Abstract
The article is a reassessment of what is known in the legal literature as the "rule vs. standards debate." Instead, however, of asking which species of legal norm fares better from the standpoint of normative ideals such as those of justice, democracy and efficiency – traditional approaches to the question focused here - the paper compares rules and standards according to their ability to intrinsically motivate (that is, to motivate independently of the threat of sanctions or other external incentives) the regulated actors to comply. It argues that rules are more suited than standards to achieve this result, since, in the case of rules, the authority charged of enforcing the norm usually does not need to make a controversial decision about the content of the norm. By freeing the enforcing authority from making decisions like these, rules prevent the relationship between regulators and regulated from gaining an adversarial tone, which is a relevant factor of compliance motivation.

Keywords
Rules, Standards, Compliance, Motivation.