Traditional international relations theories, which were consolidated in the second half of the 20th century, prioritize systemic aspects as explanatory elements of the States’ position toward the outside. The main strands of realism⁷, institutional liberalism, and certain currents of constructivism confer preeminence to the international system as a determining factor in how countries relate to each other (Hudson 2005; Lantis and Beasley 2017), minimizing the role of domestic politics, parties, specialized bureaucracy, decision-makers, and government agencies in the choices made in foreign policy.

Only during the last years of the 20th century can a “domestic turn” (Kaarbo 2015) be identified in the specialized literature of the main theoretical schools⁸. Although there is no general theory of foreign policy⁹, there has been progress, especially after the end of the Cold War, in studies on the internal factors that influence it. Significant advances in the discussion about the role of leaders, their closest circles of advisors, institutional variations in decision-making processes, new government agents beyond diplomacy, and non-governmental actors have increasingly conferred multidisciplinary status to the discipline (Salomón and Pinheiro 2013).

However, decision-makers do not exist or operate in a vacuum. Especially in democratic governments, factors related to public opinion, party politics, interest groups, and bureaucratic disputes need to be considered in the definition of foreign policy. This domestic dimension is the starting point for examining the choices made by Lula’s current government. In it, the variations regarding agents involved in the federal executive branch were small compared to his first two terms. The significant change lies in domestic politics, as indicated below.

Brazil’s presidential system, defined by the 1988 Constitution (República Federativa do Brasil, 1988), leaves no doubt about the role of the Union, represented by the President of the Republic, to maintain relations with foreign states, take part in international organizations, sign treaties and international agreements, declare war and make peace¹⁰. The distribution of competencies between the branches of government remains unchanged, and there have been no successful legislative initiatives to promote its revision¹¹. The Executive, therefore, retains the prerogative to formulate, decide, and implement foreign policy¹². Within the Executive, this decision-making process occurs hierarchically, as highlighted by Lima (1993): “In Brazilian presidentialism, the parameter that regulates the degrees of freedom or the relative autonomy held by diplomacy is presidential authorization, whether by omission or delegation of power (...)”.

In Lula 3.0, the main decision-making units within the executive branch in foreign policy have resumed the structure of his previous terms¹³. Itamaraty has regained its ability to advise the head of state and coordinate government action abroad¹⁴, with its structure reinforced by the creation of three new secretariats¹⁵, in addition to the seven existing in 2022. The design of the ministry has approached that in effect in 2010, aiming to support the resumption of the country’s international prominence in areas that have once again become priorities.

The team providing direct support to the president once again includes a Special Advisory (AESP) dedicated to international issues and directly linked to the head of state. AESP has taken on some of the responsibilities¹⁶ that for years were performed by the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, which no longer exists¹⁷.

The individuals at the center of the decision-making structure ensure continuity regarding the perception of Brazil’s role in the world, so prominent in the two previous terms. President Lula was at the origin of most of the initiatives that distinguished Brazil’s foreign action from 2003 onwards and has strong interest in continuing to act in this area. His international experience is a valuable asset for the third term, as he is one of the few leaders who actively participated in forums that remain central to global governance efforts, such as the G20, BRICS, G7, and the Climate COP. Therefore, the perceptions of the centrality of challenges faced by the country persist, especially the fight against hunger and inequalities, the promotion of sustainable development and regional integration, and the defense of peace and multilateralism.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Mauro Vieira, returns to the position after having been Dilma Rousseff’s last chancellor. His proximity to the president dates back to when he headed the Brazilian embassies in Buenos Aires and Washington. Special Advisor Celso Amorim was the chancellor during Lula’s first two presidential terms and served as Minister of Defense for Dilma Rousseff between 2011 and 2014.

Other prominent agents in matters relevant to foreign policy, even if sectorally, such as the Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, and the Minister of Finance, Fernando Haddad, are also close collaborators of the head of state and have already worked in his previous terms¹⁸. Both ministries have shared with Itamaraty the preparation of major events that Brazil hosted in 2024 (G20) and will host in 2025 (BRICS and COP 30).

Consequently, the presence of Lula and a group of experienced and trusted policymakers at the center of the foreign policy decision-making process makes the first level of analysis the most stable one, as well as the one with factors of continuity. The circumstances in which they operate, both domestic and international, register the main changes.

In 2022, Brazil emerged from the polls divided, and it remains polarized. In one of the country’s most fiercely contested elections, Lula was elected for the third time with 50.9% of the votes, the smallest margin in a second round in Brazilian history¹⁹. Although defeated in the presidential elections, Bolsonarism proved not to be a passing phenomenon and persists as an organized movement, with significant parliamentary representation, presence in state and municipal governments, and solid social bases and mobilization power.

This became evident right after the second round of the presidential election. The transitional team’s work between the previous and current governments did not take place normally. The cooperative attitude and constructive dialogue maintained with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an exception (República Federativa do Brasil 2022).

The Brazilian state reached the end of 2022 weakened. There was no budget for the main public policies for 2023, and default before international organizations was widespread²⁰. The dismantling of the planning system led to the weakening of development strategies, lack of commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals, regional development plans, and sectoral programs. There was also the dismantling of social participation in the formulation and monitoring of public policies. These facts contributed to the disorganization, lack of coordination, and consequent inefficiency of state action.

Many agencies needed to have their structures restored and teams completely rebuilt. The ministries of Women, Racial Equality (Dolce de Faria and Simoni 2025) and Human Rights, Culture, and Labor were recreated. The ministries of Planning and Budget, Management and Innovation, Finance, and Industry and Trade returned to being individual first-tier instances. For the first time in its history, Brazil now has a Ministry of Indigenous Peoples.

Brazil had to resume its activities in international forums and bilateral partnerships in a sui generis condition: practically all sectoral policies that provide substance to foreign policy needed to be redone. Besides the lack of resources, there were no environmental, cultural, human rights, health, education, science and technology, trade, or industrial policies.

On January 8, 2023, a failed coup attempt confirmed the extent of animosity installed in the social fabric and in several state agencies. As proven by the Interparliamentary Inquiry Commission (República Federativa do Brasil 2023), there was widespread instrumentalization of institutions and public agents at the federal and state levels. The investigations revealed the involvement of high-ranking officials from various state careers in elaborate schemes to disqualify the electoral process, disregard the results of the polls, and destabilize the newly inaugurated government.

Without a parliamentary majority in the House or the Senate, sustaining coalition presidentialism would require constant effort to approve measures with a direct impact on the country’s foreign actions. The institutional disarray resulting from outsourcing budget management to the Legislative during the Bolsonaro government led the country to an unprecedented situation of near semi-presidentialism or cohabitation in the manner of France from 1958²¹ onwards, where the Executive shares its responsibilities for defining and implementing public policies with the National Congress.

On one hand, all 64 nominations for heads of diplomatic mission²² made by the current government were approved in the Senate; on the other hand, highly visible issues such as the Gaza crisis, the conflict in Ukraine, or the resumption of diplomatic relations with Venezuela resonated intensely in the Legislative. Of the 213²³ parliamentary information requests addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 were about the Israel-Palestine conflict, 28 about Venezuela, 28 about expenses on international trips by the President of the Republic, 20 about consular issues, and 10 about the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Among the 84 requests for Foreign Minister summons, 25 were related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, 14 to Venezuela, and 4 to the Russia-Ukraine conflict²⁴.

The approval of Bolivia’s accession protocol to Mercosur only occurred in the Brazilian Senate via an agreement that provided for the creation of a parliamentary commission to verify the state of democracy in the neighboring country. The Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives approved a Legislative Decree that withdraws Brazil from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)²⁵. Another initiative underway in the House of Representatives seeks to suspend the decree that reinstates visa requirements for citizens of Australia, Canada, and the USA, which reestablishes the principles of the national migration policy of reciprocity²⁶.

Brazil still does not have a credit policy for the export of engineering services to face the fierce competition in markets such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia²⁷. Brazilian construction companies have ceased to be players in the competitive international civil construction market. State-owned companies that were once part of Brazil’s projection instruments, such as Petrobras, no longer have the same freedom of action, or have been privatized, like Eletrobras.

Rebuilding relations with federative entities is part of the country’s institutional rehabilitation initiative and demands constant attention. The presence of parliamentarians, governors, and mayors in the Federal Executive’s international agendas, held in Brazil or abroad, has been helping in this effort. The internalization of several ministerial meetings of the Brazilian G20²⁸ presidency and the holding of COP 30 in the Amazon are part of this strategy. The five integration routes included in the new Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) will connect Atlantic ports to Pacific ports and strengthen connections with practically all our South American neighbors²⁹. These infrastructure works create a shared interest agenda with the states of the South, Midwest, and North, where agribusiness is very present, for integration with Asian markets.

Finally, it is worth noting that the plurality of political forces in the coalition that came to power in 2023 imposes on the government the need for constant adjustments and balance between parties and civil society organizations, unions, and business entities with a more liberal profile or a more developmental vision. This is reflected, for example, in discussions about the conclusion of the Mercosur-European Union agreement, the discontinuation of Brazil’s accession process as a full member of the OECD, and the speed at which fossil fuels will be reduced in the countries´ energy matrix.

In the 2023-2024 biennium, decision-makers in foreign policy experienced daily the metaphor coined by Putnam (1988) about “two-level games”, where permanent negotiations with internal interest groups, both in government and opposition, are intertwined with relations with other states and international actors. The boundaries between domestic and foreign have quickly blurred in recent years, whether due to the effects of the technological revolution or the context of political polarization. It is difficult to find an issue where decisions made in foreign policy do not reverberate internally and vice versa. We will assess the foreign external board next.

The world underwent significant transformations between 2011 and 2024. This period is marked by a summation of crises that feed into and exacerbate each other. The geopolitical rivalry between the US and China has deepened. The consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic are still being felt. War has returned to the heart of Europe, resurrecting fears of nuclear escalation. The conflict between Israel and Palestine has once again shown its most inhumane face, victimizing thousands of innocent civilians, especially women and children, spreading to Lebanon and Syria, and provoking for the first time in history a direct confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Hunger and food insecurity continue to threaten millions of people across various continents. The technological gap between rich and poor countries keeps growing. Democracy remains under intense attack on all continents, threatened by electorally competitive extremist movements. In short, the current international situation is much more unfavorable than at the beginning of the 21st century.

The backdrop of this hostile and conflictive context, involving traditional and emerging power poles, is the deconstruction of the post-World War II liberal order and the absence of renegotiation of global governance mechanisms. The gradual dismantling of the welfare state model, which started in the 1970s, associated with the energy crisis and the end of European communism, made way for an extreme version of liberalism, built on deregulation and financialization of economies, greatly facilitated by technological advances, especially in information technology, which allowed deep and rapid integration of goods and service markets globally (Crouch 2011). The tension between market interests and social justice has been altered in favor of the former. Over the last four decades, this process has led to increasing tax cuts — especially for the wealthiest classes —, reduction of investments in social programs, privatization of assets, and outsourcing of public services (Streeck 2014).

Even after the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal dogmas demonstrated strong resilience among the political and economic elites of the West, whose technocratic approach linked to trade liberalization and deregulation of financial and capital markets remained detached from social control. Until Trump’s first election and Brexit, the Democratic Party in the US and the main political forces in Europe, linked to Christian democracy or social democracy, had great difficulty conceiving new paradigms that went beyond compensatory policies to accommodate the contingents excluded by globalization (Watkins 2021).

This fracture of the social contract within the capitalist bloc is at the root of the turbulence and uncertainty that plague contemporary international society. The threats to the global order and Western values do not come from China (Stokes 2018). Beijing’s phenomenal rise resulted from a new cycle of global capitalist expansion, led by Washington from the 1990s onwards (Arrighi 2008). The use of economic and trade governance regimes made the Asian country a direct beneficiary of triumphant neoliberalism in the world following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Chinese state knew how to plan and execute its sovereign insertion into the world, based on the rules of the game (Fouskas et al. 2021).

In recent years, China has also become a pillar of multilateralism: it is one of the main contributors to the budget and contingents of UN peace missions, and it plays a prominent role in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (United Nations Peacekeeping 2025).

A scenario of new bipolar rivalry resulting from the broad decoupling of Chinese and American economies is unlikely. Not even the touted race for leadership in the digital economy will automatically imply an irreconcilable fracture of the world into two opposing camps. Although for the US this competition is increasingly related to national security, it is unclear how far the geopolitical repercussions of this dispute can go.

The dynamics of global alliances and the resulting balance of power will certainly impact Brazil’s list of priorities. However, how this will occur is still an enigma. The intensification of geopolitical competition in recent years, of which the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a poignant example, reaffirms the centrality of the security theme, impacting the entire UN agenda. Examples include the elevation of nuclear risk, the perception of the failure of the UN Security Council, and the widespread use of unilateral sanctions adopted without support in international law, aggravating the fragmentation of the world economy and creating worrying precedents for the global order.

In this context, the US’s reaction has been to seek ways to contain the rise of its main competitor, especially in the domain of high technology. If the contrast between Kamala Harris’ and Donald Trump’s foreign policies in the electoral campaign was clear in the environmental, human rights, health, and revaluation of the multilateral system areas, the perception of the Chinese military and technological threat is bipartisan and finds strong support in American society.

Being on the world’s sidelines between 2019 and 2022 took a toll on Brazil’s ability to understand, reflect on, and act upon the international context surrounding it. As defined by Minister Vieira (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2023), the primary task from January 2023 was to recover the lost space and time, resuming ties with the main international partners.

The space for diplomatic initiatives for a country like Brazil proved to be more limited, even amid expectations generated by hosting major events such as the G20, BRICS, and COP 30 (Amorim 2024). Participation in these forums is fundamental for the defense of multilateralism, in a context of power diffusion and transition to a multipolar order, an essential condition for emerging countries to find minimum conditions of stability and predictability to plan their development autonomously, without alignment to major powers.

Brazil’s return to international forums was successful and began before taking office, with participation in COP 27, in December 2022, in Egypt (Hirst 2023). Since then, Brazil has resumed participation in the summit meetings of CELAC, MERCOSUR, CELAC - European Union, African Union, G7, G77, CPLP, BRICS, and G20, and the president has maintained an extensive agenda of bilateral visits with heads of state and government in Brazil and abroad³⁰.

However, it was not enough to simply be present again in international forums. It was necessary to revisit abandoned dossiers and remake relationship choices with the world. This is what we will assess next by considering three areas of Brazilian foreign policy action in the 2023-2024 biennium.

A country the size of Brazil, with a long diplomatic tradition of promoting peace, cannot ignore the challenges of the international security agenda. The fact that during the 2022-2024 biennium, Brazil held a seat of non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 11th time reinforced this need to take a stance on the main conflicts of the present.

The Brazilian government restored the historically balanced stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and corrected the inflections adopted between 2019 and 2022 within international organizations, notably in the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, which involved favorable votes for the occupation of Palestinian territories by illegal Israeli settler colonies.

Brazil presided over the Security Council in October 2023 and expressed on numerous occasions its repudiation of terrorist acts carried out by Hamas. It equally condemned the disproportionate reaction of Netanyahu’s government against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, which victimized more than 50,000 civilians, 70% of whom were women and children (United Nations 2024). The resolution project tabled by Brazil, which called for the release of hostages and the establishment of humanitarian pauses to support the civilian population in Gaza, received 12 positive votes, two abstentions, and the negative vote of the US, which exercised its veto power.

The protection of Brazilians in the conflict zone became a priority and resulted in two large-scale operations. With Operation Returning in Peace, it was possible to repatriate 1,524 Brazilians and their families who were in the conflict region. There was a total of 10 flights by the Brazilian Air Force, eight of them departing from Israel, one from Jordan to repatriate citizens in the West Bank, and another from Egypt to repatriate Brazilians in the Gaza Strip. With the extension of the conflict to Lebanon in 2024, another 2,662 people were repatriated in Operation Cedar Roots, of which 1,991 were Brazilians, 601 were Lebanese, and 70 were of other nationalities (República Federativa do Brasil 2024c).

The conflict was widely used for domestic political purposes in Brazil, linking the issue to religious agendas and questioning one of the most traditional positions of Brazilian foreign policy: the defense of a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. Due to criticism of the Israeli government, the Brazilian president was declared persona non grata in that country. In an unprecedented gesture of paradiplomacy, the Israeli prime minister received opposition Brazilian governors who traveled there to show solidarity.

The war in Ukraine required constant dialogue efforts from the Lula government with Ukrainian and Russian authorities, as well as with several NATO members and emerging countries. President Lula held meetings with his counterparts, Zelensky and Putin. Despite the Brazilian government’s repeated condemnation of the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity both in the General Assembly and the Security Council, there were recurring demands for Brazil to join initiatives to isolate Russia in international forums and adopt unilateral sanctions against the country. The refusal to sell ammunition for Germany’s Gepard armored vehicles, which would be re-exported to Ukraine, fits the stance of not supplying defense products that could be used in the conflict. The joint proposal by Brazil and China (República Federativa do Brasil 2024b), which led to the creation of a Group of Friends of Peace, formed by 13 emerging countries, sought to expand negotiation spaces to end the war.

The paralysis and lack of coherence among Security Council members are evident when comparing how the issue of Palestinian and Ukrainian territorial integrity is treated. Criticism of the Council’s actions and reform proposals were widely addressed in presidential speeches. For the first time in history, the foreign ministers of G20, under Brazilian presidency, gathered at the United Nations headquarters in a meeting open to all members of the organization. As a result, Brazil obtained the “Call to Action” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2024a), a document with commitments to reform and modernize the main international organizations, such as the UN, the Bretton Woods organizations, and the WTO.

At the regional level, two topics were priority. The first was to restrict the Initiative for Atlantic Cooperation³¹, proposed by the US, to activities focused on economic, scientific, and environmental cooperation, without military or defense connotations. The second was related to the border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo territory. The risk of escalation of this dispute became real throughout 2023, with potentially serious geopolitical consequences for the region as a whole and for the Amazon in particular. Brazil supported and actively worked towards the Argyle Declaration in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which provides for the renunciation of the use of force to resolve this controversy and creates a permanent dialogue mechanism between the two countries.

It took decades for Brazil to consolidate its leadership in environmental governance issues. In 1992, the country hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), which gave rise to the Climate, Desertification, and Biodiversity Conventions. The organization of Rio+20 in 2012 was the starting point for the approval of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In 2015, Brazil played a decisive role in promoting the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, confirming its status as a central actor in overcoming obstacles in international forums related to climate change and sustainable development.

This legacy was squandered by the Bolsonaro government, which refused to host COP 25, dismantled internal regulatory frameworks, spaces for social control and participation, and state structures linked to the preservation of natural and genetic heritage. To restore the credibility of Brazilian foreign policy in this area, Brazil resumed participation in international forums in a proactive manner. It convened and hosted the IV Summit of Heads of State of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, which resulted in the institutional strengthening of the entity, the only international organization linked to a biome and headquartered in Brasília³².

In partnership with the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia, Brazil articulated an initiative titled “United for Our Forests,” which already brings together 18 countries with humid tropical forests. The initiative establishes a common cooperation agenda between the Amazon, Congo, and Borneo-Mekong basins, reconciling the protection of these biomes with social inclusion, stimulating the local economy, and valuing indigenous peoples and the ancestral knowledge of traditional communities.

Brazil incorporated the climate agenda into its bilateral relations, which allowed the reactivation of the Amazon Fund with the support of partners such as Norway, Germany, the US, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The country also mobilized other developing countries to build an innovative mechanism (Tropical Forests Forever Facility) to be presented at the COP in Belém, which stipulates payment of ecosystem services provided by tropical forests.

Addressing climate change became one of the priorities of Brazil’s G20 presidency, with the creation of a Task Force that brought together climate and finance negotiators from the Group, focusing on promoting national ecological transformation plans that take into account the impact of global warming on the most vulnerable populations and countries.

Brazil resumed measures that will lead to the fulfillment of its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2030 and presented its new NDC for 2035 at COP 29 in Baku, which covers all sectors of the economy and foresees a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of between 59% and 67% compared to 2005 levels (República Federativa do Brasil 2024a).

As a holder of one of the cleanest energy matrices and vast potential in solar, wind, biomass, ethanol, biodiesel, and green hydrogen energy, Brazil has managed to combine the image of commitment to decarbonizing its economy and an exporter of sustainability. By resuming the fight against deforestation in the Amazon and mining in the Yanomami territory, the country is regaining the trust of the international community and national economic and social agents.

For the first time since 1988, the Multi-Year Plan (PPA 2024-2027)³³ includes the environmental agenda as one of its five transversal agendas (Republica Federativa do Brasil 2024). It appears in 50 of the 88 programs and has 113 specific objectives, reflecting its centrality to the government and the commitment to addressing environmental and climate challenges.

This disposition was reflected in the plans for preventing and controlling deforestation for all biomes in the country, with visible results. According to the Brazilian Biomes Monitoring System Project (Prodes), the Amazon reached the lowest deforestation rate of the decade in 2024, with the largest reduction in 15 years and about a 46% drop compared to 2022 (Secretaria de Comunicação Social 2024). In the Cerrado, the 25.7% reduction in 2024 was the first in five years, avoiding the emission of 400.8 million tons of CO2 (República Federativa do Brasil 2024b).

The subject of sustainable development also reflected in two other related topics: energy transition and the human dimension. Aligned with the strategic objective of ensuring the country’s energy security, the supply of clean energy was expanded. In the last two years, this supply increased by more than 15 gigawatts, coming from solar and wind sources (Ministério das Minas e Energia do Brasil 2023) (Ministério de Minas e Energia do Brasil 2025). Abroad, the decision was made to consolidate partner diversification and to obtain observer status in OPEC and resume the accession processes to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), the latter being the main international forum for promoting biofuels.

The visibility provided by the reconstruction of environmental policies was strengthened by the resumption of growth with social inclusion, combating the triad of hunger, poverty, and inequality. Removing Brazil from the Hunger Map again is a viable and highly impactful goal. In 2023 alone, 24.4 million people left the condition of severe food insecurity. This is why the launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty became one of the main results of the Brazilian G20 presidency. Its objective is to provide renewed impetus to the matter of development on the international agenda, aligning efforts on external and domestic fronts. Together with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and as part of the preparatory process for COP 30, a guide was developed for the inclusion of social policies and food system transformation in the NDCs.

South America has once again become a priority in Brazilian foreign policy starting in 2023. Brazil rejoined UNASUR and has been working with the other countries that still maintain ties with the entity (Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, Suriname, and Venezuela) to find a solution to the complex administrative, patrimonial, and financial situation of the entity, a legacy of its inactivity for almost a decade.

Despite the strong ideological burden that still falls on the organization, especially in conservative circles in the countries of the region, UNASUR hosted quite distinct visions of regionalism until 2016 and produced tangible results as a forum for conflict resolution, notably in the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador and the Bolivian separatist conflict, both in 2008. It also served as a space for political dialogue and coordination of positions on infrastructure, social, energy, defense, and health matters (Lima 2013).

The conservative turn marked by the rise to power of right-wing and far-right forces in the region³⁴ created the conditions for the replacement of UNASUR by two forums whose actions resulted in the dismantling of South American integration: the Lima Group³⁵ and PROSUR³⁶ (Forum for the Progress of South America).

In President Lula’s current term, two initiatives to rebuild regional institutionalism were hosted in Brazil in 2023. The meeting of South American presidents in Brasília, which included all South American heads of state and the Peruvian prime minister, and the Summit of the Countries of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) in Belém. Both events aimed to relaunch the integration process. The first left as a legacy the “Brasília Consensus,” a kind of charter of principles for integration, but without any degree of institutionalization. The second allowed the resumption of ACTO’s work after a period of blockage due to a lack of consensus on the replacement of its secretary-general and directors.

In the case of Mercosur, Brazilian actions have focused on protecting the bloc’s common external tariff and preventing its regression from a customs union to a free trade zone, in light of initiatives by some of its members (Uruguay between 2020 and 2024 and Argentina starting in 2024) to pursue extrabloc negotiations in isolation. This has partly justified Brazil’s and President Lula’s efforts to consolidate an offensive external agenda for the bloc, which led to the signing of an agreement with Singapore and the conclusion of negotiations with the European Union. The resurgence of global protectionism also explains the pursuit of agreements with the United Arab Emirates, Canada, Japan, and Vietnam. Brazil settled its debts, amounting to about $99 million, with the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM), allowing the country to execute new projects aimed at physical integration in border areas (Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil 2023a).

Despite these initiatives, the outlook for the resumption of South American institutionalism is even less promising today due to two conjunctural factors: the election of Javier Milei in 2023 and the impasse created in the Venezuelan presidential dispute in July 2024, which led to the severance of ties between the Maduro government and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. This reconfiguration of political forces in South American countries resulted in the crystallization of reciprocal political vetoes to the reconstruction of a common agenda for action at the sub-regional level, with Mercosur and ACTO, or South American level, with the Brasília Consensus and UNASUR.

The challenge for Brazil is to find an agenda for the region that is both realistic about the difficulties of reversing the effects of political polarization in the short term and allows the rearticulation of South American interests. In the absence of collective action spaces, Brazil has acted bilaterally with its neighbors through infrastructure integration projects. Lula’s visits to Guyana, Colombia, Chile, and Bolivia in 2024 had as their central subject the articulation of the five Integration Routes provided for in the Brazilian Infrastructure Program (PAC).

The relationship with China also has a catalytic effect on regional integration. The Asian country has concrete interests but does not have hegemonic ambitions in South America, does not have a significant community in the region, and its objectives are centered on assets related to energy provision, raw materials, and food. Additionally, it does not have history of interference in South American affairs. The expansion of Chinese presence in Venezuela (a frequently cited example by those who fear Chinese “imperialism”) results largely from the vacuum left by the foreign policies of Brazil and the US in recent years, which allowed a regionally encapsulated conflict to become multilateralized.

Even though China’s growing commercial presence has contributed to reducing the participation of Brazilian exports in neighboring countries, Chinese investments in South America have been directed towards opportunities outside traditional extractive areas, especially in infrastructure. Furthermore, the presence of Chinese state-owned companies at the origin of a larger share of capital invested in Brazil and the region makes political dialogue more effective (Menezes and Bragatti 2020). This is particularly relevant in a context of resurgence of US commercial unilateralism, the withdrawal of Brazilian construction and engineering companies, and the discontinuation of BNDES financial support. Articulating the relationship of regional countries with China also helps reinforce the need among regional elites to resume a South American project of international insertion.