to function successfully, drug trafficking was strong enough to continue operating, preventing violence in a territory tacitly controlled by the police. Unfortunately, this innovative project failed because it was carried out as an initiative by a minority segment of the Military Police of Rio Janeiro without political and institutional support, which resulted in a degradation process (Mendonça & Moulin, 2013). The lack of uniformity in the coordination between civil and military police, and between the state government and the municipality thwarted the efforts to strengthen this initiative in public security. Additionally, "its abrupt end due to political charges, after the Carioca press denounced the governor was tacitly accepting the continuation of illicit economies, though without violence and without effective control of territory" (Misse, 2015, pp.83-84). Discredited without greater political support, GPAE continue to exist as a kind of mini-battalions local, but gradually lost the ability, promised at its

inception, to control a spatial area. Even he not even got to have a tenth of the territorial jurisdiction of their successors: Pacifying Police Units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs)

The origins of *pacification* policy back when Rio de Janeiro was selected to host 2014 FIFA World Cup in October 2007, and as host of 2016 Olympics Games in October 2009. In this context, the decision to bring peace to the *favelas* desire coincided with the city administrators to enforce the promises made to Fédération Internationale de Football Association and International Olympic Committee in generating better security for all people of the city, state and country. Both sporting mega-events placed the *Marvelous City* on map of globalized and competitive cities. From this perspective, celebration is an important showcase to support the Rio's competitiveness, showing their material and symbolic in order to attract foreign investment flows resources.

In addition to these events, two structural and cumulative factors contributed to promote the *favelas* pacification's. On the one hand, political-party harmony existing between state and federal government allowed open a window of opportunity for Eduardo Paes (2009-15) and Sérgio Cabral (2007-14), Carioca's mayor and governor respectively, unify criteria regarding public security and create the UPP program. On the other hand, political climate of the time is: Eduardo Paes and Sergio Cabral they belonged to the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

(PMDB), and former presidents, Lula Da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-16), were members of the Workers Party, the closest allies of the PMDB (Ashcroft, 2014). This political alignment was very important to coordinate financial, logistical and human resources that would require the new strategy against organized crime.

Thus, after trial and error, the Carioca's authorities applied the lessons learned and chose to turn in a public security policy within the *favelas* launching a new program: Pacifying Police Units. However, one wonders, how do UPPs differ from other responses made earlier?

With the arrival in 2007 of former governor Sérgio Cabral and Security Secretary Jose Mariano Beltrame (first police career in the post), the new administration dismissed the idea that violence in the *favelas* was due to a problem of drug trafficking, criminal gangs, and availability of assault weapons, and chose to understand it as a matter of territorial control. If violence stemmed power that allowed criminal gangs control over communities, the solution was to recover those spaces and restore them to state authority. The UPP slogan 'veio para ficar' (came to stay) resembles notions of a 'break with history' in Rio's response to urban informality and violence (Werling, 2014). Therefore, the area is configured as a strategic pillar for a *pacification* policy, allowing the playback of sovereignty in terms of security and service provision.

From this perspective, what differentiates the new approach to *War on crime* is not the mere presence of the State in *favelas* but a change of priorities, an example of what Benjamin Lessing (2010) defined as *operational decriminalization*: reorientation of repressive drug policy by operational agents of the state forces, from the eradication of this illicit economy developed within communities towards minimizing violence, insecurity, and other negative externalities associated with drug trafficking. This shift in priorities was explained by the State Secretary of Public Security José Mariano Beltrame during an interview with *The Guardian* as follows: "We can't guarantee that we will put an end to drug trafficking, nor do we claim it [because] we would have a failed project. What we want is to break the paradigm of territory controlled by traffickers with war's weapons" (Phillips, 2010).

In strategic terms, the *operational decriminalization* gives the State a wide margin of maneuver to influence the behavior of drug traffickers: "Today is clear that anyone who intends to use drugs, the chemical dependent, will get drugs", said Beltrame. "But the guy who might be there selling them doesn't have that power, that influence" (Lisaardy, 2011a). Politically speaking, the strategy of pacification is an alternative route found for untying traffic and violence associated with it without having to face the dilemmas implicit in the option to legalize or openly negotiate with criminals. The State and specifically its security for-

ces simply defined clear and rational manner priorities and acted consistently with them. Consequently, UPPs represents a pragmatic choice to the failed *War on crime*, that from a conceptual point of view, can be equated with harm reduction: it isn't intended to eliminate the alleged root cause of the ills, crime or drugs, but to mitigate their adverse effects, such as violence and criminal control over communities (Turati, 2012).

Under this logic, *operational decriminalization* is most clearly perceived in the virtual absence of clashes during occupations as they happened before the UPPs. After the occupation and installation of the UPPs, clashes and deadly incidents are no longer the rule and became exceptional situations. For example, according to Beltrame, regarding the invasion of Rocinha, the *Amigos dos Amigos* stronghold: "The result was fantastic. In less than two hours, Rocinha was fully occupied without a single shot, and the inhabitants moved around the community in tranquility" (Koonings, 2014, p.140). That statement sends the following message: pacification is a success because occupations are well planned and organized; with a minimum of violence, are warmly welcomed by neighbors who positively perceive the State as returning to the *favelas*.

Another aspect that distinguishes the new approach is the adoption of the principles of community policing in order to maintain and integrate agents in *favelas*, representing an ambitious

effort to change the history of police abuse in Rio. As the official website of the project states:

Pacifying Police Units is a new model of public security and police that promotes rapprochement between population and the police, together with strengthening of social policy in the communities. When recovering the zones occupied for decades by drug traffickers and recently by militias, territories led by the UPPs are peace communities (UPP, 2016).

In other words, it replaces *War on crime* logics with a new approach based on the permanent police presence and an interactive community. And while UPPs exist within traditional police roles, this project grants great importance to the reconstruction of community relations. All officers perform community service as part of their routine, mainly teaching youth from music to karate and computer sciences; it tries to transform the troubled relationship between police and the community (Morse, 2011).

In this direction, it's necessary to point out that one key of the *pacification* policy lies in the recruitment and training of agents that make up the UPPs. Former Commander of the UPPs José Carvalho summarizes: "We needed fresh minds, not a *Rambo*. The old generation of police was used to kicking doors and opening fire on the street" (Isacson, 2011). In an effort to get rid of this institutional culture, only recently graduated from

the police academy were selected to participate as members. Once accepted into the program, recruits undergo three weeks of training that includes human rights, sociology, and meetings with UPPs commanders to exchange experiences, aiming to provide general guidance on the status of the specific *favela* in which each officer will operate. After this brief period of preparation, UPPs officers are deployed. Thus, the emphasis is placed on community policing rather than on the repressive activity focused on combat. Indeed, UPPs agents are much less visibly armed; they don't carry heavy weapons like those used by Special Police Operations Battalion (known as BOPE).

From that perspective, Joaquin Villalobos explain:

To win the support of citizens, it is essential the good behavior of [the security forces]. All errors, abuse of power, and corruption become operational difficulties, loss of information, and risks for themselves [the police]. Increasing the hostility of citizens, who in most cases can have forced relationships with offenders, is a serious error (Villalobos, 2015).

Therefore, the behavior is not only an ethical or human rights issue; it is an important component of operational efficiency. A better conduct of the force corresponds more possibly with the building up of intelligence networks, greater intelligence, and more efficiency (Escoto, 2016). Ultimately, the strategy aims to build peace in *favelas*

meaning political capital on their favor, whose sustainability is highly dependent on their ability, by the state, to continue earning the *minds and hearts* of the population.

From an organizational angle, it is worth to note that Sérgio Cabral launched the first decree on this new project, *Decree 41.650 o Bola da PM n°012*, in January 2009. This document provides in its *section 3* that each operation depends on the UPPs and the doctrinally Pacification Police Coordination (CPP), whose commander reports directly to the general commander of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro, and shall establish the necessary links with the State Committee appointed by the governor. In other words, the UPPs are operationally disconnected from the rest of the territorial structure of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, Cabral unveiled *Decree 42.787* in January 2011, nearly two years after the previous document. This decree establishes operational definition, objectives, criteria, and implementation of the pacification process (Monroy, 2014).

Regarding the first aspect, the decree defines the Pacifying Police Units as a small police force that works exclusively on a community located in an urban area delimited by law. Each has its own office and can have one or more bases. It also has a commander, body of officers, sergeants, and soldiers, as well as its own equipment, such as cars and motorcycles. The UPP program works on the principle of policing and has a strategy based on partnership between

the population and public security institutions. UPPs act based on respect for the culture and characteristics of each community, promoting dialogue and encouraging the emergence of community leaders. The program includes agreements and partnerships between UPPs, government departments, the private and the third sector.

About the second point, it states that UPPs were designed with the following objectives:

- Recover state control over communities under the influence of *façções criminosas*.
- Maintaining peace and security in *favelas* to ensure socio-economic development of their inhabitants.
- Breaking *War on crime* logics in Rio de Janeiro (Ashcroft, 2014).

Similarly, the decree ratifies the profile of the target areas where the UPPs are installed as follows: "Poor communities with low institutional framework, high degree of informality, and ostensible and opportunistic installation of armed criminal groups that

undermine the rule of law" (Monroy, 2014, p. 119). To better understand the selection criteria by the UPPs, occupied *favelas* must use city boundaries created by Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public Security Institute, ISP). Hence, Rio's state is divided into four sections, each designated as *Região Integrada de Segurança Pública* (Integrated Public Security Region, RISP) (table 2).

It can be seen in *Figure 1* that, since its launch in *Santa Marta favela* in December 2008, the *pacification* policy has notoriously favored RISP 1. Between 2008 and 2010, 11 UPPs were installed in RISP 1. From 2010 to 2012, 15 more were established in the first quadrant, and between 2012 and 2014 12 additional UPPs were located in the same section. In the same period, RISP 2 accumulated only 3 UPPs, two of which (*Cidade de Deus* and *Batam*) were executed shortly after *Santa Marta*. Then, the third unit of UPP in RISP 2 was implemented in *Vila Kennedy* during May 2014, more than three years later. The last UPP was at RISP

**Table 2.** RISP's Location

RISP	Location
RISP 1	<i>Rio's touristic South Zone as well as Downtown and North Zone. The famous Copacabana, Crist Redeemer, Sugar Loaf, as well as both airports of the city are located in this area.</i>
RISP 2	<i>This area encompasses the rest of Rio's municipality, with upper class (Barra) as well as lower class (Bangú, Campo Grande) neighborhoods.</i>
RISP 3	<i>To the north of Rio lie several municipalities of lower income commuters.</i>
RISP 4	<i>This area includes Rio's neighbour cities of Niterói, São Gonçalo, and several other municipalities further away from the city.</i>

**Source:** Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014.

3, only one in this sector. Finally, it's worth mentioning that RISP 4 hasn't received any UPP. Consequently, of

the 38 UPPs installed to date only 4 were implanted outside RISP 1 (see Table 3).




Figure 1. Number of UPPs installed per RISP, 2008-14

Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014

Table 3. UPPs installed, 2008-14

Favela	Implementation Date	RISP
Santa Marta	12/19/2008	1
Cidade de Deus	02/16/2009	2
Batam	02/18/2009	2
Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia	06/10/2009	1
Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo	12/23/2009	1
Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos	01/14/2010	1
Morro da Providência, Pedra Lisa e Moreira Pinto	04/26/2010	1
Morro do Borel, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Morro do Cruz, Catrambi	06/07/2010	1
Formiga	07/01/2010	1
Morro do Andaraí, Nova Divinéia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek, Jamelão, Morro Santo Agostinho e Arrelia	07/28/2010	1
Salgueiro	09/17/2010	1
Turano	10/30/2010	1
Macacos	11/30/2010	1
Quieto, São João e Matriz	01/31/2011	1
Fallet, Fogueteiro, Coroa	02/25/2011	1
Prazeres, Escondidinho	02/25/2011	1
Morro São Carlos, Mineira, Zinco e Querosone	05/17/2011	1

Favela	Implementation Date	RISP
Mangueira	11/03/2011	1
Vidigal e Chácara do Céu	01/18/2012	1
Fazendinha	04/18/2012	1
Nova Brasília	04/18/2012	1
Morro do Adeus/Morro da Baiana	05/11/2012	1
Alemão	05/30/2012	1
Chatuba	06/27/2012	1
Fé/Sereno	06/27/2012	1
Vila Cruzeiro	09/05/2012	1
Vila Proletária da Penha	09/05/2012	1
Rocinha	09/20/2012	1
Manguinhos	01/18/2013	1
Jacarezinho	01/18/2013	1
Barreira/Tuiti	05/22/2013	1
Caju	05/22/2013	1
Arará/Mandela	05/22/2013	1
Cerro-corá	07/25/2013	1
Lins	01/16/.2014	1
Camarista Meier	01/16/2014	1
Mangueirinha	24/02/2014	3
Vila Kenedy	05/23/2014	2

Source: Elaborated by author from UPP Official Website, 2016.


However, it's natural to wonder why most UPPs focus on RISP 1. As indicated, RISP 1 mainly encompasses the Southern area of Rio de Janeiro, which includes most of the tourist attractions as *Maracana Stadium*, *Crist Redeemer* and famous beaches as *Copacabana* and *Ipanema* (see Figure 1). In that sense, Ignacio Cano (2012b) argues that the vast majority of the UPPs are located in the Southern zone since, although the region is inhabited by 7% of the population, it accounts for 50%

of formal employment and generates 33% of the Carioca's Gross Domestic Product. Addressing RISP 1, UPPs ignore the state's most violent areas. Some experts recognize this bias in selection criteria stating that UPPs implementation doesn't cover the areas of greatest lethality, as *Baixada Fluminense* or the West, controlled by militias. However, most *favelas* located in RISP 1 are controlled by *facções criminosas* who want to be closer to its main customers: foreign tourists.



**Figure 2.** Map of Rio de Janeiro  
**Source:** International Amnesty, 2016.

Finally, legal framework provides a holistic view of the pacification process in the following steps (see Figure 3):



**Figure 3.** Stages of pacification process  
**Source:** Elaborated by author from Cabral 2011, Muggah, 2013 and Werling, 2014.

*Tactics.* This phase is to regain territorial control over the areas submitted by criminal groups. To achieve it, the State reports that public and early BOPE invade a given *favela* to expel the narcos. BOPE entry represents the re-conquest of territory that has been under the enemy's power. Significantly, the occupation is previously announced in order to avoid confrontation and bands voluntarily leave the area or surrender their weapons (Muggah & Souza, 2014; Nicoll, 2015). Even Carioca government itself refers to this strategy as *Announced War*, recognizing the development of an armed conflict in those territories, as well as an attempt to approach them more cautiously.

*Stabilization.* In the second step of the BOPE invasion, the territory is stabilized, neutralizing the last resistance cells of criminal gangs and they remain in the *favela* as long as necessary, creating the conditions necessary to install the contingent of the UPPs. However, this phase isn't well defined, and there's no prescriptive description of what should be or include. This space, open to interpretation, has allowed military intervention with National Security Force troops, particularly in the most populous and conflicting *favelas*: Complexo do Alemão (composed by 15 communities totaling 400,000 inhabitants) or Complexo do Maré (composed by 16 communities where 130,000 Cariocas live).

*Implantation.* The decree states that the third step is when the UPPs moves permanently to the assigned community

in order to pave the way for the arrival of public and private services, seeking the possibility that the community is reintegrated into the city, even though the program doesn't intend to implement these services itself. In other words, it is designed to set the stage for a subsequent phase called "shock of order", in which business and property relationships are formalized (Fisher, 2014). However, actual implementation is left in the air, without providing details on how the UPPs must enter or start their activities in the community. Typically, this implementation includes the construction and occupation of UPPs bases in strategic locations of occupied communities. The presence of the headquarters is crucial for the success of the strategy as without an established base in the *favela*, UPPs are delegitimizing themselves as *competitive state construction*. Even, the UPPs are usually installed in public buildings that were abandoned or used by other government agencies. There are cases, however, as in Batam where the headquarters that houses the UPPs worked as a hideout for *Comando Vermelho* (Estévez, 2013).

*Evaluation and monitoring.* The final phase of the process sets out to track course changes, aiming to continuously improve the program. Although this step may be more influential to the success and development of interventions, the decree doesn't establish a mechanism of control over the *pacification* process; and it doesn't determine formal appropriate indicators for monitoring and evaluation for effective

management (Rodrigues, 2014). Without doubt, this ruling has damaged the generation of a comprehensive view of the process, not only by local commanders, but also by the *policymakers*. Consequently, with the lack of an evaluation system, the project can't adapt to the demands, thus generating a long-term change.

From what was discussed above, we can infer that the pacification process provides a solution to the crossroads of thinking the state from the strong-weak dichotomy, as a differential presence and situational playback devices are revealed, in many cases illegal and informal. Through these devices, the state strategically focus on some of its facets: repressive-militarist or provider-institutionalism (Monroy, 2014).

Under this logic, it should be noted that the *pacification* process has tactical fundamentals underlying Counterinsurgency (COIN), an aspect that is clearly evident in how it faces the challenge represented by *facções criminosas* while ANSAs (Karim, 2014; Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). The philosophy behind the *pacification* was articulated in documents from the US Consulate in Rio, which, exposed by *WikiLeaks*, showed that UPP "shares some characteristics with US counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq" (Arsenault, 2012). Indeed, UPP is very counterinsurgency-like approach without it being called a COIN, but its logic and basic scheme are there: per-

manent presence of State, including its law enforcement as well as linking the people to State via provision of public goods, services and legal economy –the essence of what population centric COIN is about (Bertetto, 2012; Felbab-Brown, 2013).

Since it's known, COIN implies adopting multiple measures, whether military, economic, political, and social, to delimit and turn the insurgency ineffective (Garcia, 2010, p. 112). Due to the fact that the gravity center of the gangs in *favelas*, as well as in the case of insurgencies, is the local population, it makes them vulnerable to the application of counter-insurgency methodologies. Traditional COIN principles have been critical in the strategy of Rio's Government, demonstrating that its value and efficiency is preserved, even when used against criminal groups.

Additionally, similarity of this strategy with the *clear, hold, build* approach as described in the now famous Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, is obvious (Daniel, 2015, p. 100). Indeed, Michael Burgoyne (2012) assessed how effective are Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 principles in their efforts against *facções criminosas*. The research results indicate that 10 out of 12 guidelines contained in this document proved to be useful in Rio, but need some doctrinal adjustments based on the identification of the gravity center of these criminal groups (see Table 4).

**Table 4.** Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 principles in the pacification policy


Government legitimacy	+	Rule of law	+
Unity of effort	+	Long-term commitment	+
Primacy of political factors	/	Use of force	+
Knowledge the environment	+	Small units	+
Intelligence driven operations	+	Learning and adaptation	+
Isolation from popular support	+	Support to host nation	/

**Source:** Elaborated by author from Burgoyne, 2012.

Therefore, the main difference between the traditional COIN strategy and the *pacification* process lies in their starting and final conditions. Thus, the causes of criminal violence in Rio are socio-economic and cultural, more than political-ideological as for insurrection. And, instead of having as goal to strengthen the government’s legitimacy, as in a traditional COIN, the expected result of the *pacification* process is to integrate the communities to the *asfalto*,

favoring the welfare and progress of local population.

Between 2008 and 2014, 38 UPPs have been installed in Rio, benefiting 1,500,000 people in 264 communities, which amounts to a land area of 9,446,047 square meters (see Graphic 2). Judging from the figures, the *pacification* policy applied in *Marvelous City* seems to have achieved its main objective: to regain state control over favelas under the influence of *façções criminosas*.



**Figure 4.** Level coverage of the pacification policy, 2008-14

**Source:** Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

On the other hand, it is necessary to highlight that the *pacification* policy first evaluated its success by the behavior of crime rates in the intervention communities. This parameter used as its main objective, as described by official documents, to reduce the levels of violence directly associated with criminal groups operating in these areas. As shown in Figure 5, the

pacification process has had a significant impact in reducing homicides. Between 2007 and 2014, the murder rate fell more than 65% in intervened *favelas*. In fact, the homicide rate in areas with UPPs was 7.4 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2014, representing a third of the verified rate in 2008 (21.5), when the first occupation took place.




Figure 5. Intentional homicide rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Similarly, Figure 6 show that the greatest impact was a substantial decline in the rate of police lethality and accounted for only 3.7 resistance deaths (*autos do resistência*)<sup>2</sup> per 100,000 inhabitants (20 cases) in *pacified* areas during 2014, equivalent to a reduction of 85% compared to that recorded in 2008, 25.2 (136 victims). Based on these improvements, it is estimated that about 5,000 killings have been prevented since the introduction of the new anti-crime

strategy, i.e., the UPPs has sheltered 60 lives annually per 100,000 inhabitants (Efe, 2015). So, those statistics show that “UPP are in many ways a police pacification program before the approach prevailed [between security forces]: authorization to kill in *favelas*” (Vigna, 2015).

In the same way, Figure 7 shows that between 2007 and 2014 there was a sharp increase in the number of crimes reported in the pacified commu-

<sup>2</sup> *Autos do resistência* refers to homicides resulting from police intervention in the exclusion of unlawfulness and is invoked on the grounds of self-defense. Meanwhile, the responsible agents often argue that these deaths occur as a result of armed clashes. See: HRW, 2016, p. 48.

nities. Table 5 shows a breakdown in this behavior in areas with UPPs between 2007 and 2013, revealing that the three largest increases correspond

to intentional and unintentional injuries (40% of reports), threats (12%) and drug trafficking (5% of cases) (ISP, 2015, p. 5).




Figure 6. Resistance deaths rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.




Figure 7. Crime report rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Table 5. Crime reported before and after UPPs, 2007-13

Crime	Average monthly cases for community		Monthly rate (average) per 100,000 in each community	
	Pre UPP	Post UPP	Pre UPP	Post UPP
Disappearances	0.32	<b>0.71</b>	3.60	<b>6.92</b>
Intentional injury	3.34	<b>11.66</b>	41.33	<b>127.36</b>
Domestic violence	2.17	<b>8.47</b>	27.12	<b>84.66</b>
Threats	2.30	<b>7.97</b>	29.45	99.24
Rape	0.14	<b>0.37</b>	1.35	<b>4.84</b>
Robbery	5.87	2.70	61.23	20.58
Pick pocketing	3.48	<b>5.38</b>	46.46	<b>64.99</b>
Drug related crime	1.91	<b>5.83</b>	24.13	<b>63.93</b>

Note: Bold italic numbers indicate increased incidence during period studied.

Source: Muggah & Szabó, 2016.

In relation to the above, a report prepared by the Laboratório de Análise da Violência examined to what extent the installation of UPPs affects crime rates recorded in communities, concluding that while the *pacification* policy seems to have succeeded in reducing armed violence, its impact on a wider series of crime rates becomes more irregular, showing an upward trend. However, it's difficult to know why some crimes go up while others go down, and there are two plausible hypotheses:

- a) Increased reporting of crimes as a result of the increased confidence by intervened *favelas* residents when going to the authorities or local police without fear of reprisal.
- b) The *Pacification* process has undermined the authoritarian social control and power structures of criminal groups, preventing them from applying their codes of conduct, resulting in a real increase of unarmed crimes and those derived from domestic conflicts; this means that common crime is replacing bigger criminal operations (Muggah & Szabó, 2016, p. 13).

Similarly, it is worth to mention that after their expulsion as a product of the application of the *pacification* policy, *façções criminosas* were forced to move their illicit activities towards peripheral area,

creating the so-called *cockroach effect*<sup>3</sup>. As expected, the installation of UPPs generated a millionaire prejudice to criminal gangs who exploit drug trafficking. In fact, a report by the Intelligence Department in 2009 revealed that only in the communities of the South, the drug traffickers stopped receiving up to R\$1.8 million monthly (Efe, 2014). Therefore, as argue by Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), instead of achieving a spreading *ink-spot* of security (with a zone of effective public security steadily expanding), operating clearance as tactical interventions in the first phase of pacification process can become a game in which violent crime and their negative externalities simply move to other areas with weak state presence.

According to Rio's authorities, with the occupation of some of the largest *favelas*, including Complexo do Alemão, in 2010, Rocinha, in 2012; Lins, in 2013, and more recently Maré, in 2014, CV and ADA fled to Chapadão and Pedreira, turning them into their new centers of operations. Particularly, Chapadão has been christened *New Alemão*, referring to the Alemão slum complex, marked by an unprecedented violence, which was occupied in 2012 (Thompson, 2012; Belton, 2016). The CV now maintains a stronghold in Chapadão while the ADA has established a significant presence in Pedreira.

---

<sup>3</sup> According to Bruce Bagley, the *cockroach effect* occurs when criminal organizations, to avoid detection by authorities, after the light has been turned on move from one municipality to another, from one city to another, from one country to another; or from one region to another in search of a better context to establish and carry out their criminal activities. See: Garzón (2013, p. 12).

## UPP Social... Securitization of development?

The process of occupation is carried on by the entry of UPP Social for the purpose of coordinating the provision of goods and services in *pacified* areas and integrating it to the *asfalto*. This phase was designed by Rio's authorities to coordinate social and urban development interventions, with the explicit aim of 'multiplying' the impact of the *pacification* process. And represents an additional effort for public security that is only part of the equation to reverse the exclusion in *favelas*; it is also necessary to create necessary conditions for socio-economic development. It was also influenced by similar projects implemented as part of the counter-insurgency operations in the Colombian cities of Bogotá and Medellín, and bears many similarities to the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan (Foley, 2014).

As indicated by Robert Muggah: "Somehow the notion of a UPP and UPP Social emerged by default rather than by design" (Ramsey, 2014); without this being a counterpart to the security strategy, the UPPs alone will not contribute to the inclusion of communities, and despite the previous work of the UPPs in the recovery of territory, the social component couldn't exist. Therefore, UPP Social program aims to complete the *pacification* process, integrating the areas taken over by UPPs, by promoting socio-economic development, and allowing residents' access

to the same services and opportunities as the rest of the city.

It's pertinent to mention that the UPP Social was launched in August 2010 under the leadership of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro through Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP) and with the help of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), two years after the first occupation. As *pacification* process, the socioeconomic counterpart is developed in three stages:

Starting with pre-implantation, this phase, a group of local engineers goes around for a particular month after the recovery of the territory in the UPPs communities talking to associations, leaders, and residents to begin to identify the most urgent demands. This step is followed by conducting a rapid participatory mapping, which provides a socio-economic evaluation of each *favela*. Based on this initial diagnosis, it holds a UPP Social Forum in each of the neighborhoods to discuss the main demands identified and possible solutions, assisting representatives of all relevant municipal departments (health, education, housing, etc.), local leaders, the commander of the local UPP, and the private sector. The results of these forums, including the list of applications, participants, and achieved agreements are made available to the municipal and state government. Finally, a team of local coordinators of the UPP Social (two or three, depending on the size of

the community) is set permanently in the communities, making daily visits to mediate between the community, government, and other providers of basic services.

Between 2010 and 2016, the Rio de Janeiro government has invested a total of R\$2.1 billion in this initiative, obtaining remarkable results in the following areas:

*Education.* 232 Development Areas opened, 49 are in areas occupied by UPPs. They have generated 9,295 jobs in *pacified* communities since 2010. Investment in the quality of education has achieved that the Index Development of Basic Education in the territories with UPP undergone a great evolution. According to data from 2009 and 2013, in the second segment, growth in this evaluation notes reached 24%.

*Health.* Coverage of Family Health Strategy in the city increased from 3% in 2010 to 47.9% in 2016 and is expected to reach 70% in 2017. However, in *pacified* areas this index is now 73%. In 12 of the 38 favelas occupied, coverage reached 100% (Borel, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia, Formiga, Jacarezinho, Macaques, Manguinhos, Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo, Providência, Rocinha, Santa Marta, São João, Tabajaras/Kids); and three already exceed 90% (Caju - 97%, Mangueira - 95% and São Carlos - 92%). The goal for the end of 2016 is that 80% of the territories have achieved 90%.

*Elimination of geological risk.* In 22 of 38 areas occupied, R\$239 million were invested in infrastructure. The areas that received interventions were Andarai, Barreira do Vasco/Tuiuti, Batan, Borel, Cerro-Corá, Cidade de Deus, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia, Complexo da Penha, Complexo do Alemão, Complexo do Lins, Escondidinho/Prazeres, Fallet/Fogueteiro/Coroa, Formiga, Macacos, Mangueira, Providência, Rocinha, Salgueiro, São Carlos, São João, Turano, and Vidigal/Chacara do Ceu.

*Dwelling place.* Since 2009 it has invested R\$882 million, covering 53,000 households, urbanization programs as Morar Carioca in 18 *pacified* zones. Only in Manguinhos, were 9,800 homes were built, and in Complexo do Alemão other 15,500.

*Public Services.* For example, public lighting company RioLuz has earmarked R\$20.5 million for the installation or upgrade of 20,965 luminaires. In fact, in zones as Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia they had an increase of 210% in the number of new or upgraded points. Additionally, the Municipal Urban Cleaning Company (Companhia Municipal de Limpeza Urbana, COMLURB) invested R\$15.27 million in the installation of 302 containers and the purchase of 282 vehicles for logistics in garbage collection in 20 communities intervened by UPPs (Rio+Social,2016).

However, the UPP Social isn't only a matter for public investment, as indi-

cated by *Wikileaks*; the US Consulate in Rio reported in 2009 that the Gross Domestic Product of the city would approximately increase to US\$21 billion if the residents of pacified areas were incorporated into formal economy (Halais, 2013). Under this logic, it has been suggested that the pacification process intended to transform the inhabitants of *favelas* into consumers, being understood as the key that has allowed the expansion of provision of services to its residents (water, electricity, cable TV and Internet) and an incipient regularization goal of integration of these territories into the city.

Similarly, it's seen an unprecedented opportunity for the expansion of private initiatives because, although residents of the communities are poor, companies see *favelas* as places of increasing opportunity. There are several advantages in arrival at the pacified areas, particularly the media exposure of their brands, the ability to expand its customer base and sales, and the possibility of creating programs of corporate social responsibility that can contribute to community development, while strengthening their reputation as positive agents in the Carioca society.

On the other hand, the promotion of socioeconomic development in *favelas* has generated mixed reactions on their residents for it does not only mean to guarantee that they enjoy their rights, but also the need to meet a series of rigged obligations to formalization of access to public services in *pacified* communities. This situation has sig-

nificantly increased the cost of living in *favelas* once pacified; all residents must pay water bills, electricity, cable TV and Internet services previously available for free or at minimal cost. It should be remembered that prior to the arrival of UPP Social, public services were supplied illegally by *facções criminosas* thus representing a qualitative leap in terms of availability, access, and quality.

Closely related to the above, Jailson da Souza, director of the Observatory of Favelas says: "When the UPPs arrived, more taxes, tariffs, and prices rose, the space has been re-evaluated, there is real estate speculation and that makes life difficult for people because markets fall behind the police" (Selvanayagam, 2013). Even, a speculative boom has been noticed when the news that UPPs will be installed in any *favela* begin to circulate. The housing market has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the *pacification* policy; the price per square meter and rental housing tend to increase dramatically in intervened neighboring favelas and neighborhoods at a higher rate than the rest of the city. For example, prices have increased by 50% in the *pacified* communities only 24 hours after the BOPE raid (Lissardy, 2011b).

A report prepared by Getulio Vargas Foundation in 2013 concluded that after the arrival of UPPs, rents in *pacified* favelas grew 6.8% compared to the rest of the city (Griffin, 2016). In other words: "Rio is going through a huge real estate valuation, but in *fa-*

velas is higher, giving rise to what we have called the *UPP effect*" (Lissardy, 2011b). However, it has been suggested that the recovery of *favelas* as Rocinha where the houses are on average smaller and are home to more people than other communities, can bring negative consequences, such as the rampant growth of illegal settlements externalities.

### Conclusions

The analysis of Rio's experience allows the deriving of the following lessons for the design of public security policies and prevention of violence in Latin America:

Firstly, the *pacification* policy shows how *policymakers* recognized that social, political, and economic exclusion is an ideal context in which crime and violence are strengthened. It's necessary to adopt comprehensive approaches to ensure the success of any public security strategy. This is particularly true in large urban areas that have been victim of anarchy, crime, and neglect by the State for decades, as in the case of Rio's *favelas*. For this reason, *policymakers* have applied Felbab-Brown's postulates and reconceptualized their strategy against *facções criminosas* as *Competition in State-Making*.

As previously noted, although repression is a critical component in government response, often must be complemented by socio-economic

policies to provide equal opportunities and meet the basic needs of communities in order to restore the social contract between State and *favelas* residents, so that the nexus between the population and criminal enclaves created by ANSAs break. In short, there are two key variables in complex scenarios such as the ones analyzed in this work: State's effective authority, accompanied by a provision of public goods and services reduce the scale and damage capacity of the illicit economy.

Thus, Carioca's authorities adopted new premises and set realistic goals: eradicate drug trafficking isn't an attainable goal. It is feasible to minimize the impacts of illicit drug markets and control exercised by *facções criminosas* in communities. By replacing the pretense of stopping traffic to end armed criminal gangs control, *policymakers* moved the debate on public security, taking it away from the *War on crime* approach and focusing it on the territorialization of illicit economies. It's therefore necessary to assume that reducing crime is only meaningful to the extent that it improves public security.

Similarly, it's necessary to adapt the strategy to the nature of problem to be solved: *policymakers* determined that the violence was caused by the territorial control exercised by criminal gangs; therefore, the *pacification* policy focused on the recovery of these territories. For example, the use of specific police models, such as community policing isn't due to subjective assessments as it enables control of territory rescued

by improving the relationship between the inhabitants of *favelas* and UPPs.

In this regard, another difference of *pacification* policy when compared with previous policies should be highlighted: the realization of the social agenda after the police-military operations. The creation of UPP Social program to be conducted after the phase of stabilization and recovery of territory is a great indicator of that change. Access to social programs and social inclusion initiatives that get multiplied in *pacified* communities due to a deconstruction of *favelas* as the site par excellence of crime. Therefore, implementing an inclusive component after the repressive one in the strategy is crucial for successful results.

Fourth, the role of municipal authorities is essential. One can say that the best results are obtained when municipal and state authorities are in charge. A skilled and creative local management can make the difference between success and failure of a strategy since many of these plans include social services managed at the local level; the leadership of municipal officials is indispensable. In addition, local authorities are best placed to understand the needs of the community and to establish a dialogue with citizens. However, the effect is amplified when there's harmony between all levels of government as happened in Rio with former Mayor Paes and former Governor Cabral from the central government.

Finally, a successful implementation of comprehensive strategies against crime involves acquiring a lasting commitment. For a mayor or governor, talk to reverse the exclusion can generate substantial electoral political gains. However, its implementation is extremely complex and requires long-term planning; ability to obtain resources, persuade state institutions of various levels involved and involve civil society organizations and the private sector, while maintaining its support and commitment for a considerable period.

## References

- Alda Mejías, S. (December 3th., 2014). Un campo abonado para el crimen organizado. *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*. Retrieved from <http://revistafal.com/un-campo-abonado-para-el-crimen-organizado-2/>
- Arias, D. (2006). The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janeiro. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 38(2), 293-325.
- Arsenault, C. (January 4th., 2012). Counter-insurgency 'improves' Brazil's slums. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/201112281252381901.html>
- Ashcroft, P. (March 22, 2014) History of Rio de Janeiro's Military Police Part 3: Community Policing. *Rio-OnWatch*. Retrieved from <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14055>.

- Belton, L. (February 9th., 2016). Rio Olympics: Prospects for next round of favela occupations. *Insight Crime Organized Crime in Americas*. Retrieved from <http://es.insightcrime.org/analysis/rio-prospectos-para-nueva-ronda-ocupacion-favelas>
- Bertetto, J. (November 15th., 2012). Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace. *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-criminal-street-gangs-lessons-from-the-counterinsurgent-battlespace>
- Burgoyne, M. (December 1st., 2012). The Right Tool for the Job: an Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterinsurgency Principles against Criminal Insurgency. *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/resource/the-right-tool-for-the-job-an-evaluation-of-the-effectiveness-of-counterinsurgency-principles>
- Buxton, J. (2015). *Drugs and Development: The Great Disconnect*. Swansea: Global Drug Policy Observatory.
- Cabral, S. (2011). *Decreto No. 42.787: Dispõe sobre a criação da Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora - UPP e dá outras providências*, Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro.
- Cabral, S. (2009). *Decreto No. 41.650: Dispõe sobre a criação da Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora - UPP e dá outras providências*, Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro.
- Cano, I. (2012a). "No sapatinho": A evolução das milícias no Rio de Janeiro (2008-2011). Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Heinrich Böll.
- Cano, I. (2012b). *Os Donos do Morro: Uma Avaliação Exploratória do Impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora UPPs no Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública.
- Cano, I. (May 16th., 2016) Searching for an alternative to the 'war on drugs' in Rio de Janeiro. *Open Democracy*. Retrieved from <http://www.opendemocracy.net/drugpolicy/ignacio-cano/searching-for-alternative-to-war-on-drugs-in-rio-de-janeiro>.
- Daniel, J. (2015). Criminal Governance and Insurgency: The Rio de Janeiro Experience. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 9(4), 86-106.
- DCAF (2012). *Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Efe (December 4th., 2013). Grupos parapoliciales triplicaron sus áreas de influencia en Río de Janeiro. *Infolatam*. Retrieved from <http://www.infolatam.com/2013/12/04/grupos-parapoliciales-triplicaron-sus-areas-de-influencia-en-rio-de-janeiro/>
- Efe (July 23th., 2014) La pacificación de favelas de Río traslada la violencia

- cia hacia la periferia. *Infolatam*. Retrieved from <http://www.infolatam.com/2014/07/24/la-pacificacion-de-favelas-de-rio-traslada-la-violencia-hacia-la-periferia/>
- Efe (May 11, 2015) Las favelas pacificadas de Río tienen menos asesinatos que el resto de la ciudad. *El País Costa Rica*. Retrieved from <http://www.elpais.cr/2015/05/11/lasfavelaspacificadasderiotienenmenosasesinatosquerestodeciudad/>
- Escoto, R. (2016). Irregular Warfare: The Brazilian Army's Paratrooper Infantry Brigade in the pacification of slums in Rio de Janeiro. *Diálogo: Forum of the Americas*, 28-35.
- Estévez, P. (May 11th., 2013) La pacificación de las favelas. *Nexos*. Retrieved from: <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=15291>
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2010). *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2011). *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting organized crime and urban violence in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Felbab-Brown, V. (October 5th., 2013). Gangs, Slums, Megacities and the Utility of Population-Centric COIN. *Brookings Institution*. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/gangs-slums-megacities-and-the-utility-of-population-centric-coin/>
- Felbab-Brown, V. (March 2th., 2016). The skyscraper and the shack: What slum policy should not be about? *Brookings Institution*. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-skyscraper-and-the-shack-what-slum-policy-should-not-be-about/>
- Fisher, B. (July 6th., 2014). Shock of Peace: Intersection between Social Welfare and Crime Control Policy in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas. *School of Social Service Administration - The University of Chicago*. Retrieved from <http://www.ssa.uchicago.edu/shock-peace-intersection-between-social-welfare-and-crime-control-policy-rio-de-janeiro%E2%80%99s-favelas>
- Foley, C. (2014). *Pelo telefone: Rumors, truths and myths in the 'pacification' of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro: Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW).
- García, M. (2010). Contrainsurgencia en Afganistán: retos y desafíos de una estrategia común. In J. Jordán, P. Pozo & M. García Guindo, *Terrorismo sin fronteras. Actores, escenarios y respuestas en un mundo global* (1st ed., pp. 109-119). Navarra: Aranzadi.
- Garzón, J (2013). La Diáspora Criminal: La difusión transnacional del Crimen Organizado y cómo contener su expansión. In J. Garzón & E. Olson, *La Diáspora Criminal: La difusión transnacional del Crimen Organizado y cómo contener su expansión*, (1st ed, pp. 1-25). Washington, DC: Latin American

- Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
- Glenny, M (November 2th., 2012). Rio: The fight for the favelas. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/27511af8-23b3-11e2-a46b-00144feabdc0#axzz2BAeKWbvW?src=longreads>
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goulart, G. (December 2th., 2013). Study Finds: Militias Dominate 45% of Rio's Favelas. *RioOnWatch*. Retrieved from <http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=12655>
- Griffin, J. (June 15th., 2016). Olympic exclusion zone: the gentrification of a Rio favela. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jun/15/rio-olympics-exclusion-zone-gentrification-favela-babilonia>
- Grillo, I. (September 10th., 2014). Comando Vermelho de Brasil y la policía que lo combate. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Retrieved from <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/comando-vermelho-brasil-policia-combate>
- Grillo, I. (2016). *Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America*. London: Bloomsbury Press
- Gurney, K. (August 14th., 2014). Grupos criminales controlan campañas políticas en las favelas de Río. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Retrieved from <http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/grupos-criminales-controlan-campanas-politicas-en-las-favelas-de-rio>
- Halais, F. (March 12th., 2013). Pacifying Rio: what's behind Latin America's most talked about security operation. *Open Security Conflict and Peacebuilding*. Retrieved from <http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/flavie-halais/pacifying-rio-whats-behind-latin-americas-most-talked-about-security-oper>
- Hoelscher, K. & Norheim-Martinsen, P. (2014). Urban violence and the militarization of security: Brazilian 'peacekeeping' in Rio de Janeiro and Port-au-Prince. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 25(6), 957-975.
- HRW (2016). *"Good Cops Are Afraid" The Toll of Unchecked Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro*. Washington DC: Human Rights Watch (HWR).
- International, Amnesty (2016). *Violence has no place in these games! Risk of human rights violations at the Rio 2016 Olympic Games*. Rio de Janeiro: International Amnesty.
- IISS (2015). *Fresh gang violence in Rio despite pacification efforts*. London: International Institute Strategic Studies (IISS).
- ISP (2015). *Balanço de Indicadores da Política de Pacificação (2007-2014)*. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP).
- Isacson, A. (January 5th., 2011). Rio de Janeiro's Pacification Program. *Washington Office on Latin Ame-*

- rica. Retrieved from [http://www.wola.org/rio\\_de\\_janeiro\\_s\\_pacification\\_program](http://www.wola.org/rio_de_janeiro_s_pacification_program)
- Karim, S (April 16th., 2014). Security or Counterinsurgency in Rio favelas? *Americas Quarterly*. Retrieved from <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/security-or-counterinsurgency-rio-favelas>
- Koonings, K. & Koenders, S. (2012). "Winning the urban war in Rio de Janeiro? Citizen security and the favela pacification strategy", XXX LASA International Congress, May 23-26
- Koonings, K. (2014). "The Conundrum of Violence and Insecurity in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro", *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, No. 97, pp. 135-143.
- Klaubert, D. & Kruger, J. (2014). Armed peace. *ContaRío*. Retrieved from: <http://contario.net/armed-peace/>
- Lessing, B. (November 1st., 2010). Ciudad de Dios: ¿Un ejemplo para México?. *Nexos*. Retrieved from <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14035>
- Lissardy, G. (December 21th., 2011\_a) La otra estrategia contra el narco. *BBC Mundo*. Retrieved from [http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/12/111219\\_brasil\\_rio\\_narco.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/12/111219_brasil_rio_narco.shtml)
- Lissardy, G. (November 14th., 2011\_b). Suben los precios de las casas en las favelas de Río tomadas por la policía. *BBC Mundo*. Retrieved from [http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/11/111114\\_brasil\\_inmobiliario\\_favelas\\_fp.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2011/11/111114_brasil_inmobiliario_favelas_fp.shtml)
- Maihold, G. (2015). *Crimen y violencia en América Latina: Retos de gobernanza de seguridad en áreas de presencia limitada del Estado*. San Salvador: Fundaungo
- Mendonça, L. & Moulin, C. (2013). *Old problems and old solutions: an analysis of Rio de Janeiro's public safety policy and its impact on urban violence*. Rio de Janeiro: Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW).
- Misse, M. (2015). Crimen, Estado y mercancías políticas en Brasil. In D. Míguez & A. Isla, *Estado y crimen organizado en América Latina*, (1st ed., pp. 63-89). Buenos Aires: Libros de La Araucaria.
- Morse, A. (2011). "Pacifying" and Reincorporating Rio de Janeiro's Favelas. In M. Meyer, *Tackling urban violence in Latin America: Reversing exclusion through smart policing and social investment* (1st ed., pp. 2-6). Washington DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).
- Muggah, R. (June 30th., 2016). Urban governance in fragile cities. *GSDRC Professional Development Reading Pack*. Retrieved from <http://www.gsdrc.org/professional-dev/urban-governance-fragile-cities/>
- Muggah, R. & Szabó, I. (2016). *Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America*. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute.
- Muggah, R. & Souza, A. (2014). Paving the hills and leveling the streets:

- Counter-insurgency in Rio de Janeiro. In R. Muggah, *Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of fragility* (1st ed., pp. 198-214). New York: Routledge.
- Muggah, R. (2013). *Counterinsurgency in Rio de Janeiro*. Geneva - Rio de Janeiro: Graduate Institute - International Relations Institute.
- Monroy, S. (2014). Pacificación y violencia. Ejes para una comparación Colombia– Brasil. *Análisis Político*, 82, 22-44.
- Nicoll, A. (2015). *Fresh gang violence in Rio despite pacification efforts*. Essex: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
- Núñez, R. (November 30th., 2010) José Beltrame, el Elliot Ness brasileño. *Infolatam*. Retrieved from <http://www.infolatam.com/2010/11/30/brasil-jose-beltrame-el-elliott-ness-brasilenol/>.
- Paterson, P. & Blain, C. (2014). Derechos humanos y la lucha contra las organizaciones criminales transnacionales: Una estrategia imprescindible. *Security and Defense Studies Review*, 16, 57-89.
- Phillips, T. (October 17th., 2009). Twelve dead and helicopter downed as Rio de Janeiro drug gangs go to war. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/17/rio-favela-violence-helicopter>.
- Phillips, T. (April 12th., 2010). Rio de Janeiro police occupy slums as city fights back against drug gangs. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/12/rio-de-janeiro-police-occupy-slums>.
- Ramsey, G. (August 22th., 2014) Making Rio's Pacification Work: The Limits of 'UPP Social'. *Insight Crime Organized Crime in the Americas*. Retrieved from <http://www.insight-crime.org/news-analysis/rio-pacification-limits-upp-social>.
- Río+Social (2016). Quem somos. *Río+Social*. Retrieved from: <http://www.riomaisocial.org/programa/>
- Rodrigues, R. (2014). The Dilemmas of Pacification: News of war and peace in the 'Marvelous City'. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 3(1), 1-16.
- Selvanayagam, R. (August 21th., 2013). Rents in Rio de Janeiro slums soar ahead of the Olympics. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2013/aug/21/rents-rio-janeiro-soared-olympics>.
- Sampó, C. & Troncoso, V. (2015). La violencia vinculada a la criminalidad en Brasil y el papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en la búsqueda de la seguridad pública. *Revista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad*, 10(1), 89-109.
- Sampaio, A. (May 9th., 2014). Pacification and conflict in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. *Politics and Strategy. The Survival Editors' Blog*. Retrieved from <http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strat>

- egy/blogsections/2014-d2de/may-b015/brazil-favela-3b61.
- Stewart, S. (February 8th., 2012). Brazil's battle against drug traffickers. *Stratfor Global Intelligence*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/special-report-brazils-battle-against-drug-traffickers>.
- Thompson, R. (November 11th., 2012). Risks and rewards in Brazil's favela offensive. *Stratfor Global Intelligence*. Retrieved from <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/risks-and-rewards-brazils-favela-offensive>.
- Turati, M. (March 12th., 2012). El "milagro" brasileño anticrimen. *Proceso*. Retrieved from <http://www.proceso.com.mx/300755/el-milagro-brasileno-anticrimen-2>.
- UCDP (2016). Amigos dos Amigos - Comando Vermelho. *UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program*. Retrieved from <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/nonstate/12635>.
- UPP (2016). O Que É. *UPP-Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*. Retrieved from [http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o\\_que\\_e\\_upp](http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp).
- Vigna, A. (January 26th., 2015). Homicidios policiales en Brasil: violencia legalizada. *Insight Crime Crimen Organizado en las Américas*. Retrieved from <http://es.insightcrime.org/analisis/homicidios-policiales-brasil-violencia-legalizada>.
- Villalobos, J. (January 10th., 2015). Bandidos, Estado y ciudadanía. *Nexos*. Retrieved from <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=23788>.
- Werling, E. (2014). *Rio's Pacification: Paradigm shift or paradigm maintenance?* Rio de Janeiro: Humanitarian Action in Situations other than War (HASOW).
- World Bank (2012) *O retorno do Estado às favelas do Rio de Janeiro: Uma análise da transformação do dia a dia das comunidades após o processo de pacificação das UPPs*. Washington DC: World Bank.