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Abstract: Experimental philosophy is now some twenty years old and has a large body of work to its credit. Little of this work focusses directly on memory, but it has, as the philosophy of memory has come into its own over the last several years, become increasingly cl
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Abstract: In this paper, I begin to explore what a naïve realist might say about the phenomenology of episodic memory. I start by arguing that, when it comes to accounting for the phenomenology of memory experiences, there are two primary options available to the naïve
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Abstract: The relationship between the phenomenology of imagination and the phenomenology of memory is an interestingly complicated one. On the one hand, there seem to be important similarities between the two, and there are even occasions in which we mistake an imagin
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Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify, in the light of philosophical and psychological research on affective metacognition, the nature of the episodic feeling, which determines what it is like to remember or relive in one’s mind an episode from one’s own past
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Abstract: Are occurrent states of forgetting literal experiences of absences? I situate this question within the debate on mental time travel (MTT) to understand whether these states can be explained as literal experiences of absent episodic memories. To frame my argum
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Abstract: It is common for people to view memories as ‘treasured objects’ or ‘cherished possessions’. Great care is taken to preserve such memories via scrapbooks, photo albums, or mementos. Despite the widespread nature of this phenomenon in human life, it has receive
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Abstract: The debate about the necessary involvement of any form of self-consciousness in conscious experience has recently shifted its focus to the question of whether there are totally selfless states of consciousness (TSSC). The primary source of evidence for the ex
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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that causal theories of memory are typically committed to two independent, non-mutually entailing theses. The first thesis pertains to the necessity of appropriate causation in memory, specifying a condition token memories need to satis
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Abstract: If myths have been narrated since time immemorial, this study argues that a novel kind of political myth has emerged over the past decades that has been adapted to a specifically modern significance and function. To account for the appearance of this novel fo
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